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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
This thesis contributes via the concept of e¢ ciency in four distinct
elds of the nancial economics and banking literature: technological
heterogeneity, liquidity creation, protability, and stability of banks.
In Chapter 1 we motivate the analysis by presenting the main de-
velopments that have been taking place in the banking sector as far
as these four elds are concerned and highlight their importance to
the appropriate functioning of the nancial system and of the economy
overall.
In Chapter 2 we address the issue that conventional surveys on
bank e¢ ciency draw conclusions based on the assumption that all banks
in a sample use the same production technology. However, e¢ ciency
estimates can be severely distorted if the existence of unobserved dif-
ferences in technological regimes is not taken into consideration. We
estimate the unobserved heterogeneity in banking technologies using a
latent class stochastic frontier model. In order to arrive at a policy
implication that is valid across time and markets, we present two ap-
plications of the model using separately data from the UK and Greek
banking sector over the periods 1987-2011 and 1993-2011 respectively.
To increase the precision of our inferences, we adopt two distinct em-
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pirical methodologies: a panel data method and a pooled cross-section
modelling strategy. Our results reveal that bank-heterogeneity in both
banking sectors can be controlled for two technological regimes. We
nd a trade-o¤ between the level of sophistication within a nancial
system and its level of aggregate e¢ ciency. Consistency among the
results is established under both methodologies. Further, we propose
a methodology with regard to M&As activity of UK and Greek banks
within a latent class context. We examine numerous potential M&A
scenarios among banks that belong to di¤erent technological regimes,
and we test whether there is a transition of the new banks to a more
e¢ cient technological class resulting from this M&A activity. We nd
strong evidence that newnancial institutions can be better equipped
to withstand potential adverse economic conditions. Finally, we cast
doubt on what the true motivation for M&A activity is and we extract
important policy inferences in terms of social welfare.
In Chapter 3 we introduce the "Cost E¢ ciency - Liquidity Cre-
ation Hypothesis" (CELCH) according to which a rise in a banks cost
e¢ ciency level increases its level of liquidity creation. By employing
a novel stress test scenario under a PVAR methodology, we test the
CELCH and the direction of causality among liquidity creation and
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cost e¢ ciency variables in the UK and Greek banking sector. Moreover
using new measures of liquidity creation (Berger and Bouwman, 2009)
we address the question of whether potential M&As can enhance liquid-
ity creation and create additional credit channels in the economy. We
evaluate and compare the robustness of potential consolidation scenar-
ios by employing half - life measures (Chortareas and Kapetanios 2013).
We show a positive impact of cost e¢ ciency on liquidity creation in line
with CELCH. The empirical evidence further suggests that potential
consolidation activity can enhance the ow of credit in the economy.
Bank shocks seem to be the most persistent on both liquidity creation
and cost e¢ ciency and the UK banking system is found to withstand
more e¤ectively adverse economic conditions. Finally, we cast doubts
on the strategy followed by policy authorities regarding the recent wave
of M&As in the Greek banking sector.
In Chapter 4, we attempt to shed light on the trade-o¤ between
nancial stability and e¢ ciency. We highlight that current tests of
banking e¢ ciency do not take into account whether banksmanagers
are taking too much or too little risk relative to the value maximising
amount. We assume that moving from an intermediary bank type bal-
ance sheet to an investment bank type not only changes the risk-return
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combination of the balance sheet but also increases the banksdegree
of instability, that is the probability of insolvency when adverse ef-
fects occur. To this extent, we propose a new e¢ ciency measure which
incorporates all the aforementioned ambiguous points. An empirical
investigation of US commercial banks between 2003-2012 suggests that
our proposed risk-adjusted index has superior explanatory power with
respect to banksprotability and gives better predictions compared
to conventional banking e¢ ciency measures. This holds after various
robustness checks.
Chapter 5 summarizes the main ndings of all three distinct stud-
ies and concludes by highlighting the importance and the contributing
points of the thesis in the banking and nancial economics literature.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis investigates four distinct concepts in the nancial economics
literature with a special focus on the dominant segment of the nancial
system in all modern economies; i.e., the banking sector. Specically
we explore the technological heterogeneity, the liquidity creation, the
protability and the stability of banks. All these concepts are examined
through a common lense: e¢ ciency. Our motivation is driven by the
fact that the appropriate functioning of various banking systems both
in developed and emerging economies has been severely distorted by
the global nancial turmoil. Consequently, this has a severe impact
on the world-wide nancial stability due to the interconnectedness and
the universal nature of banks which results in the distortion of the real
economy by a¤ecting severely households and rms due to the neuralgic
position of the banking system in all modern economies.
The global nancial turmoil was triggered by banks and as a re-
sult the banking sector was the rst to confront the tremendous conse-
quences of the crisis. The number of bank failures escalated to unpar-
2alleled levels. As a result the two central roles of banks raison detre in
the economy; to transform risk and to supply liquidity, were severely
vitiated. To better understand the major importance of the banking
system in the stability of a country and how any decisions made by the
policy authorities with respect to their viability can a¤ect our every
day lives, lets try to think of a di¤erent industry. For example, if an
automobile or a shoe manufacturer is allowed to fail, then their com-
petitors benet. They take their place in the market, their customers,
and possibly recruit some of their workers and replenish the vacuum.
Thus, no risks arise for the wider economy and consequently there is
no reason for the state to intervene. Conversely, if a bank is allowed
to go bankrupt, competitors do not benet, but on the contrary they
are a¤ected. Fear is created among depositors who rush to withdraw
their money en masse from other banks and at the same time investors
ee the country. The entire structure of the banking sector and the
real economy therefore is threatened to collapse. The impact on the
real economy, liquidity and market, is devastating. Thus, no economy
is able to function without liquidity and banks.
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 spread tremen-
dous contagion e¤ects in the nancial systems throughout the world
and made the need of action both on a bank-level and on a state level
imperative. On one hand we experienced a big wave of bank con-
solidation activity and on the other hand we saw many banks being
recapitalised by the state they belong to. In general, when the latter
occurs it means that the ownership of these banks goes to the gov-
ernment; i.e., the taxpayer. Nevertheless, in some cases we saw that
the state did not have the necessary funds to be able to proceed with
the recapitalization process. This led some countries to seek the as-
sistance of the International Monetary Fund. In addition, world-wide
3supranational institutions responded by committing to important un-
conventional measures and creating mechanisms in order to confront
the severe adverse conditions that the crisis created.
As a result new regulations are established and others are still being
debated to date. The most characteristic ones as far as the former is
concerned are the forthcoming Basel III which introduces the Liquid-
ity Coverage ratio and Net Stable Funding ratio and has as its main
target to increase bank liquidity and decrease bank leverage; Vick-
ers Proposals that suggests to separate retail banking from investment
banking (Ring-fencing) as well as greater capital and loss-absorbing ca-
pacity; the Chartering procedure (screening of proposals to open new
nancial institutions) to prevent the adverse selection problem and the
Examinations procedure (scheduled and unscheduled) to monitor capi-
tal requirements and restrictions on asset holding to prevent the moral
hazard problem (C.A.M.E.L.S). As far as the latter is concerned, we ex-
perience extensive debates mainly in the European Union with regards
to the establishment of a banking Union.
All these regulations and proposals have the three fundamental pre-
requisites that banks should be e¢ cient, should be able to contribute to
the stability of the nancial sector and should contribute to the social
well-being of the real economy. With this in mind this current thesis
is devoted to the exploration of aspects that have a neuralgic role in
these three prerequisites, such as the heterogeneity in the technology of
banks; their ability to create liquidity; the level of their prot e¢ ciency
and how this a¤ects the risk they carry and in extension their solvency
and last but not least the trade-o¤between managerial gains and social
economic prosperity with respect to their actions.
41.1 Outline of the thesis
In Chapter 2 we deal with the fact that surveys of bank e¢ ciency in-
trinsically draw conclusions based on the assumption that all banks in a
sample use the same production technology. Nevertheless, we highlight
that failure in taking account of the existence of unobserved di¤erences
in technological regimes could lead to a severe bias in the estimation of
e¢ ciency by assigning incorrectly these deviations as ine¢ ciency. We
tackle this consideration by estimating the unobserved heterogeneity in
the UK and the Greek banking technologies using a latent class sto-
chastic frontier model. For the sake of persistence with respect to our
extracted inferences, two distinct empirical methodologies are followed:
a pooled cross-section method and a panel data modelling strategy.
A novelty of our study consists of the fact that we examine numerous
potential M&As scenarios among banks that belong to di¤erent techno-
logical regimes, in order to test whether there is a transition of the new
bank to a more e¢ cient technological class resulting from the M&A
activity. We show that bank-heterogeneity can be fully captured by
two di¤erent technological regimes. This holds under both modelling
strategies. Our empirical evidence suggests that improved economic
e¢ ciency in both banking sectors can be the result of specic potential
consolidation activity. This cast doubts on recent specic cases of Greek
M&As that were not found to result in cost e¢ ciency enhancement.
In Chapter 3 we stress the fact that the global nancial crisis dis-
torted one of the primordial functions of banks, i.e., their liquidity
creation. With this in mind we suggest a novel hypothesis, the "Cost
E¢ ciency-Liquidity Creation Hypothesis" that states that "cost e¢ -
ciency" enhancement via banksM&A can create internally both in-
creased liquidity and social well-being surplus. In order to provide an
5empirical framework of our proposed hypothesis we suggest a novel use
of a stress test scenario under a panel vector autoregressive (PVAR)
methodology where we account for a macroeconomic, a nancial and
a bank shock. In this way, we are able to shed light on the direction
of causality among cost e¢ ciency and liquidity creation. Moreover,
we investigate all historical and potential consolidation activity in the
UK and the Greek banking sector with respect to their level of liquid-
ity by using recent measures of liquidity creation (Berger and Bouw-
man, 2009). Finally, we provide an econometric framework to evaluate
and compare the robustness of bank consolidation activity by employ-
ing new half-life measures (Chortareas and Kapetanios 2013). Via our
proposed "Cost E¢ ciency-Liquidity Creation Hypothesis" we provide
strong empirical evidence which reveals that specic potential consol-
idation activity can facilitate the ow of credit in the economy and
at the same time contribute to the social welfare. This is established
through the proposed stress scenario and precisely from the positive
impact of cost e¢ ciency on liquidity creation. Furthermore, we show
that the direction of causality is stronger from liquidity creation to cost
e¢ ciency than the reverse direction. Comparison of the two banking
sectors with respect to their liquidity creation indicates that the UK
banking system is found to be more robust to all three di¤erent shocks.
As far as the Greek banking sector is concerned, the half-life and total
e¤ect results of adverse macroeconomic and bank-specic conditions
highlight that the Greek banking system was more robust with respect
to liquidity creation before its recent systemic formation. This raises
further scepticism over the decisions made by policy authorities and
banksmanagers as far as the recent wave of consolidation activity is
concerned.
Chapter 4 addresses the issue that accustomed tests of banking ef-
6ciency do not take into account the fact the trade-o¤ that might exist
between bankse¢ ciency and stability. To be more precise we argue
that conventional indicators of e¢ ciency do not consider whether bank
managers are taking too much or too little risk relative to the value
maximising amount and consequently do not account on whether this
alters the probability of insolvency when adverse e¤ects occur. To be
able to incorporate all these ambiguous points, we propose a new prot
e¢ ciency index which accounts for two di¤erent types of risks: credit
risk and the risk deriving from excessive leverage. Thus, we are able to
compare the deviation of banking e¢ ciency estimates of our suggested
risk-adjusted index and the conventional index in three di¤erent time
horizons: pre-crisis; during-crisisand post-crisis. Additionally we
examine the explanatory and forecasting power of these two indicators
accounting for an additional di¤erentiation among banks; solvent and
insolvent, both during the crisis and in the aftermath of the crisis. The
empirical evidence highlights that our suggested index shows consid-
erably less deviation of its estimated prot e¢ ciency values among all
di¤erent time horizons when we compare it to the standard prot ef-
ciency indicator. Moreover, we show strong empirical evidence with
respect to the superiority of the risk-adjusted index regarding both its
explanatory and predictive power in contrast to the conventional prot
e¢ ciency measure. This holds in all periods that both indexes are ex-
amined and in all three divisions of the sample: all banks, solvent and
insolvent. Our extracted inferences withstand various robustness tests.
What is remarkable is that when both measures are considered in the
same model the dynamic e¤ects have as a result the conventional index
to become ine¤ective and to create contradictory inferences with re-
spect to fundamental assumptions that characterise the theory of prot
e¢ ciency.
7Finally, chapter 5 draws the conclusion and summarizes the nal
remarks of the thesis.

9Chapter 2
The joint investigation of het-
erogeneous production tech-
nologies and e¢ cient M&A in
the banking sector: Implica-
tions for social welfare in the
era of the nancial crisis.
2.1 Introduction
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E¢ ciency of the banking system is one of the major issues preoccupy-
ing the new monetary and nancial establishment as it is at the heart
of a countrys nancial system. It is generally accepted that e¢ cient
bank operation, which is linked to nancial stability, allows entrepre-
neurs and households to enjoy higher-quality services at lower costs.
Thus, measuring the e¢ ciency of a banking system and analysing the
factors that explain it is very important for the supervisory authori-
ties in order for them to design the regulatory framework and for bank
managements to draw their business plans. It is indeed necessary to
identify the nature of ine¢ ciencies. These can occur due to informa-
tion on the most e¤ective processes not being easily accessible, free,
or perfect. These have a direct impact on the time needed for each
credit institution to respond to changes in environmental or market
conditions. Therefore, the contribution that ine¢ ciencies have on or-
ganizational learning, is not neglegible and constitutes unavoidably an
important source of di¤erences among nancial instututions since they
can create a competitive advantage in the long-run.
Nevertheless, surveys on bank e¢ ciency implicitly draw conclusions
based on the assumption that all banks in a sample use the same pro-
duction technology. Neglecting the existence of unobserved di¤erences
in technological regimes can have distorting e¤ects on e¢ ciency esti-
mates by assigning incorrectly these deviations to ine¢ ciency (Koetter,
Poghosyan 2009). Indeed, nancial institutions in a countrys banking
sector may use di¤erent technologies. It is important to address this is-
sue given the key role that banks have as nancial intermediaries in the
process of transformation from a planned to a market economy regard-
less of the countrys level of sophistication of its banking system. The
aim of the current study is to identify di¤erent technological regimes
within a countrys banking system and more importantly to reveal the
11
classication of each nancial institution to these potential regimes. In
order to amplify the validity of our inferences, we examine two very
di¤erent banking systems in terms of their level of sophistication.
Firstly, we focus our attention on the UK banking system. It can
be characterized as a complex sector with advanced capital market.
Its nancial institutions have expanded their roles beyond their tradi-
tional payment services, intermediation between savers and borrowers,
and insurance against risk function by adopting a more universal type
of banking. The members of the UK banking system are of major im-
portance for public authorities, since they were among the rst credit
institutions to su¤er the impact of the recent global nancial melt-
down. The consequences of the crisis were severe not only for UKs
public nances and capital market, but also for the nancial segments
and public sectors of the geographical areas that UK nancial institu-
tions are interconnected with. This becomes clear, if one looks at the
level of intervention made by the UK government which results in a
total of £ 550 billion, following two bank rescue packages in 2008 and
2009 via the Special Liquidity Schemeand the Bank Recapitalisation
Fund. Additionally, monetary authorities unavoidably had to take ac-
tion and intervened by lowering interest rates to 0.5%, a gure which "
- at the time of writing - " remains unchanged. The Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC) recognizes that the bank rate can not be reduced
any further and in order to give a further monetary stimulus to the
economy, it has undertaken unconventional monetary action. Specif-
ically, the Bank of England (BoE) has committed a total amount of
£ 375 billion to its asset purchasing program (Quantitative Easing) to
date.
The second country of interest is Greece, where the stability of its
simpler banking sector and its role as a nancial intermediary have been
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distorted by the nancial turmoil. Before the onset of the crisis, Greek
banks were unequivocally seen as well managed and prudent, which can
be justied by the fact they didnt experience severe consequences from
the rst wave of the crisis , the Financial Crisiswhich occurred after
the collapse of Lehman Brothers in August 2007. Nevertheless, the
picture changed when the second wave of the global economic crisis,
the Sovereign Debt Crisis, became apparent. As in the case of the
UK, scal authorities intervened and tried to recapitalize Greek banks.
However, that was not enough for the Greek banks to withstand the
augmented and more frequent cracks from the debt crisis, since they
constituted the main holders of the so called toxicgovernment bonds
whose value decreases every day. In turn, the more the increase in the
countrys public debt, the more fragile the nations banks become. Two
rescue bail-out packages were issued which totalled 240 billion euros.
These are part of the two respective memorandums agreed between the
Greek government and the so-called Troika (European Commission,
European Central bank, International Monetary Fund). Consequently,
Greek nancial intermediaries are found to be trapped in the middle
of their countrys turmoil, severed from international lines of credit
and able to borrow only from the European Central Bank and the
International Monetary Fund.
The fundamental di¤erences in the structure and the impact that
the global nancial turmoil had on the two disparate banking systems,
triggered our motivation to conduct an empirical analysis in order to
investigate the existence of any unobserved classication of both coun-
triesnancial intermediaries into distinct technological regimes (i.e.
business models) and identify their main characteristics. Therefore, we
are able to deduce some common policy implications for both UK and
Greece in line with recent debates regarding the creation of a unique
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European banking regulatory framework, the so-called CRD IVpack-
age of the European Banking Authority (EBA).
2.1.1 Developments
At this point, it is interesting to review how these two dissimilar bank-
ing systems evolved.
The post-war period at the 1950s was when the UK monetary
system entered a brand new era of development and innovation. The
banking sector experienced a considerable increase in provincial branch
o¢ ces and introduced the concept of high street banking. At the end
of 1950s, 100 banks provided information to the monetary authorities,
the so-called Radcli¤e Committee, and 16% of them, consisting mainly
of Scottish and London clearing banks accounted for 85% of the whole
sectors assets and more than 30% of UK GDP (Capie 2012). Clear-
ing banks and building societies were the two most important lenders of
the UK economy, with mediocre activities, such as provision of payment
services, deposit-taking activities and short-term corporate lending. By
the end of the 1970s, the two aforementioned categories of credit insti-
tutions experienced a considerable expansion on the asset side of their
balance sheet. A milestone in the evolution of the UK banking sec-
tor during those two decades was the establishment of foreign-owned
banking institutions which were mainly involved in wholesale activity,
reecting in a way the rise of the Eurocurrency market1. Another im-
portant characteristic of the UK banking sector is the demutualization
1 The Eurocurrency market is a money market that provides banking services to
a variety of customers by using foreign currencies located outside of the domestic
marketplace. The concept is not connected with the European Union or the banks
associated with the member countries, although the origins of the concept are heav-
ily derived from the region. Instead, it represents any deposit of foreign currencies
into a domestic bank.
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wave of the mid 1990s. The number of building societies fell sharply
since many of them demutualized and became banks. Albeit the num-
ber of banks almost tripled over the last 30 years, the provision of
retail services was highly concentrated due to a consolidation process
which constituted the concept of the big-four2. The latter part of the
20th century freed competitive forces in the banking system mainly via
1979s Banking Act3 and allowed banks to pursue e¢ ciencies through
functional and geographical expansion due to the implementation of
the rst Basel accord in 1988. The concept of Universal bankingwas
born. To be more precise, after the consolidation and demutualiza-
tion process, the largest nancial institutions in the UK expanded the
variety of services and products they provided. Thus, apart from the
traditional retail type of activities such as deposit taking and lend-
ing, which were captured by the commercialdivision of a Universal
bank, two new divisions were developed as well, the investmentand
the insurancedivision. The former deals with the securitization, and
includes issuing, underwriting and distributing securities, whereas the
latter o¤ers products for individuals to transfer risk from one party to
another for a premium. Initially the concept of Universal banking
was considered to mitigate risk, since it allows the commercial divi-
sion of the bank to diversify into other activity areas and thus reduces
the risk of failure. Nevertheless, the recent nancial turmoil revealed
that some nonbank activities may be more risky than banking activ-
ities since they are able to create nancial distress via the extensive
2 The term big-fourrefers to the largest four UK banking groups: Barclays,
HSBC, Lloyds, RBS.
3 This Act, established the notion of banking supervision and created a two-tier
system of banks and licensed deposit-takers. Albeit, in the beginning barriers to
entry were created by this distinction, in the end UK banking competition was
increased from both foreign banks and non-bank institutions (see Mathews et al.
2007).
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network interconnectivity of large universal nancial institutions. As
a result the Independent Commission on Bankingwas established in
2010 having as its primordial role the consideration of structural and
related non-structural reforms in the UK banking sector in order to
promote nancial stability and competition.
Turning to the Greek banking sector, it has undergone major re-
structuring in recent years which has been highlighted by both aca-
demics and practitioners4. Until the 1980s, the two key characteris-
tics of the Greek banking sector were substantial constraints and ad-
ministrative regulations which reected a high degree of government
intervention. The establishment of the Basel I accord in 1988, the
implementation of common European legislation among the country-
members, the developments in the nancial industry and the need for
enhancement of competitive forces globally among banks constitute the
main reasons that triggered the acceleration of liberalization and dereg-
ulation of the Greek nancial system. The latter trend was initiated
by the adoption of the Second Banking Directive, the establishment
of the single EU market in view of the country joining the European
Monetary Union (EMU), the determination of interest rate liberaliza-
tion, the release of capital movements and the internationalization of
competition. The Greek banking sector also experienced considerable
improvements in terms of communication and computing technology,
as banks expanded and modernized their distribution networks, which
apart from the traditional branches and ATMs, now include alternative
distribution channels such as internet banking. As the Annual Report
of the Bank of Greece (2011) highlights, Greek banks have taken major
steps in recent years towards the annulment of various credit rules, by
4 Pasiouras (2012), provides an excellent survey of the development of the Greek
banking sector.
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introducing credit scoring and probability default models. To compete
in the new nancial landscape, Greek nancial intermediaries expanded
and upgraded their distribution networks, they ameliorated their infor-
mation technology, and they invested in advanced monitoring and risk
management systems. Now, Greek commercial banks are transform-
ing themselves into nancial groups, increasing their o¤-balance sheet
operations and non-interest income as they move towards the model
of universal banking and adding subsidiaries such as insurance com-
panies, brokerages, credit card companies, mutual fund rms, so as to
o¤er additional services. It is worth noting that the whole banking
industry was restructured by two waves of consolidation, one in the
end of the 1990s and one in the beginning of 2010s. The consolida-
tion occured mainly in order to amplify the dominance of individual
banking groups domestically and to create an adequate size for them
to compete in the EU single market. Apart from Cyprus and USA,
the large Greek banks expanded their activities abroad on the wider
market of the South Eastern European region. (e.g. Albania, Bul-
garia, FYROM, Romania, Serbia). This trend signies that at least
before the countrys sovereign-debt crisis occured, Greek banks in the
region had some comparative advantage, of access to capital markets,
and of good understanding of local conditions. Going forward, the per-
formance of the subsidiaries operating abroad is expected to have an
impact on the performance of parent banks and consequently on fu-
ture decisions for further internationalization attempts. On the other
hand, the second wave of mergers and acquisitions was triggered by the
Greek sovereign debt crisis. Specically, Greek banks were cut o¤ from
international markets, faced a large outow of deposits and incurred sig-
nicant losses from the haircut on public debt in the context of Private
Sector Involvement (PSI). These adverse developments signaled that
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the Greek banking system could not continue with its previous struc-
ture in the new era. For this purpose, the Hellenic Financial Stability
Fund (HFSF) was established and in accordance with the European
Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) set the foundations for a series of res-
olutions of certain banking institutions and their acquisitions hereafter
within 2012 and 2013. As a result of the aforementioned consolidation
activity, four systemic banks were created, the so-called four corner-
stones of the Greek Economic recovery. Lastly, the HFSF initiated the
recapitalisation process of the new banking system, in order to boost
the condence of domestic savers and international nancial markets
in Greek banks. Consequently, as it is quoted in the interim report
of the governor of Greeces central bank (Bank of Greece, 2012), both
the restructuring and recapitalization processes will help relieve the liq-
uidity constraints faced by banks, by favourably a¤ecting the inow of
deposits and banksability to regain access to international money and
capital markets.
2.1.2 Literature Review
Denition of E¢ ciency
E¢ ciency from a broad perspective can be viewed as a measure of the
deviation between actual performance and desired performance. Thus,
e¢ ciency must be measured relative to an objective, it can be mea-
sured with respect to maximization of output, maximization of prots,
or minimization of costs. Duality theory can be used to derive the
cost function from the production function, and cost is a component of
prot; hence, the three concepts are not independent. Scale economies,
scope economies, and X-e¢ ciency are di¤erent aspects of performance.
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Scale and scope economies refer to selecting the appropriate outputs,
while X-e¢ ciency refers to selecting the appropriate inputs. Typically,
scale economies refer to how the rms (i.e. a bank) scale of operations
(its size) is related to cost i.e., what percentage increase in costs occurs
with a 1-percent increase in scale. A rm is operating at constant re-
turns to scale if, for a given mix of products, a proportionate increase
in all its outputs would increase its costs by the same proportion; a
rm is operating with scale economies if a proportionate increase in
scale leads to a less than proportionate increase in cost; a rm is oper-
ating with scale diseconomies if a proportionate increase in scale leads
to a more than proportionate increase in cost. Scope economies refer
to how the rms choice of multiple product lines is related to cost. A
rm producing multiple products enjoys scope economies if it is less
costly to produce those products together than it would be to separate
production into specialized rms. X-e¢ ciency measures how produc-
tive the rm is in its use of inputs to create output. If all rms in an
industry are producing the scale and combination of outputs that min-
imize the average cost of production, then the total cost of producing
the industrys output is minimized, and the industry is producing the
e¢ cient combination and level of products, provided each rm is using
its inputs e¢ ciently. Firms that exhibit X-ine¢ ciency are either wast-
ing some of their inputs (technical ine¢ ciency), or are using the wrong
combination of inputs to produce outputs (allocative ine¢ ciency), or
both.
A fundamental decision in measuring nancial institution e¢ ciency
is which concept to use, and the choice will depend on the question
being asked. The concept chosen should be related to economic op-
timization in reaction to market prices and competition, rather than
being based solely on the use of technology. We can ask the question,
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is the rm maximizing the amount of output it produces given its in-
puts or minimizing the amount of inputs it uses to produce a given level
of output i.e., is it operating on its production frontier but that is a
question about technological optimization. This is less interesting from
an economic perspective, since it ignores values. Instead, we would
like to investigate questions of economic optimization. For example, is
the rm minimizing its costs of production given its choice of inputs,
taking input prices as given; is the rm maximizing its prots given its
choice of inputs and outputs, taking input and output prices as given.
The strand of the literature that has received a considerable attention
by researchers focuses on simple objective functions, like output maxi-
mization, cost minimization, or prot maximization, but other studies
acknowledge the fact that the objectives of rm management may di¤er
from these and try to incorporate this into e¢ ciency measurement, or
focus on more market-based denitions of e¢ ciency, e.g., operation on
a risk-return frontier
E¢ ciency in the UK banking sector
Surprisingly, there are considerably fewer studies that investigate the
e¢ ciency of the UK banking system compared to other European and
overseas countries5. The rst study we examine is by Hardwick (1989).
He investigates the scale economies of UK building societies by esti-
mating a translog total cost function jointly with the derived input cost
share equations. He denes total cost to include the interest cost of bor-
rowed funds as well as the operating costs of employing labour and cap-
ital services. In addition to the usual elasticity, he develops three fur-
5 We exclude cross-country studies and we focus only on surveys where UK and
Greece individually are the countries of attention.
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ther scale economy measures: input-specic economies of scale, aug-
mented economies of scaleand augmented input-specic economies of
scale. The results tend to indicate that only modest economies of scale
are present and that they are exhausted at relatively low asset levels.
Hardwick (1990) examines the behaviour of building societiesoperat-
ing costs on the assumption that societies produce just two outputs:
one output supplied to mortgage borrowers and the other supplied to
depositors and shareholders. The results indicate that there are statis-
tically signicant economies of scale for societies with assets of up to
£ 5,500 million so long as the two outputs are expanded proportionally.
He concludes that there exists a clear cost incentive for further growth
among all but the largest building societies: this may have contributed
to the urge to mergewhich has become such an important feature of
the building society industry. Field (1990) uses a cross-section sample
of building societies in 1981, to measure their relative e¢ ciency and to
examine whether the e¢ ciency factor is the driving force behind the
merging of small building societies. His results indicate a wide dispar-
ity in e¢ ciency and he concludes that these di¤erences are not related
to the size of building societies, but rather to managersskill and mo-
tivation. Drake and Howcrof (1994) investigate the relative e¢ ciency
of a UK clearing banks branches using a non-parametric programming
methodology. This technique is utilized to investigate the causes of
observed ine¢ ciency in the case of one illustrative branch example in
detail. Optimal bank branches where deemed to be those which had
total lending of between £ 3 - 5.25m and an average of nine employ-
ees. Altunbas et al. (1995) examine the e¢ ciency and mergers in the
UK (retail) banking market. Their results indicate a high level of ef-
ciency of around 0.90 for the British banks. Drake et al. (1996) use
both a non-parametric and parametric frontier approach to calculate
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the e¢ ciency of U.K. building societies and to compare the empiri-
cal ndings among the two di¤erent modelling strategies. The results
on overall e¢ ciency are contrasted between the approaches. Hardwick
(1997) investigates the cost ine¢ ciency of UK life insurance compa-
nies to identify likely gainers and losers and to examine the e¤ects of
increasing competition on the structure of the UK life insurance indus-
try. He estimates a exible stochastic cost frontier using a sample of
54 companies over ve years. The estimated frontier is then used to
compute measures of economic, scaleand totaline¢ ciency for dif-
ferent company size groups. His results show that, on average, larger
life insurance companies are less ine¢ cient than smaller companies,
but there are substantial variations in the degree of ine¢ ciency within
size groups. Ashton in a working paper (1998) empirically quanties
rm specic distribution freecost e¢ ciency, economies of scale and
economies of scope in the UK building society sector between 1990-
1995. He employs both a exible Fourier and a translog functional form
with an intermediation representation of depository institution produc-
tion. Di¤erences in the performance of these two functional forms are
found. A broad distribution of cost e¢ ciency over the sample period is
observed, with a mean e¢ ciency of 76 % estimated using the exible
Fourier form and a mean e¢ ciency of 72.52 % estimated employing the
translog form. Distinct results for economies of scale are produced with
the two models. Ashton (1998) investigates e¢ ciency characteristics of
the British retail banking using a xed e¤ects model with a translog
specication of productive technology, accounting for both production
and intermediationmodels of bank production. He reports a substan-
tial distribution of cost e¢ ciency in the commercial sector and slight
dis-economies of scale are reported for the intermediationapproach.
Substantial diseconomies of scale are also recorded for the production
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approach. In the end he argues that a substantial dispersion of cost
e¢ ciency is observed for this sector with both model specications.
The same author in (2001) measures distribution-free cost e¢ ciency,
economies of scale, economies of scope and cost complementarities of
the British retail-banking sector by employing a one way xed e¤ects
model with a translog specication of productive technology. The re-
sults derived by both productionand intermediationmodels of bank
production indicate an increasing and a low level of dispersion of cost
e¢ ciency among these spesications. Drake (2001) investigates relative
e¢ ciencies and productivity change in the UK banking Industry using
a data sample covering the main UK banks over the period 1984-1995.
He uses the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and nds important
insights into the size-e¢ ciency relationship in UK banking. Drake and
Simper (2002), analyse the scale e¢ ciency of UK building societies by
an advanced entry/exit model. They nd that there is considerable
divergence across building societies in levels of scale e¢ ciency and in
technological change during the sample period 19921997. Further the
paper nds that scale economies and technological change estimates
are dependent on whether the econometrician balances a panel data
set or utilises the entry/exit model specication. They conclude that
scale economies in UK building societies are found to be more signif-
icant and more pervasive than in previous studies. Drake and Simper
2003 analyse the changing e¢ ciency, technological change and compet-
itive market structure of the major retail stock (plc) banks and mutual
building societies in the UK. The results indicate that the relative per-
formance of the three sets of institutions (banks, building societies and
converters) varies considerably over the sample period, and that the
plc. conversion process appears to confer only a temporary benet (in
terms of relative performance) on converting mutual building societies.
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Additionally, they provide empirical evidence that the major retail -
nancial institutions in the UK can be characterized as operating within
a monopolistically competitive market structure.
Webb (2003) investigates the relative e¢ ciency levels of large UK
retail banks during the period of transition 19821995 by using DEA
window analysis. He nds that for the entire sample the mean ine¢ -
ciency levels are low in comparison to past studies and that the overall
long run average e¢ ciency trend is falling. Moreover he notes, that
scale ine¢ ciencies dominate pure technical ine¢ ciencies, smaller banks
are more likely to report technical ine¢ ciency and that during the 1990s
banks with asset levels over £ 105bn su¤ered decreasing returns to scale.
Kosmidou et al. (2006) employ the PAIRCLAS multicriteria method-
ology to investigate the performance of UK small and large banks over
multiple criteria, such as asset quality, capital adequacy, liquidity and
e¢ ciency/protability. Their results indicate that small banks exhibit
higher overall performance compared to large ones and that the ra-
tios used in the study contribute signicantly to the discrimination
between large and small banks. Matthews et al. (2007) report an em-
pirical assessment of competitive conditions among the major British
banks, during a period of major structural change. By measuring com-
petition by the RossePanzar H-statistic for a panel of 12 banks for
the period 19802004, they nd that competition in British banking is
most accurately characterised by the theoretical model of monopolistic
competition. Additionally, they note competition appears to have be-
come less intense in the non-core (o¤-balance sheet) business of British
banks. Ashton et al. (2007) provide an empirical assessment of the
e¢ ciency and interest rate changes occurring during 61 UK retail bank
mergers. They mention as key ndings the general e¢ ciency enhancing
inuence of UK bank mergers and the limited e¤ect of mergers on retail
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interest rates. Tanna et al. (2011) use data envelopment analysis to
estimate several measures of the e¢ ciency of banks, and then use panel
data regressions to investigate the impact of board structure on e¢ -
ciency. They provide evidence of a positive association between board
size and e¢ ciency, although this is not robust across all their speci-
cations. Board composition, by contrast, has a robustly signicant
and positive impact on all measures of e¢ ciency. Finally , Xiang et al.
(2011), employ a mixed two-stage approach to estimate and explain dif-
ferences in the cross-country e¢ ciency of ten Australian, ve UK and
eight Canadian banks over the period 1988 to 2008 using stochastic
distance, cost and prot frontiers. Their empirical evidence indicates
that Australian banks exhibit superior e¢ ciency compared with their
Canadian and UK counterparts. Additionally they mention that key
factors that a¤ect e¢ ciency positively consist of the level of intangible
assets and the loans-to-deposits and loans-to-assets ratios. On the con-
trary, bank size, the ratios of loan loss provisions-to-total loans and the
debt-to-equity ratio constitute the factors that are negatively correlated
with e¢ ciency.
E¢ ciency in the Greek banking sector
Turning to studies that examine the e¢ ciency of the Greek banking
system, we provide an overview of the scope and the main inferences
of a representative sample of them. An econometric approach for the
rst time was employed by Karafolas and Mantakas (1996). The au-
thors use a second-order translog cost function to estimate the costs
in the Greek banking sector and investigate economies of scale. Using
data for eleven commercial banks from the period 1980 to 1989, they
nd that although operating-cost scale economies do exist, total cost
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scale economies are not present. Finally, their ndings indicate that
on average, Greek banks should increase their size to be able to exploit
fully the benets of economies of scale. Noulas (1997) examines the
productivity growth of ten private and ten state banks operating in
Greece during 1991 and 1992. He follows the intermediation approach
and DEA method to measure e¢ ciency. The results derived from the
estimation of the Malmquist productivity index indicate that the Greek
banking sector seems to have experienced an increase of productivity
by about 8 per cent, with state banks obtaining higher productivity
growth than private banks. The results also indicate that the sources
of this growth di¤er across the two types of banks. State banksproduc-
tivity growth is a result of technological progress, while private banks
growth is a result of increased e¢ ciency. Christopoulos and Tsionas
(2001) estimate the e¢ ciency in the Greek commercial banking sec-
tor over the period 19931998 using homoscedastic and heteroscedastic
parametric stochastic frontiers. The authors nd an average technical
ine¢ ciency about 20 per cent for the heteroscedastic model and 17 per
cent for the homoscedastic one. They report that technical and al-
locative ine¢ ciency decreases over time for both large and small banks
implying that there is room for amelioration. Spathis et al. (2002)
use a multicriteria methodology to investigate both the di¤erences in
protability and e¢ ciency between small and large Greek banks and
the factors of protability and operation related to the size of banks.
Their empirical evidence indicates that large banks are more e¢ cient
than small ones. Christopoulos, et al. (2002) examine the same sam-
ple with a multi-input, multi-output exible cost function to represent
the technology of the sector and a heteroscedastic frontier approach to
measure technical e¢ ciency. They nd that small and medium-sized
banks are almost fully e¢ cient, while in large banks e¢ ciency measures
26
range from 60 per cent to 95 per cent. They also report that invest-
ments, bank loans and economic performance are positively related to
cost e¢ ciency. In a later study, Tsionas et al. (2003) use the same sam-
ple as in Christopoulos and Tsionas (2001) and in Christopoulos et al.
(2002) but employ DEA to measure technical and allocative e¢ ciency,
and the Malmquist total factor productivity approach to measure pro-
ductivity change. The results indicate that most of the banks operate
close to the best market practices with overall e¢ ciency around 98 per
cent and that larger banks seem to be more e¢ cient relative to smaller
institutions. The Malmquist index indicates that an increase by 3.8
per cent in total factor productivity occurred over the period and tech-
nical ine¢ ciency seems to play a less important role than allocative
e¢ ciency. Halkos and Salamouris (2004) also use DEA but in contrast
to previous studies, the authors include a number of nancial e¢ ciency
ratios as output measures in the DEA model to calculate the e¢ ciency
for a sample of Greek commercial banks. The results indicate a wide
variation in average e¢ ciency over the period 19971999, and a positive
relationship between size and e¢ ciency. They also report an increase in
banksprotability which is mainly due to their accession in the Athens
Stock Exchange Market instead of conventional banking activities.
Apergis and Rezitis (2004) specify a translog cost function to analyse
the cost structure of the Greek banking sector, the rate of technical
change and the rate of growth in total factor productivity. Their dataset
consists of four state and two private Greek banks for the period 1982
97. Overall, their ndings show signicant economies of scale, implying
that Greek banks could improve their cost e¢ ciency levels by engag-
ing in activities such as mergers and acquisitions. They use both the
intermediation and the production approach and both models indicate
signicant economies of scale and negative annual rates of growth in
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technical change and in total factor productivity. Athanasoglou and
Brissimis (2004) study the impact of recent mergers and acquisitions
(M&As) on the cost and prot e¢ ciency of banks in Greece. They
apply three methods: (i) analysis of developments in certain cost and
prot indicators and their dispersion for bank groups according to their
size; (ii) calculation of cost and prot ine¢ ciency (relative to the best
performer); and (iii) analysis of individual cases of M&As in terms of
changes in bank costs and protability relative to banks not involved
in M&As. Additionally, the paper assesses the existence of economies
of scale and the extent to which they are exploited through M&As.
Their empirical results indicate that M&As, in particular those involv-
ing small banks, had a positive e¤ect on cost and prot e¢ ciency and
that scope exists for further improvement in e¢ ciency. Also, M&As
helped large banks to exploit economies of scale, which previously were
found in small to medium- sized banks. Rezitis (2006) measures e¢ -
ciency and productivity for the Greek banking sector over a relatively
long time period: 198297. He uses the same dataset but employs
the Malmquist productivity index and DEA to measure and decom-
pose productivity growth and technical e¢ ciency, respectively. He also
compares two sub-periods 198292 and 199397 in order to test the
e¤ects, if any, of intense deregulation and liberalization after 1992, and
employs Tobit regression to explain the di¤erences in e¢ ciency among
banks. The results indicate that the average level of overall technical
e¢ ciency is 91.3 per cent, while productivity growth increased on av-
erage by 2.4 per cent over the entire period. The productivity growth
is attributed mainly to intense competition and to the international-
ization process that characterized the Greek banking sector over the
second half of the 1990s. The same author (Rezitis 2008) investigates
the e¤ect of acquisition activity on the e¢ ciency and total factor pro-
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ductivity of Greek banks. The empirical evidence indicates that the
e¤ects of mergers and acquisition on technical e¢ ciency and total fac-
tor productivity growth of Greek banks are rather negative. Pasiouras
(2008) uses the DEA method to examine technical e¢ ciency and scale
e¢ ciency in the period 2000-2004. Besides traditional variables used in
similar studies, he also analyses the e¤ects on e¢ ciency of banksexpo-
sure to credit risk and to o¤-balance sheet items risk. According to his
ndings, taking account of credit risk increases Greek bankse¢ ciency,
while banks with activities abroad record higher e¢ ciency. Moreover,
technical e¢ ciency appears to be more important than scale e¢ ciency,
although only slightly more so. Finally, Greek bankse¢ ciency seems
to depend positively on each banks capitalization, the level of loans
and market share. Pasiouras et al. (2008) examine the association be-
tween the e¢ ciency of Greek banks and their share price performance.
Their empirical evidence indicates a positive and statistically signicant
relationship between annual changes in technical e¢ ciency and stock
return. Floros and Giordani (2008b) investigate the contribution of the
number of ATMs by modelling and estimating banking e¢ ciency. They
show that large banks are more e¢ cient than medium and small sized
banks and banks with a large number of ATMs are more e¢ cient than
those with a fewer number of ATMs. They note as well that the pro-
vision of e-banking services by banks does not inuence their e¢ ciency
scores.
Asimakopoulos et al. (2008) use the DEA method by employing
prot and loss data in a sample of Greek banks in the years 1994 to 2006.
Their results show an improvement over time, attributable mainly to
the rise in allocative e¢ ciency. Larger and smaller banks appear to
be more e¢ cient than medium sized banks, and, on average, banks
targeted for acquisition exhibit lower e¢ ciency than the rest. More-
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over, a positive relation with e¢ ciency is found for determinants such
as the bankscapital adequacy, protability, and loan portfolio quality.
Giokas (2008a) explores the e¢ ciency of bank branches and nds that
there is a scope for substantial e¢ ciency improvements (average ine¢ -
ciency of 12%) which can generate a substantial increase in prot for
the bank. In Giokas (2008b) his results show an average e¢ ciency of
75 % and that rural branches tend on average to be more e¢ cient than
urban branches. Gaganis et al. (2009) use data envelopment analy-
sis to explore the e¢ ciency and productivity of the 458 branches of a
Greek commercial bank. The authors then use xed and random ef-
fects models to determine the impact of internal and external factors
on the e¢ ciency and productivity scores. The results indicate that the
branches in the sample could have achieved improved overall perfor-
mance during 2002-2005. Gaganis and Pasiouras (2009) estimate an
input oriented DEA model under variable returns to scale, with inputs
and outputs selected on the basis of a prot-oriented approach for the
period 1999-2004. They nd that the average pure technical e¢ ciency
during 19992004 was 0.7325 indicating that banks in Greece could im-
prove their e¢ ciency by 26.75%. Over the same period, scale e¢ ciency
was between 0.58 and 0.87 with an average equal to 0.68. Chortareas et
al. 2009 provide a characterization of the Greek banking systems e¢ -
ciency and productivity under the new environment that the Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU) participation implies. They consider cost
and prot e¢ ciency as well as productivity change of commercial banks
using the nonparametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) Malmquist Index in the period 1998-
2003. Their ndings suggest that cost e¢ ciency has risen by 4.3% over
the 6 years under study. Moreover, they note that Greek banks seem
to enjoy relatively high prot e¢ ciency (on average 75%) showing an
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increase by 93% over 1998-2003. Similarly, productivity seems to have
risen by 15% and this is mainly driven by the improvements in the
performance of best-practice institutions. Finally, their results do not
show any role for OBS activities in Greek bankse¢ ciency. Chatzoglou
et al. (2010) in a sample of Greek banks from 2004 to 2006 use DEA by
constructing output measures by standard ratio measures of bank nan-
cial performance in combination with e¢ ciency analysis. Their ndings
indicated that Greek banking e¢ ciency remains relatively stable and
on average big banks perform better than medium and small banks.
Siriopoulos and Tziogkidis (2010), examine the reaction of banking in-
stitutions after signicant events such as M&As, privatizations and the
crisis of the Athens Stock Exchange in 1999. Their results from a DEA
modelling strategy suggest that the Greek banking sector operates e¢ -
ciently on average during the destabilization periods. In the following
year, Pasiouras et al. (2011), assess the cost e¢ ciency of the Greek
cooperative banks over the period 20002005, where rst they use a
DEA approach and in a second stage, they use a bootstrapping cen-
sored (Tobit) regression. The DEA results suggest that there is room
for Cooperative banks to improve their cost e¢ ciency, specically the
allocative one. Additionally, albeit not robust across other e¢ ciency
measures, they nd that bank total assets and the equity to assets ratio,
as well as the GDP per capita and the unemployment rate in the region
are the main factors that inuence e¢ ciency. Liargovas and Repousis
(2011) examine the impact of mergers and acquisitions on the perfor-
mance of Greek banking sector over the period 1996-2009, by using two
approaches; event study methodology and operating performance. The
results from the event study methodology, using a 30-day event window
indicate that stock prices show signicant positive cumulative average
abnormal returns (CAARs) before the announcement for a period of
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ten days (for targets and bidders banks). As far as the operating per-
formance is concerned, the results indicate that it does not improve
following mergers and acquisitions while there are controversial results
when comparing merged banks with the group of non-merging banks.
Our study di¤ers from the above which focus on the UK and Greek
nancial sector in that it adds insights in several respects, as discussed
below. A main novelty of this study is that, it is the rst empirical ap-
plication that attempts to examine the strand of technological hetero-
geneity in two completely di¤erent in terms of "sophistication, market
characteristics and volume of transactions" banking systems, the UK
and the Greek one". An additional contribution is the strategy we fol-
low in our examination. In this respect we estimate, separately for each
country, a stochastic production frontier using a latent class modelling
approach. To the best of our knowledge this is the rst study in both
banking systems to apply a latent class stochastic frontier model. Fur-
thermore, this is the rst time in the literature of latent class stochas-
tic frontier studies that two countries are being investigated separately
and not jointly. This is of major importance and in what follows we
explain the intuition behind it. The primordial reason which motivates
our approach is the fact that disdaining the tremendous di¤erences in
regulation, in supervision, in size and generally in market conditions
and including both countries in the same sample assuming that they
are homogeneous, would create a large scale bias in our estimates and
consequently no robust inferences could be extracted. The reasoning
behind this lies in two arguments. The rst one lies to the theory of the
stochastic frontier, which assumes that the best-practice bank lies on
the frontier and consequently constitutes the benchmark against which
the performance of any other nancial institution in the sample is com-
pared. Nonetheless, each banks strategic decisions within each country
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are inuenced by local characteristics and environment (i.e. competi-
tion, market concentration, regulatory framework). Thus, it becomes
inappropriate to group together banks from di¤erent countries. The
second reasoning which leads to the di¤erentiation of our paper from
the bulk of all previous studies in the literature of heterogeneity and
latent class modelling (see Barros et. al 2007) , is based on the fun-
damental misconception, that extracting inferences and attempting to
implement a common policy based on a sample of banks coming not
only from di¤erent countries but from di¤erent in nature activities can
be inappropriately labelled as homogeneous common frontier. Thus,
we argue, that any attempt to formulate a common policy implication
in the area of heterogeneity, by denition requires an empirical mod-
elling based on di¤erent bank-types and on di¤erent countries. Only in
this way a researcher can be sure that he/she measures accurately the
impact of di¤erent in nature banks in each of the di¤erent country they
belong to (see Berger 2007). In turn, at rst we identify the impacts
that each di¤erent technological regime of banks has on the country
that it belongs to and then based on this we exploit the similarities
among the same technological regimes across the countries under in-
vestigation. In this way, we increase our certainty regarding a common
policy perspective (i.e. Basel III), since we capture in the most accu-
rate way any deviation deriving not only from heterogeneity in banks
activities, but from heterogeneity in bankscountry characteristics as
well. We must highlight here another di¤erentiation of our study from
the literature of latent class stochastic frontier and specically in the
area of banking from all the previous studies as far as our knowledge
goes. We follow two di¤erent modelling strategies in order to maximize
the precision of our estimates. To be more precise, we adopt both a
panel data nature methodology (Orea and Kumbhakar 2004) which al-
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lows the e¢ ciency term to vary every year and a pooled cross-section
methodology (Bos et al. 2010) which permits each nancial institu-
tion to switch between technology regimes over time. In this way we
amplify considerably the robustness of our empirical evidence. Both
strategies are compared with a model which assumes that technology
is the same for all banks which we use as our baseline specication.
It should be highlighted that in addition to our alternative modelling
strategies, we perform various additional robustness checks, in order to
ensure the applicability of our policy recommendations across a wide
range of models. Also we provide a di¤erent length for our sample, since
the period that we cover is the largest one compared to all the previous
studies that have been compiled for the UK and Greek banking sector.
The reason this is important is that our sample-period captures all the
fundamental developments such as deregulation, nancial liberalization
and of course the recent global nancial turmoil. Therefore it allows
us to see the e¤ects of both growth and recession periods in economic
activity. Another contribution of major importance is that in contrast
with all the previous empirical banking studies in both countries that
focus specically on one type of nancial intermediary, we account for
all the credit institutions of both banking systems. Thus, we are able
to extract accurate inferences with crucial policy implications for the
entire banking system instead of providing an ad hoc generalization of
the results.
Lastly, we propose a new methodology in the spectrum of mergers
and acquisitions (M&A). Our motivation comes from the big changes
that have been taking place since the summer of 2012 until present
in the Greek banking sector. To this e¤ect, we try to shed light on
the aspect of existing and potential mergers and acquisitions of UK
and Greek banks in order to examine from an e¢ ciency point of view
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whether the creation of the new bank would move to the most e¢ cient
technological regime. We also study whether this would increase the
scores of the total factor productivity of the industry which would result
in larger social welfare. Our main contribution are: Firstly, to provide
for the rst time an econometric method to evaluate and compare the
e¢ ciency gains or losses of a potential M&A activity. Secondly, to be
able to extract unbiased inferences. This has major policy implica-
tions regarding the constant debate about the true origins of a M&A
activity in terms of promoting the social welfare or rather manager-
ial incentives. The latter is of extreme importance for policy makers
and practitioners, since after the onset of the global nancial turmoil
we have witnessed numerous cases of banksM&As world-widely and
there are daily speculations about new ones, regardless of whether those
nancial institutions are labelled in terms of specialization as, commer-
cial, saving, co-operative, real estate & mortgage bank or something
else. With this in mind we investigate all the possible combinations of
mergers and acquisitions that could occur in the two banking sectors.
Several important and interesting implications can be drawn from
our empirical analysis. First in line with Orea and Kumbhakar (2004),
we show that single-frontier methods employed in previous studies re-
sult in a downward-bias of e¢ ciency estimates, since technological dif-
ferences are inappropriately labelled as ine¢ ciency. More specically
bank heterogeneity in both banking markets can be controlled when
a model with two classes is estimated. This decision is supported by
the AIC and BIC criterion and it comes in line with the notion that
e¢ ciency increases as the number of technological regimes increases. In
both countries the nancial institutions that belong to the rst tech-
nological regime, which are well capitalised, possess a superior man-
agement in both credit and liquidity risk and seem to be the most
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e¢ cient. Overall, the same picture is drawn when we adopt Bos et al.
2010 pooled cross-section methodology. Its noteworthy that in both
countries all the credit institutions that are classied as being in the
rst of our two technological regimes on average earn higher rents and
o¤er a broader variety of products and services. In line with Casu
and Girardone (2006) we nd that a less sophisticated banking sys-
tem allows Greek banks to exercise higher e¢ ciency levels compared
to the UK ones, signalling a trade-o¤ between complexity of services
and products and aggregate e¢ ciency. Additionally, we nd evidence
of increasing returns to scale for the nancial institutions that belong
to the second class of both countries. Nevertheless, statistical support
in favour of technical progress can be associated with the UK banking
sector as it seems to be rather mediocre for the Greek banks. Finally,
we provide insight in favour of the "ring-fencing" strategy proposed by
the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB). All these conclusions
remain unchanged after we impose various robustness tests.
As far as the aspect of recent and potential M&A in the Greek
and UK banking sector is concerned, important policy implications
can be extracted. Regarding the Greek banking sector, we cast some
serious doubts on the recent wave of consolidation and its true origins
of motivation which had rather a managerial scope instead of a social
economic well-being. To this extent we present empirical evidence for
the deterioration of e¢ ciency in two of the four cornerstones which
have been assigned to the recovery of the Greek economy as a result
of their consolidation. Regarding prospective attempts of consolidation
among the two banking sectors, we conclude that there are signicant
economies of scale regarding the smaller in size nancial institutions in
both countries. Furthermore, regarding the banking institutions that
belong to the second class of both countries we argue that potentially
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higher e¢ ciency could be achieved as result of future M&A activity
among them. In turn, we argue that the newnancial institutions can
be better equipped to withstand potential adverse economic conditions
and crucial oscillations in a future nancial crisis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 o¤ers
a background of the stochastic frontier analysis and methods to ac-
count for heterogeneous productions technologies. Section 2.3 provides
an overview of the theoretical framework and presents the empirical
model. Section 2.4, provides a brief overview of the main developments
of each country within its respective sample period and describes the
data. Section 2.5 presents and discusses the empirical evidence of ap-
plying the models to the UK and Greek banking sectors. In addition, it
provides robustness tests and displays ndings regarding the proposed
methodology of recent and potential M&A activity in both banking
systems. Some conclusions and insights for future research are o¤ered
in the nal section.
2.2 Stochastic Frontier Analysis
Investigating the literature of e¢ ciency measurement, it is evident that
stochastic production (or economic) frontier functions have been in-
creasingly used in order to measure e¢ ciency of individual producers.
Notably they seem to dominate parametric approaches (Kumbhakar
and Lovell, 2000). Particularly, the Stochastic Frontier Approach
(SFA) separates ine¢ ciencies from random noise; however it needs as
a prerequisite an a priori assumption on the error term. The alter-
native parametric techniques, such as the Distribution Free Approach
(DFA) (Berger 1993) and the Thick Frontier Approach (TFA) (Berger
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and Humphrey 1991), may require less structure on the error term,
but they impose an assumption of constant core ine¢ ciency or do not
present bank specic-point estimates. On the contrary, non-parametric
techniques, while they do not impose any assumption on the error term,
they do not take into consideration the random noise and in addition
they have an extreme sensitivity to outliers. In the present study, fol-
lowing several earlier and recent as well empirical works we use SFA to
estimate the e¢ ciency of banks (Kumbhakar 1990 & 1997, Resti 1997
and Fiordelisi, Ibanez, Molyneux 2011).
The Stochastic frontier production function was independently pro-
posed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), Battese and Corra (1977)
and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) and it was applied to banking
by Ferrier and Lovell (1990). It takes the following general form:
y = 
0
x+ v   u (2.2.1)
where y is the observed outcome (goal attainment), 
0
x + v is the
optimal frontier goal followed by the individual, 
0
x is the deterministic
part of the frontier and v is the stochastic part. Stochastic frontier is
created if we combine these two parts. The aggregate amount of devi-
ation from the optimum which lies on the frontier is what constitutes
u.
Economic representations of production technology include cost,
revenue and prot frontiers. These economic frontiers are then used as
standards against which to measure cost, revenue and prot e¢ ciency.
As described by Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) a cost stochastic frontier
takes the form:
c (yi; wi; ) (2.2.2)
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and can be written as
Ci  c (yi; wi; )  exp fvig , (2.2.3)
where c (yi; wi; )  exp fvig is the stochastic frontier. In the same spirit
as before the stochastic cost frontier consists of two part: the c (yi; wi; )
part which is the deterministic kernel and is the same to all producers
and the exp fvig part which is unique to each producer and captures
the e¤ects of random shocks to each producer. To be more specic, 
is a vector of technology parameters to be estimated, yi and wi indicate
vectors of outputs and inputs prices respectively and vi is a producer
specic random disturbance. The measure of cost e¢ ciency is then
CEi =
c (yi; wi; )  exp fvig
Ci
. (2.2.4)
This is the ratio of the minimum possible cost, given vi, to actual total
cost. If Ci = c (yi; wi; )  exp fvig, then the rm i is fully e¢ cient and
CEi = 1. Otherwise actual cost exceeds the minimum so 0  CEi  1:
A number of di¤erent functional forms are used in the literature to
model production functions such as Cobb-Douglas which is log linear
in outputs and inputs, the Translog function which is a generalization
of a Cobb-Douglas function, a Quadratic in inputs function and a Nor-
malised quadratic function. The rst two are the most widely used
in the literature. Assuming that the stochastic cost frontier follows a
Cobb-Douglas function its log form representation can be written as
ln Ci  ln c (y; wi) + vi (2.2.5)
= ln c (y; wi) + ui + vi
where (ui) is a nonnegative ine¢ ciency component. Cost e¢ ciency is
then CEi = exp f uig. Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) assume
vi  N [0; 2 ] and ui  N [0+; 2u]. In addition to the half-normal
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assumption for ui, other one sided-distributions have been used in-
cluding the truncated -normal, where ui  iid N [; 2u] introduced by
Stevenson (1980), the exponential where ui  iid exp onetial intro-
duced by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) as well as Meeusen and
van den Broeck (1977), and gamma where ui  iid gamma introduced
by Greene (1980 a,b) and Stevenson (1980).
2.2.1 Methods to account for heterogeneous pro-
duction technologies
Estimation of a stochastic frontier cost function imposes a strong as-
sumption that the underlying production technology is common to all
producers. Neglecting the existence of di¤erent technologies in bank-
ing can contaminate e¢ ciency, market power, and other performance
measures. An important drawback of the homogeneous technological
regime assumption is that it imposes restrictions on certain important
characteristics of banking technology, such as technical progress and
scale economies. That is the estimate of the underlying technology
may be biased. Hence, unobserved technological di¤erences are not
taken into account during the estimation procedure and consequently
the e¤ects of these omitted unobserved technological di¤erences might
be inappropriately labelled as ine¢ ciency.
Despite the on-going harmonization of regulation, very di¤erent
banks continue to exist side by side. In the literature of bank e¢ ciency
we can identify two types of systematic di¤erences across and within
national banking markets. The rst type of heterogeneity refers to the
environment in which banks operate, which is exogenous to managers.
Conditional on environmental di¤erences, banks may employ di¤erent
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business models (retail versus wholesales) that require di¤erent inter-
mediation technologies. The second type of systematic di¤erences refers
to managerial choices, especially those related to risk management, i.e.
whether the bank manager takes too much or too little risk with re-
spect to the value maximising amount, which a¤ect the banking rms
e¢ ciency (Kauko 2009). This second type of heterogeneity is identi-
ed as endogenous to managers and inuences the ability to attain the
optimum benchmark rather than the shape of the e¢ cient frontier. In
this specic framework we will use methods in the context of SFA in
order to account for heterogeneous technologies in the banking system.
There are several approaches that can be employed to capture tech-
nological di¤erences. One approach is the one introduced by Hayami
and Ruttan (1970) which, based on the notion of the metafrontier,
emanates from the metaproduction function. This approach still re-
mains an extremely ambiguous notion, due to the fact that it is not
conducive to the understanding of the marginal contribution of the dif-
ferent elements of environmental factors that might shed light on the
di¤erences in bank e¢ ciency. Another approach is to include country-
specic environmental variables that are likely to inuence technologies
of banks, such as the level of economic development and institutional
background, as additional explanatory variables in the frontier (Bonin
et.al 2005, Berger 2007). The main disadvantage of this approach is
that the introduction of the environmental variables only a¤ects the
intercept of the frontier specication, leaving the slope una¤ected (Bos
and Schmiedel 2007). Another drawback of this approach is that tech-
nological di¤erences are assumed to be country-specic, which rules
out the possibility that banks located within the same country may
employ di¤erent business models (Koetter and Poghosyan 2009). An
alternative approach that attempts to relieve the impact of technologi-
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cal di¤erences is a priori sample separation. The sample separation can
be based, for instance on the organizational structure of banks Mester
1993; Altunbas et al. (2001), or their geographical location (Mester
1996; Bos and Schmiedel 2007; Claessens et.al 2001). In this approach
the main disadvantage is that a priori restriction of sample separation is
to some extent arbitrary. For instance, Koetter and Poghosyan (2009)
show that even banks having similar organizational structure can op-
erate under di¤erent technological regimes.
2.3 Theoretical Framework-Latent Class
Stochastic Frontier Model
In this study, we account for di¤erences in technological regimes us-
ing a latent class stochastic frontier model (LCSFM), which addresses
the disadvantages associated with the aforementioned alternative ap-
proaches. Unlike the rst of these approaches, the impact of the envi-
ronmental factors is not only reected in the magnitude of the inter-
cepts, but also a¤ects the slope coe¢ cients. Hence, we can have two
di¤erent impacts on the stochastic frontier. First we may have paral-
lel shifts of the frontier and second we may have systematic di¤erent
deviations from the frontier. Specically, the environmental variables
enter as latent class determinants rather than as a part of the frontier
and thus inuence both estimates of the technological regime of banks
and their cost e¢ ciency simultaneously. Unlike the second approach
described in the previous section, the latent class method does not re-
quire a priori grouping of banks. Instead, it utilizes all information
available in the sample and identies separate technological regimes
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based on the maximum likelihood principle. There are some notable
contributions in the literature that combine mixed latent class princi-
ples with the SFA. One strand of the literature consists of a Bayesian
approach in allocating rms to di¤erent technological regimes. To be
more precise Tsionas and Kumbhakar (2004) propose a stochastic fron-
tier production function augmented with a Markov switching structure
to account for di¤erent technology parameters across heterogeneous
countries. Another strand lies in the principles of Maximum Likeli-
hood approach. Specically, Greene (2002) proposes a maximum like-
lihood LCSFM using sample separation information and allowing for
more than two classes. Another noteworthy study as well the study is
Gaudill (2003)6 who proposes an expectation-maximization (EM) algo-
rithm and without having sample separation information, he estimates
a combination of two stochastic cost frontiers (see Greene 2001). Both
of the previous studies do not allow to the e¢ ciency term to vary every
year, which is an important drawback when we conduct productivity
growth studies. This obstacle is surmounted in our analysis, as we use
panel data LCSFM for the estimation of our latent class e¢ ciency de-
terminants. This is an approach employed in banking studies by Orea
and Kumbhakar (2004), Koetter and Poghosyan (2009) and Poghosyan
and Kumbhakar (2010). These three studies assume that every bank in
the sample remains in the same technological regime for all the years it
operates (Bos et al. 2010). Due to these methodological issues a novelty
of our study is that it uses two methodologies proposed in the litera-
ture. Firstly, we apply the one showed by Orea and Kumbhakar (2004)
which allows for a time-varying e¢ ciency term. Secondly, as a robust-
ness check of our estimates we apply the methodology followed by Bos
6 In addition see, Beard et al. (1997), for studies which use a non-frontier
approach.
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et al (2010), which permits the nancial institution to be in one regime
a specic year and in another regime the year after. Thus, the rst
methodology adopts a panel nature whereas the second one treats the
data set as a pooled cross-section. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the rst time in the latent class stochastic frontier literature that both
models would be applied in order to answer the same research question.
Thus, we manage to surmount several modelling limitations and we are
able to produce both the most accurate comparison and inferences.
In the determination of e¢ ciency, the technology of banks belong-
ing to each class (i.e. technological regime) must be modelled. Fol-
lowing Orea and Kumbhakar (2004), we assume that the technology is
represented by a cost function. This may be written for class k as
lnCit = lnC(yit; wit; t ; k) + uitjk + vitjk; (2.3.1)
where subscripts i = 1; ::::N , t = 1; ::::; Ti and k = 1; :::; K; stand for
bank, time and class respectively. Cit is individual bank total cost; yit
and wit indicate vectors of output and input prices; k is a class-specic
vector of parameters to be estimated. The two-sided random error term
vitjk is assumed to be independent of the non-negative cost e¢ ciency
variable uitjk for each class. Here the technology is represented by a
dual cost function.
To estimate the model using maximum likelihood we assume that
the random error term for class k; vitjk, follows a normal distribution
with zero mean and constant variance, 2vk: and the non-negative inef-
cient component follows a normal-half normal distribution.
The likelihood function (LF ) for rm i, at time t belonging to class
k is (see Battese and Coeli 1992 and Greene 2005):
LFiktf (Cit j xit; k; k;k) =

 
k  "itjk=j

 (0)
 1
k
 

"itjk
k

(2.3.2)
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where, "itjk = lnCitjk   0jxit; k = [2vk + 2uk]
1
2 ; k = ujk=jk; k pa-
rameter is the ratio of the standard deviation of the one-sided ine¢ cient
component to the standard deviation of the two sided random error,
and  and  (0) denote the standard normal density and cumulative
distribution function respectively.
The unconditional likelihood of bank i where k = (k; 
2
k; k; ) are
the parameters associated with the technology of class k, is obtained as
a weighted sum of the k-class likelihood functions, where the weights are
the class membership probabilities reecting the uncertainty regarding
the true membership in the sample7 :
LFi (; ) =
KX
k=1
LFik (k)  Pik (k) (2.3.3)
where 0  Pik  1 and
PK
k=1 Pik = 1
We can parameterize the class probabilities by employing the multino-
mial logit model:
Pik (k) =
e(
p
kqi)PK
k=1 e
(pkqi)
(2.3.4)
where k = 1; :::; K, denotes classes; k = 0 is a parameter normalization
for the reference class and qi is a vector of bank-specic and time-
invariant class determinants.
Combining equations (2:3:2) and (2:3:4), the overall likelihood func-
tion is a continuous function of the vectors of parameters  and  and
7 For the sake of brevity, we note that in the robustness section when we use the
methodology of Bos et al.(2010), our notation in the following equations, slightly
changes and when we write ijkwhich indicates the nancial instituition conditional
on being in class k, we mean instead, itjk, indicating that the nancial insitution
at specic time t conditional to class k, since we treat each specic observation as
independent throughout the years for each credit institution.
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is indicated as:
lnLF (; ) =
NX
i=1
lnLFi (; ) =
NX
i=1
ln
(
KX
k=1
LFik (k)  Pik (k)
)
(2.3.5)
Note that in order to identify the parameters of latent class probabili-
ties, the sample has to be generated from di¤erent technological regimes
in which the banks are operating. Therefore, the number of classes (k)
should not exceed the number of true regimes in the sample, otherwise
the parameters cannot be identied.
The estimated parameters can be used then to compute the con-
ditional posterior class probabilities. Greene (2002) showed that the
posterior probability of class-k membership for bank i can be computed
as:
P (k j i) = LFik (k)  Pik (k)
KX
k=1
LFik (k)  Pik (k)
(2.3.6)
Unlike the standard stochastic frontier approach, where the cost frontier
is the same for each bank, in the latent class stochastic frontier model
we estimate several frontiers (equal to the number of classes).
What remains to be estimated, is the cost ine¢ ciency term in the
case when we have several benchmarks (i.e. technological regimes). Ac-
cording to Greene (2002), we can achieve that by getting the weighted
average of the cost ine¢ ciency terms:
lnEFi =
KX
k=1
P (k p i)  lnEFi (k) , (2.3.7)
where EFi (k) is the banks cost e¢ ciency using class-k technology as
a reference. In this case technologies from every class are taken into
account when estimating the cost e¢ ciency.
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2.4 Data
2.4.1 UK & Greek banking market
We now turn to our data characteristics. For the estimation of the
model we use data that consist of an unbalanced panel of all the nan-
cial institutions that provided credit8during the years 1988-2011 in the
UK and 1993-2011 in Greece9. Overall, both our samples account for a
signicant market share in terms of assets, loans and deposits, occasion-
ally even more than 90% in each respective category in both countries.
More precisely, the UK sample comprises 2,324 observations for 162
nancial institutions, whereas the Greek sample consists of 30 nancial
institutions with a total of 356 observations. The main di¤erence be-
tween the two banking sectors is that Commercialbanks incorporated
in Greece are the dominant group in the banking system. The domi-
nance of commercial banking can also be conrmed by the number of
branches and employees. Greek commercial banks have 3,302 branches
in operation (out of 3,575 for all credit institutions which is equiva-
lent to 92.36%), while the number of their employees stands at 51,012
(out of 56,611 employed in all credit institutions which is equivalent to
90.11%) according to the Hellenic Banking association (2011).
During the years studied important structural changes and develop-
ments occurred awithin the European Union countries and world-wide
which inuenced both countriesnancial systems. We experienced the
8 Our sample consists of Commercial banks, Real Estate and Mortgage Banks,
Bank Holding Companies, Cooperative Banks and Savings Banks.
9 The reasoning behind selecting 1993 as the starting year for the sample regard-
ing the Greek banking sector is becauce in that year the full liberalization of the
Greek banking system occured. This followed the provision of the Second Banking
Directive regarding establishment, supervision and operation in 1992 by the Basic
Banking Law Banking Directive.
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introduction of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the macro-
economic stabilization programme, the establishment of advanced infor-
mation technologies and the internationalization of banking activities,
which enhanced competition in both price and quality levels. Impor-
tant changes took place on a domestic level as well. Regarding the
Greek banking sector, the most important development, was the es-
tablishment of Euroas the countrys common currency and sole legal
tender10. Additionally, a major structural feature of the Greek nan-
cial system, characterizing in particular the old banking regime, is the
signicant level of state intervention, which for a long time hindered
competition and created a distorted market environment. In the early
1990s, the state commercial banks controlled around 85 per cent of
total commercial banking operations. Since then, a notable trend ob-
served in the Greek banking sector commenced with the privatization
of several banks controlled by the Greek state, which contributed to the
enhancement of competition in the market. That said, the countrys
banking sector has a Herndahl index gure of 1,278 , higher than the
average European Herndahl index which is 1,102 for the 27 countries
members of the European Union (1,195 for the 17 countries members of
the European Monetary Union) (European Central Bank, 2011), which
highlights a picture of a concentrated banking sector. Finally, during
the rst half of the 1990s, new private-owned foreign commercial banks
were established, taking advantage of new products and services that
were not available in the Greek market just a decade ago.
Turning to the UK banking sector, it is noteworthy that the build-
ing society sector, having continued to expand during the 1980s and
1990s, saw a sharp contraction in the mid-late 1990s, as many building
10 Greece joined the Eurozone in 2001. Currently, 17 out of the 28 members of
the European Union use the Euro as their national currency.
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societies demutualised and became banks. Another major development
saw the largest UK banks become truly universal banks, by expanding
the range of their activities and services. Specically, now they encom-
pass securities underwriting and trading, fund management, derivatives
trading and general insurance. This expansion coincided with a period
of signicant growth in securities markets and the markets for foreign
exchange and derivatives. It must be highlighted that on aggregate,
UK banksbalance sheets account for more than 500% of annual UK
GDP, a development that occursed mainly in the 2000s.
Looking at common trends existant in both countries during the
last years of our sample, we note the signicant credit expansion, as the
level of loans to loss provisions increased considerably. One could argue
that the signs of the nancial turmoil were becoming apparent. Indeed
the six largest banks in both countries in the end of 2011 accounted for
more than 80% of each countrys nancial system.
As it was noted earlier a novel feature of our study is the period
that is being covered, which is the largest of all the previous ones that
have been elaborated in both nancial systems. The number of banks
that we examine in our study changes during the sample period in both
countries. This occurs specically in Greece due to many M&As that
took place in the end of the 90s. The observed wave of mergers and ac-
quisitions was triggered primarily by the willingness of the small banks
to obtain a higher market share and secondarily by the privatization
process which was initiated by the government, in line with the second
Banking Directive. At the end of 2011, the Greek banking system was
dominated by six leading large banks in terms of assets, deposits and
loans (Ethniki bank also known as National bank of Greece, Alpha
bank, Eurobank, Piraeus bank, Emporiki bank- also known as Commer-
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cial bank and Agricultural bank)11, which altogether held 74.6 per cent
of the market share, a gure higher than the average European concen-
tration ratio calculated by the market share of the ve largest banks in
each country (CR5). This stands at 59.6 per cent for the 27 countries
members of the European Union (Greece has 72.0 per cent) and 58.1
per cent for the 17 countries members of the European Monetary Union
(European Central Bank, 2011). On the contrary in the UK, despite
the fact that the market is dominated as in the case of Greece, by six
dominant nancial institutions as (Barclays bank, HSBC bank, RBS
bank, Lloyds bank, Santander bank and Nationwide Building society),
the banking sector is less concentrated.
In Tables 2.1.a-2.1.b and 2.2.a-2.2.b, we report representative g-
ures of the UK and Greek nancial institutions used in both our sam-
ples respectively. More specically, tables 1a and 1b o¤er an overview
of some important banking indicators of the UK and Greek banking
sector for the whole period of our study, whereas tables 2a and 2b re-
port an insight on the UK and Greek nancial intermediaries for each
year of our sample.
2.4.2 Model Specication
The latent class stochastic frontier model (Orea and Kumbhakar 2004)
presented in the previous section requires the following three sets of
variables to be determined:
- Kernel determinants: (C; y; w; eq; t)
- Ine¢ ciency determinants: z
- Class membership determinants: k
11 In the Greek banking sector a bank is classied as "large" if it holds total
assets above 20 billions in euro in 2011.
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Kernel determinants
A critical discussion of the two mostly used approaches for measur-
ing and dening inputs and outputs has been done by Berger and
Humphrey (1997). They conclude that despite the fact that none of
them is ideal, the production approach is preferable when we want to
evaluate the e¢ ciency of branches of nancial institutions, whereas the
intermediation approach is preferable when we want to analyze the ef-
ciency of the whole nancial institution. Therefore, in line with the
vast and established literature regarding the determinants of cost e¢ -
ciency in banking (Berger 2007), we specify the cost kernel components
that represent the intermediation approach of banks used by Sealey
and Lindley (1977) to dene inputs and output12. In the present study
we specify the two mainstream types of outputs as total loans (y1) and
total earning assets (y2) , which is dened as the sum of investment
assets, securities and other earning assets. However, as Stiroh (2004)
emphasizes, fee income is increasingly becoming a substitute for the
revenues that can be earned on narrowing interest margins in the clas-
sical intermediation business. To account for this development, we also
account for total o¤-balance sheet activities, credit commitments and
derivatives, as an additional output(y3)13. Additionally, we specify as
our three types of inputs: (1) the total intermediated funds (F ), which
consists of savings accounts, current accounts, time deposits, repurchase
12 The key di¤erence between the two approaches, is that production approach
treats deposits as outputs, whereas intermediation approach treats them as inputs.
13 Numerous banks around the world have broadened their portfolio to o¤er
non-traditional services. Additionally, o¤-balance sheet (OBS) activities such as
securitization, loan origination, derivative securities, and standby letters of credit
among others have been expanding at a rapid pace. As a result, the share of fee-
based and other non-interest income to total income has increased dramatically.
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agreements and alternative funding sources, (2) the labour (L), which
refers to the manpower involved in the operations of the all the credit
institutions in the sample and (3) the physical capital depreciation and
amortization (K), which consists of xed assets, including tangible xed
assets (land, buildings, o¢ ce equipment, etc., less depreciation) and
intangible assets (software, underwriting expenses, research expenses,
etc.). Furthermore, following Berger and Mester (1997), we specify eq-
uity as a quasi-xed input to control for di¤erences in risk preferences,
which may arise due to regulation, nancial distress, or informational
asymmetries 14. Raising equity is associated with higher costs than
raising deposits and the mix of these liabilities can have a direct im-
pact on cost (Berger and Mester, 1997). As dependent variable we use
total cost (TC) which is dened as the sum of personnel and admin-
istrative expenses, interest fee and commission expenses. Finally, we
include a time trend determinant (T ) to capture the potential technical
change that occurred during the examination period for each nancial
institution. Note that inputs and outputs increased by a considerable
amount during the years of our samples, due to the growing size of the
both domestic and foreign credit institutions and due to the rising level
of M&As. We measure the price of input (w1) by using the ratio of
interest expenses to total deposits and short term funding. Also we
measure the price of input (w2) by using the ratio of sta¤ expenses to
total assets. Lastly we measure the price of input (w3) by using the ra-
tio of fee and commission expenses added to administration expenses to
xed assets. As for the measurement of the quasi-xed input variable,
we measure (eq) by using the amount of equity capital that consists of
14 Berger and Mester (1997) argue that not accounting for equity can result in a
scale bias, while the e¢ ciency of banks could be miscalculated even if they behave
optimally given their risk preferences.
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common equity, non-controlling interest, securities revaluation reserves
and other accumulated comprehensive income.
Following the majority of empirical studies in banking, we obtain
the largest part of our annual bank-level data from the Bankscope data-
base of Bureau Van Dijks company. Any missing information is lled in
from the o¢ cial websites of UK and Greek nancial institutions, by the
British British Bankers and Building Societies Association, the Hellenic
Bank Association, and by the annual reports of both the governors of
Bank of England and of Bank of Greece.
At this point we highlight a number of crucial points that we take
into account in our data selection strategy. This strategy is of major
importance in terms of accuracy of the results and of the inferences
based on them. Regrettably it has been mistakenly disdained by the
bulk of the empirical studies that have used Bankscope database (see
Claessens and van Horen, 2012 and Clerides et. al 2013). To be more
precise, rst, we check both samples for double-counting observations.
Bankscope provides company account statements for banks and nan-
cial institutions across the world by collecting nancial statements with
both consolidation and unconsolidation status. We select the uncon-
solidated data15 and exclude the equivalent consolidated data to avoid
double counting the same nancial institution.
As a second step, we take into consideration mergers and acquisi-
tions (M&A). For this purpose we conduct a thorough check through
all M&A activities that took place in the past in both banking sectors
so that only the merged entity or the acquiring bank remains in the
sample after a take-over. As an intuitive example: assume that bank
A and bank B merged in 2003 to create a new entity, bank C, then the
15 In cases where unconsolidated data were not available, we chose consolidated
data instead.
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two individual banks A and B are each included in the dataset until
2003. From 2003 onwards, these two banksoperations are considered
to be terminated and the new bank (bank C) is included in the data-
base. In the same spirit, assume that bank A was acquired by bank B
in 2003; both banks are included in the database until 2003, with bank
A then becoming inactive after 2003 and bank B remaining active after
2003. We obtain detailed information on mergers and acquisitions from
Zephyr database of Bureau Van Dijks company.
All data are deated using each countrys GDP deator (using 2005
as the base year) obtained from theWorld Bank database and converted
to US Dollars. In addition to the two considerations in our data ltering
process, we exclude observations of missing, negative or zero values for
inputs/outputs and control variables. Our nal samples account for 124
nancial institutions and 1856 observations for the UK banking sector
and for 30 nancial institutions and 356 observations for the Greek
banking sector.
Ine¢ ciency determinants
Turning our attention to the parametric part of the ine¢ ciency com-
ponent, we consider three zitvariables, for each banking sector.
Time The rst variable is time indicating spillover e¤ects from recent
developments such as deregulation processes and transfer of know-how.
The parametric component becomes a function of time with only one
parameter. In turn, e¢ ciency either increases, decreases or remains
constant. We use time-trend to measure time.
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Size The second variable is size reecting recent debates concerning
the optimum size that a nancial institution should have. In general
this variable is supposed to have a positive e¤ect on e¢ ciency as it in-
creases to a certain level. Nevertheless, the impact of an extremely large
size can be proved to be counterproductive for the credit institutions
e¢ cient operation. According to empirical ndings the relationship be-
tween e¢ ciency and size is not linear. We use each banks real assets
in order to measure this determinant.
Type & Ownership The third variable is di¤erent for each country.
In the UK we recognize that two di¤erent types of nancial institutions
dominate the provision of credit: banks and building societies. For this
purpose we create a dummy variable, bs, which takes the value 1 if the
nancial institution is a building society and 0 otherwise. Regarding
the Greek banking sector, as mentioned earlier, a key development that
we take into account is the increase of the number of the private-owned
institutions. We check the impact of privately and publicly-owned or
government-owned banks on bank e¢ ciency. E¢ ciency of the banking
industry can benet from the fact that privately-owned banks perform
more e¢ ciently compared to their rivals, who often operate on di¤erent
business plans due to the meddling of politicians in the banks a¤airs.
(see Laporta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 2002). There is empiri-
cal evidence supporting this hypothesis especially during the period in
which the share of the publicly-owned banks is very high and their per-
formance is of critical importance for the Greek nancial system (Delis
et al 2009). We control for the e¤ects using a dummy variable owner
which takes the value 1 if the depository institution is privately-owned
and 0 otherwise.
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Class membership determinants
We consider the rm-average value of ve variables, apart from an
intercept, as determinants of the latent class probabilities.
Capital adequacy Examining the annual reports of the governors of
both countriescentral banks, we notice that the nancial institutions
are quite heterogeneous in terms of capital requirements. According
to the literature, credit institutions which have a signicant amount of
capital are considered more stable, can employ high cost plans in order
to ameliorate their economies of scope and are able to achieve this in a
safer way by reducing the potential risks. Furthermore, they can adjust
easier to unexpected developments. Also shareholders of banks which
are well capitalized can reduce moral hazard by controlling more closely
the banks management. We expect the most e¢ cient banks to have
higher levels of capital. In order to measure the capital adequacy we
use the equity to assets ratio.
Liquidity risk The recent nancial turmoil demonstrates the severe
impact that this risk can have on the nancial system. Clearly, credit
institutions with high liquidity are able to expand and/or face potential
adverse conditions in the economic environment better than those that
need to resort to stock markets to raise funds, especially at times of
worsening conditions in money markets as the one we experienced in
the recent nancial turnmoil. Although liquidity risk can be measured
in di¤erent ways we follow the approach by Altunbas et al. (2000)
and measure it by the loans to assets ratio. The higher this ratio, the
greater the need of the nancial institutions to raise nance.
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Credit risk The specic determinant reects a very important risk
that depository institutions confront. An indication of the quality of
the credit risk management of the institution stems from the level of
this risk, given that high values of it are associated with a less e¢ cient
functioning of lending procedures (Berger and De Young, 1997). That
said credit institutions seeking higher rents undergo in risky projects in
expectation of higher yields. Also it can be the case where borrowers
face di¢ culties to meet their obligations due to unexpected adverse
economic developments. Thus a high value of credit risk may not be
attributable to poor management. Additionally, a nancial institution
may choose a strategy which reects reduced e¤orts in granting and
monitoring loans that may appear cost e¢ cient, but has an increased
credit risk. We measure this specic category of risk by each banks
ow of provisions to total assets ratio.
Service Concentration We stress the di¤erent strategies that credit
institutions follow to create their products. We carefully examine the
income statements and identify substantial di¤erences in the level of
loans, securities, investment assets and o¤ balance sheet activities. For
this purpose we measure each nancial institutions degree of special-
ization. We argue that there exists a trade-o¤ between the variety of
products and services that a bank o¤ers and its e¢ ciency level since in
this case it requires a more specialized management. We measure it as
the sum of the squared ratios of the value of each output to the total
value of outputs of each nancial institution.
Protability All depository institutionsannual income statements
disclose tremendous di¤erences regarding their protability. This de-
terminant can have opposite e¤ects depending on which economic e¢ -
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ciency is the subject of interest. High protability allows banks to in-
vest in improved technology and in skilled personnel with higher wages
as they expect this to bring in much higher output gains and conse-
quently, higher prot e¢ ciency. However, higher wages and investments
in advanced technology would mark an increase in costs, resulting in a
decline of cost e¢ ciency. We proxy the specic variable by the ratio of
pre-tax prots to assets (ROA).
Table 2.3.a, 2.3.b, presents descriptive statistics of the variables
that we use in the estimation of the cost frontier kernel, the ine¢ cient
component and the regime class membership for the UK and Greek
banking sector respectively16. Even though we use natural logarithms
of variables in the cost kernel components (these represent the interme-
diation technology) in order to compute the e¢ ciency scores, we show
the mean and standard deviations in levels to be more informative.
The nal specication of our latent class cost stochastic frontier
model takes the following log-linear form which represents a logarithmic
transformation of a Cobb-Douglas production function 17:
lnTCitjk = 0jk+
3X
l=1
yljk ln yit;l+
2X
s=1
wsjk lnwit;s+eqjk ln eqit+tjkT+uitjk+vitjk
(2.4.1)
where, k = 1; :::; K, expresses class membership.
Ine¢ ciency is modelled as a function of its determinants18:
uitjk = exp[1jKTIME+2ijkSIZE+3ijkBS (2.4.2)
16 We dont include the two dummy variables.
17 We apply Specication tests in both countries and the results reject a translog
in favour of a Cobb-Douglas cost function.
18 We note here that in the second methodology (Bos et al. 2010) that we employ
as a robustness check, ine¢ ciency is not modelled as function of its determinants.
Only the class membership probability is.
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1and
uitjk = exp[1jKTIME+2ijkSIZE+3ijkOWNER (2.4.3)
for the UK and the Greek banking sector respectively.
TIME; SIZE;BS; OWNER refer to a time-trend variable, the
size (in terms of assets) of each nancial institution, a dummy variable
reecting the type of each UK nancial institutions and the ownership
of the Greek banks respectively.
The latent class probabilities are specied as:
Pik (k) =
e(ok+1ijkCAP_ADEQ+2ijkLIQ_RISK+3ijkCRED_RISK+4ijkSERV _CON+5ijkPROF)
KX
k=1
e
(ok+1ijkCAP_ADEQ+2ijkLIQ_RISK+3ijkCRED_RISK+4ijkSERV _CON+5ijkPROF)
(2.4.4)
whereCAP_ADEQ;LIQ_RISK;CRED_RISK; SERV_CON;PROF
refers to capital adequacy, liquidity risk, credit risk, service concentra-
tion and protability of each nancial institution in both samples.
At this point we point out that the estimated cost frontier must sat-
isfy the following regularity conditions in order to ensure that is well
behaved.19 There should be monotonicity and concavity in input prices.
These two characteristics can only be checked after the estimation pro-
cedure of the model, whereas an additional one, linear homogeneity in
input prices, has to be imposed a priori. The latter property requires:
3X
s=1
wsk = 1 (2.4.5)
Since the cost function is homogeneous of degree one in input prices,
linear homogeneity restrictions are imposed on all price and cost vari-
19 Because of the sample size limitations, the time trend T is not specied to
interact with outputs yit;l and input prices wit;s. Accordingly, only the impact of
the neutral technical change on the cost function is considered in this paper, whereas
the relevant impact, if any, of the non-neutral technical change is not identied.
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ables with respect to one of the input prices. Here we use the price of
the physical capital depreciation and amortization (w3) as a numeraire.
2.5 Empirical results
2.5.1 Determination of the number of classes
One of the most important points in the estimation of the latent
class models is the determination of the number of classes. A key
method in the literature of the standard latent class models for iden-
tifying the number of regimes is the computation of an information
criterion. The two most widely used statistics are the AIC (Akaike)
and BIC (Schwartz) criteria. These criteria evaluate the goodness of t
of the model by imposing a penalty on the numbers of parameters in
the model. They can be used to compare models with di¤erent number
of classes. The preferred model is the one with the lowest statistic.
The two statistics are computed as:
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where K, is the number of classes,  (K) is the number of parameters
to estimate for specication with K latent classes and Ti is the number
of observations for bank i.
Tables 2.4.a and 2.4.b report the AIC and BIC values for the UK
and Greek banking sectors respectively. Comparing a pooled model, i.e.
the baseline model as it was described in section 2.3, which assumes
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homogenous production technology for all the nancial institutions in
the sample, i.e. k = 1, and a model with two di¤erent technologi-
cal regimes, i.e. k = 2, the values of both criteria indicate that the
preferred model in both countries is the one with two classes20. To
illustrate this result, in gures 2.1.a and 2.1.b we plot the kernel den-
sity estimates of the variance of the residuals of ine¢ ciency for both
models for UK and Greece respectively. A leftward movement of the
kernel in the second model with two technological regimes can easily
be seen, implying that the ine¢ ciency is removed when taking into ac-
count bank-heterogeneity. Specically the sample is split by setting 17
and 73 banks in the rst technological regime and 13 and 51 in the
second one for the case of Greece and for the case of UK respectively.
In order to check the sensitivity of the class size selection to ine¢ -
ciency, we compute the average e¢ ciency scores for each year, which are
obtained by estimating models with one and two technological classes.
These are reported in table 2.5.a for UK, and 2.5.b for Greece. One can
see that the average e¢ ciency monotonically increases with the number
of classes. In turn, this suggests that if bank heterogeneity is not taken
into account, this omission can lead to downward-biased e¢ ciency score
estimates.
20 We tried to estimate a model with more than two classes as well. For the case
of the Greek banking sector it failed to achieve convergence indicating the model
is over-specied. However, for the UK banking sector neither multicollinearity nor
over-specication prohibits convergence of the maximum likelihood estimator. That
said, parameters are jointly not signicantly di¤erent from zero and the number of
observations in the additional regime is very small.
61
2.5.2 Which technological regime is the most e¢ -
cient?
Tables 2.6.a and 2.6.b, report average cost e¢ ciency estimates using
the highest probability cost frontier as a reference technology with re-
spect to UK and Greece. It is revealed that for both countries the rst
technological regime consists of banks which exhibit higher cost e¢ -
ciency levels than the second one. A graphical illustration of the kernel
density estimates of the variance of the residuals of ine¢ ciency of both
a pooled model and of a two latent classes model for both countries is
provided in gures 2.1.a and 2.1.b. It is apparent a leftward movement
of the kernel in the model that assumes two latent classes, implying
that the ine¢ ciency has been removed by taking into account bank-
heterogeneity.
It is noteworthy to highlight that in 2007 for UK and 2008 for
Greece, e¢ ciency level started to decline at the highest rate during
both of the sample periods. This coincides with the dawn of the global
nancial crisis in August 2007 and the turmoil of the global money
markets that followed and reached the point of eruption with the col-
lapse of the Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Specically for the
Greek banking sector the major decline in e¢ ciency comes after the
most successful year in terms of cost e¢ ciency. In addition, after a
decrease of 2002-2003, we note a considerable increase of the e¢ ciency
estimates of the Greek banks at the end of 2004. This increase might
be justied by the fact that a wave of M&A activity during 1998-2002
had been recently completed and the gains of synergies might have been
realized. On the other hand, in the UK banking sector the results show
the 90s to have been a decade of amelioration and development. This
can be seen as well from the low level of loans loss provisions (see table
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2.2.a). This should not come as a surprise since those years come after
a period which saw the introduction of computing, credit cards, new
sophisticated services, refurbished antiquated premises and the intro-
duction of further technologies such as ATM and many new services
which continue to drive the expansion of banks.
Another fact that is worth mentioning is that the nancial crisis
came with a greater time lag in Greece than in the UK and in the ma-
jority of countries that belong to the European Monetary Union(EMU).
A reason for this is that Greek banksstrategies were mostly focused
on a retail rather than an investment nature of banking activities, as
in the case of other EU banks. This caused huge marked-to-market
losses related to toxic assets. An overall comparison of all the banks in
both banking systems for the entire common sample period (1993-2011)
reverberate the fact that Greek banks operate under higher e¢ ciency
levels than their European counterparties albeit their more sophisti-
cated systems, a result which in line with Casu and Girardone (2006).
The answer to this conundrum could be lying in the simplicity of activ-
ities and in the smaller size of the Greek banking sector. A point which
has triggered various debates lately related to the diversity of banking
activities and the complexity of nancial systems.
Additionally, in tables 2.6.a and 2.6.b, we observe essential diver-
gences for every year in e¢ ciency estimates within the two classes in
both the UK and the Greek banking sector respectively. More precisely,
the average level of e¢ ciency in the rst technological class for Greece
is close to 82 per cent, whereas in the second technological class is close
to 66 per cent. The gap within the two regimes is even larger in UK.
Specically, around 70 per cent to only 41 per cent is the overall e¢ -
ciency of class one and class two respectively. Therefore, we highlight
that the rst technological regime in both banking systems consists of
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nancial intermediaries that exhibit, on aggregate, higher cost e¢ ciency
levels compared to those that belong to the second latent class. Over-
all, we must note that in the whole sample and in both technological
regimes, Greek banks are found to be very e¢ cient, which is line with
Pasiouras (2008) ndings, who states that the e¢ ciency of the Greek
banks increases when we account for credit risk. UK banks have a low
to moderate cost e¢ ciency which is line with Xiang et.al (2011).
2.5.3 Determinants interpretation of heterogeneous
technologies
The parameter estimates of our LCSFM are presented in tables 2.7.a
and 2.7.b for the case of the UK and of Greece respectively and are
estimated by maximum likelihood estimation using NLogit 5 (Greene
2009). All the variables are normalized by their respective geometric
mean. Thus, the Cobb-Douglas form represents a rst-order Taylor ap-
proximation around the geometric mean, to any generic cost frontier.
In both countries the estimated cost frontier elasticities are found to
be positive, in turn the estimated cost frontiers are increasing in input
prices and outputs. The signs of the parameter estimates of the vari-
ables which are included in the kernel suggest that the monotonicity
and concavity properties are satised. In most cases the estimated pa-
rameters of the e¢ ciency frontiers are signicant at the conventional
condence levels. From these two tables we note that in both tech-
nological regimes of the two di¤erent banking systems the estimated
 parameter is statistically insignicant, in contrast to a model that
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assumes homogeneous production technology21, suggesting that bank-
heterogeneity is fully controlled when a model with two classes is esti-
mated.
Next, we examine the results that emanate from determinants that
a¤ect the ine¢ ciency component. As far as the UK banks are concerned
we notice that in the rst technological regime e¢ ciency increases over
time, whereas there is an attrition of e¢ ciency throughout the years
in the second one. This can be seen from the positive sign of the
statistical signicant determinant (i.e. TIME) in class two; ine¢ ciency
increases during the years of the sample. The signicant and negative
e¤ect that size has on e¢ ciency prevails in both classes but there is a
mixed e¤ect of the nature of a nancial institution in the two regimes.
More precisely the dummy variable BS does not have any signicant
e¤ect in the second class; nonetheless, it has detrimental negative e¤ect
on e¢ ciency if the nancial institution is a bank and not a building
society22.
As far as the Greek banks are concerned, we notice a convergence
among the two di¤erent regimes in terms of the sign and the signi-
cance of the e¤ect that size has on e¢ ciency. Albeit the similarity of
estimates for the rst technological regime of Greek banks, the time
determinant has exactly the opposite e¤ect on e¢ ciency compared to
the UK regarding the banks that belong to the second technological
regime. Lastly, we highlight that ownership has no important e¤ect on
the e¢ ciency of banks, regardless of their classication among the two
21 When the same production technology is assumed for all the banks in the
sample the estimated  parameter is 3:513 with a t-value of 2:765 for UK and 3:981
with a t-value of 3:593 for Greece.
22 BSis a dummy variable that takes the value 0 if the nancial institution is a
bank and the value 1 if it is a building society. In turn, the higher the value of BS
the less (more) the level of ine¤ciency (e¢ ciency).
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regimes.
Subsequently, we shed light on di¤erences of technology regimes
based on the posterior production variable distributions. For both
countries the majority of determinants are statistically signicant, in-
dicating that they are rudimentary for classication of banks among
the two regimes. Analysis of the class determinants in terms of their
sign and their statistical signicance suggest that in the UK banking
sector the rst technological regime is very likely to consist of banks
with a strong capital base, with a high quality of both their credit and
liquidity risk management and a broader scope in product provision.
This outcome is in line with the main principles of the Basel II accord
regarding the adequate level of capital that each bank must hold in
their balance sheets in order to become more e¢ cient. On the con-
trary, banks not adequately capitalized, who undertake risky projects,
with parsimonious liquidity but with increased service specialization are
likely to be found in the second latent class. The e¤ect of protability
is lukewarm.
Turning to the Greek banking sector, we notice that the banks that
belong to the di¤erent latent classes exhibit similar characteristics in
terms of capital and the level of both credit and liquidity risk they
undertake as the UK banks in the same regimes. The primar di¤erence
between the two classes and in essence between the two countries, is
that not only protability but credit risk has an innocuous e¤ect on
the classication process of the Greek banks.
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2.5.4 Economic interpretation of heterogeneous tech-
nologies
In order to reveal the economic intuition of the results, we compute
two auxiliary measures based on the estimated frontier parameters,
economies of scale and technical change and present them in tables
2.8.a and 2.8.b with respect to UK and Greece. As far as the rst mea-
sure is concerned, it is computed as one minus the sum of elasticities of
total costs with respect to outputs

SCE = 1 Pk @ lnC@ ln yk.The results
indicate the presence of statistically signicant increasing returns to
scale for the nancial institutions that are allocated in the second class
of the two countries. Specically, we nd a level of 13.6% and 9.6% for
Greece and the UK respectively. This nding comes as no surprise since
ine¢ cient banks can become more e¢ cient if they expand in terms of
scale. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the Greek banks that
belong to the rst technological regime reveal a level of 5.3% of increas-
ing scale economies, in contrast with their Europeans counterparties of
the same regime where there are no signicant scale economies. This
result is in line with previous banking studies for Greece (Apergis and
Rezitis 2004). As far as the second auxiliary measure is concerned, the
intuition behind it lies in the fact that variations in cost over time that
are not explained by other explanatory variables, are due to exogenous
technical change computed by the derivative of total costs with respect
to time
 
TC = @ lnC
@t

. A negative sign for this measure implies techno-
logical progress, because it assumes decrease in bankscosts over time.
UK banks, despite the fact that in the second regime there is a mild
(10%) statistically signicance, show signicant technical progress re-
gardless of their classication, which is in line with Casu et al.(2004).
In Greece on the contrary, only the nancial institutions that belong
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to the rst technological regime reveal a statistically signicant tech-
nological progress, and this is in line with Pasiouras et.al.(2008).
2.5.5 Identication of heterogeneous technologies
Finally, the classication of the banks into the two technological regimes
is diplayed in tables 2.9.a and 2.9.b for the UK and Greek banking sys-
tem respectively. The empirical evidence reveals that for both countries
each regime consists of institutions of similar characteristics, despite
their di¤erences in terms of the number of the banks. This nding in-
vigorates the motivation and the scope of this paper, as it casts doubts
on an a priori sample separation depending uniquely on banking seg-
ments. A thorough look into the two classes permits us to extract
interesting inferences regarding the nature of the nancial institution
that belongs to each regime.
Regarding the UK banking sector, we highlight the fact that the
vast majority of the building societies appears to be in the rst regime.
Similarly, savings banks appear almost unanimously in the rst regime
as well. These two aforementioned results trigger our hypothesis that
both building societies and savings banks exhibit rather high e¢ ciency
levels compared to commercial types of banks. One might conjecture
that the miscellaneous activities of a commercial bank may be the pri-
mar cause of nancial turmoil like the one we experienced from August
2007 and accompanied inevitably by its calamitous consequences to the
economic growth of both developed and emerging markets. If this as-
sumption holds, we potentially provide preliminary evidence of favour
to one of the most crucial points in recent debates regarding the sep-
aration between an investment and a commercial arm of activities of
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a bank23. To this end some action has already be taken place in the
UK. Specically, the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB) pro-
poses to "ring fence" retail and small business commercial banking from
investment banking in the United Kingdom24.
Turning to the Greek banking sector we nd a similar story to
the one described for the UK. Savings type and one Cooperative type
of bank (Pancreatan Coopetative) appear in the rst technological
regime; however both regimes are actually dominated by commercial
type banks, as the Greek banking sector is in general. Nevertheless,
the rest of the Cooperative banks (Panellinia bank) appear in the less
e¢ cient regime 25. As far as ownership is concerned, we highlight that
it has rather a lukewarm e¤ect, since there is an equal distribution of
state-owned and private-owned banks among the two regimes. Note
that most of the banks from the whole sample whose operations have
been terminated either because they were acquired or because they were
involved in a merging activity, belong to the rst technological group
as well.
A common point to both countries is that the four largest banks
(in terms of assets, deposits and loans) are classied as being in the
rst regime. These are, HSBC, RBS, Lloyds and Barclays in UK and
the Ethniki, Eurobank, Alpha and Pireaus in Greece. This nding is of
extreme importance for Greece, since the four aforementioned banking
23 It should be noted that in the UK major job losses have been recorded in
investment banking and other nancial institutions trading short-term nancial
instruments against long-term securities and loans
24 Nevertheless, the "ring-fencing" idea is not yet put in action as there are
opposing ideas from other member countries of the European Commission such as
Germany and France.
25 Panellinia Bank was established in April 2001 by the Cooperative Banks and
Credit Union in Greece in an e¤ort to achieve economies of scale and due to com-
mercial competition.
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groups are designed to compose the four cornerstones of recovery of the
Greek Economy. The European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) in co-
ordination with the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF), decided
to award the systemicnature to these four banks and designed the
recapitalization of them which can boost the economic activity of the
country. Consequently, the classication of all four systemic banks into
the most e¢ cient technological regime has major policy implications
regarding the success and the scope of the recent wave of banksM&As
and in general for the countrys disengagement from the recession after
ve consecutive years.
2.5.6 Robustness checks
In order to examine the robustness of our ndings we perform a series
of robustness tests. First, as noted in section 3 we conduct exactly the
same analysis but instead of following Orea and Kumbhakars (2004)
panel data methodology, we follow Bos et al. (2010) pooled cross-
section strategy that allows the nancial institution to be in one regime
a specic year and in another regime the year after. Unequivocally, for
both countries the results do not reveal any signicant di¤erences re-
garding the number of di¤erent technological regimes (i.e. two classes)
and the classication of banks among these two regimes. Specically,
more than 80% of the yearly observations of each credit institution in
both banking sectors are in the same class as they are when we use
Orea and Kumbhakars (2004) modelling strategy. With respect to the
remaining 20%, where for some year-observations the credit institution
seems to change class, we highlight that this transition occurs no more
than two consecutive years and in the rst year-observations for all the
credit institutions that belong to this 20% in both countries. The only
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rudimentary di¤erence apparent in the results in both countries, is that
all the class membership determinants are statistically signicant and
larger than in the previous panel nature of the data sets. Consequently,
we add to our previous ndings that for both countries the credit in-
stitutions that belong to the rst technological regime are the more
protable compared with their peers in the second regime. Specically,
in terms of the Greek banking sector it seems that the broader the va-
riety of products the banks provide, the higher the probability for them
to be classied in the rst technological regime26. This larger statistical
signicance is apparent in the case of the kernel determinants as well.
It must be noted that no change in terms of signs is found. In turn, we
argue that all determinantsinuence is in the same direction as before.
Tables 2.10.a and 2.10.b display all the aforementioned ndings for the
UK and Greek banking sectors. Thus, we are condent regarding the
correct number of identied distinct technological regimes, the appro-
priateness of our determinants to allocate the credit institutions in the
two regimes and most importantly the exact classication of each credit
institution to the two technological groups.
Next, we notice that the level of loans to loss provisions increases
considerably after 2007 and 2008 for the UK and Greece respectively.
Some concerns arise regarding the scenario that our results in terms
of e¢ ciency and allocation of banks to the two technological regimes
may be biased as they may be driven by the global nancial crisis.
In order to exclude any element of the crisis and examine the hetero-
geneity of the two banking sectors in a tranquil period, we truncate
our sample and re-estimate our model without the inclusion of the
26 Nonetheless, it must be noted that despite the broader variety of products and
services that Greek banks provide compared to the last decade, it is still small in
size and sophistication comparing to the services being provided by Universaltype
of banks, such as the large UK nancial institutions.
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period 2007-2011 for both countries. As far as the Greek banks are
concerned we notice that in Table 2.11.b the classication remains al-
most unchanged27. Hence, we have strong evidence that our inferences
regarding the Greek banking sector are extracted with precision. As
far as the UK banks are concerned, we note in Table 2.11.a that 20%
(10 banks) of the banks that belonged to the second (and less e¢ cient)
regime move to the rst, whereas less than 5% of banks (3banks) move
from the rst to the second class28. In the same spirit with Greece, we
can conclude that the nancial crisis had a greater impact on the UK
banking secto than in the case of Greece. Specically, it had a severe
impact on the technology of the UK nancial institutions which allowed
them to gain higher levels of cost e¢ ciency. Consequently, their initial
position has deteriorated and they have moved further away from the
e¢ cient frontier29.
In order to be even more persistent in testing our implications
regarding both the e¢ ciency and the heterogeneity of the UK and
Greek banks, we account for macroeconomic, nancial, country-specic
and bank-specic conditions as previous studies have noted (Pasiouras
2008). For this purpose, we account for additional factors which we
27 Only one bank namely Milleniumbank moves towards the most e¢ cient class
and another, Panellinia bank, exits our sample since after the year-ltering, was
left only with one year-observation.
28 As in the case of Greece for the same reason 7 banks do not appear in the
classication up to 2006 in table 2.11.a. .
29 The case of HBOS constitutes an example of a bank that moved to the less
e¢ cient regime during the years of the nancial crisis.
HBOS was formed by the 2001 merger of Halifax plc. and the Bank of Scotland.
The formation of HBOS was heralded as creating a fth force in British banking
and UKs largest mortgage lender. HBOS was acquired by Lloyds TSB in January
2009. In February 2009, Lloyds Banking Group revealed losses of £ 10bn at HBOS,
£ 1.6bn higher than Lloyds had anticipated in November because of deterioration in
the housing market and weakening company prots.
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use both as ine¢ ciency and class membership determinants. Regard-
ing macroeconomic conditions, we take into consideration the level of
real GDP growth. As far as nancial traits are concerned, we account
for the three month Treasury bill. Additionally we account for a bank-
specic nancial factor, such as the stock return both in time t and
t-130. Then, we consider specic dynamics regarding the nature of
each banking sector. For this, we add in our analysis the Herndahl
Hirschman index (HHI) to capture the concentration of each banking
system and to examine whether it has any impact on the e¢ ciency and
consequently on the technological heterogeneity among the banks. We
note, that we calculate the HHI not only in terms of assets, but in terms
of loans and deposits as well so as to be as much robust as we can. Ad-
ditionally, as in the case of the nancial factors, we examine the bank
specic trait relating to the HHI. We account for the market power of
each bank in the sample. Lastly, we consider the number of acquisitions
that the bank has performed throughout the sample period, following
a previous study that highlights the importance of its inclusion (Orea,
Kumbhakar 2004)31. Unequivocally, for each country none of these de-
terminants are found to be statistically signicant which could support
its inclusion. This nding, amplies our selection of determinants re-
garding their suitability in capturing and revealing all the di¤erences
in terms of e¢ ciency and technological heterogeneity of the entire UK
and Greek banking sector.
Concentrating on the Greek banking sector we check the perfor-
30 We note here that not all the banks in the sample are quoted. We have missing
data, especially in the UK sample.
31 In order to take into consideration each banks acquisitions, we construct a
dummy variable that takes a value of zero if the bank doesnt acquire any nancial
institution, and its value is increased by one every time the bank acquires another
bank.
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mance of the banksstock returns during the years in our sample which
are displayed in gure 2.232. The results are in line with our previous
ndings regarding the systemic banks and their classication in the
most e¢ cient regime and consistent with previous empirical studies
(Pasiouras et. al 2008). The stock returns of the four cornerstones in
the new era of the Greek banking system outperformed the remaining
four banks which all belong to the second technological class.
2.5.7 Mergers and Acquisitions: Recent & Prospec-
tive
As a next step, we try to shed light on the aspect of recent and poten-
tial mergers and acquisitions of UK and Greek banks. We endeavour
to examine from an e¢ ciency point of view whether the creation of the
new bank will potentially move it to the most e¢ cient technological
regime and in turn, whether it can increase the scores of the total fac-
tor productivity of the industry resulting in a larger social welfare. At
this point we highlight our twofold contribution: Firstly, we provide
for the rst time in the literature an econometric method to evaluate
and compare the e¢ ciency gains or losses of a potential M&A activ-
ity. The latter is of extreme importance for policy makers and prac-
titioners, since after the onset of the global nancial turmoil we have
witnessed numerous cases of banksM&A world-widely and there are
daily speculations about new ones, regardless of whether those nan-
32 Stock return movement for listed Greek banks in the Athens Stock Exchange
(ASE) market were obtained from Datastream.
Some banks are not listed in the stock Market; nonetheless, their total market
share is less than 3% of the total assets of Greek banking sector.
The absence of many large in terms of assets banks from the UK Stock exchange
prevent us from conducting the same analysis for UK.
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cial institutions are labelled, in terms of specialization, as commercial,
saving, co-operative, real estate & mortgage bank etc. Secondly, we
are able to extract unbiased inferences with major policy implications
regarding the true origins of a M&A activity, in terms of promoting the
social welfare or managerial purposes. To achieve the last two contri-
bution points, we investigate all the possible combinations of mergers
and acquisitions that could occur in the two banking sectors and we
are motivated by the substantial changes that have been taking place
since the summer of 2012 up to present in the Greek banking sector.
In what follows, we present a brief retrospect of our motivation.
Prior to the crisis, the Greek banking sector was highly compet-
itive by international standards, with sound fundamentals. But the
sovereign crisis put the sector under stress as banks experienced sub-
stantial deposit outows, became cut o¤ from capital markets, and
took sharp losses on Greek sovereign bonds. The banks responded by
deleveraging, a process that itself contributed to economic contraction
and created negative feedback loops between the nancial and real sec-
tors. Under these circumstances, the stability of the Greek banking
system was at risk, with possible implications beyond Greece. Un-
equivocally, a leaner, restructured Greek banking sector was needed.
In this environment, the Bank of Greece, in close cooperation with the
troika, set out to create a viable and well-capitalized banking sector,
recognizing that it would play a fundamental role in steering the future
course of the economy. Their strategy aimed at strengthening viable
institutions and wind down nonviable institutions while safeguarding
nancial stability. It included basically two fundamental points: i) a
major consolidation of the banking sector and ii) a restructuring and a
recapitalization of the newGreek banking sector. Regarding the rst
point, the idea was that the expected market shares of the remaining
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banks will ensure a competitive environment while allowing banks to
benet from economies of scale. Intention of the second point was to
create stronger, well-capitalized banks, new condence for depositors
and renewed access to capital markets so that nally Greek banks can
return to their basic role of nancing the Greek economy. This resulted
in a series of M&As until the end of 2013 and nally the creation of
four systemic banks who have been assigned the important role of sus-
taining and promoting the Greek economy and their recapitalisation
process through the European Financial Stability Fund (E.F.S.F) and
the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (H.F.S.F). In Table 2.12 we pro-
vide detailed information regarding the four systemic banks and all
this recent M&A activity as well as the remaining banks in the Greek
banking sector.
At this point we try to test two hypotheses related with M&A activ-
ity and di¤erent technological regimes. Firstly, we investigate whether
the recent wave of M&As that the Greek banking sector experienced,
allocates the newbank to either a higher or to a lower technological
regime in terms of e¢ ciency. Secondly we examine whether potential
M&As in both the Greek and the UK banking system will be benecial
for the newly created bank in terms of e¢ ciency. Before we continue
with the analysis of the results we highlight a di¤erence within the
examination strategy of potential M&A of the two systems. For the
UK banking sector, we select the nine most important banks in terms
of assets, deposits and loans that belong to the most e¢ cient techno-
logical regime (i.e. the rst one) and the eleven most important from
the second technologically and less e¢ cient group after we ensure that
each of these latter twenty banks is not a subsidiary of the remaining
nineteen. Table 2.13 includes information on all the UK banks and
their classication which we use in this analysis. Consequently, we
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create every potential combination of M&A among the nine and the
eleven respective banks in each regime. In this way we are able to test
whether the new bank would benet from the M&A activity through a
transition from the lesser to the more e¢ cient class or would deterio-
rate its e¢ ciency level through an exact opposite in terms of direction
transition. Turning our attention to the Greek banking Sector we note
that things are a bit more complicated due to the M&As that recently
took place. Specically, we select all the remaining banks that have
not been involved in the recent wave of consolidation of the four sys-
temic banks and we create all potential combinations of M&As either
among themselves or with one of the four cornerstones of the Greek
economy. Additionally we control for both single and multiple M&A
by one banking institution. Last but not least, regarding the four sys-
temic banks, we examine both their recentand potential M&As in
every possible combination (i.e., either one-by-one, two-by-two, etc. or
by all the acquired banks together), in order to test what would be the
banks regime-classication if it had not been involved in the recent
consolidation process and focus only in the potential cases of M&As.
In tables 2.14.a and 2.14.b we present all the cases of potential and
recent/potential M&A activity for the UK and Greece respectively and
their classication in the two di¤erent technological regimes33.
One of the most substantial nding as far as the Greek banking sec-
tor is concerned is that two out of the four newly designed engines to
33 Regarding the recentM&As cases that the Greek banking sector experienced,
we approach each one of these cases as a potential scenario in the economy, since
our sample is dated up to 2011 and the recent consolidation wave took place in 2012
and 2013.
Additionally, to construct the potential M&As combinations we exclude the banks
whose operations have been terminated in the last year of our sample (i.e. 2011)
and those who have terminated their operations after 2011 until present in order
for the results to be of relative policy importance.
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promote the Greek economic recovery, namely Eurobank and Piraeus,
after their series of acquisitions, are found to be in the less e¢ cient
technologically class as opposed to the other two ones, Alpha bank
and Ethniki bank, where despite their recent acquisitions, they still be-
long to the rst technological regime. On the one hand it seems that
if Eurobank had absorbed only TT-Hellenic Postbank, the new bank
would have resulted in the rst and higher e¢ ciency regime, whereas
the acquisition of just Proton bank (without TT-Hellenic Postbank) ,
would have deteriorated Eurobanks position before any M&A activ-
ity had occurred. On the other hand, it may be easier to comprehend
Piraeus banks case, since it is involved in the largest consolidation ac-
tivity which may encumber its e¢ ciency levels. In order to provide a
more thorough explanation, we look at each-one of the Piraeus banks
acquisitions separately and gradually we add to it another nancial
institution from the list of banks that were absorbed in the end. Ta-
ble 2.14.b demonstrates that only two banks, namely Marn-Egnatia
bank and Millenium bank after being acquired by Piraeus bank ei-
ther individually or simultaneously, would have led to a newly created
bank that would have been allocated to the most e¢ cient technologi-
cally class. On the contrary we nd evidence that every combination
of banking institutions regarding a potential M&A activity of Pireaus
bank with ATE bank and/or Geniki bank with or without the pres-
ence of Marn_Egnatia bank and Millenium bank, nds the new bank
in the second and less e¢ cient regime34. The last points cast major
doubts on the true origins of motivation from the point of view of the
Greek government, the EFSF, the HFSF and the executive boards of
the nancial institutions that were involved in the recent wave of consol-
34 We study every combination of potential M&As activity of Pireaus bank which
can be consisted from two up to ve banking institutions.
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idation in Greece. To be more explicit, we cast doubts on the decision
of the policy makers and involving banks in the selection process of
which nancial institution will be the acquirer and which the target is
concerned, regarding the true social welfare benet of the consolidation
process. However, we conrm the concerns of the o¢ cials, regarding
the cancelled attempt of consolidation among the two of the four big
banks, namely Ethiki and Eurobank, since we nd a potential M&A
activity among them in the less e¢ cient technological regime.
Turning our attention now to potential M&As between the four
cornerstones of the new era of the Greek economy and four remain-
ing banking institutions namely, Attica bank, Aegean bank, Panellinia
bank and Pancretan co-operative bank35, we get some insightful out-
comes. We examine all potential combinations of consolidation between
the last four banking institutions, which are equally split among the two
technological regimes, with or without the four systemic banks and be-
fore and after their recent acquiring activity as well. It is noteworthy to
see, that all potential M&As of each of the four remaining banks with
each of the systemic banks before they got involved in the recent con-
solidation, would have resulted the new bank to be classied to the rst
technological regime. This would be even more important for Attica
bank and Panellinia bank which would upgrade their e¢ ciency levels
since they both belong to the second class. Shedding light on all fu-
ture possible combinations of M&As between the remaining four banks
and the status-quo of the four systemic banks reveals that the two co-
operative banks (Pancretan and Panellinia) and Aegean bank create
combinations of M&As where most of the times the new bank is found
35 Attica bank and Aegean bank are commercial banking institutions, whereas
Panellinia bank and Pancretan co-operative bank deal with co-operative banking
activities.
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to be classied in the rst technological regime. The rst systemic bank,
Alpha bank, in the aftermath of Emporikis acquisition, seems to create
four out of fourteen of its overall potential combinations of M&As that
are found to exhibit high e¢ ciency levels, i.e. belong in the rst tech-
nological class. These four prospective scenarios are constituted by the
two co-operative banks and in two cases of the Aegean bank as well (see
Table 2.14.b Potential M&As). We nd a similar picture regarding
Ethniki bank (and FFB bank and Probank as well) and its potential
combinations of consolidation with the non-systemic banks. The esti-
mation results show that in 30% of the overall cases the new bank will
be allocated in the rst and most e¢ cient technological class and thus
enhance its level of cost e¢ ciency due to the prospective consolidation
activity. All the cases include Pancreatan bank. Nevertheless, there
is a high frequency of appearance of both Attica bank and Panellinia
bank which is of extreme importance, since those two nancial institu-
tions are found initially in the lower technologically e¢ cient class. On
the contrary, approximately only 7% of the potential combinations of
the current structure of Eurobank (accompanied with New Proton bank
and New TT-Hellenic Postbank) with the four non-systemic banks, cre-
ates a new bank which will have higher levels of e¢ ciency. This will
consist of a potential M&A activity between the new systemicEu-
robank and Pancretan bank. The remaining systemic bank, Pireaus
bank ( with ATE bank, Geniki bank, Marn-Egnatia bank and Mil-
lenium bank as well), creates just twice more the Eurobanks M&As
cases that result in the rst technological regime (i.e which have en-
hanced e¢ ciency levels). This consists of potential combinations of
M&As among the new systemicPiraeus bank either with Attica bank
or with Attica bank and one of Aegean bank or Pancretan-Cooperative
bank. All these results strengthen our initial and main nding, regard-
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ing, that two out of the four systemic banks we nd to be classied
in the highest in terms of e¢ ciency technological class, are the ones
that create potential combinations of consolidation whose e¢ ciency is
enhanced after the potential M&A activity. As a last exercise, we ex-
amine the non-systemic banks and their potential interactions. By the
empirical evidence that we provide we can infer that 30% of the overall
potential combinations of those four banking institutions is classied in
the rst technological regime. All the successful (i.e enhanced e¢ ciency
after the consolidation process) combinations consist of either Aegean
bank or Pancretan bank with either Attica bank or with the joined
combination of both Attica bank and Panellinia bank together. This
outcome is of great interest since both Attica bank and Panellinia bank
belong to the second technological regime and thus by the empirical
evidence it seems that both can achieve higher e¢ ciency levels after
a potential consolidation activity either with Aegean bank or Pancre-
tan bank. In turn, our results indicate that there are still considerable
economies of scale for the smaller nancial institutions in Greece that
need to be exploited and there are additional e¢ ciency gains and ben-
ets of synergies that could be derived from the correct consolidation
actions which will enable economic prosperity and growth.
Next, we focus our analysis on the UK banking sector and its po-
tential consolidation wave. Table 2.14.a demonstrates the results about
all potential M&As activity regarding the twenty (nine in the rst tech-
nological regime and eleven in the second) most important players in
terms of assets, loans and deposits at the end of our sample period.
Since for each potential M&A case among the nine nancial institu-
tions that belong ex-ante to the rst class, we nd the newbank to be
classied in the same technological regime, for abbreviation purposes
we do not report them in table 2.14.a. We display every potential com-
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bination of M&As among not just the twenty nancial institutions in
general, but, among the eleven banks that are found ex-ante in the sec-
ond regime as well, in order to examine whether a specic consolidation
movement can have as a result the transition of the newbank in the
more e¢ cient regime (i.e the rst one).
As far as the category of potential M&As among the banks that
belong in the two di¤erent regimes is concerned, we notice from table
2.14.a that in approximately 40% of the cases the newnancial in-
stitution will be allocated in the rst and most e¢ cient technological
regime. It is noteworthy that 20% of these potential M&A case, are
constituted by a building society, namely Nationwide, and not a bank.
Additionally, our results indicate that two of the big four of the UK
banking sector, namely Barclays and HSBC, account for more than a
quarter of the potential M&As cases which result in enhanced e¢ ciency,
whereas the remaining two large UK banks (RBS, Lloyds) account ap-
proximately for just a 13% of potential M&As that create a nancial
institution with higher e¢ ciency level than before. This might reect
the calamitous impact of the nancial crisis on the latter pair of banks
which resulted in the ample nancial assistance by the UK government
with the aim of avoiding collapse of both banks36. Regarding the banks
that belonged to the second group before they were involved in M&A
activity we notice that in 75% of the cases, three banks and one building
society, namely Alpha Bank, Bank of Beirut, Bank Leumi and Progres-
sive Building Society, are found to create a nancial institution that
belongs to the most e¢ cient class following their consolidation with
their peers from the rst technological regimes. We now examine the
36 In 2008 and 2009, the UK government bailed out RBS and Lloyds. As a result
both of them were partially nationalized.
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potential combinations of consolidation among the nancial institutions
that belong only in the second technological regime. Contrary to the
previous picture, from table 2.14.a, we infer that approximately in only
25% of the overall cases we nd the new bank to be classied in the
rst regime. What is interesting is that these four banks account even
in this specic analysis for two-thirds of the situations where we experi-
ence a transition towards a more e¢ cient technological regime. Lastly
our results show that Sainsburys, the largest nancial institution from
those that belong to the second regime, would experience a transition
to the rst and more e¢ cient technological class if it merged with one of
either the big-fourof the UK banking system, or Sandander, Standard
Chartered and Citibank.
On the whole among the two banking sectors, we notice some im-
portant similarities and di¤erences. To begin with, before the recent
wave of consolidation in Greece, both countries big four banks be-
longed to the rst technological regime. Whereas we nd that this is
status quo only for UK , in Greece two of its nancial and economic cor-
nerstones moved to the second technological regime as a consequence
of their specic acquisition strategies. It is worth mentioning that in
both countries, particularly for the smaller banks, there are signi-
cant economies of scale that need to be exploited, even though this is
more apparent in the Greek banking system. Furthermore, there is a
moderate potential of increased e¢ ciency in both countries that can
be achieved by a series of specic M&A between nancial institutions
that are allocated to the second technological regime. This, can have a
crucial positive impact on the social well-being, by increasing liquidity
and consequenlty increasing investment opportunities with an ultimate
impact the promotion of growth.
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2.6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, for the rst time evidence is provided on the existence of
heterogeneous technological regimes in two absolutely di¤erent banking
systems in terms of "sophistication, market characteristics and volume
of transactions", that of the UK and Greece. Contrary to previous
cross-country studies in the framework of a latent class stochastic fron-
tier model that derive their country-specic inferences by assuming a
common sample for all di¤erent countries and thus neglecting substan-
tial di¤erences that exist among them, we attempt to compare the
countries of interest by examining them separately. Furthermore, we
employ two di¤erent modelling strategies to test the sensitivity and
the robustness of our results. To the best of our knowledge from all
previous e¢ ciency related banking studies, not only is the period we
investigate the largest, but we allow for di¤erent nancial institutions
in terms of their "activities" as well. The former allows us to capture
all the important developments of both banking sectors while the lat-
ter enables us to examine thoroughly the entire banking system of each
country.
The results suggest that bank-heterogeneity in both countries is
fully controlled by two di¤erent technological classes. More precisely,
the rst regime in each banking system consists of the most e¢ cient
credit institutions. We nd, strong empirical evidence of a trade-o¤
with regard to e¢ ciency and the level of sophistication of a banking
system. The ndings hold across both di¤erent modelling strategies
that we follow and after various robustness tests that we perform. Fur-
thermore, we address with a circumspect manner and from a social
well-being point of view the decisions of policymakers with regard to
the selection of specic acquirers and targets during a recent wave of
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consolidation that took place in the Greek banking sector. Finally
we provide detailed empirical evidence of enhanced e¢ ciency in both
countries as result of potential M&As.
Given the important role that the banking sector plays in the nan-
cial development of the UK and Greece and in several more developed
and emerging economies, further research needs to be conducted in or-
der to analyse the implications of technology di¤erences among banks
in the spectrum of potential M&A which could lead to the enhance-
ment of growth and economic prosperity. This methodology could be
applied to more countries with high level of public debt, a special situ-
ation that gives a higher weight of importance to the prime role of the
banking sector in ensuring the nancial stability of the country. All in
all, attention should be given to di¤erent bank specic characteristics
such as managerial behaviour and corporate governance, which are not
accountable in nancial bank statements but still have a great impact
on the harmonic operation of nancial institution. Such considerations
could lead to more thorough inferences.
85
2.7 Appendix
Figure 2.1.a:  UK - Kernel density of the estimated variance of the inefficient component
Notes: This figure displays the kernel density estimators for the two sets of the variance of inefficiencies
{σ²u|k} as far as the UK banking sector is concerned .  The model is
                                                    lnC(it)=lnC(y[it],w[it],t ;β[k])+u[it|k]+v[it|k]
where subscripts i=1,....N, t=1,....,T_{i} and k=1,...,K, stand for bank, time and class respectively. C{it}
is individual bank total cost; y{it} and w{it} indicate vectors of output and input prices; β{k} is a
class-specific vector of parameters to be estimated.The two-sided random error term v[it|k] is assumed to
be independent of the non-negative cost efficiency variable u[it|k] for each class. Here the technology
is represented by a dual cost function. U_POOLED'  and  'U_2LC' refer to a model that assumes the same
(k=1) production technology for all the banks in the sample and to a model with two (k=2) latent classes
 respectively.
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Figure 2.1.b:  Greece - Kernel density of the estimated variance of the inefficient component
Notes: This figure displays the kernel density estimators for the two sets of the variance of inefficiencies
{σ²u|k} as far as the Greek banking sector is concerned .  The model is
                                                    lnC(it)=lnC(y[it],w[it],t ;β[k])+u[it|k]+v[it|k]
where subscripts i=1,....N, t=1,....,T_{i} and k=1,...,K, stand for bank, time and class respectively. C{it} is
individual bank total cost; y{it} and w{it} indicate vectors of output and input prices; β{k} is a
class-specific vector of parameters to be estimated.The two-sided random error term v[it|k] is assumed to be
independent of the non-negative cost efficiency variable u[it|k] for each class. Here the technology
is represented by a dual cost function. U_POOLED'  and  'U_2LC' refer to a model that assumes the same
(k=1) production technology for all the banks in the sample and to a model with two (k=2) latent classes
 respectively.
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year Num OBS   T.A (B) Gr. Ls (B) Dep. (B)  Eqt. (B)  L.L.P (M) HHI
1988 13 10.73 18.09 9.58 0.55 25.77 0.19
1989 40 16.6 26.98 14.33 0.86 338.95 0.12
1990 49 19.4 36.34 16.76 0.96 205.41 0.08
1991 53 21.63 37.9 18.64 1.11 287.72 0.08
1992 66 17.16 25.94 14.39 0.87 227.15 0.08
1993 69 15.95 23.62 13.04 0.81 147.54 0.07
1994 70 19.92 31.13 15.9 1.01 76.32 0.08
1995 80 14.56 22.57 11.56 0.89 45.88 0.06
1996 110 14.76 25.06 11.75 0.92 30.11 0.05
1997 114 18.04 29.84 14.22 0.99 38.9 0.08
1998 115 20.52 34.13 16.16 1.16 100.34 0.06
1999 116 18.3 29.59 14.47 1.2 73.44 0.05
2000 117 24.06 35.9 18.94 1.7 67.05 0.07
2001 120 23.65 34.3 18.73 1.77 95.16 0.06
2002 125 33.11 53.37 26.58 2.05 127.42 0.07
2003 127 35.3 63.01 27.02 2.76 137.02 0.06
2004 127 73.56 142.07 59.93 5.16 351.77 0.15
2005 126 87.6 150.83 62.92 4.42 223.69 0.12
2006 121 104.11 204.36 68.12 6.32 541.66 0.14
2007 120 132.24 264.95 98.8 8.22 579.07 0.23
2008 116 107.92 157.32 53.52 4.1 783.78 0.09
2009 116 87.82 142.22 53.25 7.16 971.87 0.08
2010 113 86.56 135.5 51.52 7.32 675.16 0.07
2011 101 138.39 213.96 80.69 10.43 863.94 0.08
Total 2324 1141.89 1938.98 790.82 72.74 7015.12 0.09
Notes: This table presents an overview of the UK banking system throughout our sample
period.  T.A, Gr. Ls, Dep., Eqt, L.L.P, HHI represent  average values of Total Assets, Gross
loans, Deposits,  Equity, Loans and loss Provisions and Market Concentration  (expressed
by the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) Index and it is defined as the sum of the squares of the
market shares of all banks in the sample for each year:  a HHI index below 0.01 indicates
a highly competitive index, a HHI index below 0.15 indicates an unconcentrated index, a
HHI index between 0.15 to 0.25 indicates moderate concentration, while a HHI index above
0.25 indicates high concentration.) respectively. 'B' stands for billions while 'M' for millions.
Table 2.1.a: UK - Time Series Analysis of characteristic banking indicators
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year Num OBS   T.A (B) Gr. Ls (B) Dep. (B)  Eqt. (B)  L.L.P (M) HHI
1993 19 3.84 5.24 3.28 0.17 12.91 0.21
1994 19 4.85 6.89 4.18 0.22 18.54 0.23
1995 19 6.05 8.7 5.25 0.26 13.78 0.21
1996 21 5.04 6.95 4.49 0.24 24.62 0.16
1997 21 5.74 6.92 5.07 0.27 32.97 0.2
1998 20 6.79 8.19 6.06 0.42 41.5 0.16
1999 16 8.77 9.1 7.47 0.9 45.36 0.16
2000 15 9.31 8.77 8.04 0.83 38.31 0.16
2001 15 9.94 8.76 8.77 0.76 44.99 0.17
2002 18 9.85 10.33 8.76 0.6 47.85 0.18
2003 20 11.84 14.96 10.17 0.81 75.79 0.16
2004 21 13.33 18.15 10.83 0.79 89.34 0.15
2005 21 13.44 15.86 10.93 0.93 75.35 0.14
2006 19 19.2 25.29 15.08 1.39 125.15 0.14
2007 19 26.95 39.68 19.55 2.27 120.8 0.13
2008 19 31.71 44.12 25.05 2.13 260.27 0.14
2009 19 34.67 49.95 28.1 2.85 424.91 0.14
2010 20 30.36 40.57 24.77 2.74 562.62 0.13
2011 15 30.54 39.51 26.21 1.1 1779.96 0.19
Total 356 282.22 367.94 232.06 19.68 3835.02 0.17
Notes: This table presents an overview of the Greek banking system throughout our sample
period.  T.A, Gr. Ls, Dep., Eqt, L.L.P, HHI represent  average values of Total Assets, Gross
loans, Deposits,  Equity, Loans and loss Provisions and Market Concentration  (expressed
by the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) Index and it is defined as the sum of the squares of the
market shares of all banks in the sample for each year:  a HHI index below 0.01 indicates
a highly competitive index, a HHI index below 0.15 indicates an unconcentrated index, a
HHI index between 0.15 to 0.25 indicates moderate concentration, while a HHI index above
0.25 indicates high concentration.) respectively. 'B' stands for billions while 'M' for millions.
Table 2.1.b: Greece - Time Series Analysis of characteristic banking indicators
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 Table 2.2.a: UK - Financial Intermediaries Analysis of characteristic banking indicators
name Years Num OBS   T.A (B) Gr. Ls (B) Dep. (B)  Eqt. (B)  L.L.P (M) Mar. Pr (%)
ABC Int. 1996-2011 16 3.19 1.38 2.33 0.41 5.72 0.35
AIB Bank 1992-2008 17 2.23 0.14 2.05 0.14 0 0.25
AIB Group 1995-2011 17 25.81 16.41 22.26 1.36 219.22 2.86
Abbey Nat. 1990-2011 22 190.34 27.9 126.34 3.65 45.36 21.09
Adam & Company 1989-2011 23 1.63 0.59 1.52 0.08 1.47 0.18
Ahli United 1989-2011 23 2.78 1.29 2.32 0.21 10.63 0.31
Alliance & Leic. BS 1988-1996 9 29.95 23.6 26.42 1.49 106.78 3.32
Alliance & Leic. Bank 1995-2006 12 5.44 1.65 4.32 0.45 6.17 0.6
Alliance & Leic. Plc 1996-2011 16 80.46 57.6 59.22 2.64 182.14 8.92
Alpha Bank 1989-2011 23 0.59 0.29 0.5 0.08 1.49 0.07
Anglo-Romanian 1989-2010 22 0.25 0.11 0.17 0.06 2.26 0.03
Arbuthnot 1991-2011 21 0.27 0.14 0.21 0.04 1.55 0.03
BMCE Int. 2006-2011 6 0.36 0.17 0.28 0.06 0.55 0.04
Bank Leumi 1996-2011 16 1.72 1.17 1.5 0.15 7.13 0.19
Bank Mandiri 1999-2011 13 0.17 0.08 0.11 0.05 3.42 0.02
Bank Saderat 1996-2011 16 0.82 0.18 0.55 0.19 0.61 0.09
Bank of Beirut 2002-2011 10 0.35 0.14 0.27 0.06 0.08 0.04
Bank of China 2007-2011 5 1.18 0.6 1.01 0.24 7.36 0.13
Bank of Cyprus 1997-2003 7 0.85 0.55 0.75 0.07 0.43 0.09
Bank of N.Y. Mellon 1997-2011 15 5.11 0.22 4.47 0.33 0 0.57
Bank of Scotland 1990-2011 22 368.13 256.88 260.55 12.28 3821.53 40.79
Bank of Tokyo 1988-1996 9 0.68 0.28 0.59 0.06 5.91 0.08
Bank of  Philip. Isl. 2009-2011 3 35.73 0.49 3.45 32.01 18 3.96
Barclays Bank 1992-2011 20 1262.61 431.68 647.54 42.14 3266.07 139.91
Barclays Priv. & Tr. 2002-2005 4 2.07 0.18 1.79 0.24 0.47 0.23
Barclays Priv. Clien. 2002-2008 7 27.88 4.01 26.22 1.06 10.92 3.09
Barnsley BS 1992-2007 16 0.45 0.34 0.41 0.03 0.27 0.05
Bath BS Sav. & Inv. 1995-2010 16 0.26 0.19 0.24 0.02 0.09 0.03
Beneficial Bank 1988-1998 11 2.2 1.95 1.31 0.23 98.35 0.24
Beverley BS 1996-2011 16 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.01 0.18 0.02
Birmingham Mid. BS 1988-1998 11 8.43 6.96 7.63 0.4 16.74 0.93
Bradford & Bingley BS 1988-1999 12 23.59 18.76 21.38 1.26 24.3 2.61
Bradford & Bingley Int. 2007-2010 4 3.91 3.74 3.53 0.37 0 0.43
Bradford & Bingley Bank 1999-2011 13 68.99 54.42 35.75 2.18 181.36 7.65
Bristol & West BS 1988-1996 9 10.93 8.83 9.81 0.54 39.43 1.21
Britannia BS 1989-2009 21 35.06 22.06 27.75 1.64 19.22 3.89
British Arab 1989-2011 23 2.68 0.62 2.3 0.21 5.32 0.3
Buckinghamshire BS 2003-2011 9 0.25 0.18 0.23 0.02 0.02 0.03
Butterfield Guernsey 1996-2011 16 1.12 0.22 1.02 0.07 0.62 0.12
Butterfield Holdings 1992-2010 19 0.5 0.11 0.44 0.05 -0.01 0.06
Cambridge BS 1996-2011 16 1.24 0.91 1.15 0.08 0.49 0.14
Capital One 2002-2011 10 6.96 6.07 2.64 0.65 382.69 0.77
Catholic BS 1997-2007 11 0.06 0.04 0.06 0 0 0.01
Chelsea BS 1990-2009 20 12.72 9.61 11.08 0.55 12.7 1.41
Cheltenham & Gloucester BS 1988-1995 8 22.82 19.26 20.98 1.08 79.71 2.53
Cheltenham & Gloucester Bank 1996-2011 16 66.45 94.73 88.26 2.41 -6.19 7.36
Cheshire BS 1990-2007 18 5.2 4.02 4.07 0.25 4.04 0.58
Citibank 1989-2011 23 31.44 9.95 24.01 2.69 234.57 3.48
City of Derry BS 1998-2010 13 0.04 0.03 0.04 0 0.16 0
Co-operative 1990-2011 22 17.88 11.85 15.27 0.93 112.16 1.98
Consolidated Credits 2002-2011 10 0.15 0 0.12 0.03 0 0.02
Coventry BS 1989-2011 23 18.11 12.92 15.16 0.71 8.33 2.01
Credit Agricole 2000-2004 5 2.6 0.47 1.45 0.07 0 0.29
Credit Suisse 1997-2011 15 1.75 0.44 1.59 0.09 0 0.19
Cuscatlan Bank and Trust 2002-2006 5 0.33 0.19 0.28 0.04 0.38 0.04
(Continued)
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 Table 2.2.a: UK - Financial Intermediaries Analysis of characteristic banking indicators (Continued)
name Years Num OBS   T.A (B) Gr. Ls (B) Dep. (B)  Eqt. (B)  L.L.P (M) Mar. Pr (%)
DB UK 1996-2011 16 14.44 3 7.57 1.31 1.39 1.6
Darlington BS 1996-2011 16 0.87 0.67 0.8 0.06 0.52 0.1
Derbyshire BS 1992-2007 16 6.4 5.02 5.85 0.34 0.92 0.71
Dexia Municipal 1992-1999 8 0.61 0.52 0.53 0.05 0.28 0.07
Dunbar 1995-2010 16 1.12 0.99 0.85 0.21 70.78 0.12
Duncan Lawrie 2008-2010 3 0.24 0.06 0.2 0.04 0 0.03
Dunfermline BS 1992-2007 16 3.26 2.52 2.99 0.17 0.84 0.36
Ecology BS 1997-2011 15 0.1 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.01
Egg 1996-2011 16 11.89 7.14 9.81 0.58 258.35 1.32
Europe Arab 2005-2011 7 5.61 2.51 5.38 0.42 47.33 0.62
FBN 2003-2011 9 1.49 0.34 1.25 0.11 -1.35 0.17
FIBI 1996-2011 16 0.35 0.25 0.27 0.07 0.63 0.04
Fairbairn 1998-2011 14 1.01 0.26 0.94 0.06 0.3 0.11
Finsbury Pavement 1991-2006 16 0.8 0.16 0.58 0.17 0.17 0.09
Furness BS 1996-2011 16 1.2 0.93 1.1 0.07 0.36 0.13
Gainsborough BS 1992-2000 9 0.05 0.03 0.04 0 0 0.01
Ghana 1998-2011 14 0.51 0.05 0.43 0.07 0.16 0.06
Gresham Trust 1993-2000 8 0.15 0 0.02 0.13 0 0.02
HBOS 2000-2011 12 494.11 387.03 383.7 26.91 7010.74 54.75
HFC 1989-2011 23 4.29 3.25 2.35 0.46 230.8 0.48
HSBC Middle East 1989-2011 23 12.93 7.17 10.38 1.04 144.53 1.43
HSBC 1989-2011 23 488.09 200.1 279.61 22.28 1175.48 54.09
Habib Allied 2001-2011 11 122.81 40.29 103.93 11.85 246.18 13.61
Habibsons 1996-2011 16 0.32 0.08 0.29 0.02 0.41 0.04
Halifax 1996-2006 11 301.63 220.16 264.75 10.49 526.95 33.43
Harpenden BS 1996-2011 16 0.21 0.16 0.19 0.01 0.09 0.02
Heritable 1989-2007 19 0.46 0.41 0.38 0.05 1.3 0.05
ICBC 2003-2011 9 0.91 0.35 0.72 0.16 -0.16 0.1
Ilkeston Permanent BS 1997-2000 4 0.03 0.02 0.02 0 0 0
Isle of Man Bank Limited 1995-2011 17 5.09 1.11 4.64 0.36 0.27 0.56
Italian Int. 1988-1997 10 2.37 0.35 2.14 0.12 1.16 0.26
JP Morgan 1996-2011 16 1.95 1.5 0.14 0.98 0 0.22
Jordan Int. 1996-2011 16 0.33 0.07 0.28 0.04 6.69 0.04
KDB Bank 1992-1998 7 0.38 0.08 0.31 0.05 5 0.04
Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander 1989-2007 19 1968.65 1233.45 1638.98 144.34 7931.22 218.15
Kingdom 2009-2011 3 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.4 0.01
Kookmin 1995-2010 16 0.26 0.03 0.21 0.04 1.46 0.03
Lazard & Co Holdings 1999-2011 13 1.1 0.31 0.81 0.21 0 0.12
Leeds BS 1989-2011 23 9.75 7.63 8.28 0.53 23.14 1.08
Leek United BS 1996-2011 16 1.1 0.86 1.01 0.07 0.15 0.12
Lloyds (BLSA) 1992-2001 10 1.96 0.72 1.7 0.12 13.81 0.22
Lloyds 1988-1998 11 132.06 78.23 109.79 5.85 999.95 14.63
Lloyds TSB 1998-2011 14 539.94 309.35 373.09 25.28 3962.68 59.83
Lloyds TSB Scotland 1989-2010 22 11.54 8.41 10.4 0.73 43.28 1.28
London Int. 2001-2006 6 0.01 0 0 0.01 0 0
London Trust 1991-1998 8 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.7 0.01
MBNA Europe Bank 1995-2010 16 11.94 9.83 6.49 1.82 607.25 1.32
Manchester BS 1990-2011 22 0.83 0.64 0.75 0.05 0.99 0.09
Mansfield Building Society 1995-2011 16 0.32 0.25 0.29 0.03 0.05 0.04
Market Harborough BS 1998-2011 14 0.64 0.5 0.59 0.04 0.03 0.07
Marsden BS 1996-2011 16 0.53 0.38 0.48 0.04 0.59 0.06
Melli 2001-2011 11 1.54 0.19 1.14 0.27 4.49 0.17
Melton Mowbray BS 1996-2011 16 0.6 0.43 0.54 0.05 0.2 0.07
Mercantile BS 1992-2005 14 0.29 0.22 0.26 0.02 0.04 0.03
Merrill Lynch 1990-2005 16 11.59 5.81 8.24 0.8 3.28 1.28
(Continued)
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 Table 2.2.a: UK - Financial Intermediaries Analysis of characteristic banking indicators (Continued)
name Years Num OBS   T.A (B) Gr. Ls (B) Dep. (B)  Eqt. (B)  L.L.P (M) Mar. Pr (%)
Morgan Stanley 2001-2011 11 7.61 2.14 4.1 1.02 17.26 0.84
National Bank of Kuwait 1996-2011 16 1.88 0.65 1.55 0.28 0.66 0.21
National Counties BS 1996-2011 16 1.57 1.15 1.11 0.44 1.28 0.17
National Westminster 1989-2011 23 294.59 167.49 240.32 14.12 2146.48 32.65
Nationwide BS 1990-2011 22 175.11 135.5 145.05 6.57 241.61 19.41
Newcastle BS 1989-2011 23 5.16 4.02 4.48 0.27 3.85 0.57
Northern 1995-2010 16 7.54 5.71 6.24 0.48 42.29 0.84
Northern Rock 1996-2011 16 89.7 72.91 51.35 2.29 370.68 9.94
Northern Rock BS 1987-1996 10 10.41 8.61 9.56 0.48 14.03 1.15
Norwich & Peterborough BS 1995-2010 16 5.52 4.17 5.07 0.27 4.93 0.61
Nottingham BS 1992-2011 20 3.07 2.48 2.82 0.18 0.92 0.34
PNB 1997-2011 15 0.03 0 0.02 0.01 0.11 0
Penrith BuS 2008-2011 4 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.02 0 0.02
Portman BS 1989-2006 18 15.72 11.46 13.84 0.77 7.4 1.74
Principality BS 1989-2011 23 6.22 4.72 5.48 0.34 9.59 0.69
Progressive BS 1996-2011 16 1.84 1.46 1.71 0.09 1.46 0.2
Prudential-Bache 1996-2001 6 0.58 0.21 0.48 0.08 0 0.06
Riggs 1989-2004 16 0.41 0.24 0.34 0.05 4.45 0.05
Riyad 1993-1997 5 0.16 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.1 0.02
Royal Bank of Scotland Int. 1996-2008 13 29.11 5.41 26.63 2.08 35.04 3.23
Royal Bank of Scotland 1995-2011 17 930.46 401.98 482.44 42.5 4124.73 103.11
Saffron BS 1996-2011 16 1.09 0.77 1.01 0.06 0.36 0.12
Sainsbury's 2002-2011 10 6.86 3.65 6.2 0.31 104.87 0.76
Santander 1989-2011 23 243.49 150.01 177.69 8.59 461.62 26.98
Schroders 1989-2011 23 8.2 1.03 3.9 1.6 5.18 0.91
Secure Trust 1999-2011 13 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.01 1.11 0.01
Shepshed BS 1997-2011 15 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.01 0.08 0.01
Skipton BS 1989-2011 23 13.26 9.2 11.44 0.71 16.35 1.47
Staffordshire BS 1989-2002 14 1.82 1.5 1.64 0.13 1.7 0.2
Standard 2000-2011 12 21.72 5.95 12.61 1.01 31.88 2.41
Standard Chartered 1998-2011 14 240.37 102.85 145.94 16.09 677.87 26.64
Standard Chartered Plc 1990-2011 22 122.96 72.43 124.62 11.31 601.8 13.63
Stroud & Swindon BS 1994-2009 16 3.64 2.61 3.38 0.14 0.45 0.4
Swansea BS 1996-2011 16 0.16 0.11 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.02
TSB 1988-1997 10 41.56 27.36 35.78 2.69 276.84 4.61
Teachers' BS 1996-2011 16 0.36 0.28 0.25 0.11 -0.01 0.04
The Access 2008-2011 4 0.3 0.03 0.26 0.04 0 0.03
Tipton & Coseley BS 2001-2011 11 0.5 0.39 0.46 0.03 0.41 0.06
Turkish 1996-2011 16 0.18 0.06 0.16 0.03 0.04 0.02
Ulster 1989-2011 23 29.02 21.05 21.82 2.3 812.56 3.22
Union 2005-2011 7 0.94 0.04 0.87 0.05 -0.08 0.1
United National 2001-2011 11 0.23 0.09 0.16 0.06 0.15 0.03
United Trust 1999-2011 13 0.13 0.09 0.1 0.02 1.44 0.01
Unity Trust 1991-2011 21 0.54 0.12 0.49 0.04 1.08 0.06
Universal BS 1992-2005 14 0.6 0.48 0.54 0.03 0.31 0.07
VTB Capital 2004-2011 8 4.91 1.53 1.67 0.65 15.32 0.54
Vernon BS 1993-2011 13 51.9 39.3 48.13 3.51 9.98 5.75
Weatherbys 1997-2011 15 0.23 0.07 0.2 0.02 0.83 0.03
Wesleyan 2001-2011 11 0.16 0.05 0.15 0.02 0.98 0.02
West Merchant 1988-1997 10 4.39 0.78 3.79 0.13 7.81 0.49
Woolwich BS 1988-1996 9 34.41 28.12 31.44 1.81 83.53 3.81
Yorkshire BS 1989-2011 23 25.51 16.76 21.5 1.17 12.8 2.83
Total 2327 9024.17 4977.99 6409.96 500.22 42418.32 100
Notes: This table presents an overview of all the UK financial intermediaries throughout our sample  period.  T.A, Gr. Ls, Dep.,  Eqt, L.L.P, Mar. Pr
represent average values of Total Assets, Gross loans, Deposits,  Equity, Loans and loss Provisions and Market Power (measured as each bank's share
of the indrustry's total assets) respectively. 'B' stands for billions while 'M' for millions.
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Table 2.2.b: Greece- Financial Intermediaries Analysis of characteristic banking indicators
name Years Num OBS   T.A (B) Gr. Ls (B) Dep. (B)  Eqt. (B)  L.L.P (M) Mar. Pr (%)
Aegean Baltic 2003-2011 9 0.3 0.17 0.23 0.07 1.59 0.1
Agricultural (ATE) 1993-2011 19 22.86 16.02 20.41 1.16 154.05 7.8
Alpha 1993-2011 19 37.62 24.22 28.64 2.42 422.81 12.9
Attica 1993-2011 19 2.9 2.16 2.54 0.25 33.54 1
Bank of Athens 1993-1997 5 0.36 0.18 0.32 0.03 2.15 0.1
Bank of Central Greece 1993-1998 6 0.51 0.24 0.44 0.05 2.84 0.2
Bank of Crete (Cretabank) 1993-1998 6 1.24 0.62 1.13 0.07 6.38 0.4
Emporiki  (Commercial) 1993-2011 19 21.58 14.61 17.91 1.19 313.21 7.4
Ergobank 1993-1999 7 4.21 1.6 3.53 0.34 18.21 1.4
Eurobank Ergasias 1993-2011 19 42.12 26.19 33.16 2.66 753.08 14.4
FBB First Business 2002-2011 10 1.76 1.39 1.59 0.15 27.33 0.6
General 1993-2011 19 3.5 2.71 3.13 0.19 103.4 1.2
Ionian and Popular 1993-1998 6 5.53 1.75 4.79 0.26 39.29 1.9
Laiki 1993-2005 13 1.62 1.04 1.47 0.12 16.96 0.6
Macedonia Thrace 1993-1999 7 1.53 0.62 1.32 0.14 12.58 0.5
Marfin 1993-2005 13 0.48 0.2 0.43 0.04 4.28 0.2
Marfin Egnatia 1993-2010 18 8.58 5.59 7.34 0.5 70.25 2.9
Millennium 2000-2011 12 5.7 4.24 4.7 0.33 31.51 1.9
National Bank of Greece (Ethiki) 1993-2011 19 68.15 35.19 58.65 4.02 465.16 23.3
National Mortgage Bank 1993-1997 5 7.09 3.53 5.63 0.22 8.3 2.4
Omega 2001-2004 4 0.76 0.45 0.67 0.08 2.7 0.3
PRObank 2001-2011 11 3.42 2.42 3.03 0.3 35.49 1.2
Pancretan Cooperative 2002-2011 10 1.74 1.42 1.49 0.19 0 0.6
Panellinia 2005-2011 7 1.04 0.78 0.91 0.11 12.34 0.4
Piraeus 1993-2011 19 25.57 17.15 20.84 1.42 332.39 8.8
Proton 2002-2010 9 1.92 0.98 1.59 0.28 19.76 0.7
T Bank 1993-2010 18 2.26 1.58 1.89 0.14 11.55 0.8
TELESIS Investment 1993-2000 8 0.35 0.14 0.25 0.08 1.53 0.1
TT Hellenic Postbank 1998-2011 14 16.51 5.78 14.72 1.32 37.74 5.7
Xiosbank 1993-1998 6 0.93 0.35 0.84 0.05 3.18 0.3
Total 356 292.12 173.29 243.58 18.16 2943.63 100
Notes: This table presents an overview of all the Greek financial intermediaries throughout our sample  period.  T.A, Gr. Ls, Dep.,  Eqt, L.L.P, Mar. Pr
represent average values of Total Assets, Gross loans, Deposits,  Equity, Loans and loss Provisions and Market Power (measured as each bank's share
of the indrustry's total assets) respectively. 'B' stands for billions while 'M' for millions.
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Table 2.3.a: UK - Descriptive Statistics of the variables of interest.
Variable Mean St. Dev Percentiles
5th 95th
Kernel determinants
Total Cost tc 1147.161 174.709 804.612 1489.709
Price of borrowed funds w1 0.126 0.019 0.089 0.163
Price of labor w2 0.023 0.001 0.021 0.025
Price of physical capital w3 6.36 0.744 4.901 7.82
Total loans y1 26154.18 2781.631 20700.58 31607.78
Total earning assets y2 21727.69 2127.914 17555.82 25899.56
Off-balance sheet items y3 14404.49 1150.945 12147.57 16661.41
Equity eq 2925.062 327.158 2283.656 3566.467
Inefficiency determinants
Time z1 14.375 0.092 14.194 14.556
Size z2 48946.8 4949.264 39243.56 58650.03
Class  determinants
Capital adeqaucy q1 0.157 0.003 0.15 0.163
Liquidity risk q2 0.511 0.005 0.502 0.521
Credit risk q3 0.946 0.264 0.427 1.464
Service concentration q4 0.566 0.004 0.559 0.573
Profitability q5 0.024 0.013 0.021 0.089
Notes: This table refers to 1,856 observations and 124 UK financial institutions between 1988-2011.
The table reports descriptive statistics of the kernel, inefficiency and the class membership variables we
use in the estimation of the latent class stochastic cost frontier model (apart from the dummy variable
that represents the type of the financial institution, i.e. 'BS') as described in Figure 2.1.a. All monetary
variables are deflated using 2005 as a base year. Kernel determinants consist of the dependent variable,
i.e. total cost (tc), inputs prices (w), output quantities (q) and equity (eq) as a quasi-fixed input variable.
Inefficiency determinants (z) consist of 'Time'= time-trend and 'Size' = bank's real assets. Finally the class
ratio, determinants (q) consist of 'Capital adequacy' = equity to assets ratio, 'Liquidity risk' = loans to
 assets 'Credit risk'= loans loss provisions to total assets ratio and 'Service Concentration' = the sum
of the squared ratios of the value of each output to the total value of outputs of each financial institution.
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Table 2.3.b: Greece - Descriptive Statistics of the variables of interest.
Variable Mean St. Dev Percentiles
5th 95th
Kernel determinants
Total Cost tc 392.932 38.422 317.365 468.499
Price of borrowed funds w1 0.058 0.002 0.054 0.062
Price of labor w2 0.017 0.0005 0.016 0.018
Price of physical capital w3 1.549 0.303 0.952 2.146
Total loans y1 6913.851 625.514 5683.612 8144.091
Total earning assets y2 4248.469 369.007 3522.74 4974.198
Off-balance sheet items y3 2899.264 384.447 2142.604 3655.925
Equity eq 812.078 73.574 667.383 956.773
Inefficiency determinants
Time z1 9.938 0.291 9.366 10.51
Size z2 14750.98 1378.103 12040.71 17461.25
Class  determinants
Capital adeqaucy q1 0.1 0.005 0.09 0.11
Liquidity risk q2 0.556 0.01 0.535 0.576
Credit risk q3 0.127 0.036 0.056 0.197
Service concentration q4 0.464 0.006 0.453 0.475
Profitability q5 0.0016 0.0019 0.0022 0.0033
Notes: This table refers to 356 observations and 30 Greek financial institutions between 1993-2011. The
table reports descriptive statistics of the kernel, inefficiency and the class membership variables we use
in the estimation of the latent class stochastic cost frontier model (apart from the dummy variable that
represents the onwership of the financial institution, i.e. 'OWNER') as described in Figure 2.1.b. All
monetary variables are deflated using 2005 as a base year. Kernel determinants consist of the dependent
variable, i.e. total cost (tc), inputs prices (w), output quantities (q) and equity (eq) as a quasi-fixed input
variable. Inefficiency determinants (z) consist of 'Time'= time-trend and 'Size' = bank's real assets. Finally
the class determinants (q) consist of 'Capital adequacy' = equity to assets ratio, 'Liquidity risk' = loans to
assets ratio, 'Credit risk'= loans loss provisions to total assets ratio and 'Service Concentration' = the sum
of the squared ratios of the value of each output to the total value of outputs of each financial institution.
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Table 2.4.a: UK - Selection of the number of latent classes
No. of classes No. of banks No. of Param. Log-Likelihood AIC BIC
Pooled Model 1 124 12 -456.9226 0.50998 0.54598
Latent Class 2 73(1) 51(2) 28 -251.6265 0.30411 0.38811
Notes: This table features stochastic frontier model estimations for 1 and 2 latent classes using 1,856 observations
and 124 UK financial institutions between 1988-2011.  The preferred model is the one with the lowest AIC and BIC
statistic.
Table 2.4.b: Greece - Selection of the number of latent classes
No. of classes No. of banks No. of Param. Log-Likelihood AIC BIC
Pooled Model 1 30 12 -4.211612 0.1247 0.28904
Latent Class 2 17(1) 13(2) 28 90.97407 -0.48442 -0.10096
Notes: This table features stochastic frontier model estimations for 1 and 2 latent classes using 356 observations
and 30 Greek financial institutions between 1993-2011.  The preferred model is the one with the lowest AIC and BIC
statistic.
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Table 2.5.a: UK - Average cost efficiency indexes with different number of classes
Year SFM with one Latent class SFM with two Latent classes
1988 0.48 0.68
1989 0.57 0.69
1990 0.49 0.68
1991 0.49 0.68
1992 0.58 0.67
1993 0.56 0.66
1994 0.58 0.65
1995 0.59 0.65
1996 0.61 0.66
1997 0.58 0.68
1998 0.61 0.7
1999 0.61 0.69
2000 0.58 0.66
2001 0.57 0.65
2002 0.57 0.64
2003 0.58 0.64
2004 0.61 0.65
2005 0.61 0.64
2006 0.61 0.64
2007 0.6 0.62
2008 0.6 0.62
2009 0.58 0.61
2010 0.56 0.59
2011 0.53 0.56
Total 0.57 0.65
Notes: This table reports the average cost efficiency scores for each year of the UK banking
industry, which are obtained by estimating stochastic frontier models with one and two
technological classes.
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Table 2.5.b: Greece - Average cost efficiency indexes with different number of classes
Year SFM with one Latent class SFM with two Latent classes
1993 0.63 0.69
1994 0.64 0.68
1995 0.66 0.69
1996 0.71 0.72
1997 0.68 0.76
1998 0.69 0.76
1999 0.67 0.73
2000 0.7 0.72
2001 0.71 0.73
2002 0.7 0.72
2003 0.7 0.71
2004 0.76 0.79
2005 0.73 0.82
2006 0.7 0.83
2007 0.72 0.86
2008 0.7 0.85
2009 0.69 0.84
2010 0.67 0.82
2011 0.64 0.79
Total 0.69 0.76
Notes: This table reports the average cost efficiency scores for each year of the Greek banking
industry, which are obtained by estimating stochastic frontier models with one and two
technological classes.
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Table 2.6.a: UK - Average cost efficiency estimates
Overall Sample LCM
Class1 Class2
Year Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs.
1988 0.68 6 0.68 6 - -
1989 0.69 29 0.73 22 0.48 7
1990 0.68 38 0.71 28 0.46 10
1991 0.68 42 0.7 31 0.49 11
1992 0.67 50 0.71 37 0.47 13
1993 0.66 52 0.69 38 0.48 14
1994 0.65 53 0.7 39 0.47 14
1995 0.65 62 0.69 42 0.5 20
1996 0.66 85 0.71 56 0.41 29
1997 0.68 89 0.67 58 0.43 31
1998 0.7 89 0.73 57 0.42 32
1999 0.69 90 0.72 55 0.42 35
2000 0.66 92 0.71 56 0.41 36
2001 0.65 96 0.73 59 0.34 37
2002 0.64 100 0.71 58 0.35 42
2003 0.64 103 0.71 59 0.39 44
2004 0.65 103 0.72 58 0.41 45
2005 0.64 104 0.71 58 0.4 46
2006 0.64 103 0.71 56 0.4 47
2007 0.62 99 0.7 57 0.37 42
2008 0.62 98 0.69 56 0.36 42
2009 0.61 97 0.68 55 0.34 42
2010 0.59 94 0.66 53 0.32 41
2011 0.56 82 0.63 50 0.3 32
Total 0.65 1856 0.7 1144 0.41 712
Notes: This table reports the average cost efficiency estimates for each year of the
UK banking industry with respect to the number of financial institutions that belong
to the first and to the second technological class.
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Table 2.6.b: Greece - Average cost efficiency estimates
Overall Sample LCM
Class1 Class2
Year Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs.
1993 0.69 21 0.77 13 0.44 8
1994 0.68 21 0.76 13 0.46 8
1995 0.69 21 0.77 13 0.49 8
1996 0.72 21 0.78 13 0.56 8
1997 0.76 21 0.8 13 0.52 8
1998 0.76 20 0.78 12 0.59 8
1999 0.73 16 0.76 8 0.57 8
2000 0.72 15 0.78 7 0.63 8
2001 0.73 16 0.78 7 0.65 9
2002 0.72 19 0.8 8 0.63 11
2003 0.71 20 0.8 9 0.64 11
2004 0.79 20 0.85 9 0.75 11
2005 0.82 20 0.88 9 0.76 11
2006 0.83 18 0.9 9 0.79 9
2007 0.86 18 0.91 9 0.82 9
2008 0.85 18 0.89 9 0.81 9
2009 0.84 18 0.89 9 0.81 9
2010 0.82 18 0.86 9 0.79 9
2011 0.79 15 0.83 8 0.77 7
Total 0.76 356 0.82 187 0.66 169
Notes: This table reports the average cost efficiency estimates for each year of the
Greek banking industry with respect to the number of financial institutions that belong
to the first and to the second technological class.
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Table 2.7.a: UK - Latent cost frontier, inefficiency, and class determinants estimates
Technology Class 1 2
Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er.
Kernel determinants
Constant 1.585 22.288 0.447 4.311
LNP1 0.059 7.732 0.07 2.495
LNP2 0.872 83.717 0.662 33.423
LNY1 0.482 33.109 0.292 8.623
LNY2 0.303 23.577 0.251 10.341
LNY3 -0.031 -4.045 -0.039 -2.141
LNEQ 0.183 9.549 0.32 4.681
Trend -0.001 -0.647 0.013 2.036
Ineffficient determinants
TIME -0.056 -5.589 0.047 3.153
SIZE 0.225 8.473 0.165 3.056
BS -0.884 -2.207 0.007 0.005
Class determinants
CONSTANT 0.78 5.944 Control Group
CAPITAL ADEQUACY 0.568 6.056 Control Group
LIQUIDITY RISK -0.736 4.694 Control Group
CREDIT RISK -0.263 -4.513 Control Group
SERV_CON -0.628 -3.637 Control Group
PROFITABILTY 1.472 0.864 Control Group
Sigma 0.181 4.837 0.388 5.876
Lambda 0.358 0.608 0.307 1.044
Number of observations 1144 712
Prior class probabilities at data means 0.573 0.427
Notes: The table feautures latent cost frontier, inefficiency, and class determinants estimates of 1856 observations for 124
UK financial institutions in the period 1988-2011. The estimation is conducted under a panel data nature methodology
(Orea and Kumbhakar 2004) which allows the efficiency term to vary every year. Dependent variable is lnTC/lnW3. Log
likelihood is -456.9226. Lamda (λ) and Sigma (σ) are efficient parameters, where λ ( = σu/σv), the ratio of the standard
deviation of efficiency over the standard deviation of the noise term, and σ ( = σu+σv), the composite standard deviation.
The variables are as described in Table 2.3.a.
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Table 2.7.b: Greece - Latent cost frontier, inefficiency, and class determinants estimates
Technology Class 1 2
Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er.
Kernel determinants
Constant 0.933 5.502 0.346 10.479
LNP1 0.042 6.286 0.713 12.876
LNP2 0.852 18.514 1.026 10.808
LNY1 0.529 10.5 0.626 8.171
LNY2 0.352 7.214 0.292 2.597
LNY3 -0.017 -4.862 0.087 5.383
LNEQ 0.133 3.034 0.023 4.156
Trend 0.177 1.851 0.104 2.722
Ineffficient determinants
TIME -0.075 -3.244 -0.143 -3.969
SIZE 0.694 6.298 0.297 2.879
Owner 0.267 0.435 0.703 0.33
Class determinants
CONSTANT 1.276 2.609 Control Group
CAPITAL ADEQUACY 0.547 4.831 Control Group
LIQUIDITY RISK -0.947 -5.874 Control Group
CREDIT RISK -0.686 -3.039 Control Group
SERV_CON -0.097 -0.982 Control Group
PROFITABILTY 0.001 0.222 Control Group
Sigma 0.948 11.63 0.974 26.655
Lambda 0.118 0.422 0.24 0.402
Number of observations 187 169
Prior class probabilities at data means 0.625 0.375
Notes: The table feautures latent cost frontier, inefficiency, and class determinants estimates of 356 observations for 30
Greek financial institutions in the period 1993-2011. The estimation is conducted under a panel data nature methodology
(Orea and Kumbhakar 2004) which allows the efficiency term to vary every year. Dependent variable is lnTC/lnW3. Log
likelihood is 90.97407. Lamda (λ) and Sigma (σ) are efficient parameters, where λ ( = σu/σv), the ratio of the standard
deviation of efficiency over the standard deviation of the noise term, and σ ( = σu+σv), the composite standard deviation.
The variables are as described in Table 2.3.b.
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Table 2.8.a: UK - Economies of Scale & Technical change
OVERALL LCM
 SAMPLE Class 1 Class 2
Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er.
Economies of scale 0.042 2.023 0.002 1.189 0.096 7.569
Technical Change -0.317 -6.012 -0.181 -5.647 -0.132 -1.836
Notes: This table feautures 1856 observations for 124 UK financial institutions in the period 1988-2011. Economies
of Scale are estimated as one minus the sum of elasticities of total costs with respect to outputs. Technical change is
etimated as the derivative of total costs with respect to time.
Table 2.8.b: Greece - Economies of Scale & Technical change
OVERALL LCM
 SAMPLE Class 1 Class 2
Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er.
Economies of scale 0.071 3.287 0.053 3.896 0.136 4.863
Technical Change -0.104 -2 .989 -0.177 -4.851 -0.705 -1.322
Notes: This table feautures 356 observations for 30 Greek financial institutions in the period 1993-2011. Economies
of Scale are estimated as one minus the sum of elasticities of total costs with respect to outputs. Technical change is
etimated as the derivative of total costs with respect to time.
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Table 2.9.a: UK - Classification of banks
Latent Class 1 Latent Class 2
name Years Num OBS name Years Num OBS
_1 ABC Int. 1996-2011 16 _1 AIB Group 1995-2011 17
_2 AIB Bank 1992-2008 17 _2 Abbey Nat. 1990-2011 22
_3 Adam & Company 1989-2011 23 _3 Alliance & Leic. Bank 1995-2006 12
_4 Ahli United 1989-2011 23 _4 Alpha Bank 1989-2011 23
_5 Alliance & Leic. Plc 1996-2011 16 _5 Anglo-Romanian 1989-2010 22
_6 Arbuthnot 1991-2011 21 _6 BMCE Int. 2006-2011 6
_7 Bank of China 2007-2011 5 _7 Bank Leumi 1996-2011 16
_8 Bank of Cyprus 1997-2003 7 _8 Bank Mandiri 1999-2011 13
_9 Bank of Tokyo 1988-1996 9 _9 Bank Saderat 1996-2011 16
_10 Barclays Bank 1992-2011 20 _10 Bank of Beirut 2002-2011 10
_11 Barclays Priv. & Tr. 2002-2005 4 _11 Bank of N.Y. Mellon 1997-2011 15
_12 Bath BS Sav. & Inv. 1995-2010 16 _12 Bank of Scotland 1990-2011 22
_13 Beneficial Bank 1988-1998 11 _13 Barclays Priv. Clien. 2002-2008 7
_14 Britannia BS 1989-2009 21 _14 Bradford & Bingley Bank 1999-2011 13
_15 Buckinghamshire BS 2003-2011 9 _15 British Arab 1989-2011 23
_16 Butterfield Guernsey 1996-2011 16 _16 Butterfield Holdings 1992-2010 19
_17 Cambridge BS 1996-2011 16 _17 Capital One 2002-2011 10
_18 Cheshire BS 1990-2007 18 _18 Chelsea BS 1990-2009 20
_19 Co-operative 1990-2011 22 _19 Citibank 1989-2011 23
_20 Coventry BS 1989-2011 23 _20 Cuscatlan Bank and Trust 2002-2006 5
_21 Credit Suisse 1997-2011 15 _21 DB UK 1996-2011 16
_22 Darlington BS 1996-2011 16 _22 Dunbar 1995-2010 16
_23 Dexia Municipal 1992-1999 8 _23 Egg 1996-2011 16
_24 Duncan Lawrie 2008-2010 3 _24 Europe Arab 2005-2011 7
_25 Dunfermline BS 1992-2007 16 _25 FBN 2003-2011 9
_26 FIBI 1996-2011 16 _26 Fairbairn 1998-2011 14
_27 Ghana 1998-2011 14 _27 Finsbury Pavement 1991-2006 16
_28 HSBC Middle East 1989-2011 23 _28 Gresham Trust 1993-2000 8
_29 HSBC 1989-2011 23 _29 HBOS 2000-2011 12
_30 Habib Allied 2001-2011 11 _30 Halifax 1996-2006 11
_31 Habibsons 1996-2011 16 _31 Heritable 1989-2007 19
_32 Isle of Man Bank Limited 1995-2011 17 _32 ICBC 2003-2011 9
_33 Italian Int. 1988-1997 10 _33 JP Morgan 1996-2011 16
_34 Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander 1989-2007 19 _34 Jordan Int. 1996-2011 16
_35 Kingdom 2009-2011 3 _35 KDB Bank 1992-1998 7
_36 Leeds BS 1989-2011 23 _36 Kookmin 1995-2010 16
_37 Lloyds (BLSA) 1992-2001 10 _37 Lazard & Co Holdings 1999-2011 13
_38 Lloyds 1988-1998 11 _38 London Int. 2001-2006 6
_39 Lloyds TSB 1998-2011 14 _39 MBNA Europe Bank 1995-2010 16
_40 Lloyds TSB Scotland 1989-2010 22 _40 Morgan Stanley 2001-2011 11
_41 London Trust 1991-1998 8 _41 Northern 1995-2010 16
_42 Manchester BS 1990-2011 22 _42 Northern Rock 1996-2011 16
_43 Marsden BS 1996-2011 16 _43 PNB 1997-2011 15
_44 Melli 2001-2011 11 _44 Progressive BS 1996-2011 16
_45 Melton Mowbray BS 1996-2011 16 _45 Riggs 1989-2004 16
_46 Merrill Lynch 1990-2005 16 _46 Sainsbury's 2002-2011 10
_47 National Bank of Kuwait 1996-2011 16 _47 The Access 2008-2011 4
_48 National Counties BS 1996-2011 16 _48 Ulster 1989-2011 23
_49 National Westminster 1989-2011 23 _49 Union 2005-2011 7
_50 Nationwide BS 1990-2011 22 _50 United Trust 1999-2011 13
(Continued)
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Table 2.9.a: UK - Classification of banks  (Continued)
Latent Class 1 Latent Class 2
name Years Num OBS name Years Num OBS
_51 Newcastle BS 1989-2011 23 _51 VTB Capital 2004-2011 8
_52 Nottingham BS 1992-2011 20
_53 Principality BS 1989-2011 23
_54 Prudential-Bache 1996-2001 6
_55 Riyad 1993-1997 5
_56 Royal Bank of Scotland Int. 1996-2008 13
_57 Royal Bank of Scotland 1995-2011 17
_58 Santander 1989-2011 23
_59 Schroders 1989-2011 23
_60 Secure Trust 1999-2011 13
_61 Skipton BS 1989-2011 23
_62 Standard 2000-2011 12
_63 Standard Chartered 1998-2011 14
_64 Standard Chartered Plc 1990-2011 22
_65 Stroud & Swindon BS 1994-2009 16
_66 Swansea BS 1996-2011 16
_67 TSB 1988-1997 10
_68 Turkish 1996-2011 16
_69 United National 2001-2011 11
_70 Unity Trust 1991-2011 21
_71 Weatherbys 1997-2011 15
_72 West Merchant 1988-1997 10
_73 Yorkshire BS 1989-2011 23
Total 1144 712
Notes: This table reports the classification of 124 UK financial institutions for the period 1988-2011 into the two latent technological
classes according to the regime membership determinants desribed in Table 2.3.a.
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Table 2.9.b: Greece - Classification of banks
Latent Class 1 Latent Class 2
name Years Num OBS name Years Num OBS
_1 Aegean Baltic 2003-2011 9 _1 Agricultural (ATE) 1993-2011 19
_2 Alpha 1993-2011 19 _2 Attica 1993-2011 19
_3 Bank of Athens 1993-1997 5 _3 Emporiki  (Commercial) 1993-2011 19
_4 Bank of Central Greece 1993-1998 6 _4 FBB First Business 2002-2011 10
_5 Bank of Crete (Cretabank) 1993-1998 6 _5 General 1993-2011 19
_6 Ergobank 1993-1999 7 _6 Laiki 1993-2005 13
_7 Eurobank Ergasias 1993-2011 19 _7 Macedonia Thrace 1993-1999 7
_8 Ionian and Popular 1993-1998 6 _8 Marfin 1993-2005 13
_9 National Bank of Greece (Ethiki) 1993-2011 19 _9 Marfin Egnatia 1993-2010 18
_10 National Mortgage Bank 1993-1997 5 _10 Millennium 2000-2011 12
_11 PRObank 2001-2011 11 _11 Omega 2001-2004 4
_12 Pancretan Cooperative 2002-2011 10 _12 Panellinia 2005-2011 7
_13 Piraeus 1993-2011 19 _13 Proton 2002-2010 9
_14 T Bank 1993-2010 18
_15 TELESIS Investment 1993-2000 8
_16 TT Hellenic Postbank 1998-2011 14
_17 Xiosbank 1993-1998 6
Total 187 169
Notes: This table reports the classification of 30 UK financial institutions for the period 1993-2011 into the two latent technological
classes according to the regime membership determinants desribed in Table 2.3.b.
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Table 2.10.a: UK - "Pooled-Cross Section Data", Latent cost frontier and class determinants estimates
Technology Class 1 2
Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er.
Kernel determinants
Constant 1.782 24.642 0.732 5.249
LNP1 0.081 8.019 0.076 2.893
LNP2 0.928 92.761 0.676 23.884
LNY1 0.491 36.534 0.292 8.623
LNY2 0.303 23.577 0.428 15.093
LNY3 -0.035 -4.824 -0.063 -3.691
LNEQ 0.183 9.549 0.32 4.682
Trend 0.009 4.37 0.054 2.847
Class determinants
CONSTANT 1.025 7.864 Control Group
CAPITAL ADEQUACY 0.894 8.186 Control Group
LIQUIDITY RISK -0.942 5.138 Control Group
CREDIT RISK -0.648 -4.975 Control Group
SERV_CON -0.849 -4.013 Control Group
PROFITABILTY 1.188 3.046 Control Group
Sigma 0.236 7.317 0.658 11.914
Lambda 0.748 0.964 0.483 1.204
Number of observations 1144 712
Prior class probabilities at data means 0.573 0.427
Notes: The tablepresents latent cost frontier, inefficiency, and class determinants estimates of 1856 observations for 124
UK financial institutions in the period 1988-2011. The estimation is conducted under a pooled cross-section methodology
(Bos et al. 2010) which permits each financial institution to switch between technology regimes over time. Dependent
variable is lnTC/lnW3. Log likelihood is -431.6557. Lamda (λ) and Sigma (σ) are efficient parameters, where λ ( = σu/σv),
the ratio of the standard deviation of efficiency over the standard deviation of the noise term, and σ ( = σu+σv), the
composite standard deviation. The variables are as described in Table 2.3.a.
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Table 2.10.b: Greece - "Pooled-Cross Section Data", Latent cost frontier and class determinants estimates
Technology Class 1 2
Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er.
Kernel determinants
Constant 1.024 5.749 0.412 11.723
LNP1 0.051 6.476 0.787 13.244
LNP2 0.938 19.247 1.122 11.625
LNY1 0.604 11.264 0.714 8.668
LNY2 0.378 7.461 0.313 2.934
LNY3 -0.019 -4.903 0.091 5.427
LNEQ 0.144 3.854 0.051 4.764
Trend 0.204 2.314 0.187 2.876
Class determinants
CONSTANT 1.258 2.897 Control Group
CAPITAL ADEQUACY 0.639 4.924 Control Group
LIQUIDITY RISK -1.014 -6.013 Control Group
CREDIT RISK -0.816 -3.944 Control Group
SERV_CON -0.849 -2.975 Control Group
PROFITABILTY 0.758 2.496 Control Group
Sigma 0.988 13.47 1.013 27.486
Lambda 0.247 0.549 0.285 0.501
Number of observations 187 169
Prior class probabilities at data means 0.642 0.358
Notes: The tablepresents latent cost frontier, inefficiency, and class determinants estimates of 356 observations for 30
Greek financial institutions in the period 1993-2011. The estimation is conducted under a pooled cross-section methodology
(Bos et al. 2010) which permits each financial institution to switch between technology regimes over time. Dependent
variable is lnTC/lnW3. Log likelihood is 98.4726. Lamda (λ) and Sigma (σ) are efficient parameters, where λ ( = σu/σv),
the ratio of the standard deviation of efficiency over the standard deviation of the noise term, and σ ( = σu+σv), the
composite standard deviation. The variables are as described in Table 2.3.b.
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Table 2.11.a: UK - Classification of banks before the financial crisis
Latent Class 1 Latent Class 2
name Years Num OBS name Years Num OBS
_1 ABC Int. 1996-2006 11 _1 AIB Group 1995-2006 12
_2 AIB Bank 1992-2006 15 _2 Abbey Nat. 1990-2006 17
_3 Adam & Company 1989-2006 18 _3 Alliance & Leic. Bank 1995-2006 12
_4 Ahli United 1989-2006 18 _4 Alpha Bank 1989-2006 18
_5 Alliance & Leic. Plc 1996-2006 11 _5 Anglo-Romanian 1989-2006 18
_6 Arbuthnot 1991-2006 16 _6 Bank Leumi 1996-2006 11
_7 Bank of Cyprus 1997-2003 7 _7 Bank Mandiri 1999-2006 8
_8 Bank of Tokyo 1988-1996 9 _8 Bank Saderat 1996-2006 11
_9 Barclays Bank 1992-2006 15 _9 Bank of Beirut 2002-2006 5
_10 Barclays Priv. & Tr. 2002-2005 4 _10 Bank of N.Y. Mellon 1997-2006 10
_11 Bath BS Sav. & Inv. 1995-2006 12 _11 Barclays Priv. Clien. 2002-2006 5
_12 Beneficial Bank 1988-1998 11 _12 British Arab 1989-2006 18
_13 Britannia BS 1989-2006 18 _13 Butterfield Holdings 1992-2006 15
_14 Buckinghamshire BS 2003-2006 4 _14 Cuscatlan Bank and Trust 2002-2006 5
_15 Butterfield Guernsey 1996-2006 11 _15 DB UK 1996-2006 11
_16 Cambridge BS 1996-2006 11 _16 Dunbar 1995-2006 12
_17 Cheshire BS 1990-2006 17 _17 Egg 1996-2006 11
_18 Co-operative 1990-2006 17 _18 FBN 2003-2006 4
_19 Coventry BS 1989-2006 18 _19 Fairbairn 1998-2006 9
_20 Credit Suisse 1997-2006 10 _20 Finsbury Pavement 1991-2006 16
_21 Darlington BS 1996-2006 11 _21 Gresham Trust 1993-2000 8
_22 Dexia Municipal 1992-1999 8 _22 Halifax 1996-2006 11
_23 Dunfermline BS 1992-2006 15 _23 Heritable 1989-2006 18
_24 FIBI 1996-2006 11 _24 ICBC 2003-2006 4
_25 HSBC Middle East 1989-2006 18 _25 JP Morgan 1996-2006 11
_26 HSBC 1989-2006 18 _26 Jordan Int. 1996-2006 11
_27 Habib Allied 2001-2006 6 _27 KDB Bank 1992-1998 7
_28 Habibsons 1996-2006 11 _28 Kookmin 1995-2006 12
_29 Isle of Man Bank Limited 1995-2006 12 _29 Lazard & Co Holdings 1999-2006 8
_30 Italian Int. 1988-1997 10 _30 London Int. 2001-2006 6
_31 Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander 1989-2006 18 _31 Morgan Stanley 2001-2006 6
_32 Leeds BS 1989-2006 18 _32 PNB 1997-2006 10
_33 Lloyds (BLSA) 1992-2001 10 _33 Progressive BS 1996-2006 11
_34 Lloyds 1988-1998 11 _34 Riggs 1989-2004 16
_35 Lloyds TSB 1998-2006 9 _35 Sainsbury's 2002-2006 5
_36 Lloyds TSB Scotland 1989-2006 17 _37 United Trust 1999-2006 8
_37 London Trust 1991-1998 8 _38 VTB Capital 2004-2006 3
_38 Manchester BS 1990-2006 17 _39 Ghana 1998-2006 9
_39 Marsden BS 1996-2006 11 _40 Riyad 1993-1997 5
_40 Melli 2001-2006 6 _41 United National 2001-2006 6
_41 Melton Mowbray BS 1996-2006 11
_42 Merrill Lynch 1990-2005 16
_43 National Bank of Kuwait 1996-2006 11
_44 National Counties BS 1996-2006 11
_45 National Westminster 1989-2006 17
_46 Nationwide BS 1990-2006 17
_47 Newcastle BS 1989-2006 18
_48 Nottingham BS 1992-2006 15
_49 Principality BS 1989-2006 18
_50 Prudential-Bache 1996-2001 6
(Continued)
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Table 2.11.a: UK - Classification of banks before the financial crisis (Continued)
Latent Class 1 Latent Class 2
name Years Num OBS name Years Num OBS
_51 Royal Bank of Scotland Int. 1996-2006 11
_52 Royal Bank of Scotland 1995-2006 12
_53 Santander 1989-2006 18
_54 Schroders 1989-2006 18
_55 Secure Trust 1999-2006 8
_56 Skipton BS 1989-2006 18
_57 Standard 2000-2006 7
_58 Standard Chartered 1998-2006 9
_59 Standard Chartered Plc 1990-2006 17
_60 Stroud & Swindon BS 1994-2006 13
_61 Swansea BS 1996-2006 11
_62 TSB 1988-1997 10
_63 Turkish 1996-2006 11
_64 Unity Trust 1991-2006 16
_65 Weatherbys 1997-2006 10
_66 West Merchant 1988-1997 10
_67 Yorkshire BS 1989-2006 18
_68 Bank of Scotland 1990-2006 17
_69 Bradford & Bingley Bank 1999-2006 8
_70 Capital One 2002-2006 5
_71 Chelsea BS 1990-2006 17
_72 Citibank 1989-2006 18
_73 HBOS 2000-2006 7
_74 MBNA Europe Bank 1995-2006 12
_75 Northern 1995-2006 12
_76 Northern Rock 1996-2006 11
_77 Ulster 1989-2006 18
Total 980 403
Notes: This table reports the classification of 118 UK financial institutions for the period 1988-2006 (i.e. before the financial crisis) into
the two latent technological classes according to the regime membership determinants desribed in Table 2.3.a. Those financial insitutions
 that change class (compared with their previous classification where the sample was up to 2011 as diplayed in table 2.9.a) are labeled with
a bold font.
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Table 2.11.b: Greece - Classification of banks before the financial crisis
Latent Class 1 Latent Class 2
name Years Num OBS name Years Num OBS
_1 Aegean Baltic 2003-2006 4 _1 Agricultural (ATE) 1993-2006 14
_2 Alpha 1993-2006 14 _2 Attica 1993-2006 14
_3 Bank of Athens 1993-1997 5 _3 Emporiki  (Commercial) 1993-2006 14
_4 Bank of Central Greece 1993-1998 6 _4 FBB First Business 2002-2006 5
_5 Bank of Crete (Cretabank) 1993-1998 6 _5 General 1993-2006 14
_6 Ergobank 1993-1999 7 _6 Laiki 1993-2005 13
_7 Eurobank Ergasias 1993-2006 14 _7 Macedonia Thrace 1993-1999 7
_8 Ionian and Popular 1993-1998 6 _8 Marfin 1993-2005 13
_9 National Bank of Greece (Ethiki) 1993-2006 14 _9 Marfin Egnatia 1993-2006 14
_10 National Mortgage Bank 1993-1997 5 _10 Omega 2001-2004 4
_11 PRObank 2001-2006 6 _11 Proton 2002-2006 5
_12 Pancretan Cooperative 2002-2006 5
_13 Piraeus 1993-2006 14
_14 T Bank 1993-2006 14
_15 TELESIS Investment 1993-2000 8
_16 TT Hellenic Postbank 1998-2006 9
_17 Xiosbank 1993-1998 6
_18 Millennium 2000-2006 7
Total 150 117
Notes: This table reports the classification of 29 Greek financial institutions for the period 1993-2006 (i.e. before the financial crisis) into
the two latent technological classes according to the regime membership determinants desribed in Table 2.3.b. Those financial insitutions
 that change class (compared with their previous classification where the sample was up to 2011 as diplayed in table 2.9.b) are labeled with
a bold font.
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Table 2.12: GREECE - M&As & Structure of the banking sector
Systemic Banks M&As Year of the M&A activity
ALPHA BANK EMPORIKI 2012
EUROBANK NEW PROTON BANK, NEW TT-HELLENIC POSTBANK 2013 (Both financial institutions)
ETHNIKI BANK FBB, PROBANK 2013 (Both financial institutions)
PIRAEUS BANK ATE BANK, GENIKI BANK, MARFIN_EGNATIA, MILLENIUM 2012 : ATE BANK and GENIKI Bank
2013: MARFIN- EGNATIA and MILLENIUM
Remaining Banks Type
ATTICA Commercial
AEGEAN Commercial
PANELLINIA Commercial created by Co-operatives banks
PANCRETAN Co-operative
Notes: This table reports detailed information about the recent wave of M&As where the ‘big-four’ of the Greek banking sector, i.e. ALPHA BANK,
 EUROBANK, ETHNIKI BANK and PIRAEUS BANK, were involved and resulted to the creation of the four 'systemic’ banks. Additionally, the table
presents the financial intermediaries and their business model that constitute the current structure of the Greek banking sector. As far as "ATE BANK,
NEW PROTON BANK, NEW TT-HELLENIC POSTBANK, FBB and PROBANK" are concerned, only the 'healthy' part of assets and liabilities of those
financial institutions was acquired by the . It should be noted that PIRAEUS BANK acquired in 2013 'CYPRUS BANK' and 'HELLENIC BANK' as well,
however due to unavailability of data we do not include these two cases. 'ETHNIKI' stands for the 'NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE' while
MARFIN_EGNATIA' stands for 'CYPRUS POPULAR BANK (LAIKI BANK)'. Finally, there are a few more 'Co-operative' type banks which we do not
quote them as their aggregate market share is less than 2% in assets, deposits and loans of the whole banking sector.
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Table 2.13: UK - 20 Largest banks in both regimes in the end of 2011
Class 1 Class 2
_1 Barclays Bank _1 Alpha Bank
_2 Co-operative _2 The Access
_3 HSBC _3 Bank of Beirut
_4 Habib Allied _4 Citibank
_5 Lloyds TSB _5 DB UK
_6 Nationwide BS _6 Europe Arab
_7 Royal Bank of Scotland _7 Bank Leumi
_8 Santander _8 Bank of N.Y. Mellon
_9 Standard Chartered _9 Progressive BS
_10 Sainsbury's
_11 Union
Notes: This table presents the classification among the two different techonlogical
latent classes of the 20 largest UK financial institutions that were used in the analysis
of the prospective M&As scenarios. Specifically, all potential consolidation activities
consist of combinations of financial intermediaries that belong either in different
technological regimes, or in the second (i.e. less efficient) latent class.
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Table 2.14.a: UK - Hypothetical M&As Scenarios
Potential M&As among banks in  both classes Class Potential M&As among banks in the 2nd class Class
_1 ALPHA-ACCESS 2 _1 BARCLAYS-ACCESS 2
_2 ALPHA-BEIRUT 1 _2 BARCLAYS-ALPHA 1
_3 ALPHA-CITIBANK 1 _3 BARCLAYS-LEUMI 1
_4 ALPHA-DBUKBANK 2 _4 BARCLAYS-BEIRUT 1
_5 ALPHA-EUROPEARAB 2 _5 BARCLAYS-CITIBANK 2
_6 ALPHA-LEUMI 1 _6 BARCLAYS-DBUKBANK 2
_7 ALPHA-BAN OF NEW YORK 2 _7 BARCLAYS-EUROEPARAB 1
_8 ALPHA-PROGRESSIVE 1 _8 BARCLAYS-NEWYORK 2
_9 ALPHA-SAINSBURY'S 2 _9 BARCLAYS-PROGRESSIVE 1
_10 ALPHA-UNION 2 _10 BARCLAYS-SAINSBURY'S 1
_11 LEUMI-ACCESS 2 _11 BARCLAYS-UNION 2
_12 LEUMI-BEIRUT 1 _12 CO-OPERATIVE-ACCESS 2
_13 LEUMI-CITIBANK 1 _13 CO-OPERATIVE-ALPHA 1
_14 LEUMI-DBUKBANK 2 _14 CO-OPRATIVE-BEIRUT 1
_15 LEUMI-EUROPE 2 _15 CO-OPERATIVE-CITIBANK 2
_16 LEUMI-NEW_YORK 2 _16 CO-OPERATIVE-DBUKBANK 2
_17 LEUMI-PROGRESSIVE 1 _17 CO-OPERATIVE-EUROPEARAB 2
_18 LEUMI-SAINSBURY'S 2 _18 CO-OPERATIVE-LEUMI 1
_19 LEUMI-UNION 2 _19 CO-OPERATIVE-NEW_YORK 2
_20 BEIRUT-ACCESS 1 _20 CO-OPERATIVE-PROGRESSIVE 2
_21 BEIRUT-CITIBANKJ 1 _21 CO-OPERATIVE-SAINBURY'S 2
_22 BEIRUT-DBUKBANK 2 _22 CO-OPERATIVE-UNION 2
_23 BEIRUT-EUROPEARAB 2 _23 HABIB-ALPHA 1
_24 BEIRUT-NEWYORK 2 _24 HABIB-BEIRUT 1
_25 BEIRUT-PROGRESSIVE 1 _25 HABIB-LEUMI 1
_26 BEIRUT-SAINSBURY'S 2 _26 HABIB-ACCESS 2
_27 BEIRUT-UNION 2 _27 HABIB-CITIBANK 2
_28 NEW_YORK-ACCESS 2 _28 HABIB-DBUKBANK 2
_29 NEW_YORK-CITIBANK 2 _29 HABIB-EUROPE 2
_30 NEW_YORK-DBUKBANK 2 _30 HABIB-NEW_YORK 2
_31 NEW_YORK-EUROPE 2 _31 HABIB-PROGRESSIVE 1
_32 NEW_YORK-PROGRESSIVE 2 _32 HABIB-SAINSBURY'S 2
_33 NEW_YORK-SAIBURY'S 2 _33 HABIB-UNION 2
_34 NEW_YORK-UNION 2 _34 HSBC-ACCESS 2
_35 CITIBANK-ACCESS 2 _35 HSBC-ALPHA 1
_36 CITIBANK-DBUKBANK 2 _36 HSBC-BEIRUT 1
_37 CITIBANK-EUROPEARAB 2 _37 HSBC-CITIBANK 1
_38 CITIBANK-PROGRESSIVE 1 _38 HSBC-DBUKBANK 2
_39 CITIBANK-SAINBURY'S 1 _39 HSBC-EUROPE 2
_40 CITIBANK-UNION 2 _40 HSBC-LEUMI 1
_41 DBUKBANK-EUROPEARAB 2 _41 HSBC-NEW_YORK 2
_42 DBUKBANK-PROGRESSIVE 1 _42 HSBC-PROGRESSIVE 1
_43 DBUKBANK-SAINSBURY'S 2 _43 HSBC-SAINSBURY'S 1
_44 DBUKBANK-ACCESS 2 _44 HSBC-UNION 2
_45 DBUKBANK-UNION 2 _45 LlOYDS-ACCESS 2
_46 EUROPE-PROGRESSIVE 1 _46 LlOYDS-ALPHA 1
_47 EUROPE-SAINSBURY'S 2 _47 LlOYDS-BEIRUT 1
_48 EUROPE-ACCESS 2 _48 LlOYDS-CITIBANK 2
_49 EUROPE-UNION 2 _49 LlOYDS-DBUKBANK 2
_50 PROGRESSIVE-ACCESS 2 _50 LlOYDS-EUROPE 2
_51 PROGRESSIVE-SAINSBURY'S 2 _51 LlOYDS-LEUMI 2
_52 PROGRESSIVE-UNION 1 _52 LlOYDS-NEW_YORK 2
(continued)
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Table 2.14.a: UK - Hypothetical M&As Scenarios (Continued)
Potential M&As among banks in  both classes Class Potential M&As among banks in the 2nd class Class
_53 SAINSBURY'S -ACCESS 2 _53 LlOYDS-PROGRESSIVE 2
_54 SAINSBURY'S -UNION 2 _54 LlOYDS-SAINSBURY'S 2
_55 ACCESS-UNION 2 _55 LlOYDS-UNION 2
_56 NATIONWIDE-ACCESS 2
_57 NATIONWIDE-ALPHA 1
_58 NATIONWIDE-BEIRUT 1
_59 NATIONWIDE-CITIBANK 1
_60 NATIONWIDE-DBUKBANK 2
_61 NATIONWIDE-EUROPE 1
_62 NATIONWIDE-LEUMI 1
_63 NATIONWIDE-NEW YORK 1
_64 NATIONWIDE-PROGRESSIVE 1
_65 NATIONWIDE-SAINSBURY'S 1
_66 NATIONWIDE-UNION 1
_67 RBS-ACCESS 2
_68 RBS-ALPHA 2
_69 RBS-BEIRUT 1
_70 RBS-CITIBANK 2
_71 RBS-DBUKBANK 2
_72 RBS-EUROPE 2
_73 RBS-LEUMI 1
_74 RBS-NEW_YORK 2
_75 RBS-PROGRESSIVE 1
_76 RBS-SAINSBURY'S 2
_77 RBS-UNION 2
_78 SANTANDER-ACCESS 2
_79 SANTANDER-ALPHA 1
_80 SANTANDER-BEIRUT 1
_81 SANTANDER-CITIBANK 2
_82 SANTANDER-DBUKBANK 2
_83 SANTANDER-EUROPE 2
_84 SANTANDER-LEUMI 1
_85 SANTANDER-NEW_YORK 2
_86 SANTANDER-PROGRESSIVE 2
_87 SANTANDER-SAINSBURY'S 2
_88 SANTANDER-UNION 2
_89 STANDARD-ACCESS 2
_90 STANDARD-ALPHA 1
_91 STANDARD-BEIRUT 1
_92 STANDARD-CITIBANK 2
_93 STANDARD-DBUKBANK 2
_94 STANDARD-EUROPE 2
_95 STANDARD-LEUMI 2
_96 STANDARD-NEW_YORK 2
_97 STANDARD-PROGRESSIVE 1
_98 STANDARD-SAINSBURY'S 1
_99 STANDARD-UNION 2
Notes: This table reports all the prospective scenarios of M&As among 20 UK financial institutions and the classification of the 'new' financial
entity into the two latent technological classes according to the regime membership determinants described in Table 2.3.a. Specifically, we select
the nine most important financial intermediaries in terms of assets, deposits and loans that belong to the most efficient technological regime (i.e.
the first one) and the eleven most important from the second technologically and less efficient class after we ensure that each of these latter
twenty banks is not a subsidiary of the remaining nineteen. The first column presents all possible combinations of consolidation between those
financial institutions that belong to different technological class, while the second column reposts all possible combinations of consolidation
between those financial institutions that belong to the second and less efficient technological regime.
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Table 2.14.b: Greece - Hypothetical M&As Scenarios
RECENT - M&As CLASS POTENTIAL - M&As CLASS
_1 ALPHA-EMPORIKI 1 _1 ALPHA-ATTICA 1
_2 EUROBANK-PROTON-TT_HELLENIC 2 _2 ALPHA-AEGEAN 1
_3 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK 1 _3 ALPHA-PANELLINIA 1
_4 PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM 2 _4 ALPHA-PANCRETAN 1
_5 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-ATTICA 2
_6 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN 2
RECENT (POTENTIAL) - M&As _7 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-PANELLINIA 1
_1 EUROBANK-PROTON 2 _8 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-PANCRETAN 1
_2 EUROBANK-TT_HELLENIC 1 _9 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-ATTICA-AEGEAN 2
_3 ETHNIKI-FBB 1 _10 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-ATTICA-PANELLINIA 2
_4 ETHNIKI-PROBANK 1 _11 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-ATTICA-PANCRETAN 2
_5 PIRAEUS-ATE 2 _12 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN-PANNELINIA 1
_6 PIRAEUS-MARFIN_EGNATIA 1 _13 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 1
_7 PIRAEUS-MILLENIUM 1 _14 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 2
_8 PIRAEUS-GENIKI 2 _15 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA 2
_9 PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI 2 _16 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN-ATTICA-PANCRETAN 2
_10 PIRAEUS-MILLENIUM-GENIKI 2 _17 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 2
_11 PIRAEUS-MARFIN_EGNATIA-GENIKI 2 _18 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 2
_12 PIRAEUS-MILLENIUM-MARFIN_EGANTIA 1 _19 EUROBANK-ATTICA 1
_13 PIRAEUS-MILLENIUM-ATE 2 _20 EUROBANK-AEGEAN 1
_14 PIRAEUS-MARFIN_EGANTIA-ATE 2 _21 EUROBANK-PANELLINIA 1
_15 PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI-MARFIN_EGANTIA 2 _22 EUROBANK-PANCRETAN 1
_16 PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI-MILLENIUM 2 _23 EUROBANK-PROTON-TT_HELLENIC-ATTICA 2
_17 PIRAEUS-GENIKI-MILLENIUM-MARFIN_EGNATIA 2 _24 EUROBANK-PROTON-TT_HELLENIC-AEGEAN 2
_18 PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM 2 _25 EUROBANK-PROTON-TT_HELLENIC-PANELLINIA 2
_26 EUROBANK-PROTON-TT_HELLENIC-PANCRETAN 1
_27 EUROBANK-PROTON-TT_HELLENIC-ATTICA-AEGEAN 2
_28 EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC-ATTICA-PANELLINIA 2
_29 EUROBANK-PROTON-TT_HELLENIC-ATTICA-PANCRETAN 2
_30 EUROBANK-PROTON-TT_HELLENIC-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA_2.LPJ 2
_31 EUROBANK-PROTON-TT_HELLENIC-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 2
_32 EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 2
_33 EUROBANK-PROTON-TT_HELLENIC-ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA 2
_34 EUROBANK-PROTON-TT_HELLENIC-ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 2
_35 EUROBANK-PROTON-TT_HELLENIC-ATTICA-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 2
_36 EUROBANK-PROTON-TT_HELLENIC-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 2
_37 EUROBANK-PROTON-TT_HELLENIC-ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 2
(Continued)
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Table 2.14.b: Greece - Hypothetical M&As Scenarios (Continued)
POTENTIAL - M&As CLASS
_38 ETHNIKI-ATTICA 1
_39 ETHNIKI-AEGEAN 1
_40 ETHNIKI-PANELLINIA 1
_41 ETHNIKI-PANCREATAN 1
_42 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-ATTICA 1
_43 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN 2
_44 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-PANELLINIA 2
_45 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-PANCRETAN 1
_46 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-ATTICA-AEGEAN 2
_47 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-ATTICA-PANELLINIA 1
_48 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-ATTICA-PANCRETAN 1
_49 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA 2
_50 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 2
_51 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 1
_52 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA 2
_53 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 2
_54 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-ATTICA-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 1
_55 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 2
_56 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 2
_57 PIRAEUS-ATTICA 1
_58 PIRAEUS-AEGEAN 1
_59 PIRAEUS-PANELLINIA 1
_60 PIREAUS-PANCRETAN 1
_61 PIRAEUS-ATE-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-GENIKI-ATTICA 2
_62 PIRAEUS-ATE-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-GENIKI-AEGEAN 2
_63 PIRAEUS-ATE-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-GENIKI-PANELLINIA 2
_64 PIRAEUS-ATE-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-GENIKI-PANCRETAN 2
_65 PIRAEUS-ATE-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-GENIKI-ATTICA-AEGEAN 1
_66 PIRAEUS-ATE-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-GENIKI-ATTICA-PANELLINIA 2
_67 PIRAEUS-ATE-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-GENIKI-ATTICA-PANCRETAN 1
_68 PIRAEUS-ATE-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-GENIKI-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA 2
_69 PIRAEUS-ATE-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-GENIKI-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 2
_70 PIRAEUS-ATE-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-GENIKI-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 2
_71 PIRAEUS-ATE-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-GENIKI-ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA 2
_72 PIRAEUS-ATE-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-GENIKI-ATTICA-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 2
_73 PIRAEUS-ATE-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-GENIKI-ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 2
_74 PIRAEUS-ATE-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-GENIKI-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 2
_75 ATTIKA-AEGEAN 2
_76 ATTICA-PANELLINIA 2
_77 ATTICA-PANCRETAN 2
_78 AEGEAN-PANELLINIA 2
_79 AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 1
_80 PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 2
_81 ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA 2
_82 ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 1
_83 AEGEAN-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 2
_84 ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 1
Notes: This table reports all the prospective scenarios of M&As among all the Greek financial institutions and the classification of the 'new' financial entity into the two latent technological
classes according to the regime membership determinants described in Table 2.3.b.The first column presents two categories entitled ‘Recent’ and ‘Recent (Potential)’. The former consists of all
consolidation activities that took place recently and created the four so- called systemic banks (ALPHA, ETHNIKI, EUROBANK, PIRAEUS). As far as the latter is concerned it consists of all
possible combinations of consolidation between the ‘big four’ of the Greek banking sector and the institutions that they finally were absorbed by them and altogether formed their systemic nature.
We approach each one of these cases in both categories as a prospective M&A scenario in the economy, since our sample is dated up to 2011 and the recent consolidation wave took place in
2012 and 2013. The second column reports all possible combinations of consolidation between the  four major banks of the Greek economy, before and after they got involved into the recent wave
of M&As, and the four remaining banking institutions namely, Attica bank, Aegean bank, Panellinia bank and Pancretan. The table presents all possible combinations of consolidation among those
four remaining banks (i.e. only non-systemic banks) and the classification of the new financial entity as well.
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Chapter 3
Liquidity creation through ef-
cient M&As. A viable so-
lution for vulnerable bank-
ing systems? Evidence from
a stress test under a PVAR
methodology
3.1 Introduction
More than six years have passed since the beginning of the nancial
crisis in July 2007 but the economic impact it had on the real economy
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is still conspicuous. The crisis which began in the housing market of
the USA in 2007 has since spread to the world nancial system and the
real economy. The crisis in the banking system climaxed in September
2008 and spread to Europe. Most economies experienced negative rates
of growth, unemployment continues to increase, a number of nancial
giants have closed or are having severe problems, private consumption
and investment have shrunk because of uncertainty and reductions in
the value of nancial assets. This crisis is di¤erent from previous ones,
mainly because of its world-wide extent and because a vicious cycle
links the problems in the nancial sector with the deceleration of the
real economy. The return to sustained growth presupposes, inter alia,
restructuring of household portfolios, considered to be more di¢ cult
to occur than that of corporate portfolios. It is therefore di¢ cult to
establish mechanisms for coordination and return to positive growth
rates.
The global nancial turmoil was triggered by banks and as a re-
sult the banking sector was the rst to confront the tremendous con-
sequences of the crisis. The number of bank failures had escalated
unparalleled. Bank stocks plummeted. One of the two central roles of
banks 1 in the economy liquidity creation, was severely distorted. In
response to both the great economic recession and the dire conditions
of the banking industry, banks tightened their lending terms and stan-
dards to unprecedented levels. The tightening in bank lending could
undermine or even derail the economic recovery.
That said, we turning now into the emerging importance of liquid-
ity. Compared to credit risk, there is a smaller literature to discuss
with liquidity risk. The Basel I Accord (Basel Committee on Banking
1 The two central functions of banks are to transform risk and to supply liquidity
to the economy.
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Supervision, 1988) set out regulatory standards for credit risk. Besides,
the Basel II Accord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004)
even takes operational risk into account. However, both of these ac-
cords seldom mention liquidity risk. Landskroner and Paroush (2008)
also indicated that there has been an extensive academic and regulatory
discussion of the di¤erent major banking risks: credit risk, market risk
and even operation risk. However, relatively little attention has been
paid to liquidity risk before the onset of the recent nancial turmoil,
that has become one of the major risks faced by banks and other nan-
cial institutions in recent years. Throughout the global nancial crisis
many banks struggled to maintain adequate liquidity. Unprecedented
levels of liquidity support were required from central banks in order
to sustain the nancial system and even with such extensive support
a number of banks failed, were forced into mergers or required reso-
lution. The crisis illustrated how quickly and severely liquidity risks
can crystallize and certain sources of funding can evaporate. Conse-
quently, creating substantial liquidity bu¤ers across the board is the
explicit aim of a number of regulatory responses to the crisis, such as
the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) guidelines on
liquidity bu¤ers (CEBS 2009b) and the forthcoming Basel III liquid-
ity standards, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable
Funding Ratio (NSFR).
The recent nancial crisis underscored the importance of having a
better understanding of the ways in which liquidity conditions inu-
ence credit extension to domestic and foreign customers. 5Bank liquid-
ity came from abroad due to the incapability of domestic deposits to
support the large expansion in credit growth. Nowadays, new liquid-
ity is hard to come from abroad and and in addition there is a crying
need in shifting demand from consumption to investment especially
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in countries where recession still follows an accelerating pace. How-
ever in periods of contracting economies investment opportunities are
limited since the funding sources are scarce. For a loan expansion to
occur domestic policy action is required, like reducing reserve require-
ments, capital increases in state-owned banks, increasing the minimum
insurance on bank deposits, or coming to terms with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) mechanism. Nevertheless, investigation of dif-
ferent possibilities to increase the credit channels in the economy is of
primordial concern for governments and policy authorities, especially
in countries with a high level of sovereign debt and default risk.
In their inuential paper Berger and Bouwman (2009), demonstrate
that recently completed banksM&As account for the industrys overall
liquidity and show the greatest growth in liquidity creation over time.
Additionally, a recent study by Pana et al. (2010) presents empiri-
cal evidence that banks with higher levels of deposit insurance create
higher levels of liquidity around mergers. The theoretical basis on these
ndings lies in two strands of the literature. In the rst strand, we re-
fer to papers related to the banking theory of liquidity creation with
respect to the sources of bank liquidity. In this category we nd the
seminal papers of Bryant (1980), Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Holm-
strom and Tirole (1998), Diamond and Rajan (2000) and Kashyap et
al. (2002). These authors explain that banks create liquidity both
on balance sheet by nancing relatively illiquid assets with relatively
liquid liabilities and o¤ balance sheet through loan commitments and
similar claims to liquid funds. In the second strand, we refer to papers
related to the dynamics and mechanisms that a consolidation activity
generates with respect to liquidity creation and information. The pri-
mary contributions to this strand are the studies by Carletti et. al,
(2007) and Panetta et. al, (2009). The insights that are revealed by
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the empirical evidence of both these papers is that consolidated banks
create more liquidity as they take advantage of their improved ability
to screen borrowers.
Our study di¤erentiates itself from all the aforementioned ones,
related either to M&As or to the liquidity creation framework, in that it
adds insights in several respects, as discussed below. First and foremost
we contribute to the literature by examining the concept of potential
consolidation activity among banks and by addressing the question of
whether it can lead to an increase of liquidity in the banking sector and
consequently increase the credit channels in the economy, especially
in countries with a high level of sovereign debt and severe country
default risk. In this way, by conducting a comparative and a forecasting
analysis pre-crisis and post-crisis, we exploit on one hand, potential
social well-being benets in the UK banking system through potential
M&As and we address the question of whether they can reduce the scale
of commitment to unconventional monetary activities (i.e QE, FLS) of
the Bank of England. While on the other hand, we investigate whether
potential M&As can be proved vital in alleviating the terms of the
memorandum between Greece and the so-called Troika (IMF, European
Commission, European Central Bank), enhancing the real economy,
households and rms, with the creation of additional credit channels in
the context of a severe contraction of the countrys economic activity. In
addition we shed light on the trade-o¤between managerial motives and
social economic surplus that triggers M&A activity. This leads us to two
the following prerequisites. The rst raises concerns that a potential
consolidation activity in the banking sector increases concentration in
the system and it may cause anticompetitive e¤ects with a negative
impact to the social well-being. The second addresses the issue on how
we will be able to measure liquidity with respect to potential bank
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M&As in the future. For this purpose, we propose the "Cost E¢ ciency
- Liquidity Creation Hypothesis" (CELCH) to measure the liquidity
creation of a potential bank consolidation activity through its potential
level of e¢ ciency. The CELCH argues that after a consolidation activity
if the new nancial institution has cost e¢ ciency gains these can be
reected in both liquidity creation enhancement and social well-being
surplus. Both the US and EU merger guidelines explicitly note that the
criterion for judging potential mergers as acceptable is their ability to
create merger-specic e¢ ciency gains and pass them on to customers.
Thus the CELCH has both theoretical and empirical foundations.
Nevertheless, the result of increased liquidity creation and social
well-being via potential cost e¢ cient bank M&As can lose its signi-
cance, if these outcomes vanish when adverse future economic condi-
tions occur. In turn, to the best of our knowledge, it is the rst study
to address the impact of potential adverse economic conditions that
can occur in an economy on liquidity creation and cost e¢ ciency. To
achieve that we create a stress test under a panel vector autoregressive
(PVAR) methodology, where we shock two completely di¤erent banking
systems in terms of "sophistication, market characteristics and volume
of transactions", in three di¤erent ways; by imposing a macroeconomic,
a nancial and a bank specic shock. This is of extreme importance
taking into account possible anticompetitive consequences that could
result from a potential consolidation activity. In this way, we are able to
extract inferences on the contribution of each specic prospective M&A
to the robustness of each countrys banking sector with respect to both
liquidity creation and cost e¢ ciency and consequently on whether it
should be realised from both an economic and social perspective in the
aftermath of the recent nancial crisis. This leads to a third novelty
of our study; via the PVAR framework we gauge and investigate the
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impact of e¢ ciency on liquidity creation and the direction of causality
among the two variables. Moreover, we are able to examine empirically
the "Cost E¢ ciency - Liquidity Creation Hypothesis". An additional
contribution of our study is the proposition of a novel methodology; i.e.,
to evaluate and compare the robustness of each potential bank M&As
scenario through recent half-life measures (Chortareas and Kapetanios
2013). Further, it is the rst study that examines all the historical
UK and Greek banksM&As with respect to their credit supply by
employing recently developed measures of liquidity creation (Berger
and Bouwman, 2009) that account for both on and o¤ balance sheet
banksactivities. Finally, for the rst time in both banking sectors, the
impact of the "Deposit Insurance Hypothesis" on liquidity creation is
being analysed as well as the relationship between capital and liquidity
which is expressed by two additional competing hypotheses: "Financial
Fragility Crowding out" vs. "Risk Absorption", in the spirit of Basel
III, where a major emphasis on liquidity is given.
The empirical evidence that we present from the stress test scenario
sets a solid foundation for our proposed Cost E¢ ciency - Liquidity
Creation Hypothesisin two ways: rst by the estimated positive im-
pact of cost e¢ ciency on liquidity creation and second by the fact that
bank shocks and specically the level of non-performing loans in the
sector are the more persistent and account for most of the deviations of
the forecasted values of both the cost e¢ ciency and liquidity creation
variables from their true levels. The causality between these two vari-
ables of interest is found to run stronger from liquidity creation towards
cost e¢ ciency than in reverse. Through the proposed CELCH, we pro-
vide evidence of increased liquidity that is created after potential M&A
activity of two and three banking institutions in both the pre-crisis
and post-crisis era, with considerably stronger evidence for the former
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period. In addition, in both periods the highest liquidity derived from
potential consolidation activity is due to the large nancial institutions.
Doubts are cast on the decisions of the foregoing policy makers and the
boards of the involving banks as far as the recent wave of bank con-
solidation and the creation of the so-called four cornerstonesof the
Greek economy is concerned, with respect to social-benets. Last but
not least, we note that the impact of adverse macroeconomic and bank-
specic conditions on the Greek banking sectors liquidity creation is
greater in its current systemic formation rather than prior to the recent
wave of M&As. This nding raises further questions about the social
economic benets of this recent wave of banksconsolidation activity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
impact of the crisis and the bank consolidation developments in both
UK and Greece while it reviews as well the relevant literature. Section
3 provides an overview of the theoretical framework and presents the
recent measures of liquidity creation. Section 4 discusses our empirical
methodology. Section 5, provides an overview of the main developments
of each country within its respective sample period and describes the
data. Section 6 presents the empirical evidence and robustness tests
as well. Conclusions are quoted in section 7, while insights for future
research are o¤ered in the nal section.
3.2 Financial and Sovereign turmoil - M&As
3.2.1 UK Financial Crisis
First we quote the UKreaction mechanisms against the crisis, as the
emergence of large, highly interconnected universal banks has trans-
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formed the nancial network, increasing the likelihood of system-wide
contagion in the event of an individual banks distress. To the extent
that these banks are too important to fail, private incentives are dis-
torted and resources misallocated (Haldane, 2010). That said, a bank
rescue package totalling some £ 500 billion in loans and guarantees was
announced by the British government on 8 October 2008, as a response
to the on-going global nancial crisis. After two unsteady weeks at
the end of September, the rst week of October had seen major falls
in the stock market and severe worries about the stability of British
banks. The plan aimed to restore market condence and help stabilise
the British banking system, and provided for a range of short-term
loans and guarantees of interbank lending, as well as up to £ 50 bil-
lion of state investment in the banks themselves. Most simply, £ 200
billion will be made available for short term loans through the Bank
of Englands Special Liquidity Scheme. Secondly, the Government will
support British banks in their plan to increase their market capitali-
sation through the newly formed Bank Recapitalisation Fund, by £ 25
billion in the rst instance with a further £ 25 billion to be called upon
if needed. Thirdly, the Government will temporarily underwrite any el-
igible lending between British banks, giving a loan guarantee of around
£ 250 billion. However, only £ 400 billion of this is fresh money, as
there is already a system in place for short term loans up to the value
of £ 100 billion.
The extent to which di¤erent banks participate will vary according
to their needs. HSBC Group issued a statement announcing it was
injecting £ 750m of capital into the UK bank and therefore has "no plans
to utilise the UK governments recapitalisation initiative". Standard
Chartered also declared its support for the scheme but its intention
not to participate in the capital injection element. Barclays intends
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to raise £ 6.5 billion from private investors, and will cancel its nal
dividend for the year for a net saving of £ 2 billion. The Royal Bank of
Scotland Group will raise £ 20 billion from the Bank Recapitalisation
Fund, with £ 5 billion in preference shares and a further £ 15 billion
being issued as ordinary shares. HBOS and Lloyds TSB will together
raise £ 17 billion, £ 8.5 billion in preference shares and a further £ 8.5
billion issue of ordinary shares. The Fund will purchase the preference
shares outright, for a total £ 13.5 billion investment, and will underwrite
the issues of ordinary shares; should they not be taken up by private
investors, the Fund will undertake to purchase them. If none of the new
stock is taken up, this would give the Government an overall holding
of 60% of the Royal Bank of Scotland, with 40% of the merged HBOS-
Lloyds, held as a mixture of preference and ordinary stock.
A second bank rescue package totalling at least £ 50 billion was an-
nounced by the British government on 19 January 2009, as a response
to the on-going global nancial crisis. The package was designed to
increase the amount of money that banks could lend to businesses and
private individuals. This aid comes in two parts: an initial £ 50 billion
being made available to big corporate borrowers, and a second undis-
closed amount that forms a form of insurance against banks su¤ering
big losses.
3.2.2 UK Sovereign Crisis
The Bank of England (BoE) has operated, since January 2009, an As-
set Purchase Facility (APF) to buy "high-quality assets nanced by
the issue of Treasury bills and the DMOs cash management opera-
tions" and thereby improve liquidity in the credit markets. It has,
since March 2009, also provided the mechanism by which the Banks
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policy of "Quantitative Easing" (QE) is achieved, under the auspices
of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). In July 2012, the MPC an-
nounced the purchase of a further £ 50bn to bring total assets purchases
through the Asset Purchasing Facility (APF) to £ 375 bn. The APF
is undertaken by a subsidiary company of the Bank of England, the
Bank of England Asset Purchase Facility Fund Limited (BEAPFF).
The same month the Bank of England and the HM Treasury launched
the "Funding for Lending Scheme" (FLS). The FLS is designed to in-
centivise banks and building societies to boost their lending to the UK
real economy. It does this by providing funding to banks and build-
ing societies for an extended period, with both the price and quantity
of funding provided linked to their lending performance. Neverthe-
less, despite the £ 14bn that have been provided via the FLS, it was
revealed that the total lending was actually less in the six-month pe-
riod after FLSs implementation than in the six-month period before.
In the summer 2013, the new governor of the BoE, Mark Carney, has
set out a "forward guidance" policy in a way of converting low short-
term interest rates into lower long-term interest rates, in order to try
to make the unconventional monetary policy; QE and FLS, more e¤ec-
tive. Nonetheless, the annual rate of growth in the stock of lending to
UK businesses in both large and small enterprises was negative while
the annual rate of growth in the stock of secured lending to individuals
remain unchanged, (BoE October 2013).
Figure 3.1.a diplays the annual growth rate of the volume of credit
facility (i.e. loans) provided in both public and private sector by the
nancial intermediaries operating in the UK. We note that the highest
positive annual percentage changes take place in the years 1995, and
2005. In both of these years, the UK experienced the biggest wave of
M&As that took place in the domestic banking sector. Additionally,
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we note the ample credit facility in the year 2009 and its adverse con-
sequencesin the two following years, indicated by the negative values
of the annual percentage change which characterises the onset of the
recession period that UK follows thereafter.
3.2.3 Greek sovereign debt crisis in the context of
the banking sector
The collapse of Lehman Brothers a¤ected the condence of depositors
and forced the European governments to take action in providing ad-
ditional liquidity aid by the Eurosystem. It is noteworthy that Greek
banks were not exposed to the risks that triggered the recent global
nancial crisis. Thus, the spillover e¤ects from the global nancial cri-
sis on the Greek banking system were limited. Accordingly, there was
no need to activate a bank rescue programme. Hence, the recovery
plan adopted by the Greek government in late 2008 was mainly aimed
at the enhancement of liquidity conditions in the system. Following
its European counterparties as far as the deposit insurance schemes
are concerned regarding the rst policy initiatives against the crisis,
Greece established in 2008 the Hellenic Deposit and Investment Guar-
antee Fund (HDIGF), which raised the maximum deposit guarantee
cover per depositor from e20,000 to e100,000.2. In October 2008 the
Greek government had announced a e28bn support package for Greek
banks consisting of e5bn of capital injections as far as a recapitaliza-
tion scheme was concerned, e15bn of state loan guarantees to credit
institutions with varying maturity from three months up to three years
in order for the banking system to meet its liquidity needs and e8bn of
2 The Hellenic Deposit Guarantee Fund (HDGF) existed from 1995 till then.
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liquidity in the form of special bonds with maturity up to three years
to be used as collateral to the Eurosystem and/or the interbank mar-
ket for any credit provided by them. Greeces largest banks opted to
participate in the capital-raising scheme, designed to bring their Tier 1
capital ratios above 8.5%. By June 2009, around 80% of the available
state-supported capital injections were taken up by the banks, but then
they asked for the remaining e17bn of e28bn in the following April.
As was expected, during the global nancial crisis, liquidity con-
ditions have deteriorated as Greek banks had limited access to whole-
sale markets to fund their lending activity, and maturing inter-bank
liabilities put additional pressure on their liquidity position. Despite
the problems, Greek banks have shown remarkable resilience and were
able to renance their loan portfolios owing, inter alia, to a number
of factors: they had a strong capital base and steadily increased their
provisions (more than 40 per cent, year-on-year);they were facilitated
by measures taken by the European Central Bank and the Greek gov-
ernment and the e¤ective prudential supervision by the Bank of Greece
ensured the stability of the Greek banking system. Overall, during
the global nancial crisis, the Greek banking system remained healthy,
adequately capitalised, and highly protable.
The Greek banking system was negatively a¤ected by the Greek
debt crisis. The recession and losses from government debt exposures
have had considerable implications on the banking system, undermining
the nancial stability of the previous years. As a result Greek banks
lost access to the international wholesale market in early 2010 because
of increasing perceived risks stemming from the scal crisis and the
downgrading of Greek government debt to junk bond status in April
2010. As a result, they have relied almost exclusively on the E.C.B
for funding, using government and other bonds as collateral. In May
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2010, the Eurozone countries and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) agreed on a e110 billion bailout loan for Greece (i.e., the rst
Memorandum).
A number of steps have been taken to stabilise the Greek banking
sector. First, the E.C.B decided in early May 2010 to waive Greeces
minimum sovereign rating requirement to draw funds, ensuring that
Greek banks will not be cut o¤ from the emergency lending facility.
Second, a new aid package for banks under the IMF/euro zone pro-
gramme reinforces stability in the banking sector in the medium term.
The package consists of an additional e15bn in loan guarantees o¤ered
by the Greek government as part of its support package, bringing the to-
tal amount of state-a¤orded liquidity up from e28bn to e43bn. Third,
by the end of June 2010 the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF)
was created along with the national branch, the Hellenic Financial Sta-
bility Fund (HFSF), consisting of a e10bn loan from the IMF/euro
zone to be used to provide capital injections. Overall in 2010 Greek
banks drew a total of e97bn of liquidity from the E.C.B.
Nevertheless, one year later Greece is still in serious danger of run-
ning out of cash and defaulting on its debt. The latter enforces the
urgent need to nd new sources of liquidity as it is globally highlighted
in various articles (see Katie Martin, June 1 2011, Wall Street Journal)
and is noted that the basic problem of Greek banks is not capital but
liquidity (June 7 2011, Reuters). The European Central Bank (E.C.B)
is the only source of lending for Greek banks. The banks complain
that the E.C.B. is pressuring them to reduce their dependence on cen-
tral bank funding, hurting not only the banks but Greek businesses
and consumers who are unable to get credit. (June 21 2011, New York
Times). In October 2011, Eurozone leaders consequently agreed to o¤er
a second e130 billion bailout loan for Greece (i.e., the second Memoran-
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dum), conditional not only on the implementation of another austerity
package (combined with the continued demands for privatisation and
structural reforms outlined in the rst programme), but also that all
private creditors holding Greek government bonds should sign a deal
accepting lower interest rates and a 53.5 per cent face value loss. The
second bailout deal was nally ratied by all parties in February 2012,
and became active one month later.
Private Sector Involvement (PSI)
All the aforementioned led us to March 2012 when, the new rescue plan
for Greece was signed in Brussels and accepted by private investors. It
combines "new money" (130 billion from the EU and the IMF) with
"debt reconstruction". Private holders of the 177 billion Greek debt
issued under Greek law (out of 206 billion of private debt) will take a
53.5 per cent haircut on the debts nominal value, with the remaining
46.5 per cent will be swapped for cash (15 per cent) and for new longer
term Greek debt (31.5 per cent), with an estimated present value cut
of 75 per cent. Yet, as pointed out by some observers (Roubini, 2012 ),
the direct O¢ cial Sector Involvement is also going to be considerable:
the estimated 100 billion of total debt relief imposed on private cred-
itors will be partly o¤set by the new 130 billion o¢ cial money, which
will go largely to private investors (15 billion in the European Financial
Stability Fund (EFSF) guarantees and about 30 billion for banks recap-
italization). In addition, a positive result that emanates from the PSI
was the upgrade of Greek economy from RD status (restricted default)
to B- status, by one of the three largest rating agencies (Fitch). Nev-
ertheless, the status B- which applies to the new bonds issued under
Greek law, is still junk status, meaning they are not yet in an invest-
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ment grade despite the huge cut to Greeces debt pile. However, the
upgrade of the Greek economy boosts the condence of E.C.B, who up-
grades the collateral supplied to them by Greek banks. It is expected
that this will immediately lead to an extra 25 billion euros of liquidity
being available to lenders in Greece.
Nevertheless, Greece has seen a slow run on its banks, as companies
and increasingly ordinary Greeks take their money out in cash, or move
it to the safety of a bank account abroad. So the problem is not just
that money has stopped owing into Greece, but that is actually owing
out of the country, and that makes it even harder for the Greek banking
system to full its basic function of supporting the Greek economy. In
turn, Greece is in a deep economic slump since banks arent lending and
consequently companies arent investing. The latter enforces the urgent
need to nd new sources of liquidity in the Greek banking market.
The Greek turnaround is nowhere more evident than in the banking
system. Prior to the crisis, the banking sector was highly competitive by
international standards, with sound fundamentals. But the sovereign
crisis put the sector under stress as banks experienced substantial de-
posit outows, became cut o¤ from capital markets, and took sharp
losses on Greek sovereign bonds. The banks responded by delever-
aging, a process that itself contributed to economic contraction and
created negative feedback loops between the nancial and real sector.
Under these circumstances, the stability of the Greek banking system
could have been at risk, with possible implications beyond Greece. A
leaner, restructured Greek banking sector was needed, which is some-
thing di¢ cult to achieve in the best of times but especially di¢ cult
amid a contracting economy.
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Systemic era
That said, in the second half of 2012 up to the third quarter of 2013,
the Greek banking sector experienced a complete turnaround, where
eleven banks where merged or absorbed to form the newfour systemic
cornerstones (i.e., Alpha bank, Eurobank, National Bank of Greece or
Ethiki bank, Piraeus bank) of the countrys economic recovery. For this
purpose a recapitalization programme of the banking sector totalling
e50bn was initiated by the EFSF via the HFSF. Moreover, those four
systemic banks raised nearly e30bn in equity and regulatory capital.
The result was that three of the new systemic banks managed to raise
the 10 per cent capital they needed to avoid nationalisation, apart from
Eurobank.
Nevertheless, despite the aforementioned actions, there is increasing
speculations among the supranational institutions of a new haircut
and another reconstruction of the Greek debt in 2014, since projections
cast doubts that the target set by the Troika of 120 per cent of debt to
GDP ratio by the end of 2020 becomes unrealistic. With this in mind
uncertainty came back to the markets, where for the rst time after the
Euro era, Greece is downgraded by an index( i.e. S&P Dow Jones)
from developed to emerging market in the end of October 2013. Finally,
according to the report of the Governor of the Bank of Greece (October
2013), there is a negative 3.9% annual change in the total level of
creditprovided by the Greek nancial intermediaries to both public
and private sector at the same time when Greek bank depositshave
experienced a positive 6.7% annual change. In addition the sectors
interest rate spread met an annual increase of 3.6%. Consequently,
further concerns are raised regarding the e¤ectiveness and the social
surplus of the recent wave of consolidation in terms of credit and
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liquidityprovided in the economy which is a neuralgic prerequisite for
the promotion of investments and growth.
Figure 3.1.b, illustrates graphically the annual growth rate of the
volume of credit facility (i.e. loans) provided in both public and pri-
vate sector by the nancial intermediaries operating in Greece up to
2011. We notice the highest positive percentage change in the year
2000, which is one year after the big wave of M&As that took place in
the domestic banking sector and as before (i.e, UK bannking system)
it might give a signal of a positive relationship between M&A activity
and liquidity provided one year after. As in the case of the UK bank-
ing sector, with a time lag though, its unequivocally clear that there
was an unprecedented decline in credit provided by the Greek nancial
intermediaries once the consequences of the crisis started to become
apparent in the economy.
3.2.4 Mergers and Acquisitions
Merger and acquisition (M&A) deals are the two most visible expres-
sions of the functioning of the corporate control market. While M&A
refer to di¤erent deals, these are usually analysed together since both
achieve the same goal, which is the change of ownership of a company.
In turn, M&As are a very important phenomenon not only because they
are associated with deals that reect a signicant monetary value, but
due to the fact as well that they refer to the change of corporate control
and the formation of the structure of the market. The consolidation in
the banking industry has been an important phenomenon worldwide.
In the last two decades banking systems have displayed very high rates
of consolidation via mergers and acquisitions (M&As) among di¤erent
countries and regulatory environments around the world. The main
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causes for this unprecedented wave of M&As, which are common to
most countries, are the deregulation and integration of nancial mar-
kets as well as technological innovations and the development of new IT
systems. With this in mind, one of the main reasons for M&As is to in-
crease bank e¢ ciency via e¤ective operational synergies. Whether these
synergies can be generated via bank M&As depends on the realization
of economies of scale and scope. Economies of scale may arise because
consolidated banks may achieve control of cost-saving technologies or
spread their xed cost over a larger volume of output, thus reducing
average cost and increasing e¢ ciency. Economies of scope may arise
because merging banks enter new markets and cross-sell their products
to existing customers. In addition to any e¤ects of operational synergies
per se, as the study by Haynes and Thompson (1999) indicates, bank
M&As may have a potential impact on bank performance via one of
the three following ways: rst, via the selective redeployment of assets,
i.e. horizontal mergers could generate savings as output is reassigned
to more productive capital (Dutz, 1989); second, via the transfer of
asset control to better quality managers (Thompson, 1997); and third,
via the renegotiation of implicit labour contracts (Shleifer and Sum-
mers, 1988). However, the extent to which the aforementioned gains
could be exploited via bank M&As might be elusive in large, complex
institutions.
The banking literature (e.g. Vander Vennet, 1996; Resti, 1998;
Amel et al., 2004) provides three additional motives for bank M&As
which are not justied on e¢ ciency grounds. The rst is related to the
management-utility maximization hypothesis and the other two are re-
lated to the too-big-to fail (TBTF) and the market power arguments.
With regard to the management-utility maximization hypothesis, man-
agers channel expenditures based on their private preferences and for
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this reason they might seek to increase the size of their institutions via
M&As so as to increase their perquisites, prestige, power and salary
levels. Furthermore, as the size of the bank increases the TBTF ar-
gument comes into e¤ect because the concern about the demise of a
particular bank increases as the size of that bank increases. The third
argument indicates that banks via M&As aim to obtain market power
in order to exploit quasi-monopoly prots. According to Vander Vennet
(1994) the market power motive of M&As can better characterize EU
banks because they are organized as a system of national oligopolies.
Thus, consolidation may increase the market power of EU banks and
strengthen their competitive position on their home markets.
Nevertheless, despite their popularity, many of the M&As fail to
deliver the expected outcomes. This could either reect the complexity
of these deals or that many of them are related to managerial purposes
rather than to the maximization of shareholderswealth. The impact
of bank mergers in the banking industry has raised concerns from a
di¤erent perspective in addition to the one developed above (i.e., the
social welfare). Policy-makers remain sceptical as to whether bank bor-
rowers can benet from the consolidations. The consequences of bank
M&As on the welfare of borrowers have been investigated from two per-
spectives: credit availability and loan pricing behaviour. Banks have
an essential role in the economy. One of their main duties is to collect
funds from excess fund sectors and lend to customers with insu¢ cient
funds. From these nancial intermediary activities, they have an im-
portant role in determining the amount and distribution of credit in the
economy. Since an increase in bank credit leads to increased investment
and in turn to increased employment levels, changes in bank lending
behaviour have a marked impact on the economic development of the
country. Banks change their lending decisions in response to changes
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in the structure of the banking market. One of the issues arising in
this context is bank mergers and acquisition (M&As). Since market
structures can change as a result of mergers, bank mergers can have
a signicant impact on changes in bank lending behaviour, especially
when a country confronts an overall meltdown of its economic activity.
UK M&As
The UK banking sector experienced an unprecedented reform in 1986
with the so called Big Bang. The changes saw many of the old rms
being taken over by large banks both foreign and domestic and would
lead in the following years to further changes to the regulatory en-
vironment that would eventually lead to the creation of the nancial
services authority (FSA). The e¤ects of Big Bang were dramatic, with
Londons place as a nancial capital decisively strengthened, to the
point where it is arguably the worlds most important nancial cen-
tre. According to the UK legal framework, mergers between banks
can be blocked when they are viewed to limit competition. Central
to improving the competitiveness of a sector is both the achievement
of e¢ ciency or synergies from the mergers and the degree to which
these e¢ ciency savings will be passed on to customers. For example,
a recent large UK bank merger between Lloyds TSB and Abbey Na-
tional was expected to create substantial e¢ ciency gains. This merger
was blocked as the competition authority stated, amongst other rea-
sons, that these e¢ ciency gains would not be passed on to customers
(Competition Commission 2001). This decision, emphasising the pass
through of e¢ ciency gains to customers over the realisation of e¢ ciency
gains alone, is consistent with the social equity and/or consumer wel-
fare concerns which underpin competition law within Europe and the
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USA (Stuyck 2005). The Treasury Committee in October 2012 rec-
ommended the government "include an explicit requirement for the
Prudential Regulatory Authority to approve major bank acquisitions
and mergers in forthcoming legislation". Recent speculations conjec-
tured that potential bidders are interested to buy Lloydsshares from
the government. The relatively concentrated UK banking market, with
a limited number of large banks and a large fringe of smaller banks,
has appreciated a considerable amount of merger activity during the
previous decades consisting of both banks and building societies. Table
3.1.a, highlights the merging and acquisition activity that took place
in the UK the last two and half decades.
Greek M&As - Pre Crisis
The main factors behind the M&A activity in the Greek banking sec-
tor during the second half of the 1990s were the countrys forthcoming
accession into the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the pos-
sible decrease in income this would cause, stronger competition in the
domestic market and potential competition from foreign banks and the
introduction and advancement of new technology. Its noteworthy that
during 90s the strand on the Greek banking market was a big wave
of privatizations and acquisitions of banks that where either directly
or indirectly under state control (e.g. acquisition of Macedonia-Thrace
bank and Hellenic Industrial Development Bank by Piraeus bank and
acquisition of Ionian bank by Alpha bank). An acquisition that caused
a stir in the market was that of Ergobank by Eurobank (1999). An-
other noteworthy fact is that after 2004, there has been a big wave
of acquisitions of Greek banks by foreign banks, mostly French ones
(e.g. acquisition of Geniki bank by Societe Generale and Commercial
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bank(former Emporiki) by Credit Agricole. On the whole the vast ma-
jority of the M&As in the Greek banking sector were completed by the
large banks before the end of the Millenium and represented more than
33% of the value of the asset side of the whole sector. In general Greek
banks did not pursue any M&A activity in the EURO -area but mostly
in the Balkan and south Eastern European region. The result of all
M&As that took place in the last two decades is the creation of six
dominant banking groups in Greece, namely National bank of Greece,
EFG Eurobank, Alpha bank, Piraeus bank, Commercial bank and Agri-
cultural bank. With this in mind, before the onset of the nancial crisis
markets expected further M&A activity by the six major banks target-
ing smaller banks. Nevertheless, no one could be certain whether there
would be any further activity. Additionally, economic theory suggested
that M&As would continue mostly among small banks, since gures
revealed that small Greek banks operated under a 10% of return on
equity (ROE) and with a 70% cost to revenue ratio, in a period when
the same average gures for the European counterparties were 20% and
50% respectively. In turn it seemed that this category of banks has not
reached yet the size that will enable them to perform like their large
competitors did.
Greek M&As - Post Crisis
That said, there was increasing speculation in Greece about the pos-
sibility of mergers between banks, in order to give them greater clout
in raising wholesale resources. In April 2010 Hellenic Postbank ac-
quired a 32.9% stake in Aspis Bank. Hellenic Postbank is owned 34.4%
directly by the government and 10% by Hellenic Post, which is com-
pletely owned by the Greek government. There have been rumours of
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Hellenic Postbank merging with NBG as part of a politically backed
e¤ort to create "one strong state bank and two to three private banks",
in the words of the prime minister, George Papandreou, in an interview
in September 2010. Piraeus Bank proposed in 2010 a plan for merging
with the nancially strong Hellenic Postbank and ATE bank, which
is problematic, yet rich in illiquid assets. The proposal was declined.
National Bank of Greece submitted a proposal to Alpha Bank for a
friendly merger on February 2011. The board of Alpha bank rejected
unanimously that proposal3. Lastly, Greeces second and third largest
lenders Eurobank and Alpha bank on August 2011, rubber-stamped
the deal to form the largest bank in southeast Europe, aided by a capi-
tal injection from the Qatar Investment Authority and the 23rd largest
bank in Europe.The deal collapsed on March 2012 after the private
sectors involvement (PSI) in debt reconstruction. Nevertheless, re-
cent announcement of Basel III Accord (Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, 2010) rules on capital requirements and liquidity, which
are intended to shore up the international banking system against fur-
ther shocks, and pressures to Greek banks, by the so-called troika
(European Union, International Monetary Fund and European Central
Bank) to align with the principles of Basel III , create an expectation for
further consolidation in the Greek banking sector in the recent future.
The last round of domestic banking consolidation in the post cri-
sis area was inaugurated by Piraeus Bank acquiring the sound part of
ATEbank in late July 2012. At that time, few had thought that devel-
opment was not an exceptional case, but it was actually the rst in a
series of upcoming M&A transactions: In early October National Bank
3 About a decade ago the same two banks tried to merge but the plan fell
apart because corporate culture was very di¤erent and there were disputes over
management roles between the two senior executive teams
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announced a tender o¤er to Eurobank shareholders creating the largest
(by far) Greek banking group. A couple of weeks later on October
17, Alpha Bank announced it had entered into a contract with Credit
Agricole for the acquisition of its Greek subsidiary, Emporiki Bank.
Before the end of 2013, eleven banks were deleted from the newGreek
banking sector and four systemic banks were created, the so-called four
cornerstones of the Greek Economic recovery. Table 3.1.b displays all
the pre and post crisis M&As in the country.
3.2.5 Related Literature Review
UK and Greek M&As
In the literature in both countries only a handful of studies have exam-
ined banksconsolidation activity4. As far as the UK banking sector is
concerned, the rst study to date is by Barnes (1985) where he tested
the hypothesis that merger benets will arise in terms of improved
management expenses ratios and growth rates. In terms of the former,
this does not seem to be borne out either in the short period or the
long period. The tendency in fact was towards higher operating unit
costs. The evidence for increased growth rates as a result of merger
is not conclusive. He notes that undeniably , a merger has e¤ects on
the future performance and policy of a society; these may however, be
qualitative rather than quantitative, and aggregate performance may
be una¤ected. Haynes and Thompson (1999) empirically investigated
the impact of acquisition activity on nancial intermediary productiv-
ity. Specically, they used an augmented production function approach
4 We exclude cross-country studies and we focus only on surveys where UK and
Greece individually are the countries of attention.
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to investigate the impact of acquisition, after controls for input changes.
Their model is estimated on an unbalanced panel of UK building soci-
eties over the period 19811993, using data on their core nancial inter-
mediation activities. Their results indicate signicant and substantial
productivity gains following acquisition. These were consistent with
an acquisitions process in which less e¢ cient rms are acquired and
reorganized. The post-merger gains appeared to increase substantially
in the post-deregulation period, when pressures to minimize cost are
widely considered to have increased. In more recent years, Ashton and
Pham (2007) examined the inuence of bank mergers by focusing on
the level of interest payable on retail deposits. Using data from the UK
retail bank mergers between 1988 and 2004, their results indicate that
merged banks tend to be more cost e¢ cient, which leads to improved
deposit interest rates for their consumers. The last study we found
in the literature is by Ashton (2012) where he examined whether de-
positors benet from bank mergers and whether horizontal retail bank
mergers inuence the availability and interest rates of deposit services.
The author reports that di¤erent deposit services and deposits of dif-
ferent values face statistically insignicant levels of interest-rate change
after mergers. The availability of notice deposit services for low and
high levels of investment is reduced after mergers and is largely un-
changed for other deposit services. He concludes that UK depositors
benet little from bank mergers, and di¤erent types of depositors face
di¤erences in the availability of deposit services after mergers.
Turning to the Greek banking sector, the rst study that addressed
the phenomenon of M&As is by Athanasoglou and Brissimis (2004)
which examined the e¤ect of M&As in Greek banking on the cost and
prot e¢ ciency and on economies of scale by using nancial indicators.
The results of this study show an improvement in cost and, in partic-
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ular, prot e¢ ciency between the pre-merger period (19941997) and
the post-merger one (20002002).With regard to economies of scale,
the study indicates that the post-merger period is characterized by
the presence of economies of scale throughout the whole size range of
Greek banks as opposed to the pre-merger period where economies of
scale were found only in small to medium-sized banks, with large banks
experiencing negative economies of scale. Then we nd the paper of
Halkos and Salamouris (2004) where they measured the performance
of Greek banks during the rst wave of M&As (i.e., 1997-1999). The
authors report mixed evidence for the impact of M&As on e¢ ciency.
The third study is conducted by Mylonidis and Kelnikola (2005) which
used nancial indicators to investigate whether prot, operating e¢ -
ciency and labour productivity ratios improved after the mergers of the
period 19992000. Their results indicate that the aforementioned nan-
cial ratios did not improve but when compared with the corresponding
ratios of non-merging banks the result show those mergers had a pos-
itive impact on performance. Rezitis (2008) nds that M&As exercise
a negative impact on bank technical e¢ ciency and total factor produc-
tivity growth during the 1993-2004 period. Pasiouras and Zopounidis
(2008) examined the relationship between banksperformance and the
likelihood of acquisition in the Greek banking industry over the period
1998-2002. The authors conclude that protability, expenses manage-
ment, liquidity, the annual growth of banks total assets and capital
strength do not seem to have an impact on acquisition likelihood. Ad-
ditionally, they note that the number of branches, the size of banks
and the market share are negatively related to acquisition likelihood,
proving support that achievement of greater market share in the mar-
ket was the main reason for large banks to acquire smaller institutions.
In the same year, using a sample over the period 1997-2007, Vergos
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and Christopoulos (2008) found that cumulative abnormal returns are
positive when the target is a Greek bank, but negative when the tar-
get is a foreign bank. Siriopoulos and Tziogkidis (2010) argued that
one should examine M&As while accounting for other signicant events
like privatizations, regime changes, market crisis, etc. By examining the
period 1993-2005 they nd that after signicant events the e¢ ciency
of Greek banks declines, while a recovery period follows, leading to a
greater e¢ ciency score compared with the initial state within the next
two to three years. Finally, Liargovas and Repousis (2011) follow both
an event study approach and an operational performance approach for
the period 1996-2009. The results indicate that bank mergers and ac-
quisitions have no impact and do not create wealth. Additionally, the
authors note that operational performance measured by nancial ratios
does not improve after M&As.
Liquidity Creation
Liquidity creationrefers to the fact that banks provide illiquid loans
to borrowers while giving depositors the ability to withdraw funds at
par value at a moments notice (e.g., Bryant, 1980; Diamond and Dyb-
vig, 1983). Banks also provide borrowers liquidity o¤ the balance sheet
through loan commitments and similar claims to liquid funds (e.g.,
Boot, Greenbaum, and Thakor, 1993; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998;
Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, 2002; Thakor, 2005).
Standard textbooks on nancial intermediation (e.g., Greenbaum
and Thakor, 2007; Freixas and Rochet, 2008) explain that banks are in-
stitutions that make loans funded by a combination of deposits from the
public and equity supplied by the banksshareholders. More formally,
banks engage in liquidity creation,which is a form of qualitative as-
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set transformation. As explained in Bouwman (2013), to understand
liquidity creation, we can picture a rm in need of long-term nanc-
ing in a world without banks. In such a world, savers would directly
nance the funding needs of the rm, and they would end up with an
illiquid claim against the rm. In contrast, in a world with banks, it is
the bank that provides the long-term loan to the rm, and the bank is
able to o¤er savers demand deposits. So it is the bank that holds the
illiquid claim against the rm and savers end up with a liquid claim
against the bank. Because of this di¤erence in liquidity between what
banks do with their money and the way they nance their activities,
banks are said to create liquidity.
The literature on banksliquidity creation remains scarce because
its expansion is a recent development in the wake of Berger and Bouw-
mans (2009) pioneering article. Their paper makes a major contribu-
tion by suggesting a new method for measuring the liquidity created by
banks. The authors use this method to measure liquidity creation in
the US banking industry between 1993 and 2003. They nd that liquid-
ity creation increased substantially between 1993 and 2003, as the US
banking industry created $2.8 trillion in liquidity in 2003. They nd
that the relation between capital and liquidity creation varies with size
and depending on whether o¤-balance-sheet items are added to the
liquidity creation measure. With measures that include o¤-balance-
sheet items, the relation is positive for large banks, not signicant for
medium banks, and negative for small banks. With measures exclud-
ing o¤-balance-sheet items, the relation is not signicant for large and
medium banks, and negative for small banks. Then Fungáµcová et al.
(2010) extend the debate by analysing how a deposit insurance scheme
a¤ects this relation. The authors study Russia since it provides a nat-
ural experiment to investigate this issue because a deposit insurance
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scheme was implemented there in 2004. A negative relation between
capital and liquidity creation is reported before and after the deposit
insurance scheme. Additionally, they observed that the relation varies
with size and ownership. Their results indicate a statistically signi-
cant negative relationship for small and medium banks and for private
domestic banks, while the relation is not signicant for large banks,
foreign banks, and state-owned banks. Further, Pana et al. (2010) ex-
amine the impact of bank mergers on liquidity creation for US banks,
reporting a positive inuence of mergers on banksliquidity creation.
Rauch et al. (2011) examine potential determinants of liquidity creation
for a sample of German savings banks. By comparing the inuence of
macroeconomic factors, including monetary policy and unemployment,
with bank-specic factors such as size or nancial performance, they
nd some support for the impact of monetary policy; the tightening
of monetary policy reduces liquidity creation. However, bank-specic
factors do not seem to have any inuence on liquidity creation.
Berger and Bouwman (2012) analyse the impact of monetary policy
on aggregate liquidity creation by banks in the US. Analysing the period
from 1984 to 2008, they examine whether the impact di¤ers between
normal periods and nancial crises, and whether the impact also di¤ers
according to bank size. Their empirical evidence indicates that tight-
ening monetary policy only reduces liquidity creation for small banks.
This e¤ect is weaker during nancial crises. They also note that liquid-
ity creation is somewhat higher prior to nancial crises that suggests
measures of aggregate liquidity creation have explanatory power in pre-
dicting crises. While Berger et al. (2012) investigate how regulatory
interventions and capital injections inuence risk and liquidity creation
using a sample of German universal banks. The authors nd that these
interventions reduce both risk and liquidity creation. Fungacova et al.
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(2013) investigate bank failures related to the core liquidity-creating
role of bank. They introduced a novel hypothesis; the "Excessive Liq-
uidity Creation Hypothesis" (ELCH), where according to it a rise in a
banks core liquidity creation activity increases its probability of fail-
ure. The results suggest that excessive liquidity creation signicantly
increases the probability of bank failure that regulatory authorities can
mitigate systemic distress and reduce the costs to society from bank
failures through early identication of excessive liquidity creators and
enhanced monitoring of their activities. Horvath et al. (2013), inves-
tigate the relation between capital and liquidity creation by banks by
examining the causality of this link. They show a negative, bi-causal
relation between capital and liquidity creation, where capital negatively
Granger-causes liquidity creation for small banks and that liquidity cre-
ation Granger-causes a reduction in capital. The same authors (Hor-
vath et al., 2013) examine the relationship between bank competition
and liquidity creation by banks and found that increased bank com-
petition reduces liquidity creation. They conclude that competition
increases bank fragility, which reduces banksincentives to create liq-
uidity. A similar study was conducted by Joh and Kim (2013), who
investigate the relationship between competition and liquidity creation
in the banking industry among twenty ve OECD countries. Their em-
pirical evidence suggests that as the market becomes less competitive,
a bank provides more liquidity to customers. Additionally, they nd
large banks to increase their loan supply and liquidity creation as the
banking industry becomes more concentrated while statistically signif-
icant changes in their liquidity supply are found for the small banks
regardless of their market structure.
Our study di¤erentiates itself from all the aforementioned ones, re-
lated either to the M&As or to the liquidity creation framework, in
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that it adds insights in several respects, as discussed below. First and
foremost we contribute to the literature by examining the concept of po-
tential consolidation activity and by addressing the question of whether
it could lead to an increase of liquidity in the banking sector and conse-
quently to the creation of new credit channels in the economy. In this
way, we are able to exploit on one hand, potential social welfare bene-
ts in the UK banking system through potential M&As and we address
the question of whether they can reduce the unconventional monetary
activities (i.e QE, FLS) of the Bank of England. While on the other
hand, we investigate whether potential M&As can be proved vital in
alleviating the terms of the memorandum between Greece and the so-
called Troika (IMF, European Commission, European Central Bank),
enhancing the real economy, households and rms, with the creation of
additional credit channels in the spectrum of a severe country default
risk. In addition, we employ a comparative and a forecasting analysis
pre-crisis and post-crisis, where we shed light on the trade-o¤ between
managerial motives and social welfare that triggers M&A activity. We
establish the e¤ects on liquidity creation of potential consolidation ac-
tivity via our proposed hypothesis, "Cost E¢ ciency-Liquidity Creation
Hypothesis" (CELCH), which argues that enhancing in terms of "cost
e¢ ciency" banksM&A, can create both increased liquidity and so-
cial well-being surplus. Second, to the best of our knowledge, it is the
rst study to address the impact of potential adverse macroeconomic,
nancial and bank-specic conditions that can occur in an economy
on liquidity creation and cost e¢ ciency. For this purpose we create a
stress test scenario under a panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) model.
In this way we are able to extract unbiased inferences regarding the ro-
bustness of a banking sector with respect to both its liquidity creation
and cost e¢ ciency level and extract thusly crucial policy implications
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towards the stability of vulnerable banking systems especially in the
era of the recent nancial crisis and towards the spectrum of the eco-
nomic prosperity. This leads to a third novelty of our study, where we
gauge the impact of e¢ ciency on liquidity creation and the direction of
causality among them in two completely di¤erent in terms of "sophis-
tication, market characteristics and volume of transactions" banking
systems, the UK and the Greek one. An additional contribution of
our study is the proposition of a novel methodology; i.e. the concept
of half - life, to evaluate and compare the robustness of mergers and
acquisitions. Moreover, is it the rst study that examines all the his-
torical UK and Greek banksM&As in respect to their credit supply
by employing recently developed measures of liquidity creation (Berger
and Bouwman, 2009) that account for both on and o¤ balance sheet
banksactivities. Finally, for the rst time in both banking sectors,
it is being analysed the impact of the "Deposit Insurance Hypothesis"
on liquidity creation and the relationship between capital and liquidity
which is expressed by two additional competing hypotheses: "Financial
Fragility Crowding out" vs "Risk Absorption", in the spirit of Basel
III, where a major emphasis on liquidity is given and it is implemented
by the introduction of two ratios, namely the liquidity coverage ratio
(LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR).
3.3 Theoretical Framework
According to the theory of nancial intermediation, an important role
of banks in the economy is to provide liquidity and specically better
liquidity insurance than nancial markets. On one hand, banks can cre-
ate liquidity through their on-balance sheet activities by funding long
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term illiquid assets (e.g., business loans) with short term liquid liabil-
ities (e.g., transactions deposits) (Bryant, 1980; Diamond and Dybvig
1983). To put it di¤erently, banks can be liquidity providers, as they
hold illiquid assets and provide cash and demand deposits to the rest
of the economy. On the other hand, banks can enhance their liquidity
provision via o¤-balance sheet activities, through loan commitments
and claims to liquid funds because the feature of loan commitments
is very similar to demand deposits from the perspective of customers
(Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998; Kashyap et al., 2002). On the contrary,
liquidity can be destroyed when banks use illiquid liabilities or equity
to nance liquid assets (e.g treasury securities). Consequently, they
expose themselves to the risk of facing a sudden increase in deposit
withdrawals, and thus to the risk of a bank run.
In periods of crisis, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Allen and
Santomero (1998) argue that liquidity creation increases the probability
of higher losses when illiquid assets are sold to meet a sudden increase
in customersliquidity demands. Nevertheless, Carletti at al. (2007)
argue that this risk is partially mitigated through a bank merger. The
authors note argue that banksbehaviour after a merger is changed
by the creation of an internal money market, a venue through which
reserves can be exchanged internally. Through this internal market,
the merged bank is able to increase the weight of its relatively illiquid
assets, which is the group of assets where the bank can generate higher
rates of return. Thus, if a sudden increase on the liability side occurs
the bank will not have to be involved in so-called "asset re sales". The
reason that after a consolidation activity the banks ability to increase
the weight of illiquid assets is ameliorated, is the fact that an M&A
activity reduces information asymmetries and enables them to screen
borrowers more e¢ ciently (Panetta et al. 2009).
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3.3.1 Measurement of Liquidity
Liquidity creation by banks has historically been measured as the loans-
to-asset ratio as shown in Hughes et al. (1996), or the ratio of cash
and related liquid items to total assets - as proxies of bank liquidity
(Molyneux and Thornton, 1992; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999).
However, such liquidity indicators have been criticized as they do not
consider comprehensive aspects of bank liquidity provision and the
development of market conditions connected with nancial markets
(Shleifer and Vishny, 2010). The existing literature indicates that there
have only been two papers that attempt to measure bank liquidity cre-
ation. The rst is one by Deep and Schaefer (2004), where a measure
of liquidity transformation is constructed and applied to data gathered
from 200 of the largest US banks over the period 1997-2001. The liq-
uidity transformation gap, or "LT gap" is dened as liquid liabilities
minus liquid assets divided by total assets. The authors consider all
loans with a maturity of one year or less to be liquid in this model
and loan commitments and other o¤-balance sheet activities are explic-
itly excluded due to their contingent nature. Nonetheless, as discussed
above, in order to precisely measure a banks aggregate liquidity sup-
ply, all aspects of the balance sheet should be considered. To be more
precise, liquidity that a bank provides is on one hand attributed to the
structure of both the asset and liability sides, but on the other hand
is attributed to o¤-balance sheet activities as well. This leads us to
the second methodological attempt in the literature to gauge liquidity,
proposed by Berger and Bouwman (2009). The authors averred that
the "LT gap" is a step forward, but argued that it is not su¢ ciently
comprehensive by highlighting a few di¤erences between their approach
and the LT gap developed by Deep and Schaefer (2004). Firstly, the
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Berger and Bouwman (2009) model classies loans by category as well
rather than solely by maturity and employs measures which include
o¤-balance sheet activities, consistent with the arguments of Kashyap
et al. (2002), and Repullo (2004).
That said, Berger and Bouwman (2009) construct their liquidity
creation measure using a three step approach. In the rst step, they
classify all bank balance sheet and o¤-balance sheet activities as liquid,
semi-liquid, or illiquid based on the ease, cost, and time for banks to
dispose of their obligations to obtain liquid funds to meet customers
demands. Within each category, shorter maturity items are dened
as more liquid than longer maturity items because they self-liquidate
without as much e¤ort. Loans are classied by category ("cat") or
entirely by maturity ("mat"). In the second step, the authors assign
weights to the activities classied in rst step. The weights are based on
the liquidity creation theory according to which banks create the most
liquidity when as they transform, illiquid assets into liquid liabilities
and maximum liquidity is destroyed when liquid assets are transformed
into illiquid liabilities. Therefore positive weights are applied to both
illiquid assets and liquid liabilities and negative weights to liquid assets
and illiquid liabilities. They argue that the magnitudes of the weights
are based on simple dollar-for-dollar adding up constraints, so that $1
of liquidity is created (destroyed) when banks transform $1 of illiquid
(liquid) assets into $1 of liquid (illiquid) liabilities. In the last step,
they combine the activities as classied in the rst step, and weighted
according to the second step, in order to construct four liquidity mea-
sures. These measures classify loans by category or maturity ("cat"
vs "mat") and di¤erentiate on whether banks include o¤-balance sheet
activities ("fat") or exclude them ("nonfat"). Detailed description of
the three-step procedure is provided in table 3.2. Thus, four liquid-
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ity creation measures are constructed based on the four combinations
"catfat", "catnonfat", "matfat", "matnonfat" and represented by
the following equations:
catfat
LC =

1
2
 illiquidassets(cat) + 0 semiliquidassets(cat)  1
2
 liquidassets

+8>><>>:
1
2
 liquidliabilities+ 0 semiliquidliabilities  1
2
 illiquidliabilities
 1
2
equity
9>>=>>;+8>><>>:
1
2
 illiquidguarantees+ 0 semiliquidguarantees
 1
2
 liquidguarantees  1
2
liquidderivatives
9>>=>>;
(3.3.1)
cat  nonfat
LC =

1
2
 illiquidassets(cat) + 0 semiliquidassets(cat)  1
2
 liquidassets

+8>><>>:
1
2
 liquidliabilities+ 0 semiliquidliabilities  1
2
 illiquidliabilities
 1
2
equity
9>>=>>;
(3.3.2)
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matfat
LC =

1
2
 illiquidassets(mat) + 0 semiliquidassets(mat)  1
2
 liquidassets

+8>><>>:
1
2
 liquidliabilities+ 0 semiliquidliabilities  1
2
 illiquidliabilities
 1
2
equity
9>>=>>;+8>><>>:
1
2
 illiquidguarantees+ 0 semiliquidguarantees
 1
2
 liquidguarantees  1
2
liquidderivatives
9>>=>>;
(3.3.3)
mat  nonfat
LC =

1
2
 illiquidassets(mat) + 0 semiliquidassets(mat)  1
2
 liquidassets

+8>><>>:
1
2
 liquidliabilities+ 0 semiliquidliabilities  1
2
 illiquidliabilities
 1
2
equity
9>>=>>;
(3.3.4)
Berger and Bouwman (2009) suggest that "cat fat" is the preferred
liquidity creation measure, because in this specic category they can
treat business loans as illiquid regardless of their maturity because
banks generally cannot easily dispose of them to meet liquidity needs,
and they treat residential mortgages and consumer loans as semiliquid
because these loans can often be securitized and sold to meet demand
for liquid funds. In addition, this measure includes o¤-balance sheet
activities, consistent with the arguments in Holmston and Tirole (1998)
and Kashyap et al. (2002) who suggest that banks also create liquidity
o¤ the balance sheet through loan commitments and similar claims to
liquid funds.
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3.4 Empirical Methodology
3.4.1 Historical M&As - Liquidity Creation
The rst step of our empirical methodology is to investigate the liq-
uidity creation of all domestically completed M&As among nancial
depository institutionsin both countries throughout our sample peri-
ods. For this purpose, we compute using Berger and Bouwman (2009)
preferred measure of liquidity creation, (i.e. catfat) the level of liquid-
ity that the acquirer and the target creates one year before the M&A
and the liquidity that is created from the new nancial entity one year
after the M&A activity. In turn, if we assume the consolidation occurs
in time t we examine the involving nancial intermediaries in terms of
their liquidity creation in time t   1 and t + 1. While Focarelli and
Panetta (2003) note that a three years period is required for all the
e¢ ciency gains derived from the consolidation process to be realised,
Erel (2009) highlights that considerable developments occur from the
rst year onwards. Thus, following Pana et al. (2010) we allow for
a two year interval believing that it ideally captures the e¤ect of the
M&A on the level of liquidity created by the new nancial institution
demonstrated by the following equation:
difcatfat = catfatAB;t=t+1   (catfatA;t=t 1 + catfatB;t=t 1); (3.4.1)
where catfatAB;t=t+1, represents the level of liquidity created by
the new nancial institution one year after the M&A activity has been
completed, whereas catfatA;t=t 1 and catfatB;t=t 1, represent the liq-
uidity creation level of each nancial institution one year before the
consolidation process occurred.
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3.4.2 Historical M&As - "Financial Fragility-Crowding
out Hypothesis" vs "Risk Absorption Hy-
pothesis" and the impact of "Deposit Insur-
ance Hypothesis "
The primary reason why banks hold capital is to absorb risk, including
the risk of liquidity crunches, protection against bank runs, and vari-
ous other risks, most importantly credit risk. Although the reason why
banks hold capital is motivated by their risk transformation role, recent
theories suggest that bank capital may also a¤ect banksability to cre-
ate liquidity. These theories produce opposing predictions on the link
between capital and the change in liquidity creation around mergers.
The "nancial fragility-crowding out hypothesis" predicts that higher
capital reduces liquidity creation. Diamond and Rajan (2001) model an
investment bank that raises funds from investors to provide nancing to
an entrepreneur, in which the entrepreneur may withhold e¤ort, which
reduces the amount of bank nancing attainable. More importantly,
the bank may also withhold e¤ort, which limits the banks ability to
raise funding. A deposit contract mitigates the banks hold-up problem
because depositors can run on the bank if the bank threatens to with-
hold e¤ort and therefore maximises the liquidity creation. Providers of
capital cannot run on the bank, which limits their willingness to pro-
vide funds, and hence reduces the liquidity creation thus, the higher
a banks capital ratio, the less liquidity it will create. Gorton and Win-
ton (2000) show a higher capital ratio may reduce liquidity creation
through the crowding out of deposits and argue that deposits are more
e¤ective liquidity hedges for investors than investments in equity capi-
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tal. Thus, the higher capital ratios shift investorsfunds from relatively
liquid deposits to relatively illiquid bank capital, reducing the overall
liquidity for investors.
The "risk absorption hypothesis" argues that higher capital en-
hances banksability to create liquidity based on two strands of litera-
ture. The rst argues that liquidity creation exposes a bank to risk as
the more liquidity it creates, the greater the likelihood and severity of
losses associated with having to dispose of illiquid assets to meet the
liquidity demands of the customers ( Allen and Santomero 1998; Allen
and Gale 2004 ). The second argues that bank capital absorbs risk and
expands banksrisk-bearing capacity (Bhattacharya and Thakor 1993;
Repullo 2004; Von Thadden 2004; Coval and Thakor 2005). Combining
these two strands yields the prediction that higher capital ratios may
allow banks to create more liquidity.
Finally, a di¤erent hypothesis, the "Deposit Insurance Hypothesis",
according to which banks with a higher level of deposit insurance are
expected to perform higher levels of liquidity transformation, can be
positively or negatively correlated, with respect to liquidity creation,
with the two aforementioned hypotheses. The deposit insurance scheme
states that the protection o¤ered under a system of deposit insurance
is a guarantee that all or a limited amount of the principal and the
interest accrued on protected accounts will be paid. The guarantee may
be explicitly given in law or regulation5. There are conicting views
5 The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision uses the term "deposit pro-
tection" instead of "deposit insurance." This distinction is understandable because
deposit insurance di¤ers from most other forms of insurance. In other words, bank
failures are not the independent events that other forms of insurance typically cover.
Rather, failures tend to occur in waves, partly in response to a severe recession or
some other macroeconomic shock, partly because the legal/regulatory/ supervisory
structure is inadequate, and partly because bank failures can be contagious when
the failure of one bank brings down its counterparties (Garcia 1996)..
160
regarding the after-e¤ect of a deposit insurance implementation. On
one hand, it creates a more structured and regulated banking system
which protects customers and mitigates bank-panics. On the other
hand, it might cause the so called moral hazardproblem, where bank
managers undertake excessive risk due to the presence of insurance on
deposits as such.
In turn, a second step of our empirical methodology is to exam-
ine which hypothesis, the "Financial fragility-crowding out" and the
"Risk absorption" hypothesi, characterizes each countrys historical
bank M&As. In addition, we attempt to shed light on any implica-
tions of the "Deposit Insurance Hypothesis" in regard to the liquidity
creation of the new nancial entity one year after the consolidation has
been completed.
Model
We base our analysis on the preferred liquidity measure of Berger
and Bouwman (2009), more specically the "catfat". We test all the
M&As that took place during our sample, to check the level of liquidity
provision in the years after the M&A activity has been completed. Fol-
lowing Pana et al. (2010), in order to examine the "Financial fragility-
crowding out" , "Risk absorption" and "Deposit Insurance Hypothesis"
the following regression equations are estimated:
catfat
GTA

i;t+1
 

catfat
GTA

i;t 1
=
a0 + a1

UninsuredDeposits
GTA

i;t 1
+ a2

Bankcapital
GTA

i;t 1
+a3 Re lativesizei;t 1 + a4Publicstatusi;t 1 + a5GDPi;t 1 + "i;t (3.4.2)
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The variables are dened as follows: catfat represents the liquidity
measures based on category for the merged banks at t+ 1 and the pro-
forma bank at t 1, uninsured depositsare the total uninsured deposits
of the acquirer bank before the merger and Bankcapital is the amount
of equity capital of the acquirer bank before the merger. These three
variables are all normalised by the gross total assets (GTA). Relative-
size is the ratio of target and acquirer GTA. Publicstatus is a dummy
variable with a value of 1 if both acquirers and targets are private and 0
otherwise, and GDP is the real gross domestic product. Normalization
by GTA is necessary to make both the dependent and independent
variables meaningful and comparable across banks and to avoid giv-
ing undue weight to the largest institutions. Reported statistics are
adjusted for heteroskedasticity.
As argued under the risk absorptionhypothesis, it is important
to appropriately control for bank risk as the main reason for banks to
hold capital is to be able to absorb risk. Further, Berger and Bouwman
(2009) suggest that inclusion of risk measures in the analysis could
help isolate the role of capital in the liquidity creation function from its
role in supporting risk transformation functions of banks. That said, in
order to measure the banks ability to absorb shocks occurring from the
mergers and acquisitions, we use the Herndahl-Hirschman of revenue
(HHIREV ) diversication measure (Stiroh 2004):
HHIREV=

NON
NETOP
2
+

NET
NETOP
2
(3.4.3)
NETOP = NON +NET (3.4.4)
where NON is non interest income, NET is net interest income, and
NETOP is net operating revenue.
As the HHIREV rises, the bank revenue stream becomes more con-
centrated and less diversied. While other measures of bank risk ab-
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sorption ability are more popular in the banking literature (e.g. the
ratio of commercial real estate to total loans, or the ratio of jumbo cer-
ticates of deposit (CDs) to assets), the revenue diversication measure
is preferred because it avoids the use of balance sheet items, and thus
mitigates the endogeneity problem. In addition, we split all the M&As
under investigation into large and small acquirers, in order to identify
any patterns linking size and the three aforementioned hypotheses of
interest.
3.4.3 Recent & Potential M&As - "Cost E¢ ciency-
Liquidity Creation Hypothesis" (CELCH)
In the third step of our empirical strategy we examine whether those
M&As could lead to an increase of liquidity in the banking sector and
in turn, to an increase of the credit channels (i.e loans) in the econ-
omy, especially in the spectrum of a severe country default risk. This
has an additional policy implication as far as the trueincentives that
trigger an M&A activity is concerned, i.e., a trade-o¤ between share-
holderspersonal gains and societys economic prosperity. To conduct
our analysis, we create potential mergers and acquisitions between the
most important nancial institutions in terms of assets, loans and de-
posits in the UK and Greek banking sector respectively and we com-
pare their potential liquidity creation with the sum of each individual
banks liquidity creation. Nevertheless, this raises the following chal-
lenge; "How we will be able to measure potential liquidity creation?.
Since the liquidity creation is measured by the recently proposed in the
literature liquidity measures of Berger and Bouwman (2009) and due
to the fact those measures are constructed by an accounting and not by
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an estimation procedure, consequently, I cannot calculate the liquidity
creation of potential M&As. To be more explicit, lets assume bankA
and bankB where we have data for both them in time t   1, t and in
time t + 1 as well and we calculate each banks liquidity creation (i.e
catfat) in all three points in time. Lets assume now that we create
a potential consolidation activity among these two banks (bankAB) in
time t. If we try to calculate the liquidity creation di¤erence between
the newbank (i.e the merged bank) in time t + 1 and the two old
ones (i.e the proforma bank) in time 0t  10 the result will be:
difcatfat = catfatAB;t=t+1 (catfatA;t=t 1+catfatB;t=t 1) = n (3.4.5)
, where n could be a positive, negative or even equal to zero number de-
pending on the values of the level of liquidity creation of all three nan-
cial instutitions, i.e. AB; A, B, in both points in time. Nonetheless, any
result of equation 3:4:5 would derive incorrect conclusions. The culprit
here would be the AB nancial institution, since catfat0AB;t=t+1does
not represent the liquidity creation of a hypothetical merged bank, as
it was explained in section 3:4:1, but of a hypothetical proforma bank.
since the consolidation process has not occurred historically and thus
we cannot observe its e¤ect on the level of liquidity creation.For this
reason, we introduce the Cost E¢ ciency - Liquidity Creation Hypothe-
siswhich states that after a consolidation activity if the new nancial
institution has cost e¢ ciency gains these can be reected to liquidity
creation enhancement. Thus, we propose to measure the liquidity cre-
ation of a potential M&A through its potential level of e¢ ciency. It
is noteworthy that bankse¢ ciency enhancement is an explicit policy
objective in the Single Market Directive of the European Commission,
highlighting is importance.
Nonetheless, at this point it is important to provide a theoretical
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justication for our proposed methodology. Put it di¤erently, we need
to explain in detail our theoretical motivation and methodological steps
which combine the concepts of e¢ ciency, M&As, liquidity creation and
social benet.
During the last decade, antitrust and competition law assessment of
M&As has altered to accommodate growing scepticism with the use of
concentration and market share measures (Hausman and Sidak, 2007;
Werden, 2002). Subsequently, a crucial criterion for judging poten-
tial mergers as acceptable is their ability to pass on merger-specic
e¢ ciency gains to customers. This e¢ ciency pass-through criterion is
explicitly stated in the US and EU merger guidelines (Neven, 2006)
and is employed in Australia in an informal manner. In other words,
the rst theoretical pinpoint for a bank-consolidation to be acceptable
it to create synergies and pass on these benets to customers.
Additionally, economic theory suggests that mergers can be an ef-
cient means to restructure an industry, and the subsequent e¢ ciency
gains from mergers can be larger than customer losses from increased
market concentration. Copious theoretical studies have investigated
the relationship between merger-specic e¢ ciency and price changes.
The rst to date was by Williamson (1968), who claimed that merger-
specic cost e¢ ciency gains outweighed possible anticompetitive e¤ects.
Within this general framework, increased cost e¢ ciency arising from
mergers can be larger than the deadweight loss of reduced production
which stems from the increase in market power. In turn, we may expe-
rience a trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency gains and anticompetitive e¤ects
of M&As as e¢ ciency enhancement could result in a limited price in-
crease. Consequently, as a second point we argue that M&As can lead
to an increase in e¢ ciency.
In a later study Farrell and Shapiro (1990), demonstrate that if a
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merger generates no synergies (e¢ ciencies) and does not lower marginal
costs, prices will rise. Thus, they argue M&As can only be contribute
to the social well-being when e¢ ciency has increased substantially and
these gains are passed on to consumers. Consequently, as a third point
we conclude that e¢ ciency enhancing M&As could lead to consumer
benets.
Nonetheless, the positive e¤ect of a consolidation process is inu-
enced as well by the size of the involved nancial institutions. On one
hand M&As of small banks increase the market share of larger more
e¢ cient banks and thus increase the markets total surplus. On the
other hand M&As of large banks shift market share to less e¢ cient
smaller banks which need additional e¢ ciency gains to increase total
surplus. In a very recent study, Park and Pennacchi (2009) examine
the di¤erences in pricing e¤ects of large and of small banks. Their re-
sults indicate that as large merging banks borrow relatively more funds
from money markets rather than from retail deposits, large bank merg-
ers will result in a reduction in rates for depositors and improve rates
for borrowers. Consequently, as a fourth point we conclude that large
banksM&As could ameliorate the terms of the issuing loans from the
point of view of the borrowers.
DeYoung et al., (2009), despite the fact that they show that US
bank M&As have an negative impact on e¢ ciency, their empirical ev-
idence on European bank M&As reveals on the contrary a positive
impact on e¢ ciency. Moreover, Haynes and Thompson (1999) note
that UK bank mergers have been associated with positive performance
e¤ects and Ashton and Pham (2007) infer that UK (and German) bank
mergers have led to signicantly enhanced cost e¢ ciency for the merg-
ing banks. Consequently, as a fth point from the two aforementioned
studies, we are condent that the examination of liquidity creation of
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potential UK and Greek banksM&As is in line with the established
criteria of EU M&As guidelines, and these potential consolidation ac-
tivities can be proclaimed as acceptable.
The empirical evidence of Berger and Bouwman (2009) highlights
that recently completed banksM&As account for the industrys overall
liquidity. This is in line with the most recent study of Pana et al.
(2010) and with the vast majority of our earlier ndings regarding all
historical UK and Greek M&As. Thus, as a sixth point, we infer that
consolidation activity results in an increase in liquidity creation.
According to the theory of economic e¢ ciency, a nancial institu-
tion can enhance its cost e¢ ciency if it manages to achieve the minimum
level of inputs costs to produce a certain level of outputs. A way this
can be done is by establishing a new business plan which can enable the
bank to exploit economies of scale or economies of scope. Additionally,
it can acquire or invent more sophisticated technology which can re-
sult in reducing its inputsunit cost. Alternatively, cost e¢ ciency can
be achieved by minimizing information asymmetries which will result
to the minimization of costs. According to the banking e¢ ciency the-
ory one of the main outputs of banks is loans. The primary problem
that banks face with loans is the level of those that are not perform-
ing6. Nevertheless, if a bank is being able to reduce its information
asymetries then it ameliorates its ability to screen borrowers and thus
reducing the level of non-performing loans. Consequently, it can real-
locate its resources and increase the weight of loans; i.e., illiquid assets,
which results to increase in liquidity creation. As we discussed earlier a
consolidation activity reduces information assymmetries and results in
6 A Non-performing loan (NPL) is a loan that is in default or close to being in
default. Many loans become non-performing after being in default for 90 days, but
this can depend on the contract terms.
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increased liquidity, in turn, with the same mechanism strategies that re-
sult in cost e¢ ciency can result in increased liquidity and consequently
in increased ow of credit to the economy.
Thus, from the seven aforementioned points, we build the theo-
retical intuition for Cost E¢ ciency - Liquidity Creation Hypothesis,
which argues that potential scenarios of M&As which exhibit higher
levels of economic e¢ ciency compared to the average individual level
of e¢ ciency of the involving nancial institutions (without completing
the M&A) can create as well higher levels of liquidity creration (against
the same benchmark) with enhanced lending rates for the borrowers.
Next challenge is to demonstrate a mathematical proof of this rea-
soning. In order to achieve that, lets use for one more time the above
hypothetical scenario of bankA, bankB, and the potential bankAB in
time 0t0 .
To estimate the level of economic e¢ ciency and specically the level
cost e¢ ciency7 , we opt for the stochastic frontier approach (SFA)8
under the intermediation approach by Sealey and Lindley (1977)9. In
particular, we follow the specication:
lnTCit = lnC(yit; wit; T; Eit ; ) + uit + vit; (3.4.6)
where subscripts i = 1; ::::N stand for each nancial institution (i.e.
each M&A activity), T = :year1; year2:::; final-year; and indicates a
7 Due to unavailability of data on output prices we dont estimate prot e¢ ciency.
8 Kubhakar and Lovell (2000) is an excellent guide on Stochastic Frontier analysis
and its parametric framework on the estimation of e¢ ciency.
9 Several approaches have been suggested in the literature in order to dene
bank inputs and outputs (for a review see Berger and Humphrey, 1992). In our
study we are interested in the estimation of overall e¢ ciency and economic viability
of potential banks M&A and its relationship with liquidity creation, thus, the
intermediation approach seems to t better the purposes of our analysis (Berger
and Mester, 1997).
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time trend and is included in each specication to allow for technologi-
cal change, using both linear and quadratic (i.e. T and T 2) respectively.
TCit is individual bank total cost; yit and wit indicate vectors of out-
put and input prices; we specify equity (E) as a quasi-xed input to
control for di¤erences in risk preferences, which may arise due to reg-
ulation, nancial distress, or informational asymmetries;  is a vector
of parameters to be estimated. The two-sided random error term vit is
assumed to be independent of the non-negative cost e¢ ciency variable
uit and is assumed to follow a symmetric normal distribution around
the frontier and ui, accounts for the rms ine¢ ciency and is assumed
to follow a half-normal distribution. To empirically implement the cost
frontier, we opt for10:
lnTCit = 0 +
2X
l=1
yl ln yit;l +
2X
s=1
ws lnwit;s +
1
2
2X
l=1
2X
s=1
ylys ln yit;l ln yit;s
+
1
2
2X
l=1
2X
s=1
wlws lnwit;l lnwit;s +
3X
l=1
3X
s=1
ylws ln yit;l lnwit;s
+(
2X
s=1
ws lnwit;s)  T + (
2X
l=1
ws ln yit;l)  T + E lnEit (3.4.7)
+tT +
1
2
ttT
2 + uit + vit
Standard linear homogeneity and symmetry restrictions in all quadratic
terms are imposed in accordance with economic theory. Its noteworthy
to mention that e¢ ciency values range between 0 (the least e¢ cient
nancial institution in the sample) and 1 (the most e¢ cient nancial
institution in the sample).
10 The translog function has been widely applied in the literature due to its
exibility. Berger and Mester (1997) found that both the translog and the Fourier-
exible form specications yielded essentially the same average level and dispersion
of measured e¢ ciency, and both ranked the individual banks in almost the same
order.
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If we attempt now to calculate the di¤erence between the level of
the estimated economic (cost) e¢ ciency of the newbank and of the
two oldones in both points in time the result will be:
difeff = effAB;t   (effA;t + effB;t)
2
6= 011; (3.4.8)
simply because e¢ ciency is a result of an empirical estimation pro-
cedure, whereas Berger and Bouwman (2009) liquidity measures are
rather a result of an accounting procedure where,
difcatfat = catfatAB;t   (catfatA;t + catfatB;t) = 0 (3.4.9)
Thus, from equations 3:4:7 and 3:4:8 we can create the following hy-
pothesis: If
effAB;t  (effA;t + effB;t)
2
; (3.4.10)
then
j catfatAB;t j effAB;t  (effA;t + effB;t)
2
 j (catfatA;t + catfatB;t) j
(3.4.11)
which results in
dif(effAB;t   (effA;t + effB;t)
2
) j catfatAB;t j 0; (3.4.12)
where as it can be seen both sides of the inequality 3:4:11 are calculated
in the same point in time when the hypothetical M&A takes place (i.e.
t). Note that liquidity creation can be negative (i.e, bank destroys
liquidity), for this reason we include the absolute value of catfat in
both inequalities 3:4:11 and 3:4:12. In this way, we provide a logic
11 Due to the fact that e¢ ciency is computed via the parametric Stochastic fron-
tier approach (SFA) and is expressed as a ratio of the actual observed level of
e¢ ciency to the optimum level of e¢ ciency of the best-practice bank in the sample,
we cannot use the sum (as we did with respect to the measurement of liquidity of
two banks in section 3.4.1) but instead we take the average level of e¢ ciency of the
involving nancial institutions.
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mathematical sequence of a theoretical hypothesis regarding liquidity
gains or losses associated with the economic e¢ ciency stemming from a
potential consolidation process among several nancial institutions. In
this way we are able to evaluate and compare the liquidity-e¢ ciency
gains or losses of potential M&A activity. This is of extreme importance
for policy makers and practitioners, since after the onset of the global
nancial turmoil we have witnessed numerous cases of banksM&A
world-wide and there are daily speculations about new ones. Thus
rstly, in the spirit of Basel III, where a major emphasis is given on
liquidity and implemented by the introduction of two ratios, namely
the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio
(NSFR), we investigate whether potential consolidation activity can
create neuralgic and necessary credit channels in the economy that are
essential for its recovery and for the promotion of growth in an era
where the adverse e¤ects of the global nancial turmoil are still visible.
While secondly, we are able to extract policy implications about the true
origins of a M&A activity, in terms of promoting the social well-being
or managerial purposes by investigating whether a trade-o¤ between
shareholderspersonal gains and societys economic prosperity exists.
For this purpose, as it was aforesaid we select the largest nancial
institutions in terms of assets, loans and deposits of both the UK and
the Greek banking sector and we create potential mergers and acquisi-
tions scenarios among them. Furthermore, we conduct a comparative
analysis pre-crisis and post crisis. As far as the examination of the for-
mer period is concerned we use data of the nancial institutions up to
2006, whereas for the investigation of the latter period we use data up
to 2011. In this way, we test whether the level of liquidity associated
with e¢ ciency that had been created by the same potential M&As has
changed due to the crisis. This has crucial distinct contribution for
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each banking system and major policy implications towards its stabil-
ity. On one hand we are able to provide empirical evidence of whether
the BoE could scale back its unconventional monetary policy (i.e. QE,
FLS) in two di¤erent points in time and how di¤erent the future of UK
economy and its nancial institutions which experienced a great nega-
tive impact of the crisis could be, had they involved in a consolidation
process earlier. On the other hand, we can investigate whether poten-
tial M&As could have been proved vital in alleviating the terms of each
of the two memorandums between Greece and the so-called Troika, en-
hancing the real economy, households and rms, with the creation of
additional credit channels.
Specically in the Greek banking Sector, we select all the remaining
banks that have not been involved in the recent wave of consolidation
of the four systemic banks and we create all potential combinations of
M&As either among themselves or with one of the four cornerstones of
the Greek economy. Additionally we control for both single and mul-
tiple M&As by one banking institution. Last but not least, regarding
the four systemic banks, we examine both their recent12 and potential
M&As in every possible combination (i.e. either one-by-one, two-by-
two, etc. or by all the acquired banks together), in order to test what
would be the banks liquidity creation associated with its economic ef-
ciency if it hadnt been involved in the recent consolidation process
and focus only in the potential cases of M&As13.
12 Regarding the recentM&As cases that the Greek banking sector experienced,
we approach each one of these cases as a potential scenario in the economy, since
our sample is dated up to 2011 and the recent consolidation wave took place in 2012
and 2013.
Additionally, to construct the potential M&As combinations we exclude the banks
that their operations have been terminated in the last year of our sample (i.e. 2011)
and those who have terminated their operations after 2011 till present in order the
results to be of relative policy importance.
13 We thoroughly examine that each of the following nancial institutions for
172
3.4.4 Stress test scenario
In the fourth step of our empirical methodology, we want to examine
whether potential bank consolidation activity will create the essential
dynamics that will enhance the liquidity-stabilityof the sector overall
in the face of future adverse economic conditions. Our intuition de-
rives from the tremendous impact the recent nancial meltdown had
on the stability of nancial intermediaries. Bank liquidity was tradi-
tionally viewed as of equal importance to solvency. Liquidity risks are
inherent in maturity transformation, i.e., the usual long-term maturity
prole of banksassets and short-term maturities of liabilities. Banks
have commonly relied on retail deposits, and, to some degree, long-term
wholesale funding as supposedly stable sources of funding. Yet, atten-
tion to liquidity risk diminished in recent decades, as symbolized by the
absence of consideration of liquidity risk in the 1988 Basel I framework.
The global nancial crisis has clearly shown that neglecting liquidity
risk comes at a substantial price. Over the last decade, large banks be-
came increasingly reliant on short-term wholesale funding (especially
in interbanking markets) to nance their rapid asset growth. At the
same time, funding from non-deposit sources (such as commercial paper
each banking sector is not a subsidiary of the rest.
Precisely from the UK banking sector we select: AIB plc, Barclays Bank plc,
Royal Bank of Scotland plc, HSBC Bank plc, Lloyds TSB Bank plc, Standard
Chartered Bank plc, Santander UK plc, Co-operative Bank plc , Sainsburys Bank
plc and UBS plc.
While from the Greek banking sector we choose, National bank of Greece (or
Ethinki bank), EFG Eurobank, Alpha bank, Piraeus bank, Attica bank, Panellinia
bank, Pancretan Co-operative bank, Aegean bank, Commercial bank (or Empo-
riki bank), Agricultural bank (or ATE bank), Marn-Egnatia bank, TT-Hellenic,
Genini bank, Millenium bank, Proton bank, Probank, FBB bank. The last thirteen
banks have been already absorbed by the four new systemicbanks National bank
of Greece or Ethinki bank (acquired Probank, FBB bank) , EFG Eurobank (ac-
quired TT-Hellenic, Proton bank), Alpha bank (acquired Emporiki bank ), Piraeus
bank (acquired ATE bank, Marn-Egnatia bank, Genini bank, Millenium bank).
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placed with money market mutual funds) soared. With the unfolding
of the global nancial crisis, when uncertainties about the solvency of
certain banks emerged, various types of wholesale funding market seg-
ments froze, resulting in funding or liquidity challenges for many banks.
In the light of this experience, there is now a widespread consensus that
banksextensive reliance on deep and broad unsecured money markets
pre-crisis is to be avoided. Consequently, it is one thing to present po-
tential consolidation activity that can ameliorate the social welfare via
enhanced cost e¢ ciency and liquidity creation and a completely di¤er-
ent story to know whether this social benets can still be existing after
a hypothetical nancial crisis with its calamitous contagion e¤ects as
the one that was triggered in August 2007 and was climaxed by the
Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008.
In order to investigate the robustness of the UK and the Greek
banking sectors liquidity creation, we create a hypothetical environ-
ment, similar to a stress test scenario. The idea here is to create a
stress environment which will be composed by the potential scenario of
liquidity shortage faced by the banks due to adverse macroeconomic,
nancial and bank-specic conditions as well. In other words, we stress
each countrys economy in three di¤erent ways: by a macroeconomic, a
nancial and a bank shock. We use for each country the real growth rate
of gross domestic product (GDP) to account for macroeconomic con-
ditions, the level of policy interest rates described by the three month
treasury bill rate and the level of the real e¤ective exchange rate to ac-
count for nancial distress and the level of total problem loans in each
banking sector to capture banks liquidity risk. The literature sug-
gests that these specic variables directly a¤ect the liquidity of banks.
Additionally, since banking theory considers a high level of e¢ ciency
as the preponderant precondition against a banks default, we account
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for an additional bank-specic shock; the cost e¢ ciency score of each
potential combination of banksM&A and of each nancial institution
in each country that we used in the previous subsection, in order to
examine how its deviation a¤ects liquidity creation. To the best of our
knowledge this is the rst study in the literature that addresses the
impact of e¢ ciency on liquidity creation and additionally, the direction
of causality among those two variables.
To pursue this analysis, our econometric procedure lies upon the
framework of a vector autoregressive (VAR) model to implement a
stress test in banking. A vast body of literature endorses the fact that
the changes in the macroeconomic conditions of any economy do impact
banksperformance, simultaneously or with lag. It is also possible that
the feedback e¤ects of bank instability on real economic activity could
amplify the uctuations especially during recessions. Therefore, in or-
der to judge the resilience of banking on various macroeconomic shocks,
Vector Autoregressive (VAR) approach has been adopted, as done by
Hoggarth, Sorensen and Zicchino (2005), Marcucci and Quagliariello
(2005) and Filosa (2007). The advantage of the VAR model is that it
allows to fully capture the interaction among macroeconomic and nan-
cial variables and banks specic variables. It also captures the entailed
feedback e¤ect. We use a panel-data vector autoregression methodol-
ogy (Holtz et al. 1988).This technique combines the traditional VAR
approach, which treats all the variables in the system as endogenous,
with the panel-data approach, which allows for unobserved individual
heterogeneity (Love and Zicchino, 2006).
In turn the PVAR can be represented in the following general form:
Zit+p =   +
qX
j=1
jZit+p j + "it+p (3.4.13)
where, i = 1; 2; 3::I represents each panel (i.e. di¤erent bank),   is a
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constant vector, j are matrices, "it+p is a vector of residuals/shocks,
and p denotes the forecasting time horizon. Zit+p j is the vector of
endogenous variables including the real growth rate of GDP, the policy
interest rates, the real e¤ective exchange rate, the three month treasury
bill rate, the level of bad loans loans, cost e¢ ciency estimates and the
level of liquidity creation calculated as before by the preferred measure
"cat fat". We are mainly interested in examining the behaviour of
the liquidity creation and cost e¢ ciency variable. The equation in
the model for the preferred measure of liquidity creation and thus the
equation dening the shock to the preferred measure of liquidity is of
the following form:
lcit+p = lc + lcZit+p 1 + "lc;it+p (3.4.14)
where lcit+p represents the liquidity creation measure("cat fat"), "lc;it+p
is a white noise shock, lc is a constant, lc is a row vector of parame-
ters corresponding to the row of coe¢ cients in p in the equation for
liquidity creation. Zit+p 1 is the vector of the variables included in
the VAR including liquidity creation itself. The last equation describes
the determinants of the bank liquidity creation which are lagged val-
ues of the variables included in the VAR. Modelling the dynamics of
the macroeconomic, nancial, bank-specic variables and the liquidity
creation variable using a VAR has the advantage that impulse response
analysis can be carried out  the stress test proposed in this paper.
By estimating the system, it is possible to simulate various shocks to
these variables and consider the feedback from these shocks to the level
of liquidity created by a bank and thus the aggregate level of a coun-
trys liquidity need. Equivalently, one can investigate whether shocks
to the liquidity of the banks have an impact on future macroeconomic,
nancial and bank developments.
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In the same spirit the equation in the model for the economic e¢ -
ciency and thus the equation dening the shock to the cost e¢ ciency
scores is of the following form:
ceffit+p = lc + lcZit+p 1 + "ceff;it+p (3.4.15)
where the left hand-side variable; ceffit+p, represents bank-specic cost
e¢ ciency estimates.
An appealing fact of the VAR modelling is that it does not require
the imposition of strong structural relationships, although theory is
involved to select the appropriate normalization and to interpret the
results. Another advantage is that only a minimal set of assumptions
is necessary to interpret the impact of shocks on each variable of the
PVAR system. The reduced form VAR, once the unknown parame-
ters are estimated, permits implementing dynamic simulations. This
method only allows for the analysis of short-run adjustment e¤ects and
not of structural long-run e¤ects. The results come in the form of im-
pulse response functions (IRFs) and their coe¢ cients analysis, as well
as forecast error variance decompositions (FEVDs) that let one examine
the impact of innovations or shocks to any particular variable on other
variables in the system. IRFs model the dynamics of the response; the
coe¢ cients represent the average e¤ects of IRFs and permit recognizing
the signicance of the overall response, while variance decompositions
give information about the variation in one variable due to shock to
the others. The response corresponds to a one-time shock in other
variables, holding all the other shocks constant at zero. In other words,
orthogonalizing the response allows us to identify the e¤ect of one shock
at a time, while holding other shocks constant.
Since the variance-covariance matrix of the VAR residuals/shocks is
unlikely to be diagonal, the residuals need to be orthogonalised in order
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to obtain orthogonalized impulse response functions. Consequently, we
decompose the residuals in a way that makes them orthogonal. Such
exercises require applying a careful VAR identication procedure. The
most common way to deal with this problem is to choose a causal or-
dering. A standard procedure in the literature is to apply a Cholesky
decomposition, which is equivalent to adopting a particular ordering
of the variables and allocating any correlation between the residuals of
any two elements to the variable that is ordered rst. It is well known
that these impulse response functions can be sensitive to the ordering of
the variables. In turn, the variables in the model were initially ordered
in ascendance according to the likely speed of reaction to any particular
shock. Variables at the front end of the VAR are assumed to a¤ect the
following variables contemporaneously but only to be a¤ected them-
selves by shocks to the other variables after a lag. Variables at the bot-
tom of the VAR, on the other hand, only a¤ect the preceding variables
after a lag but are a¤ected themselves immediately. The nancial vari-
ables; three month treasury bill rate and the level of the real e¤ective
exchange rate, were ordered at the bottom of the VAR implying that
they react instantaneously to shocks in the real side variables whereas
the remaining variables ( the growth rate of gross domestic product,
the level of total problem loans, the estimated cost e¢ ciency and the
level of liquidity creation,) react only after a lag following shocks to
the nancial variables. The growth rate of gross domestic product was
ordered after the level of total problem loans and economic e¢ ciency re-
spectively, reecting priors that the economic cycle a¤ects bank losses.
Last was ordered the liquidity creation variable14.
14 Note that the ordering would be irrelevant if there are low estimated covariances
between the errors across equations. Preliminary results show that indeed these
covariances are low.
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In applying the VAR procedure to panel data, we need to impose
the restriction that the underlying structure is same for each cross-
sectional unit. Since this constraint is likely to be violated in practice,
one way to overcome the restriction on parameters is to allow for indi-
vidual heterogeneityin the levels of the variables by introducing xed
e¤ects, (Love and Zicchino, 2006). Hence, equation 3:4:12 becomes
Zit+p =   +
qX
j=1
jZit+p j + dit + "it+p; (3.4.16)
where di denotes the xed e¤ects.
Since the xed e¤ects are correlated with the regressors due to lags
of the dependent variables, the mean-di¤erencing procedure commonly
used to eliminate xed e¤ects would create biased coe¢ cients. To avoid
this problem we use forward mean di¤erencing, also referred to as the
Helmert procedure(see Arellano and Bover, 1995). This procedure
removes only the forward mean, i.e., the mean of all the future obser-
vations available for each bank-year. This transformation preserves the
orthogonality between transformed variables and lagged regressors, so
we can use lagged regressors as instruments and estimate the coe¢ cients
by system GMM. Further, to analyze the impulse response functions
we need an estimate of their condence intervals. Since the matrix
of impulse-response functions is constructed from the estimated VAR
coe¢ cients, their standard errors need to be taken into account. We
calculate standard errors of the impulse response functions and gener-
ate condence intervals with 1000 Monte Carlo simulations15. Finally,
15 In practice, we randomly generate a draw of coe¢ cients of model (1) using
the estimated coe¢ cients and their variance covariance matrix and re-calculate the
impulse-responses. We repeat this procedure 1000 times (we experimented with a
larger number of repetitions and obtained similar results). We generate 5th and
95th percentiles of this distribution that we use as a condence interval for the
impulse-responses.
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we also present variance decompositions, which show the percentage of
the variation in one variable that is explained by the shock to another
variable, accumulated over time. The variance decompositions show the
magnitude of the total e¤ect. We report the total e¤ect accumulated
over ten, twenty and thirty periods ahead.
That said, we compare the stability with respect to liquidity of the
whole banking system for each hypothetical M&A scenario against a
baseline case where no consolidation activity has been enganged in the
sector. We note that regarding the Greek banking sector we create an
additional baseline case which incorporates all the recent consolidation
activity that took place in the country despite the fact that some spe-
cic M&A formations were found as cost e¢ ciency-liquidity creation
enhancing16. In this way we are able to make accurate comparisons
between the two benchmark banking status and extract important in-
ferences from a policy perspective.
Lastly, in order to be able to make presice comparisons in an appro-
priate way among these baseline cases and the various combinations of
potential banksM&As, we use the concept of half-life, since it repre-
sents a measure for assessing the speed of mean reversion or persistence
in the variable of interest. Precisely, we employ the recently proposed
half lifemeasures of Chortareas and Kapetanios (2013)17 and we cal-
culate the half lifeof the response of liquidity creation to each specic
shock for each specic potential M&A activity by the following equa-
tion: Z h
o
j i j di =
Z 1
h
j i j di (3.4.17)
where we dene the impulse response as a function of i, which we
16 This baseline scenario will include only the nal formation of the four systemic
banks, after their series of consolidation activity and the potential M&A category.
17 For a recent summary see also Choi, Mark, and Sul (2006).
180
denote as i to provide a distinction in focus from standard impulse
responses and di is the order of intergration. Then, the half-life is the
point h. In other words, h is the point in time at which half the
absolute cumulative e¤ect of the shock has dissipated.
3.5 Data
We use annual data that consists of an unbalanced panel of all the -
nancial institutions that provided credit18during the years 1988-2011 in
the UK and 1993-2011 in Greece19. Following the majority of empirical
studies in banking, we obtain the largest part of our bank-level data
from the Bankscope database of Bureau Van Dijks company. Any miss-
ing information is lled in from the o¢ cial websites of UK and Greek
nancial institutions, by the British Bankers and Building Societies As-
sociation, the Hellenic Bank Association, and by the annual reports of
both the governors of Bank of England and of Bank of Greece. Over-
all, both our samples account for a signicant market share in terms
of assets, loans and deposits, occasionally even more than 90% in each
respective category in both countries. More precisely, the UK sample
comprises 2,324 observations for 162 nancial institutions, whereas the
Greek sample consists of 30 nancial institutions with a total of 356
observations. The main di¤erence between the two banking sectors
is that Commercialbanks incorporated in Greece are the dominant
18 Our sample consists of Commercial banks, Real Estate and Mortgage Banks,
Bank Holding Companies, Cooperative Banks and Savings Banks.
19 The reasoning behind selecting 1993 as the starting year for the sample regard-
ing the Greek banking sector is because in that year the full liberalization of the
Greek banking system occurred. This followed the provision of the Second Banking
Directive regarding establishment, supervision and operation in 1992 by the Basic
Banking Law Banking Directive.
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group in the banking system. The dominance of commercial banking
can also be conrmed by the number of branches and employees. Greek
commercial banks have 3,302 branches in operation (out of 3,575 for all
credit institutions which is equivalent to 92.36%), while the number of
their employees stands at 51,012 (out of 56,611 employed in all credit
institutions which is equivalent to 90.11%) according to the Hellenic
Banking association (2011).
At this point we highlight a number of crucial points that we take
into account in our data selection strategy. This strategy is of major
importance in terms of accuracy of the results and of the inferences
based on them. Regrettably it has been mistakenly disdained by the
bulk of the empirical studies that have used Bankscope database (see
Claessens and van Horen, 2012 and Clerides et. al 2013). To be more
precise, rst, we check both samples for double-counting observations.
Bankscope provides company account statements for banks and nan-
cial institutions across the world by collecting nancial statements with
both consolidation and unconsolidation status. We select the uncon-
solidated data20 and exclude the equivalent consolidated data to avoid
double counting the same nancial institution.
As a second step, we take into consideration mergers and acquisi-
tions (M&A). For this purpose we thoroughly went through all M&A
activities that took place in the past in both banking sectors so that
only the merged entity or the acquiring bank remains in the sample
after a take-over. As an intuitive example: assume that bank A and
bank B merged in 2003 to create a new entity, bank C, then the two
individual banks A and B are each included in the dataset until 2003.
From 2003 onwards, these two banksoperations are considered to be
20 In cases where unconsolidated data were not available, we chose consolidated
data instead.
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terminated and the new bank (bank C) is included in the database. In
the same spirit, assume that bank A was acquired by bank B in 2003;
both banks are included in the database until 2003, with bank A then
becoming inactive after 2003 and bank B remaining active after 2003.
We obtain detailed information on mergers and acquisitions from the
Zephyr database of Bureau Van Dijks company.
All data are deated using each countrys GDP deator (using 2005
as the base year) obtained from theWorld Bank database and converted
to US Dollars. In addition to the two considerations in our data ltering
process, we exclude observations of missing, negative or zero values for
inputs/outputs and control variables. Our nal samples account for 124
nancial institutions and 1834 observations for the UK banking sector
and for 30 nancial institutions and 356 observations for the Greek
banking sector.
3.5.1 Developments
During the years studied, important structural changes and develop-
ments occurred within the European Union countries and world-wide
which inuenced both countriesnancial systems. We experienced the
introduction of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the macro-
economic stabilization programme, the establishment of advanced infor-
mation technologies and the internationalization of banking activities,
which enhanced competition in both price and quality levels. Important
changes took place on a domestic level as well. Regarding the Greek
banking sector, the most important development, was the establishment
of the Euro as the countrys common currency and sole legal tender21.
21 Greece joined the Eurozone in 2001. Currently, 17 out of the 28 members of
the European Union use Euroas their national currency.
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Additionally, a major structural feature of the Greek nancial system,
characterizing in particular the old banking regime, is the signicant
level of state intervention, which for a long time hindered competition
and created a distorted market environment. In the early 1990s, the
state commercial banks controlled around 85 per cent of total commer-
cial banking operations. Since then, a notable trend observed in the
Greek banking sector was the privatization of several banks controlled
by the Greek state, which contributed to the enhancement of compe-
tition in the market. That said, the countrys banking sector has a
Herndahl index 22 gure of 1,278 , higher than the average European
Herndahl index which is 1,102 for the 27 countries members of the
European Union (1,195 for the 17 countries members of the European
Monetary Union) (European Central Bank, 2011), which highlights a
picture of a concentrated banking sector. Finally, during the rst half
of the 1990s, new private-owned foreign commercial banks were estab-
lished, taking advantage of new products and services that were not
available in the Greek market just a decade ago.
Turning to the UK banking sector, it is noteworthy that the build-
ing society sector, having continued to expand during the 1980s and
1990s, saw a sharp contraction in the mid-late 1990s, as many building
societies demutualised and became banks. Another major development
saw the largest UK banks become truly universalbanks, by expanding
the range of their activities and services. Specically, now they encom-
22 The Herndahl index is a conventional structural indicator of the level of
concentration in an industry. It is dened as the sum of the squares of the market
shares of the 50 largest rms (or summed over all the rms if there are fewer
than 50) within the industry. A HHI index below 0.01 (or 100) indicates a highly
competitive index, a HHI index below 0.15 (or 1,500) indicates an unconcentrated
index, between 0.15 to 0.25 (or 1,500 to 2,500) indicates moderate concentration,
while a HHI index above 0.25 (above 2,500) indicates high concentration in the
industry.
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pass securities underwriting and trading, fund management, derivatives
trading and general insurance. This expansion coincided with a period
of signicant growth in securities markets and the markets for foreign
exchange and derivatives. It must be highlighted that on aggregate,
UK banksbalance sheets account for more than 500% of annual UK
GDP, a development that occurred mainly in the 2000s.
Looking at common trends existent in both countries during the
last years of our sample, we note the signicant credit expansion, as the
level of loans to loss provisions increased considerably. One could argue
that the signs of the nancial turmoil were becoming apparent. Indeed
the six largest banks in both countries in the end of 2011 accounted for
more than 80% of each countrys nancial system.
A special feature of our study is the period that is being covered,
which is one of the largest of all surveys that have been elaborated in
both nancial systems. The number of banks that we examine in our
study changes during the sample period in both countries. This occurs
specically in Greece due to many M&As that took place in the end
of the 90s. The observed wave of mergers and acquisitions was trig-
gered primarily by the willingness of the small banks to obtain a higher
market share and secondarily by the privatization process which was
initiated by the government, in line with the second Banking Direc-
tive. At the end of 2011, the Greek banking system was dominated by
six leading large banks in terms of assets, deposits and loans (Ethniki
bank also known as National bank of Greece, Alpha bank, Eurobank,
Piraeus bank, Emporiki bank- also known as Commercial bank and
Agricultural bank)23, which altogether held 74.6 per cent of the market
share, a gure higher than the average European concentration ratio
23 In the Greek banking sector a bank is classied as "large" if it holds total
assets above 20 billions in euro in 2011.
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calculated by the market share of the ve largest banks in each country
(CR5). This stands at 59.6 per cent for the 27 countries members of
the European Union (Greece has 72.0 per cent) and 58.1 per cent for
the 17 countries members of the European Monetary Union (European
Central Bank, 2011). Turning to the UK banking sector, despite the
fact that the market is dominated by four dominant nancial insti-
tutions (Barclays bank, HSBC bank, RBS bank, Lloyds bank) is less
concentrated than the Greek one.
In Tables 3.3.a, 3.3.b and 3.4.a, 3.4.b, we report representative g-
ures of the UK and Greek nancial institutions used in both our samples
respectively. More specically, tables 3.3.a and 3.3.b o¤er an overview
of some important banking indicators of the UK and Greek banking
sector for the whole period of our study, whereas tables 3.4.a and 3.4.b
report an insight on the UK and Greek nancial intermediaries for each
year of our sample.
3.6 Empirical Results
3.6.1 Historical M&As - Liquidity Creation
Tables 3.5.a and 3.5.b display the empirical ndings for UK and Greece
respectively. We nd a strong empirical evidence of increased liquidity
that is created one year after almost all existing M&A activities that
have taken place in both banking systems. To be more precise, in the
UK banking system our results highlight that in 89:3% of the cases
the liquidity that is created by the new nancial entity one year after
the consolidation process is higher than then liquidity of the proforma
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bank24 one year before the M&A activity occurs and specically it is
increased on average by 17:51%. The aforementioned tendency is ampli-
ed in a greater scale when we examine the Greek banking sector where
the results indicate that liquidity is increased on average by 41:49%
one year after the consolidation process. This nding is unequivocally
conrmed for all the M&As that have been completed throughout the
whole sample period for Greece. Taking a closer look into the charac-
teristics of the involved UK nancial institutions, we highlight the fact
that despite the low frequency of historical M&As which have been
completed by large UK banks compared to the consolidation process
that UK building societies consummated, the former are those who cre-
ate the highest level of liquidity. It is worth mentioning that the cases
of consolidation which occur during the years of the nancial crisis are
the ones which exhibit the biggest positive di¤erence between the two
year interval. The latter is of crucial importance as it signals the poten-
tial liquidity gains which can be exploited during periods of economic
downturns, since problematic nancial institutions in terms of liquidity
could be able to take advantage of the synergies and cost benets that
result from a consolidation process producing higher liquidity and thus
additional credit channels in the economy. Another interesting feature
is that nancial institutions with multiple M&As within the same year,
create higher level of liquidity compared the those which are involved
in single M&A activity within a year. Last but not least, specically
for the cases of mergers where all involving nancial intermediaries con-
tinue to exist25, there is strong empirical evidence that on average not
24 Proforma bank consists of the acquirer and the target one year before the M&A
occurs.
25 In the case of an acquisition one nancial institution takes over another one
and establishes itself as the new owner. Consequently, from a legal point of view,
the target nancial institution ceases to exist.
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only the acquirer but the target nancial institution as well increases
considerably its level of liquidity one year after the merger is completed
compared to one year before. Turning our attention to the Greek bank-
ing sector, the results indicate, as in the case of the UK banking sector,
that greater liquidity creation is observed one year after the large in size
Greek banks complete their M&As activities compared to the consoli-
dation among the smaller banking institutions. Moreover, we highlight
the same positive relationship between the number of multiple M&A
by the same nancial institution and the level of liquidity creation as
in the UK banking system.
Robustness Issues
In order to increase the precision of our inferences, we employ two ad-
ditional ratios which represent two of the most popular liquidity indica-
tors highly used by bank managers and practitioners in supranational
institutions. Specically we use:
i.)
liquid1 =
Liquid Assets
Total Assets
(3.6.1)
ii.)
liquid2 =
Liquid Assets
Customer&Short Term Funding
(3.6.2)
Apart from the wide use of both of these ratios another reason that
motivates us to use especially those two is the fact that they compute
the liquidity of a nancial institution in a di¤erent way compared not
only to Berger and Bouwmans (2009) preferred measure but among
each other as well. The rst ratio specically captures the absolute
asset liquidity, since it reects the percentage of the total assets whose
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sale can provide instant liquidity in times of need. On the contrary,
the second ratio apprehends the relativeasset quality, since it relates
liquid assets to liquid liabilities. It is known as a deposit run o¤ ratio
since it represents what percentage of customer and short term funds
could be met if they were withdrawn suddenly. In tables 3.6.a and
3.6.b we present for UK and Greece respectively the di¤erences among
the three liquidity measures for each specic historical M&A activity.
Since the two additional measures are expressed as a ratio, it would be
wrong if we add the liquidity of the acquirer and target in time t   1
and compare it with the level of liquidity of the new nancial entity in
time t+ 1 for each one of the liquidity measures respectively. Precisely,
regarding the preferred measure of Berger and Bouwman (2009) (i.e.
catfat), we display the di¤erence in liquidity creation between the new
nancial entity in time t + 1 compared with the joint liquidity of the
acquirer and target in time t   1, while as far as the two ratios are
concerned, we display the di¤erence in liquidity creation between the
new nancial entity in time t + 1 compared to the individual level of
liquidity of the acquirer and target in time t 1 for each respective ratio.
The results displayed in tables 3.6.a and 3.6.b highlight the fact that in
both countries the three di¤erent measures of liquidity produce similar
pictures in favour of the tendency of increased liquidity for the new
nancial entity one year after consolidation process compared to the
proforma bank one year before. We demonstrate that the three di¤erent
measures of liquidity exhibit at least a 80% degree of robustness among
their ndings and for some cases we report a 95% of precision.
Now we examine the handful of occasions where we notice a de-
crease in the two liquidity ratios in time t+ 1 compared to time t  1.
The results reveal that in both countries the foregoing occurs fairly
equal for both acquirers and targets. As far as the acquirers are con-
189
cerned, it seems the two liquidity ratios decrease in t + 1 for those
nancial institutions which are involved in multiple M&As in the same
year, while as far as the targets are concerned, this occurs for those
credit institutions which are small in size and which are involved into
a consolidation process with small in size acquirers as well. This is
in line with Berger and Bouwman (2009) who note that large banks
are the ones to demonstrate increased liquidity after the M&A activity.
Furthermore, we notice in the Greek banking sector that the occasions
where each liquidity ratio decreases in time t+ 1, either concerning the
acquirer or the target, are exactly the same, while we cannot identify
the same pattern in the UK banking sector.
Nonetheless, each liquidity ratio contains di¤erent specic informa-
tion about the nancial institution and someone that examines sepa-
rately each liquidity ratio cannot extract robust inferences regarding
the liquidity position of the nancial institution. To be more explicit,
lets assume two banks have the same level of loans to deposits but one
has stable sources of funds whereas the other one doesnt. Someone
then could jump to the conclusion that both banks have the same posi-
tion in terms of liquidity. Nevertheless, neglecting the liquidity risk can
contaminate our inferences since the bank with xed sources of funds
faces considerable less liquidity risk than its counterparty. Thus, we
investigate in how many of these limited M&As cases which result into
a decreased liquidity ratios in time t+1 compared to time t 1 in both
countries, the liquidity decrease appears simultaneously for both ratios
as far as either the acquirer and/or the target is concerned. In tables
3.7.a and 3.7.b we provide detailed information for each historical UK
and Greek M&A activity respectively, for all three di¤erent liquidity
measures and for both the acquirer and target regarding the two con-
ventional in the literature measures of liquidity. We notice that this
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occurs in 12 occasions for the UK and 8 for Greece. If we conduct the
previous investigation but this time in order to check how often the
aforementioned occurs not only for both ratios simultaneously but for
both acquirers and targets of each specic M&A as well, we nd that it
happens in just one occasion and specically in the UK banking sector.
Consequently, this amplies considerably the degree of precision of our
conjectures which indicate that in both countries, both the acquirer
and the target benet in terms of liquidity one year after they have
been involved in an M&A activity.
3.6.2 Historical M&As - "Financial Fragility-Crowding
out Hypothesis" vs "Risk Absorption Hy-
pothesis" and "Deposit Insurance Hypoth-
esis "
Tables 3.8.a and 3.8.b display the empirical ndings for the UK and
the Greek historical M&As. There is strong empirical evidence result-
ing from the regression equations of the Pana et al. (2010) model,
in favour of the "Financial fragility-crowding out" hypothesis in both
countries indicated by the negative, statistically signicant coe¢ cient of
the bank capital variable. Nonetheless, this nding is common in both
banking systems only as far as the small acquirers are concerned and it
is supported throughout all the sample only in the Greek banking sys-
tem. This nding is in line with Berger and Bouwman (2009), who use
theories of Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) and Gorton and Winton
(2000) to justify it. To be more precise, on one hand the former paper
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states that small banks deal more with entrepreneurial-type small busi-
nesses which require close monitoring, while the latter paper highlights
that capital may "crowd out" deposits since small banks tend to raise
funds locally. In addition, empirical support is found in both banking
systems regarding the deposit insurance hypothesis. Specically in line
with Pana et al (2010). we nd that banks with high level of insured
deposits complete M&As which result in an increase of the level of liq-
uidity that they create, at least in the short run. Notwithstanding, as
in the case of the two aforementioned conicting hypotheses, the re-
sults hold only for the small in size acquirers who got involved in the
historical consolidation process. This nding is partially in line with
Fungacova et al (2010), whose ndings suggest that implementation of
deposit insurance reduces the positive impact of capital on liquidity
creation suggested by the "risk absorption hypothesis". Nonetheless,
we highlight that we found support of the aforementioned statement
only for the small in size acquirers. As far as the relative size of
the involved institutions is concerned, once again the results suggest
that in both banking systems the higher this ratio the higher the liq-
uidity created one year after the M&A activity took place. This is
apparent in the whole sample and in both large and small in size UK
acquirers, while we report the same evidence for the whole sample and
the small Greek acquirers. This nding for both countries is line with
Berger and Bouwmans (2009) ndings who indicate that nancial in-
stitutions which were involved in recent M&As which were large (both
the acquirer and the target), account for most of the industrys overall
liquidity in that specic year.
On the contrary, there is a considerable deviation among both coun-
triesempirical ndings concerning the ownership of the involved nan-
cial institutions in the consolidation process . To be more specic, the
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Greek M&As who are completed by private credit institutions result
in a higher level of liquidity creation in time t + 1, whereas there is
no statistically signicant evidence of same in the UK banking sector.
This does not come as a surprise, as the vast majority of the nancial
institutions are privately owned. Last but not least, we turn our atten-
tion to a second set of regressions which include an additional indicator
of banks ability to absorb risk; the bank-revenue diversication mea-
sure (Stiroh 2004). Albeit the establishment of a nonlinear relationship
(i.e, HHIREV ^2) between the di¤erence in liquidity creation around
M&As and the diversication of the acquirers revenue stream, the em-
pirical ndings are controversial among each country (i.e, HHIREV ).
On one hand, for the UK banking sector, we report that for the whole
sample and large acquirers, revenue diversication did not enhance the
new nancial entitys ability to absorb any risk resulting from the con-
solidation process. The opposite holds only in the case of small UK
acquirers. On the other hand, we nd a positive relationship between
the level of the acquiring banks revenue diversication and the liquid-
ity creation of the new nancial institution in time t+ 1 for the Greek
banking sector. This holds for both the whole sample and large acquir-
ers. The aforementioned conicting results, can be justied by an in-
verted U-shapedrelationship between risk and diversication that has
recently been proposed in the literature (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga,
2010). On a preliminary level, a degree of diversication in a banks
products and services enables the nancial institution to absorb risk,
since its revenue derives from di¤erent sources. Nonetheless, the recent
nancial turmoil revealed that if banks revenue is highly depended
on non-traditional banking activities (which follow a non-interest rev-
enue stream), then the banksliquidity risk is greater. Since the large
UK nancial institutions follow a more sophisticated Universal type of
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banking with more complex non-interest revenue activities than their
Greek counterparties and the small UK banks, is why we nd evidence
of counterproductive consequences in terms of liquidity creationre-
sulting from their intense revenue diversication process.
Robustness Issues
Similarly to the previous subsection, in order to test the sensitivity
of our empirical ndings, we conduct two additional robustness tests.
First we perform the same regression analysis where this time instead
of the independent variables deriving just from acquirers, they derive
from both acquirers and targets (i.e., proforma bank) in time t   1.
The results for the UK and the Greek banking sector are displayed in
tables 3.9.a and 3.9.b respectively. Second, it is acknowledged that the
lagged value of banks equity capital, which is the key variable of inter-
est in dening which hypothesis our data supports, is also included in
the dependent variable. For this purpose, we re-estimate our model by
excluding equity capital from the calculation of our dependent variable
(i.e. catfat, the preferred measure of liquidity of Berger and Bouwman
(2009)). We conduct this analysis by using both the acquirersand pro-
formas values for our independent variables. As before, tables 3.10.a
and 3.10.b, and 3.11.a and 3.11.b demonstrate the empirical evidence
for both countrieshistorical M&As where the independent variables
derive from the acquirers and proforma bank respectively. As far as
the former robustness control is concerned, the primordial di¤erence in
the UK banking system is that we dont nd support anymore of the
deposit insurance hypothesis in the small sized acquirers. This can be
explained by the fact that the size of the proforma bank is not consid-
ered to be smallanymore as it was the acquirers in the rst round of
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the regression analysis. While the main di¤erence in the Greek banking
sector is that now, not only for the whole sample and the large acquirers
but for the small as well, there is a positive relationship of the relative
sizevariable and liquidity creation around M&As. We use the same
reasoning as in the previous di¤erence in the UK M&As and pointing
out, that probably the Greek proforma institutions are not considered
as small nancial institutions anymore and demonstrate a same pat-
tern regarding their relationship with the specic variable as the large
acquirers do. As far as the latter robustness control is concerned, the
results across countries and across di¤erent methods in the measure-
ment of the independent variables used in the regressions unequivocally
remain unchanged. Consequently, from the two aforementioned robust-
ness tests and the derivation of various sub categories for each one of
them, we can be condent that the inferences in both countries regard-
ing the two conicting hypotheses (i.e. "Financial fragility-crowding
out" and the "Risk absorption") and the relationship between the de-
posit insurancehypothesis and the liquidity creation around M&As
were extracted with a high degree of condence.
3.6.3 Recent & ProspectiveM&As - "Cost E¢ ciency-
Liquidity Creation Hypothesis" (CELCH)
In tables 3.12.a and 3.12.b we present the results of all the cases of
potential and recent/potential M&A activity for the UK and Greece re-
spectively. One of the most intrinsic nding is that in both banking sec-
tors the vast majority of the potential combinations of M&Awould have
contributed considerably to the enhancement of the liquidity-e¢ ciency
relationship, had they occurred in the pre-crisis period. Precisely, the
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empirical evidence displayed in tables 3.12.a and 3.12.b reveals that in
more than 99.4% and 98.1% of the UK and Greek hypothetical banks
M&A scenarios respectively cost e¢ ciency and liquidity creation would
increase. As far as the post-crisis period is concerned, the results high-
light a crucial di¤erence between the two countries. In the UK banking
sector, we report a small decrease compared to the pre-crisis period
where approximately 87% of the cases of potential consolidation ac-
tivity would be benecial for the economy in terms of e¢ ciency and
liquidity. However, the di¤erence is much higher in the Greek banking
sector between the two periods, where only 43% of the total hypothet-
ical scenarios could have possibly created additional credit channels in
the economy through their enhanced cost e¢ ciency. Overall, in both
banking systems for both periods, hypothetical consolidation activity
among large nancial institutions seems to create the highest cost ef-
ciency benets which could result in increased provision of liquidity
to the economy which is in line with Berger and Bouwman (2009) and
Pana et al. (2010). Noteworthy is the fact that for both the UK and
the Greek banking system in the pre-crisis period, the same hypothet-
ical M&A combinations produce 83% and 93% higher e¢ ciency gains
respectively compared to the years following the crisis. This illustrates
the detrimental impact that the recent nancial turmoil had on both
countriesbanking system stability.
Taking a closer look at the empirical ndings concerning the UK
banking sector, we highlight the fact for most of the cases that con-
tribute successfully to the cost e¢ ciency-liquidity relationship, the
combinations that consist of three banking institutions are those which
produce the higher positive di¤erences compared to those that are con-
stituted by two credit institutions. Precisely, it seems that the big-four
of the UK banking sector (Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds and RBS) create
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the most cost-e¢ cient combinations of potential M&A activity which
could result in increased liquidity creation, with Barclays bank pro-
ducing the highest during the pre-crisis period and Lloyds bank during
the post-crisis period. On the contrary, potential M&A combinations
among small banks do not seem to improve their position regarding
their cost e¢ ciency and liquidity creation. This is more frequent in
M&A combinations that Co-operative bank, UBS bank and AIB bank
create and in certain occassions the ones of Sainsburys bank as well,
regardless of whether they involve larger or smaller banks. This is in
line with recent empirical ndings (Hughes and Mester 2013) who nd
evidence of higher scale economies for large USA banks compared to
small size banks. Thus, increased size and consequently increased mar-
ket share deriving from potential M&A activity can be proved essential
in exploitation of economies of scale which will enhance the banks cost
e¢ ciency and produce as an aftermath increased liquidity creation.
Turning our attention now to the Greek banking sector, our em-
pirical evidence reveals a similar positive relationship between size and
the CELCH for the pre-crisis period, as in the UK banking sector. The
big fourof the Greek banking sector (National bank of Greece, EFG
Eurobank, Alpha bank, Piraeus bank), seem to produce the highest
cost e¢ ciency-liquidity creationgains with National bank of Greece
being the rst in this list. This holds when we examine them in both
their previous individual formation and the current systemic shape re-
sulting from the recent consolidation process (i.e. including for each
one of them all the nancial institutions they acquired). Nonetheless,
the results are mixed as far as the post-crisis period is concerned. To
be more precise, we report strong evidence of decreased cost e¢ ciency-
liquidity creationproduced by potential M&A combinations for all the
four new systemiccornerstones of the Greek Economy. Precisely, the
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new Eurobank and the new Piraeus bank seem to generate the most
cost e¢ ciency-liquiditylosses in the aftermath of the global nancial
meltdown. This holds in both banks for more than 86% of all their po-
tential combinations of consolidation activity after their recent M&A
whereas this percentage is reduced to 70% for both the new Ethniki
bank and the new Alpha bank. On the contrary, our empirical exami-
nation indicates that all the big-four of the countrys banking system in
their pre-systemic shape or during their systemic formation (i.e., if they
hadnt acquired specic nancial institutions), would produce higher
cost e¢ ciency-liquidity levels. To be more explicit, we show evidence
of negative impact in liquidity creation resulting from the acquisition
of Proton bank and of ATE bank and Geniki bank from Eurobank
and Piraeus bank. Unequivocally, the last points cast doubts on the
true motivation from the point of view of the Greek government, the
European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) and the Hellenic Financial
Stability Fund (HFSF) and the executive boards of the nancial insti-
tutions that were involved in the recent wave of consolidation in Greece.
To be more explicit, we cast doubt on the selection process followed by
the foregoing policy makers and involved banks in deciding which nan-
cial institution will be the acquirer and which the target, with respect
to the true social benets stemming from the consolidation process. As
far as the potential consolidation activity between each of the four new
systemic banks with the remaining nancial institutions that have not
been involved in the recent wave of consolidation (Attica bank, Pan-
ellinia bank, Pancretan Co-operative bank, Aegean bank) is concerned,
we found a positive impact in liquidity creation from the potential com-
binations that Aegean bank and Pancretan Co-operative bank create,
while negative empirical evidence is found in most of Attica banks and
Panellinia banks M&A scenarios with the new big-four. This holds
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when we examine the hypothetical consolidation activity among the
remaining non-systemic banks, where cost e¢ ciency-liquidity creation
gains is reported only in 20% of the potential M&A scenarios, all being
constituted by Aegean bank and Pancretan Co-operative bank and in
one case Panellinia bank is involved as well. Overall, after a thorough
examination of all the potential M&A scenarios that we examine in the
Greek banking sector, the consensus inference that we extract is that
the higher the number of the banking institutions involved in a hypo-
thetical consolidation activity, the lower are the cost e¢ ciency-liquidity
creationgains.
On the whole, we argue that the main reason for reporting such a
considerable decrease of the Greek bankspotential consolidation cases
which could be proved benecial for the economy via their enhanced
e¢ ciency and thus enhanced liquidity, might be due to the important
haircut (i.e. Private Sector Involvement) in the value of the gov-
ernment bond that these institutions hold in their nancial accounts.
Of course, maybe we would nd a similar negativepicture in terms
of liquidity creation in the post crisis period in the UK banking sec-
tor, had we examined potential M&A combinations consisting of more
than three credit institutions and/or had we selected smaller in size
in terms of assets, loans and deposits nancial intermediaries. Nev-
ertheless, for both banking systems and for both periods, we report
strong empirical evidence of potential consolidation activities among
specic banking institutions that could ameliorate the social well-being
via bankse¢ ciency and liquidity headway. As far as the Greek econ-
omy is concerned, these certain hypothetical M&A scenarios could be
proven vital in alleviating the terms of the both memorandumswith
the Troikaand could result in social benets deriving from softer aus-
terity measures, while the UK economy could have benet as well, as
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the BoE might not have to continue in such a great scale its unconven-
tional monetary strategy and the UK economy might had experienced
milder increase of its unemployment and especially milder decline of its
growth.
3.6.4 Stress test scenario
In this subsection our empirical analysis has a twofold simultaneous
scope: on one hand we attempt to investigate the contribution of the
successful, in terms of cost e¢ ciency-liquidity creation, potential com-
binations of M&As of UK and Greek banks in the post-crisis period,
which we just presented in the previous subsection, to the robustness
of the whole banking system in terms of liquidity riskunder a PVAR
methodology ; while at the same time, we examine the impact of bank
cost e¢ ciency on bank liquidity creation and the direction of their
causality as well. This, in essence, tests from a di¤erent econometric
perspective our suggested cost e¢ ciency-liquidity creationhypothesis.
Before going ahead with the panel VAR approach, an essential con-
dition is that all variables included in the system are stationary. With
respect to this we run the model in rst di¤erences26 to focus on the
dynamics of liquidity creation adjustments and shortrun e¤ects27. Ad-
ditionally, we test whether the main variables of interest are stationary
by examining two di¤erent panel unit root tests; the ADF and PP type
26 Remember that the estimate of cost e¢ ciency is expressed by a ratio and its
score ranges between the values 0 and 1, thus we keep this variable in levels, as it
is by construction stationary.
27 Another way to proceed would be to test for stationarity variables in levels
and if they are found non-stationary, to test for cointegration relationship between
variables. The absence of cointegration relationship would justify solely focusing on
short-run and using variables in rst di¤erences, while the presence of cointegration
would call for structural VAR analysis of long-run e¤ects. Our study does not
address long-run e¤ects and therefore we directly use variables in rst di¤erences.
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Fisher Chi-square tests of Maddala and Wu (1999)28. All unit root
tests are reported in tables 3.13.a and 3.13.b for UK and Greece respec-
tively29. The results strongly suggest that all the variables included in
the analysis do not follow a unit root process in each potential M&A
scenario for both banking systems.
Another important issue before we proceed with the estimation of
the panel VAR is is to determine the appropriate lag order p of the right-
hand variables in the system of equations. Lütkepohl (2005) suggests
to estimate models with di¤erent lag orders and then to choose the
model with the highest lag order that passes the diagnostic tests. To
do so, we utilize the Arellano-Bover GMM estimator for higher order
of lags. We use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to choose the
optimal lag order. The AIC suggests that the optimum lag order is
one, while the Arellano-Bond AR tests conrm this. We included more
lags to control for autocorrelation. The Sargan tests provide evidence
of lag order one as well.
Impulse response functions and Variance decompositions
Figure 3.2 illustrates the impulse response functions with respect to
liquidity creation deriving from the panel VAR system for both the UK
and Greek baseline scenario of no bank consolidation activity in the
28 Due to the fact that we have an unbalanced data, we can conduct either the
unit root test of Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS), (2003) or the Fisher-type unit-root tests.
Nevertheless, the IPS unit-root test requires at least 10 observations per panel,
which is not the case in our study. Additionally, Maddala and Wu (1999) favour
Fisher-type unit-root tests as they are more powerful in distinguishing the null and
the alternative hypotheses and cross-sectional correlation among variables.
29 We test for a unit root in each potential M&A scenario for both countries.
However for brevity purposes, we report only the two common in both countries
baseline cases where no bank consolidation activity has been held in the sector.
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sector and the additional baseline scenario including the recent wave
of Greek banks for each of our shocks. First and foremost, looking
at gure 3.2 we note that nancial and bank shocks seem to be the
most persistent on liquidity creation. Precisely as far as the former
is concerned, in all three rows a one standard deviation shock of the
three month Treasury bill rate on liquidity is positive and statistically
signicant, while the e¤ect of the real e¤ective exchange rate is rather
innocuous.
Comparing the two countriesbanking sectors, we see that the e¤ect
of a change in the level of policy rates on liquidity is more persistent
in the Greek banking sector where it takes about two years to lose its
signicance, while it requires one and a half years approximately in
the UK banking sector. Looking at the two Greek baseline scenarios,
noteworthy is the fact that its e¤ect is slightly bigger in the systemic
formation of the banking sector. As far the bank shock is concerned
we highlight that both its sources; the cost e¢ ciency and total prob-
lem loans variables, create a positive and statistical signicant impact
on liquidity creation. The fact that liquidity has a response in the
same direction on both sources of the bank shocks conrms that there
is no violation from a theoretical perspective when we characterized
the average of both cost e¢ ciency and total problem loans variables
as a bank-specic shock. Since, if this common direction did not ex-
ist potentially the two di¤erent bank shocks could be cancelling out
each other. As far as the shock on the non-performing loans variable
is concerned, we note that it is always statistically signicant and as
before more persistent in the Greek banking sector with a statistically
signicant time-period di¤erence of about half a year more than the
UK one. Additionally, the impact is once again bigger in the state
after the recent M&As in the Greek banking system. The fact that a
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positive one standard deviation bank-specic shock of cost e¢ ciency
on liquidity triggers a positive and statistically signicant (at least for
the formation including the recent consolidation activity as far as the
Greek banking sector is concerned) response in both countries, is of
major importance for two reasons: First and foremost, we provide for
the rst time in the literature an empirical insight about the impact
of e¢ ciency on liquidity creation and its sign as well. Second, the fact
that the response of liquidity is positive provides an empirical proof of
the positive impact of cost e¢ ciency on liquidity creation that we based
our assumptions in the previous part of our empirical analysis and sets
a solid foundation for our proposed Cost E¢ ciency - Liquidity Cre-
ation Hypothesis. Furthermore, we highlight that the cost e¢ ciency
bank-specic shock on liquidity creation takes at least six months less
to be absorbed in the UK than the Greek banking sector. An interest-
ing nding is that this impact seems to be of minor importance in the
Greek banking system without its current systemic nature. This may
amplify our belief that the specic recent Greek banksM&As did not
contribute to the amelioration of the proformabankscost e¢ ciency
and in extend to the overall sectors cost e¢ ciency which could enhance
liquidity creation30. Lastly, we note that in both countries and in both
formations of the Greek banking system, the response of liquidity to
a macroeconomic shock exhibits a rather oscillating pattern which re-
ects a downwards movement during the rst periods and an upward
direction thereafter.
Further, we want to examine the impact of macroeconomic, nan-
cial and bank shocks to the robustness of each countrys baseline sce-
30 As a robustness check, di¤erent ordering of the variables was considered and
the impulse responses computed using the generalised impulsefunction described
in Pesaran and Shin (1998). This method constructs an orthogonal set of shocks
that does not depend on the variable ordering. The results remained unchanged.
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nario of the banking sector with respect to its cost e¢ ciency. Figure
3.3 displays the response of cost e¢ ciency for all three categories of
shocks. One of the most intrinsic di¤erences is that all shocks are per-
sistent on cost e¢ ciency. A nding of utmost importance is that a
closer look at the bank shocks (i.e., liquidity creation, non-performing
loans) reveals that cost e¢ ciency is decreasing after innovations to each
one of those two. From this we extract two important inferences. First,
non-performing loans decrease cost e¢ ciency, thus nancial institutions
seek to nd strategies to confront with this issue. According to the
banking theory, a successful strategy with respect to the issuance of
loans is to reduce information asymmetries and improve their screen-
ing process of their borrowers. Thus, we show that we establish an
additional empirical proof in line with the proposed Cost E¢ ciency -
Liquidity Creation Hypothesis. Second, albeit that before we report
an increase on liquidity creation after a positive shock of cost e¢ ciency,
now, we highlight a decrease of cost e¢ ciency when there is a positive
bank-specic shock to liquidity. At rst sight, this result might look
odd; nevertheless, it is in line with recent studies highlighting that ex-
cessliquidity creation could distort the stability of the banking sector
by triggering bank failures (Fungacova et al., 2013). To put it di¤er-
ently, despite the fact that liquidity creation is desirable in the economy,
since it increases the available credit channels and consequently, it en-
hances investment and growth, however, beyond the optimumlevel it
increases the likelihood of distress of a bank and the severity of losses is
exacerbated as assets are liquidated to meet liquidity demands (Allen
and Gale 2004). At this point it would be interesting to pinpoint the
direction of causality among liquidity creation and cost e¢ ciency which
is quite challenging due to the conicting direction of the response of
each variable to a standard deviation shock of the other. An important
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di¤erence between these two shocks is the fact that the innovation of
cost e¢ ciency becomes apparent on liquidity creation after one period,
whereas the shock of liquidity creation on cost e¢ ciency has an instan-
taneous negative impact on cost e¢ ciency. Additionally, we highlight
that the persistence of liquidity creations innovation on cost e¢ ciency
is twice as large as the cost e¢ ciencys shock on liquidity. Taking into
consideration the last two points, we argue that the direction of causal-
ity among these two variables of interest is found to be stronger from
liquidity creation towards cost e¢ ciency than the reverse impact. Fur-
ther, as before, the fact that the sign of the response of cost e¢ ciency is
the same in each one of the shocked bank variables; it means that there
is no violation from a theoretical perspective when we characterize as a
bank shock (on cost e¢ ciency) the average innovation of both liquidity
creation and total problem loans variable. It is worth mentioning that
that the shock of non-performing loans on cost e¢ ciency is statistically
more signicant in the UK than in the Greek banking sector without
any recent consolidation activity; though its signicance it is apparent
only for a short period31. This result may reect the higher cost e¢ -
ciency scores of the Greek banking sector than the UK one (European
Banking Federation (EBF) report 2012). The liquidity creation shock
though is more persistent in both formations of the Greek banking
sector compared to the UK. Moreover we highlight that the liquidity
creation shock is more persistent in the systemic nature of the Greek
banking sector which highlights the vulnerability of this recent forma-
tion on potential liquidity shocks. As far as the macroeconomic shock
is concerned we note that an innovation to GDP will increase cost ef-
ciency. In addition, the shock is clearly more persistent in Greece at
31 The literature on IRFS highlights that when the condence interval of IRFs is
wide, one needs to treat the results with caution.
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least for an additional six-month period. Last, as far as the nancial
shock is concerned, we note that it is highly persistent in both countries
and statistically signicant in both its sources; policy interest rates and
real e¤ective exchange rate. However, once again we can see that an
innovation on the policy interest rates will dissipate quicker in the UK
than the two baseline conditions of the Greek banking system.
To shed more light into our analysis, we also present variance de-
compositions (VDCs), which show the per cent of the variation in one
variable that is explained by the shock in another variable. In tables
3.14 and 3.15 we report the total e¤ect accumulated over 10, 20 and 30
years for all the baselines conditions of the UK and the Greek banking
sector with respect to liquidity creation and cost e¢ ciency respectively.
The empirical evidence in table 3.14 insinuates the importance of the
bank shocks and specically the aggregate level of non-performing loans
in explaining the variation of liquidity creation. This empirical nding
amplies further the theoretical intuition of the Cost E¢ ciency - Liq-
uidity Creation Hypothesis, as it highlights the importance of a bank
manager to reduce the level of NPL since it distorts the its cost e¢ -
ciency level. This results to reduce information asymmetries and thus
increase the banks liquidity creation via increasing the weight of illiquid
assets. To be more precise, close to 11,6% and 13,6% of liquidity cre-
ations forecast error variance after thirty years is explained by the level
of badloans in the UK and Greek banking sector without any poten-
tial bank consolidation activity. We highlight that the aforementioned
percentage increases and reaches a level of 20% in the recent systemic
nature of the Greek banking sector. While the second source of a bank-
specic shock, the cost e¢ ciency variable, explains only about 4% for
the UK and 1% for the Greek banking in its pre-systemic formation of
a potential deviation between the forecasted and the true values of liq-
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uidity creation thirty years from now. This percentage becomes even
smaller than 1% after the creation of the four systemic cornerstones
of the Greek economy. Macroeconomic factors play a more important
role in explaining variations of liquidity creation over all the forecasting
horizons in the UK rather than in the Greek banking sector, though
this is less than 2%. As far as the nancial indicators are concerned, the
empirical evidence shows a common pattern in both countries. Specif-
ically the level of the policy interest rates accounts for approximately
4% of the forecast error of the level of the liquidity creation level of the
whole banking system in both countries after thirty years, while the
impact of the e¤ective exchange rate is innocuous.
Turning now to table 3.15 and the variance decompositions with re-
spect to cost e¢ ciency, a noteworthy di¤erence is in fact that liquidity
creation accounts for a considerably larger percentage of the deviation
from the true future values of cost e¢ ciency, that the reverse rela-
tionship. This holds in both countries and in all specications. This
nding is of crucial importance as it amplies our belief that the di-
rection of causality from liquidity creation to cost e¢ ciency is stronger
than in the opposite direction. An additional remarkable di¤erence is
that both sources of the bank shock explain to a greater extent any
deviations between the forecasted and the true values of cost e¢ ciency
in the UK banking system than in the Greek one with or without the
recent wave of consolidation. This might be justied from the fact that
the UK banking sector is more sophisticated and at the same time more
complex than the Greek one, and consequently the future score of cost
e¢ ciency depends more heavily on bank-specic elements. As far as
the macroeconomic and nancial shocks are concerned, we note their
contribution on future deviations of cost e¢ ciency scores is larger in
the Greek banking sector than in the UK, and specically in its recent
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systemic formation. This nding increases our concerns with respect
to the social benets deriving from the recent consolidation activity of
the big-fourGreek banks.
On the whole, after the impulse response and the associated vari-
ance decomposition analysis, we argue that both the liquidity creation
and cost e¢ ciency of the UK banking sector seems to be more robust
than both the pre and post systemic nature of the Greek banking sector,
when hypothetical adverse, macroeconomic, nancial and bank-specic
conditions occur in the economy. In addition we argue that the direction
of causality among these two variables is stronger from liquidity cre-
ation to cost e¢ ciency than the reverse impact. A closer look at these
three di¤erent in nature shocks and their respective components, reveals
that bank-specic conditions and precisely the level of non-performing
loans in the sector is what has the biggest e¤ect on liquidity creation
and explains, in a considerably larger extent than the rest variables in
the panel VAR system, deviations of the forecasted values of liquid-
ity creation from its trues levels. Nonetheless, we note that all three
types of shocks are important and more persistent with respect to cost
e¢ ciency. As far as the Greek banking sector is concerned, notewor-
thy is the fact that the impact of macroeconomic, nancial and bank
shocks is more persistent in its recent systemic formation. This nding
amplies our scepticism from the previous subsection of our empirical
analysis regarding the social economic benets of the recent wave of
banksM&As. For this reason, we investigate further the stability of
the UK and Greek banking sector regarding their liquidity creation in
both baseline scenarios against hypothetical macroeconomic, nancial
and bank unexpected innovations by exploring the behaviour of specic
potential banksconsolidation activity.
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Recent & Prospective M&As - Half life comparisons
The following pairs of tables - 3.16.a, 3.16.b; 3.17.a, 3.17.b and 3.18.a,
3.18.b - demonstrate those UK and Greek potential combinations of
banksM&A that achieve to create the necessary dynamics for the
whole banking system to be able to produce greater stability in terms
of its liquidity creation, than a banking system without the presence
of those specic hypothetical banks consolidation activities, after a
future macroeconomic, nancial and bank shock respectively. Precisely,
in these tables we present all the potential M&A cases which form a
banking sector whose half-life and total e¤ect after each shock is less
than the respective ones which derive from a banking sector without
any consolidation activity, and/or without any further consolidation
activity as far as the Greek banking sector is concerned.
It is noteworthy that potential consolidation activity among the
largest banks in each country creates the most robust banking sec-
tors with respect to their liquidity creation. A result which amplies
previous ndings in our study concerning the high levels of liquidity
creation, the enhanced cost e¢ ciency and the after-e¤ect social gains
as well that is produced after M&As among large banks. Another in-
teresting nding common in both countries, is that the time needed for
half of the e¤ect of each shock to dissipate and its total e¤ect on the
whole banking systems liquidity creation, is less when potential consol-
idation activity consists of three rather than two nancial institutions.
Nonetheless, we nd conicting evidence for most of the M&A cases
in both countries where more nancial intermediaries are involved in a
consolidation activity. This nding comes is line with recent debates
from both an academic and a practitioners perspective, regarding the
optimal size of nancial institution and whether it is too-big-to-fail
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(TBF) or too-big-to-save (TBS), since it has been shown that the
structure of a nancial system a¤ects the transmission of business cy-
cles shocks in the economy and vice-versa. Specically, after the recent
nancial crisis, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) has created a list
of 29 global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) whose "distress or
disorderly failure, as a result of their size, complexity and systemic
interconnectedness, would cause signicant disruption to the wider -
nancial system and economic activity" (FSB November 2011). Tables
3.19.a and 3.19.b, display these UK and Greek potential bankscon-
solidation activities respectively that constitute a banking sector whose
liquidity creation is found to be more robust in all three di¤erent shocks,
than the current UK and Greek banking sector in each formation. Ad-
ditionally, from these aforementioned M&As, we construct all possible
hypothetical consolidation scenarios that can occur simultaneously in
each banking system and present in tables 3.20.a and 3.20.b in respect
to the UK and Greek banking sector. A noteworthy nding is that the
vast majority of those simultaneousM&As scenarios seems to create
more robust conditions with respect to liquidity creation of the coun-
trys banking sector than the individual banksconsolidation scenarios
that they consist of. Thus, it seems that the more frequent is the con-
solidation activity among large and cost e¢ cient nancial institutions,
the higher is the stability of the banking sectors liquidity creation.
Last but not least, the half-life and the total e¤ect of a macroeconomic
shock, is considerably higher than the one of a nancial and a bank
shock. This result should not come as a surprise, since both theo-
retical and empirical evidence has demonstrated that business cycles
which are determined by uctuations in macroeconomic factors, such
as aggregate output, consumption and income, create conditions whose
impact requires adequate amount of time to dissipate.
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Turning our attention to each countrys banking sector, a notewor-
thy di¤erence is that both the half-life and the total e¤ect of either three
di¤erent shocks is considerably less for the UK banking sector. This
holds when we compare the UK banking sectors baselinecase with
either of the two baselinecases of the Greek banking sector. This is
a crucial nding, since both banking systems confronted serious conse-
quences of the nancial turmoil, nevertheless, it seems that the impact
of the crisis was more severe in terms of liquidity in the Greek bank-
ing sector. Concerning the UK banking system, the results reveal that
HSBC bank and Barclays bank from the big fourof the UK banking
system and Standard Chartered bank and Santander bank from the
remaining banks that we include in our study, create the most robust
in terms of liquidity creationcombinations of potential consolidation
activity, against all three di¤erent stress tests that we created. While
we nd the same empirical evidence for Ethniki bank and Alpha bank
from the big-fourgroup of the Greek banking system and for Aegean
bank and Pancretan bank as well regarding the group of banks that
have not been involved in the recent wave of M&A.
Lastly, as the far as the Greek banking sector is concerned, we
compare the two baselinesectors; one that does not include the recent
wave of consolidation and its after-e¤ect: the formation of the four
so-called cornerstonesof the Greek economy and another one which
does include all the recent banksM&A. The half-life and total e¤ect
results indicate that in two out of the three di¤erent hypothetical stress
tests, the Greek banking sector is found to be more robust with its
initial structure before 2012, which does not incorporate the series of
M&A of the big-four institutions of the sector. Precisely, only in
the scenario of a potential nancial shock the current formation of the
Greek banking sector seems to create these necessary dynamics that
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allow it to better withstand future tremors in the total level of liquidity
that it creates. This nding amplies our aforementioned concerns
regarding the true social benets stemming from the recent wave of
consolidation. Our empirical evidence highlights that the formation
of two out of the four cornerstones of the Greek economic recovery,
the systemic Eurobankand Piraeus bankdoesnt create the most
optimum conditions to be able to withstand uctuations in the level
of liquidity that they create after a potential adverse macroeconomic
and bank-specic developments. It is important to remember that the
primary reason of the recent wave of consolidation in the Greek banking
system was the enhancement of liquidity and stability conditions in
the economy in an era where the country has been blocked from the
international capital markets and their resulting credit channels. With
this in mind, the latest (in the time that this study is written) nancial
report of the Governor of the Bank of Greece (October 2013), notes
that there is a negative 3.9 per cent annual change in the total level
of credit provided by the Greek nancial intermediaries to both public
and private sector, while during the same period the total level of Greek
bank deposits has been increased by 6.7 per cent. Additionally the
report indicates that the interest rate spread in the country has seen
increased and reached the level 3,6 per cent, mainly due to reduced
deposit rates. Consequently, our ndings strengthen our concerns about
the e¤ective social surplus, in terms of liquidity which results in the
aftermath of the recent wave of banks consolidation.
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3.7 Concluding Remarks
The global nancial crisis triggered and exposed several scal imbal-
ances and large sovereign debts of various developed and emerging
economies in an international level. Unequivocally, the European econ-
omy constitutes the most representative example of this severe eco-
nomic downturn, since it experienced its deepest recession since the
1930s, with real GDP following its sharpest contraction in the history
of the European Union. That said, a scepticism has been raised regard-
ing the future existence of both the European Monetary Union and the
European Union, since there is the fear of the so-called systemic risk
and its tremendous contagion consequences being transmitted from dif-
ferent member countries. The UK and Greece, from the beginning of
the global nancial turmoil, went through deeper recession and slow
improvements in competitiveness which had a severe impact on both
countries banking sector solvency and stability since one of its two
primordial roles, liquidity provider to the economy, has been severely
deteriorated. The impact of banks M&A has raised concerns among
policy-makers as to whether these could generate increased liquidity
and enhance the stability conditions of the sector.
This study proposes a novel theoretical hypothesis, the so-called
"Cost E¢ ciency-Liquidity Creation Hypothesis" (CELCH), which ar-
gues that "cost e¢ ciency" enhancing banksM&A, can create both
increased liquidity and social welfare surplus. An additional novelty of
our study is that we provide empirical evidence regarding the direction
of causality among these two variables. In this spirit, this is the rst
study that investigates all the historical UK and Greek banksM&As
in respect to their credit supply and their consequences to social ben-
ets and to loan pricing behaviour. We approach this framework by
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employing recently developed measures of liquidity creation that ac-
count for both on and o¤ balance sheet banksactivities (Berger and
Bouwman 2009). Additionally, we exploit on one hand potential social
welfare benets in the UK banking system through potential M&As
and we address the question of whether they can reduce the uncon-
ventional monetary activities (i.e Quantitative Easing) of the Bank of
England. On the other hand, we investigate whether potential M&As
can be proved vital in alleviating the terms of the memorandum be-
tween Greece and the so-called Troika (IMF, European Commission,
European Central Bank), enhancing the real economy, households and
rms, with the creation of additional credit channels in the spectrum of
a severe country default risk. Further, we conduct a comparative and
a forecasting analysis pre-crisis and post-crisis which has major pol-
icy implications regarding the trade-o¤ between shareholderspersonal
gains and societys economic prosperity, that triggers M&A activity. In
addition, we examine the impact of the "Deposit Insurance Hypothesis"
to liquidity creation and the relationship between capital and liquidity
which is expressed by two additional competing hypotheses: "Finan-
cial Fragility Crowding out" vs "Risk Absorption", in the spirit of
Basel III, where it is given a major emphasis on liquidity and it is
implemented by the introduction of two ratios, namely the liquidity
coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR).
Last but not least, we propose a novel methodology to evaluate
and compare the robustness of mergers and acquisitions. The way we
achieve that is by the use of a stress test scenario under a panel vector
autoregressive (PVAR) model, which enables us to infer major policy
implications towards the stability of vulnerable banking systems espe-
cially in the era of the recent nancial crisis. Thus, we capture in a
more appropriate way the impact of adverse macroeconomic, nancial
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and bank-specic conditions and thus we are able to extract unbiased
inferences regarding the robustness of the Greek and UK banking sector
on liquidity creation, with crucial policy implications in the spectrum
of the economic prosperity. Said that, this if the rst study which
addresses empirically the impact of e¢ ciency on liquidity. This is of
extreme importance since the formers enhancement is an explicit policy
objective in the Single Market Directive of the European Commission,
while the latter is the main driver of the recently implemented reg-
ulations on banking supervision under the Basel III Accord. To be
able to make precise evaluations and comparisons among the poten-
tial M&As cases under investigation we employ recent in the literature
half-life measures of the associated impulse response functions, in or-
der to examine thoroughly the robustness and the total e¤ect on liq-
uidity creation of the UK and Greek bankshypothetical consolidation
activities, due to adverse macroeconomic, nancial and bank-specic
developments.
We report increased liquidity that is created after the vast major-
ity of historical consolidation activity in both countries. Additionally,
empirical evidence deriving from these historical M&As, gives support
to the "Deposit Insurance Hypothesis" and reveals that both banking
systems are in line with the "Financial Fragility Crowding out hy-
pothesis". These results hold after various robustness checks. Via our
proposed "Cost E¢ ciency-Liquidity Creation Hypothesis" (CELCH),
we provide evidence of increased liquidity that is created after poten-
tial M&A activity of two and three banking institutions in both the
pre-crisis and post-crisis era, though the evidence during the former
period is considerably stronger. Large nancial institutions seem to
create the highest cost e¢ ciency benets which could result in increased
provision liquidity to the economy. This is consistent in both banking
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systems and for both periods around the crisis. As far as the recent
wave of bank consolidation and the creation of the four so-called cor-
nerstonesof the Greek economy is concerned, we cast doubts on the
decision of the foregoing policy makers and the boards of the involved
banks in the selection process regarding the true social welfare benet
of the consolidation process, since the results indicate decreased cost
e¢ ciency-liquidity creation.
The stress test scenario reveals a positive impact of cost e¢ ciency
on liquidity creation and sets a solid foundation for our proposed "cost
e¢ ciency-liquidity creation hypothesis". Moreover, the empirical evi-
dence highlights that more robust conditions exist in the UK than in
the Greek banking sector with respect to liquidity creation when hypo-
thetical adverse, macroeconomic, nancial and bank-specic conditions
occur in the economy. In both countriesbanking sectors it seems that
bank shocks and specically the level of non-performing loans in the
sector are more persistent and account from most of the deviations of
the forecasted values of liquidity from its trues levels. Nonetheless,
all three types of shocks are found to play an important role for both
countries and for all baselines conditions with respect to cost e¢ ciency.
In addition, our results highlight that the direction of causality among
these two variables of interest is stronger from liquidity creation to-
wards cost e¢ ciency than the reverse impact. Noteworthy is the fact,
that the e¤ect of all three di¤erent in nature shocks that we stressed
the economy is more persistent in the current systemic formation of the
Greek banking sector compared to its pre-crisis formation. A nding
that raises further concerns towards the social economic benets of the
recent wave of banks M&A. Further investigation regarding potential
UK and Greek banksconsolidation activity against the three di¤erent
in nature shocks revealed that the more frequent is the consolidation
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activity among large and cost e¢ cient nancial institutions the higher
is the stability of the banking sectors liquidity creation. While, re-
garding the Greek banking sector, the half-life and total e¤ect results
of adverse macroeconomic and bank-specic conditions indicate the sec-
tor was more robust with respect to liquidity creation before its current
systemic formation
3.8 Discussion
Our study has some main policy implications in the post crisis era. We
argue that additional credit channels in the economy can be created
via potential bank-consolidation activity. Nonetheless, according to our
proposed "Cost E¢ ciency-Liquidity Creation Hypothesis", this credit
facilitation can contribute to the social welfare only if cost e¢ ciency en-
hancement is apparent in the newnancial entity. However, we note
that our proposed PVAR methodology in examining the robustness of
a banking system on exogenous and endogenous shocks should be fur-
ther applied before any police implementation takes place. Specically,
banking systems, not only in EU and EMU area but worldwide such as
in US, China and in several emerging economies, should be empirically
investigated as well. Additionally, it would be interesting to investigate
the impact of prote¢ ciency on liquidity creation and thus address
both standards of economic e¢ ciency on more countries. In this way
we can have a more complete view of the overall impact of economic
e¢ ciency on liquidity creation.
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3.9 Appendix
Figure 3.1.a: UK - Growth rate of credit to public & private sector by UK financial intermediaries
Notes: This figure displays the annual growth rate of the volume of loans and credit facility provided in both public and
private sector by the financial intermediaries operating in the UK banking sector.
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Figure 3.1.b: Greece - Growth rate of credit to public & private sector by Greek financial intermediaries
Notes: This figure displays the annual growth rate of the volume of loans and credit facility provided in both public and
private sector by the financial intermediaries operating in the Greek banking sector.
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Figure 3.2: Liquidity Creation - Impulse Response Functions
UK
Greece BEFORE the recent consolidation activity
Greece AFTER the recent consolidation activity
This figure illustrates the impulse response functions of Liquidity Creation with respect to a Bank, a Macroeconomic and a Financial shock, deriving from the panel vector
autoregressive (PVAR) system for both the UK and Greek baseline scenario where there is no bank consolidation activity in the sector and the additional baseline scenario that
indicates the current conditions of the Greek banking system after the recent wave of Greek banks' M&As. Specifically, 'd Catfat2', 'd TPL',  'd GDP', 'd Real EER' and 'd 3M Tbill'
 refer to the first differences of Liquidity Creation, Total Problem Loans ( i.e. Bank shock), Gdp Growth Rate (i.e. Macroeconomic shock), Real Effective Exchange Rate
(i.e. Financial shock) and Three month treasury bill rate (i.e. Financial shock) respectively, while 'Ceff' refers to the cost efficiency score ( i.e. Bank shock).
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Figure 3.3: Cost Efficiency - Impulse Response Functions
UK
Greece BEFORE the recent consolidation activity
Greece AFTER the recent consolidation activity
This figure illustrates the impulse response functions of Cost Efficiency with respect to a Bank, a Macroeconomic and a Financial shock, deriving from the panel vector
autoregressive (PVAR) system for both the UK and Greek baseline scenario where there is no bank consolidation activity in the sector and the additional baseline scenario that
indicates the current conditions of the Greek banking system after the recent wave of Greek banks' M&As. Specifically, 'd Catfat2', 'd TPL',  'd GDP', 'd Real EER' and 'd 3M Tbill'
 refer to the first differences of Liquidity Creation, Total Problem Loans ( i.e. Bank shock), Gdp Growth Rate (i.e. Macroeconomic shock), Real Effective Exchange Rate
(i.e. Financial shock) and Three month treasury bill rate (i.e. Financial shock) respectively, while 'Ceff' refers to the cost efficiency score ( i.e. Bank shock).
221
Table 3.1.a: UK - Historical M&As
 Acquirer Target Date of M&A
_1 Cheltenham & Gloucester BS Essex Equitable BS Feb. 1988
_2 Heart of England BS Rowley Regis BS Mar. 1988
_3 Heart of England BS Kidderminster Equitable BS Mar. 1988
_4 West of England BS North Wilts Ridgeway BS Mar. 1988
_5 Woolwich Equitable BS Gateway BS May. 1988
_6 Chelsea BS City of London BS Jul. 1988
_7 Cheshunt BS Aid to Thrift BS Jul. 1988
_8 Cheltenham & Gloucester BS Bolton BS Oct. 1988
_9 Cheltenham & Gloucester BS Bury St Edmunds BS Jan. 1989
_10 West of England BS Regency May. 1989
_11 Wessex BS Portman BS Jul. 1989
_12 Cheltenham & Gloucester BS Bedford BS Apr. 1990
_13 Cheltenham & Gloucester BS Guardian BS Apr. 1990
_14 Bradford & Bingley BS Sheffield BS Jun. 1990
_15 Cheltenham & Gloucester BS Peckham BS Jul.  1990
_16 Stroud & Swindon BS Frome Selwood Permanent BS Jul.  1990
_17 Cheltenham & Gloucester BS Walthamstow BS Oct. 1990
_18 Regency & West of England BS Portman Wessex BS Oct. 1990
_19 Sussex Eastbourne Mutual BS Oct. 1990
_20 Bradford & Bingley BS Louth Mablethorpe & Sutton BS Nov. 1990
_21 Bradford & Bingley BS Hendon BS Mar. 1991
_22 Bradford & Bingley BS Hampshire BS Jun. 1991
_23 Cheltenham & Gloucester BS Portsmouth BS Jun. 1991
_24 Bradford and Bingley Leamington Spa Jul. 1991
_25 Cheltenham & Gloucester BS Bedford Crown BS Jul. 1991
_26 Britannia BS Mornington BS Oct. 1991
_27 Bristol and West BS Cheshunt BS Dec. 1991
_28 Leeds Permanent BS Southdown BS Apr. 1992
_29 Woolwich BS Town and Country BS May.1992
_30 Northern Rock BS Lancastrian BS Jul. 1992
_31 Cheltenham & Gloucester BS Mid-Sussex BS Aug.1992
_32 Yorkshire Haywards Health BS Dec. 1992
_33 Northern Rock BS Surrey BS Jul. 1993
_34 Cheltenham & Gloucester BS Heart of England BS Oct. 1993
_35 Bradford & Bingley BS Bexhill-on-Sea BS Nov. 1993
_36 Portman BS St Pancreas BS Dec. 1993
_37 Northern Rock BS North of England BS Oct. 1994
_38 Universal BS Tynemouth BS Oct. 1994
_39 Halifax Leeds Permanent BS Aug. 1995
_40 Lloyds Cheltenham and Gloucester Aug. 1995
_41 Lloyds TSB Dec. 1995
_42 Stroud and Swindon BS City and Metropolitan BS Apr. 1996
_43 Abbey National National and Provincial BS Aug. 1996
_44 Bank of Ireland Bristol and West Jul. 1997
_45 Cumberland BS West Cumbria BS Jul. 1997
_46 Portman BS Greenwich BS Jul. 1997
_47 Abbey National Cater Allen Jul. 1997
_48 Halifax Birmingham Midshires Apr. 1999
_49 Mercantile BS Standard BS Sep. 1999
_50 Newcastle BS Nottingham Imperial BS Feb. 2000
_51 Royal Bank of Scotland Natwest Feb. 2000
_52 Yorkshire BS Gainsborough BS May. 2001
_53 Barclays Woolwich Nov. 2001
_54 Halifax Bank of Scotland Nov. 2001
_55 Derbyshire BS Ilkeston Permanent BS Aug. 2002
(Continued)
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Table 3.1.a: UK - Historical M&As (Continued)
 Acquirer Target Date of M&A
_56 Derbyshire BS Clay Cross BS Dec. 2003
_57 Northern Rock Legal and General Bank Dec. 2003
_58 Portman BS Staffordshire BS Dec. 2003
_59 Britannia BS Bristol and West May. 2005
_60 Leeds and Holbeck BS Mercantile BS Aug. 2006
_61 Portman Lambeth Sep. 2006
_62 Newcastle Universal Dec. 2006
_63 Nationwide Portman Aug. 2007
_64 Abbey National Alliance & Leicester Sep. 2008
_65 Abbey National Bradford & Bingley Sep. 2008
_66 Lloyds HBOS Sep. 2008
_67 Yorkshire BS Barnsley Dec. 2008
_68 Nationwide Cheshire Dec. 2008
_69 Chelsea Catholic Dec. 2008
_70 Nationwide Derbyshire Dec. 2008
_71 Nationwide Dunfermline Mar. 2009
_72 Skipton Building Society Scarborough BS Mar. 2009
_73 Yorkshire BS Chelsea BS Apr. 2010
_74 Skipton BS Chesham BS Jun. 2010
_75 Coventry BS Stroud & Swindon BS Sep. 2010
_76 Yorkshire BS Egg banking JuL. 2011
_77 Yorkshire BS Norwich & Peterborough BS Nov. 2011
_78 Scottish BS Century BS Feb. 2013
_79 Nottingham BS Shepshed BS Jul. 2013
Notes: This tables reports all the merging and acquisition activity that has been undertaken
domestically in the UK retail banking sector over the period 1988 to 2013.
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Table 3.1.b: Greece - Historical M&As
 Acquirer Target Date of M&A
_1 EFG Eurobank Interbank Jul. 1996
_2  National Mortgage Bank of Greece  National Housing Bank of Greece Apr. 1997
_3 Piraeus Bank Chase Manhattan (1) Aug. 1997
_4 Piraeus Bank Credit Lyonnais Greece Mar. 1998
_5  National Bank of Greece  National Mortgage Bank of Greece Mar. 1998
_6 EFG Eurobank Bank of Athens Apr. 1998
_7 EFG Eurobank Creta Bank Jun. 1998
_8 Egnatia bank Bank of Central Greece May. 1999
_9 Alpha Bank Ionian and Popular Bank of Greece April. 1999
_10 Piraeus Bank  Macedonia Thrace Bank Feb. 1999
_11 Piraeus Bank Xios Bank Apr. 1999
_12 Piraeus Bank Nat.Westminster Bank (1) May. 1999
_13 EFG Eurobank Ergobank Jun. 1999
_14 Telesis Investment Bank Dwriki Bank Jul. 2000
_15 EFG Eurobank-Ergasias Telesis Investment Bank Mar. 2001
_16 Piraeus Bank Hellenic Industrial Development Bank Jul. 2001
_17  National Bank of Greece Nation. Invest. Bank for Industrial Development Sep. 2002
_18 Aspis Bank ABN-AMRO (1) Jun. 2002
_19 Emporiki Bank of Greece Bank of Investments Apr. 2004
_20 Marfin Bank Egnatia bank Sep. 2005
_21 Marfin Bank Laiki Bank Oct. 2005
_22 Proton Bank Omega Bank Jun. 2006
_23 Aspis Bank FBB First Business Bank (2) Feb. 2007
_24 TT Hellenic Postbank Aspis Bank Jun. 2009
_25 Piraeus Bank Agricultural (ATE) Jul. 2012
_26 Alpha Bank Emporiki Bank of Greece Oct. 2012
_27 Piraeus Bank General Oct. 2012
_28 Piraeus Bank Bank of Cyprus (3) Mar. 2013
_29 Piraeus Bank Marfin Egnatia (3) Mar. 2013
_30 Piraeus Bank Hellenic Bank (3) Mar. 2013
_31 Piraeus Bank Millennium Apr. 2013
_32  National Bank of Greece FBB First Business Bank May. 2013
_33  National Bank of Greece PRObank Jul. 2013
_34 Eurobank-Ergasias  Proton Bank Jul. 2013
_35 Eurobank-Ergasias TT Hellenic Postbank Jul. 2013
Notes: This tables reports all the merging and acquisition activity that has been undertaken domestically in the Greek
 banking sector over the period 1996 to 2013.
1.  Piraeus Bank and Aspis Bank acquired the network of Chase Manhattan, Nat. Westiminster and ABN-AMRO
respectively in Greece.
2. Aspis Bank in 2007 acquired  50% of the network  of FBB First Business Bank.
3. Piraeus bank proceeded in the acquisition of the banking operations in Greece of: Bank of Cyprus, Cyprus Popular
Bank (Marfin Egnatia) and Hellenic Bank.
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Table 3.2: Bank activities of liquidity measures
Assets
Illiquid assets (weight = 1/2) by Category Semiliquid assets (weight = 0)  by Category Liquid assets (weight = –1/2)
Commercial real estate loans (CRE) Residential real estate loans (RRE) Cash and due from other institutions
Loans to finance agricultural production Consumer loans All securities
Other loans and leases financing Loans to depository institutions Trading assets
Other real estate owned (OREO) Loans to state and local governments Fed funds sold
Customers’ liability on bankers acceptances Loans to foreign governments
Customers’ liability on bankers acceptances
Intangible assets
Premises
Other assets
Illiquid assets (weight = 1/2) by Maturity Semiliquid assets (weight = 0) by Maturity
Loans and leases with a remaining maturity  > 1 year Loans and leases with a remaining maturity <= 1 year
Liabilities plus equity
Liquid liabilities (weight = 1/2) Semiliquid liabilities (weight = 0) Illiquid liabilities plus equity (weight = –1/2)
Transactions deposits Time deposits Bank’s liability on bankers acceptances
Savings deposits Other borrowed money Subordinated debt
Overnight federal funds purchased Overnight federal funds purchased
Trading liabilities Other liabilities
Equity
Off-balance sheet: Financial guarantees
Illiquid guarantees (weight = 1/2) Semiliquid guarantees (weight = 0) Liquid guarantees (weight = –1/2)
Unused commitments Net credit derivatives Net participations acquired
Net standby letters of credit Net securities lent
Commercial and similar letters of credit
All other off-balance sheet liabilities
Off-balance sheet: Derivatives
Liquid derivatives (weight=?1/2 )
Interest rate derivatives
Foreign exchange derivatives
Equity and commodity derivatives
Notes: This table reports definitions of both 'on' and 'off' balance sheet items in terms of their liquidity, which is the basis for calculation of the liquidity creation
measures. The general functional form to calculate liquidity creation is
                        Liquidity Creation (LC) = [ ½ × illiquid assets (cat) + 0 × semi-liquid assets (cat) – ½ × liquid assets (cat) ] +
                                                                  [ ½ × liquid liabilities + 0 × semi-liquid liabilities – ½ × illiquid liabilities – ½ ×  equity capital ] +
                                                                 [ ½ × illiquid guarantees + 0 × semi-liquid guarantees – ½ × liquid guarantees  – ½ × liquid derivatives ]
In line with Berger and Bouwman (2009) methodology:
a. Step 1: We classify all bank activities as liquid, semiliquid, or illiquid. b. Step 2: We assign weights to the activities classified in step 1.
c. Step 3: We combine bank activities as classified in step 1 and as weighted in step 2 in different ways to construct four liquidity creation measures.
d. We classify loans both by category and maturity.
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 Table 3.3.a: UK - Financial Intermediaries Analysis of characteristic banking indicators
name Years Num OBS   T.A (B) Gr. Ls (B) Dep. (B)  Eqt. (B)  L.L.P (M) Mar. Pr (%)
ABC Int. 1996-2011 16 3.19 1.38 2.33 0.41 5.72 0.35
AIB Bank 1992-2008 17 2.23 0.14 2.05 0.14 0 0.25
AIB Group 1995-2011 17 25.81 16.41 22.26 1.36 219.22 2.86
Abbey Nat. 1990-2011 22 190.34 27.9 126.34 3.65 45.36 21.09
Adam & Company 1989-2011 23 1.63 0.59 1.52 0.08 1.47 0.18
Ahli United 1989-2011 23 2.78 1.29 2.32 0.21 10.63 0.31
Alliance & Leic. BS 1988-1996 9 29.95 23.6 26.42 1.49 106.78 3.32
Alliance & Leic. Bank 1995-2006 12 5.44 1.65 4.32 0.45 6.17 0.6
Alliance & Leic. Plc 1996-2011 16 80.46 57.6 59.22 2.64 182.14 8.92
Alpha Bank 1989-2011 23 0.59 0.29 0.5 0.08 1.49 0.07
Anglo-Romanian 1989-2010 22 0.25 0.11 0.17 0.06 2.26 0.03
Arbuthnot 1991-2011 21 0.27 0.14 0.21 0.04 1.55 0.03
BMCE Int. 2006-2011 6 0.36 0.17 0.28 0.06 0.55 0.04
Bank Leumi 1996-2011 16 1.72 1.17 1.5 0.15 7.13 0.19
Bank Mandiri 1999-2011 13 0.17 0.08 0.11 0.05 3.42 0.02
Bank Saderat 1996-2011 16 0.82 0.18 0.55 0.19 0.61 0.09
Bank of Beirut 2002-2011 10 0.35 0.14 0.27 0.06 0.08 0.04
Bank of China 2007-2011 5 1.18 0.6 1.01 0.24 7.36 0.13
Bank of Cyprus 1997-2003 7 0.85 0.55 0.75 0.07 0.43 0.09
Bank of N.Y. Mellon 1997-2011 15 5.11 0.22 4.47 0.33 0 0.57
Bank of Scotland 1990-2011 22 368.13 256.88 260.55 12.28 3821.53 40.79
Bank of Tokyo 1988-1996 9 0.68 0.28 0.59 0.06 5.91 0.08
Bank of  Philip. Isl. 2009-2011 3 35.73 0.49 3.45 32.01 18 3.96
Barclays Bank 1992-2011 20 1262.61 431.68 647.54 42.14 3266.07 139.91
Barclays Priv. & Tr. 2002-2005 4 2.07 0.18 1.79 0.24 0.47 0.23
Barclays Priv. Clien. 2002-2008 7 27.88 4.01 26.22 1.06 10.92 3.09
Barnsley BS 1992-2007 16 0.45 0.34 0.41 0.03 0.27 0.05
Bath BS Sav. & Inv. 1995-2010 16 0.26 0.19 0.24 0.02 0.09 0.03
Beneficial Bank 1988-1998 11 2.2 1.95 1.31 0.23 98.35 0.24
Beverley BS 1996-2011 16 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.01 0.18 0.02
Birmingham Mid. BS 1988-1998 11 8.43 6.96 7.63 0.4 16.74 0.93
Bradford & Bingley BS 1988-1999 12 23.59 18.76 21.38 1.26 24.3 2.61
Bradford & Bingley Int. 2007-2010 4 3.91 3.74 3.53 0.37 0 0.43
Bradford & Bingley Bank 1999-2011 13 68.99 54.42 35.75 2.18 181.36 7.65
Bristol & West BS 1988-1996 9 10.93 8.83 9.81 0.54 39.43 1.21
Britannia BS 1989-2009 21 35.06 22.06 27.75 1.64 19.22 3.89
British Arab 1989-2011 23 2.68 0.62 2.3 0.21 5.32 0.3
Buckinghamshire BS 2003-2011 9 0.25 0.18 0.23 0.02 0.02 0.03
Butterfield Guernsey 1996-2011 16 1.12 0.22 1.02 0.07 0.62 0.12
Butterfield Holdings 1992-2010 19 0.5 0.11 0.44 0.05 -0.01 0.06
Cambridge BS 1996-2011 16 1.24 0.91 1.15 0.08 0.49 0.14
Capital One 2002-2011 10 6.96 6.07 2.64 0.65 382.69 0.77
Catholic BS 1997-2007 11 0.06 0.04 0.06 0 0 0.01
Chelsea BS 1990-2009 20 12.72 9.61 11.08 0.55 12.7 1.41
Cheltenham & Gloucester BS 1988-1995 8 22.82 19.26 20.98 1.08 79.71 2.53
Cheltenham & Gloucester Bank 1996-2011 16 66.45 94.73 88.26 2.41 -6.19 7.36
Cheshire BS 1990-2007 18 5.2 4.02 4.07 0.25 4.04 0.58
Citibank 1989-2011 23 31.44 9.95 24.01 2.69 234.57 3.48
City of Derry BS 1998-2010 13 0.04 0.03 0.04 0 0.16 0
Co-operative 1990-2011 22 17.88 11.85 15.27 0.93 112.16 1.98
Consolidated Credits 2002-2011 10 0.15 0 0.12 0.03 0 0.02
Coventry BS 1989-2011 23 18.11 12.92 15.16 0.71 8.33 2.01
Credit Agricole 2000-2004 5 2.6 0.47 1.45 0.07 0 0.29
Credit Suisse 1997-2011 15 1.75 0.44 1.59 0.09 0 0.19
Cuscatlan Bank and Trust 2002-2006 5 0.33 0.19 0.28 0.04 0.38 0.04
(Continued)
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 Table 3.3.a: UK - Financial Intermediaries Analysis of characteristic banking indicators (Continued)
name Years Num OBS   T.A (B) Gr. Ls (B) Dep. (B)  Eqt. (B)  L.L.P (M) Mar. Pr (%)
DB UK 1996-2011 16 14.44 3 7.57 1.31 1.39 1.6
Darlington BS 1996-2011 16 0.87 0.67 0.8 0.06 0.52 0.1
Derbyshire BS 1992-2007 16 6.4 5.02 5.85 0.34 0.92 0.71
Dexia Municipal 1992-1999 8 0.61 0.52 0.53 0.05 0.28 0.07
Dunbar 1995-2010 16 1.12 0.99 0.85 0.21 70.78 0.12
Duncan Lawrie 2008-2010 3 0.24 0.06 0.2 0.04 0 0.03
Dunfermline BS 1992-2007 16 3.26 2.52 2.99 0.17 0.84 0.36
Ecology BS 1997-2011 15 0.1 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.01
Egg 1996-2011 16 11.89 7.14 9.81 0.58 258.35 1.32
Europe Arab 2005-2011 7 5.61 2.51 5.38 0.42 47.33 0.62
FBN 2003-2011 9 1.49 0.34 1.25 0.11 -1.35 0.17
FIBI 1996-2011 16 0.35 0.25 0.27 0.07 0.63 0.04
Fairbairn 1998-2011 14 1.01 0.26 0.94 0.06 0.3 0.11
Finsbury Pavement 1991-2006 16 0.8 0.16 0.58 0.17 0.17 0.09
Furness BS 1996-2011 16 1.2 0.93 1.1 0.07 0.36 0.13
Gainsborough BS 1992-2000 9 0.05 0.03 0.04 0 0 0.01
Ghana 1998-2011 14 0.51 0.05 0.43 0.07 0.16 0.06
Gresham Trust 1993-2000 8 0.15 0 0.02 0.13 0 0.02
HBOS 2000-2011 12 494.11 387.03 383.7 26.91 7010.74 54.75
HFC 1989-2011 23 4.29 3.25 2.35 0.46 230.8 0.48
HSBC Middle East 1989-2011 23 12.93 7.17 10.38 1.04 144.53 1.43
HSBC 1989-2011 23 488.09 200.1 279.61 22.28 1175.48 54.09
Habib Allied 2001-2011 11 122.81 40.29 103.93 11.85 246.18 13.61
Habibsons 1996-2011 16 0.32 0.08 0.29 0.02 0.41 0.04
Halifax 1996-2006 11 301.63 220.16 264.75 10.49 526.95 33.43
Harpenden BS 1996-2011 16 0.21 0.16 0.19 0.01 0.09 0.02
Heritable 1989-2007 19 0.46 0.41 0.38 0.05 1.3 0.05
ICBC 2003-2011 9 0.91 0.35 0.72 0.16 -0.16 0.1
Ilkeston Permanent BS 1997-2000 4 0.03 0.02 0.02 0 0 0
Isle of Man Bank Limited 1995-2011 17 5.09 1.11 4.64 0.36 0.27 0.56
Italian Int. 1988-1997 10 2.37 0.35 2.14 0.12 1.16 0.26
JP Morgan 1996-2011 16 1.95 1.5 0.14 0.98 0 0.22
Jordan Int. 1996-2011 16 0.33 0.07 0.28 0.04 6.69 0.04
KDB Bank 1992-1998 7 0.38 0.08 0.31 0.05 5 0.04
Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander 1989-2007 19 1968.65 1233.45 1638.98 144.34 7931.22 218.15
Kingdom 2009-2011 3 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.4 0.01
Kookmin 1995-2010 16 0.26 0.03 0.21 0.04 1.46 0.03
Lazard & Co Holdings 1999-2011 13 1.1 0.31 0.81 0.21 0 0.12
Leeds BS 1989-2011 23 9.75 7.63 8.28 0.53 23.14 1.08
Leek United BS 1996-2011 16 1.1 0.86 1.01 0.07 0.15 0.12
Lloyds (BLSA) 1992-2001 10 1.96 0.72 1.7 0.12 13.81 0.22
Lloyds 1988-1998 11 132.06 78.23 109.79 5.85 999.95 14.63
Lloyds TSB 1998-2011 14 539.94 309.35 373.09 25.28 3962.68 59.83
Lloyds TSB Scotland 1989-2010 22 11.54 8.41 10.4 0.73 43.28 1.28
London Int. 2001-2006 6 0.01 0 0 0.01 0 0
London Trust 1991-1998 8 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.7 0.01
MBNA Europe Bank 1995-2010 16 11.94 9.83 6.49 1.82 607.25 1.32
Manchester BS 1990-2011 22 0.83 0.64 0.75 0.05 0.99 0.09
Mansfield Building Society 1995-2011 16 0.32 0.25 0.29 0.03 0.05 0.04
Market Harborough BS 1998-2011 14 0.64 0.5 0.59 0.04 0.03 0.07
Marsden BS 1996-2011 16 0.53 0.38 0.48 0.04 0.59 0.06
Melli 2001-2011 11 1.54 0.19 1.14 0.27 4.49 0.17
Melton Mowbray BS 1996-2011 16 0.6 0.43 0.54 0.05 0.2 0.07
Mercantile BS 1992-2005 14 0.29 0.22 0.26 0.02 0.04 0.03
Merrill Lynch 1990-2005 16 11.59 5.81 8.24 0.8 3.28 1.28
(Continued)
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 Table 3.3.a: UK - Financial Intermediaries Analysis of characteristic banking indicators (Continued)
name Years Num OBS   T.A (B) Gr. Ls (B) Dep. (B)  Eqt. (B)  L.L.P (M) Mar. Pr (%)
Morgan Stanley 2001-2011 11 7.61 2.14 4.1 1.02 17.26 0.84
National Bank of Kuwait 1996-2011 16 1.88 0.65 1.55 0.28 0.66 0.21
National Counties BS 1996-2011 16 1.57 1.15 1.11 0.44 1.28 0.17
National Westminster 1989-2011 23 294.59 167.49 240.32 14.12 2146.48 32.65
Nationwide BS 1990-2011 22 175.11 135.5 145.05 6.57 241.61 19.41
Newcastle BS 1989-2011 23 5.16 4.02 4.48 0.27 3.85 0.57
Northern 1995-2010 16 7.54 5.71 6.24 0.48 42.29 0.84
Northern Rock 1996-2011 16 89.7 72.91 51.35 2.29 370.68 9.94
Northern Rock BS 1987-1996 10 10.41 8.61 9.56 0.48 14.03 1.15
Norwich & Peterborough BS 1995-2010 16 5.52 4.17 5.07 0.27 4.93 0.61
Nottingham BS 1992-2011 20 3.07 2.48 2.82 0.18 0.92 0.34
PNB 1997-2011 15 0.03 0 0.02 0.01 0.11 0
Penrith BuS 2008-2011 4 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.02 0 0.02
Portman BS 1989-2006 18 15.72 11.46 13.84 0.77 7.4 1.74
Principality BS 1989-2011 23 6.22 4.72 5.48 0.34 9.59 0.69
Progressive BS 1996-2011 16 1.84 1.46 1.71 0.09 1.46 0.2
Prudential-Bache 1996-2001 6 0.58 0.21 0.48 0.08 0 0.06
Riggs 1989-2004 16 0.41 0.24 0.34 0.05 4.45 0.05
Riyad 1993-1997 5 0.16 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.1 0.02
Royal Bank of Scotland Int. 1996-2008 13 29.11 5.41 26.63 2.08 35.04 3.23
Royal Bank of Scotland 1995-2011 17 930.46 401.98 482.44 42.5 4124.73 103.11
Saffron BS 1996-2011 16 1.09 0.77 1.01 0.06 0.36 0.12
Sainsbury's 2002-2011 10 6.86 3.65 6.2 0.31 104.87 0.76
Santander 1989-2011 23 243.49 150.01 177.69 8.59 461.62 26.98
Schroders 1989-2011 23 8.2 1.03 3.9 1.6 5.18 0.91
Secure Trust 1999-2011 13 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.01 1.11 0.01
Shepshed BS 1997-2011 15 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.01 0.08 0.01
Skipton BS 1989-2011 23 13.26 9.2 11.44 0.71 16.35 1.47
Staffordshire BS 1989-2002 14 1.82 1.5 1.64 0.13 1.7 0.2
Standard 2000-2011 12 21.72 5.95 12.61 1.01 31.88 2.41
Standard Chartered 1998-2011 14 240.37 102.85 145.94 16.09 677.87 26.64
Standard Chartered Plc 1990-2011 22 122.96 72.43 124.62 11.31 601.8 13.63
Stroud & Swindon BS 1994-2009 16 3.64 2.61 3.38 0.14 0.45 0.4
Swansea BS 1996-2011 16 0.16 0.11 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.02
TSB 1988-1997 10 41.56 27.36 35.78 2.69 276.84 4.61
Teachers' BS 1996-2011 16 0.36 0.28 0.25 0.11 -0.01 0.04
The Access 2008-2011 4 0.3 0.03 0.26 0.04 0 0.03
Tipton & Coseley BS 2001-2011 11 0.5 0.39 0.46 0.03 0.41 0.06
Turkish 1996-2011 16 0.18 0.06 0.16 0.03 0.04 0.02
Ulster 1989-2011 23 29.02 21.05 21.82 2.3 812.56 3.22
Union 2005-2011 7 0.94 0.04 0.87 0.05 -0.08 0.1
United National 2001-2011 11 0.23 0.09 0.16 0.06 0.15 0.03
United Trust 1999-2011 13 0.13 0.09 0.1 0.02 1.44 0.01
Unity Trust 1991-2011 21 0.54 0.12 0.49 0.04 1.08 0.06
Universal BS 1992-2005 14 0.6 0.48 0.54 0.03 0.31 0.07
VTB Capital 2004-2011 8 4.91 1.53 1.67 0.65 15.32 0.54
Vernon BS 1993-2011 13 51.9 39.3 48.13 3.51 9.98 5.75
Weatherbys 1997-2011 15 0.23 0.07 0.2 0.02 0.83 0.03
Wesleyan 2001-2011 11 0.16 0.05 0.15 0.02 0.98 0.02
West Merchant 1988-1997 10 4.39 0.78 3.79 0.13 7.81 0.49
Woolwich BS 1988-1996 9 34.41 28.12 31.44 1.81 83.53 3.81
Yorkshire BS 1989-2011 23 25.51 16.76 21.5 1.17 12.8 2.83
Total 2327 9024.17 4977.99 6409.96 500.22 42418.32 100
Notes: This table presents an overview of all the UK financial intermediaries throughout our sample  period.  T.A, Gr. Ls, Dep.,  Eqt, L.L.P, Mar. Pr
represent average values of Total Assets, Gross loans, Deposits,  Equity, Loans and loss Provisions and Market Power (measured as each bank's share
of the indrustry's total assets) respectively. 'B' stands for billions while 'M' for millions.
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Table 3.3.b: Greece- Financial Intermediaries Analysis of characteristic banking indicators
name Years Num OBS   T.A (B) Gr. Ls (B) Dep. (B)  Eqt. (B)  L.L.P (M) Mar. Pr (%)
Aegean Baltic 2003-2011 9 0.3 0.17 0.23 0.07 1.59 0.1
Agricultural (ATE) 1993-2011 19 22.86 16.02 20.41 1.16 154.05 7.8
Alpha 1993-2011 19 37.62 24.22 28.64 2.42 422.81 12.9
Attica 1993-2011 19 2.9 2.16 2.54 0.25 33.54 1
Bank of Athens 1993-1997 5 0.36 0.18 0.32 0.03 2.15 0.1
Bank of Central Greece 1993-1998 6 0.51 0.24 0.44 0.05 2.84 0.2
Bank of Crete (Cretabank) 1993-1998 6 1.24 0.62 1.13 0.07 6.38 0.4
Emporiki  (Commercial) 1993-2011 19 21.58 14.61 17.91 1.19 313.21 7.4
Ergobank 1993-1999 7 4.21 1.6 3.53 0.34 18.21 1.4
Eurobank Ergasias 1993-2011 19 42.12 26.19 33.16 2.66 753.08 14.4
FBB First Business 2002-2011 10 1.76 1.39 1.59 0.15 27.33 0.6
General 1993-2011 19 3.5 2.71 3.13 0.19 103.4 1.2
Ionian and Popular 1993-1998 6 5.53 1.75 4.79 0.26 39.29 1.9
Laiki 1993-2005 13 1.62 1.04 1.47 0.12 16.96 0.6
Macedonia Thrace 1993-1999 7 1.53 0.62 1.32 0.14 12.58 0.5
Marfin 1993-2005 13 0.48 0.2 0.43 0.04 4.28 0.2
Marfin Egnatia 1993-2010 18 8.58 5.59 7.34 0.5 70.25 2.9
Millennium 2000-2011 12 5.7 4.24 4.7 0.33 31.51 1.9
National Bank of Greece (Ethiki) 1993-2011 19 68.15 35.19 58.65 4.02 465.16 23.3
National Mortgage Bank 1993-1997 5 7.09 3.53 5.63 0.22 8.3 2.4
Omega 2001-2004 4 0.76 0.45 0.67 0.08 2.7 0.3
PRObank 2001-2011 11 3.42 2.42 3.03 0.3 35.49 1.2
Pancretan Cooperative 2002-2011 10 1.74 1.42 1.49 0.19 0 0.6
Panellinia 2005-2011 7 1.04 0.78 0.91 0.11 12.34 0.4
Piraeus 1993-2011 19 25.57 17.15 20.84 1.42 332.39 8.8
Proton 2002-2010 9 1.92 0.98 1.59 0.28 19.76 0.7
T Bank 1993-2010 18 2.26 1.58 1.89 0.14 11.55 0.8
TELESIS Investment 1993-2000 8 0.35 0.14 0.25 0.08 1.53 0.1
TT Hellenic Postbank 1998-2011 14 16.51 5.78 14.72 1.32 37.74 5.7
Xiosbank 1993-1998 6 0.93 0.35 0.84 0.05 3.18 0.3
Total 356 292.12 173.29 243.58 18.16 2943.63 100
Notes: This table presents an overview of all the Greek financial intermediaries throughout our sample  period.  T.A, Gr. Ls, Dep.,  Eqt, L.L.P, Mar. Pr
represent average values of Total Assets, Gross loans, Deposits,  Equity, Loans and loss Provisions and Market Power (measured as each bank's share
of the indrustry's total assets) respectively. 'B' stands for billions while 'M' for millions.
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year Num OBS   T.A (B) Gr. Ls (B) Dep. (B)  Eqt. (B)  L.L.P (M) HHI
1988 13 10.73 18.09 9.58 0.55 25.77 0.19
1989 40 16.6 26.98 14.33 0.86 338.95 0.12
1990 49 19.4 36.34 16.76 0.96 205.41 0.08
1991 53 21.63 37.9 18.64 1.11 287.72 0.08
1992 66 17.16 25.94 14.39 0.87 227.15 0.08
1993 69 15.95 23.62 13.04 0.81 147.54 0.07
1994 70 19.92 31.13 15.9 1.01 76.32 0.08
1995 80 14.56 22.57 11.56 0.89 45.88 0.06
1996 110 14.76 25.06 11.75 0.92 30.11 0.05
1997 114 18.04 29.84 14.22 0.99 38.9 0.08
1998 115 20.52 34.13 16.16 1.16 100.34 0.06
1999 116 18.3 29.59 14.47 1.2 73.44 0.05
2000 117 24.06 35.9 18.94 1.7 67.05 0.07
2001 120 23.65 34.3 18.73 1.77 95.16 0.06
2002 125 33.11 53.37 26.58 2.05 127.42 0.07
2003 127 35.3 63.01 27.02 2.76 137.02 0.06
2004 127 73.56 142.07 59.93 5.16 351.77 0.15
2005 126 87.6 150.83 62.92 4.42 223.69 0.12
2006 121 104.11 204.36 68.12 6.32 541.66 0.14
2007 120 132.24 264.95 98.8 8.22 579.07 0.23
2008 116 107.92 157.32 53.52 4.1 783.78 0.09
2009 116 87.82 142.22 53.25 7.16 971.87 0.08
2010 113 86.56 135.5 51.52 7.32 675.16 0.07
2011 101 138.39 213.96 80.69 10.43 863.94 0.08
Total 2324 1141.89 1938.98 790.82 72.74 7015.12 0.09
Notes: This table presents an overview of the UK banking system throughout our sample
period.  T.A, Gr. Ls, Dep., Eqt, L.L.P, HHI represent  average values of Total Assets, Gross
loans, Deposits,  Equity, Loans and loss Provisions and Market Concentration  (expressed
by the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) Index and it is defined as the sum of the squares of the
market shares of all banks in the sample for each year:  a HHI index below 0.01 indicates
a highly competitive index, a HHI index below 0.15 indicates an unconcentrated index, a
HHI index between 0.15 to 0.25 indicates moderate concentration, while a HHI index above
0.25 indicates high concentration.) respectively. 'B' stands for billions while 'M' for millions.
Table 3.4.a: UK - Time Series Analysis of characteristic banking indicators
230
year Num OBS   T.A (B) Gr. Ls (B) Dep. (B)  Eqt. (B)  L.L.P (M) HHI
1993 19 3.84 5.24 3.28 0.17 12.91 0.21
1994 19 4.85 6.89 4.18 0.22 18.54 0.23
1995 19 6.05 8.7 5.25 0.26 13.78 0.21
1996 21 5.04 6.95 4.49 0.24 24.62 0.16
1997 21 5.74 6.92 5.07 0.27 32.97 0.2
1998 20 6.79 8.19 6.06 0.42 41.5 0.16
1999 16 8.77 9.1 7.47 0.9 45.36 0.16
2000 15 9.31 8.77 8.04 0.83 38.31 0.16
2001 15 9.94 8.76 8.77 0.76 44.99 0.17
2002 18 9.85 10.33 8.76 0.6 47.85 0.18
2003 20 11.84 14.96 10.17 0.81 75.79 0.16
2004 21 13.33 18.15 10.83 0.79 89.34 0.15
2005 21 13.44 15.86 10.93 0.93 75.35 0.14
2006 19 19.2 25.29 15.08 1.39 125.15 0.14
2007 19 26.95 39.68 19.55 2.27 120.8 0.13
2008 19 31.71 44.12 25.05 2.13 260.27 0.14
2009 19 34.67 49.95 28.1 2.85 424.91 0.14
2010 20 30.36 40.57 24.77 2.74 562.62 0.13
2011 15 30.54 39.51 26.21 1.1 1779.96 0.19
Total 356 282.22 367.94 232.06 19.68 3835.02 0.17
Notes: This table presents an overview of the Greek banking system throughout our sample
period.  T.A, Gr. Ls, Dep., Eqt, L.L.P, HHI represent  average values of Total Assets, Gross
loans, Deposits,  Equity, Loans and loss Provisions and Market Concentration  (expressed
by the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) Index and it is defined as the sum of the squares of the
market shares of all banks in the sample for each year:  a HHI index below 0.01 indicates
a highly competitive index, a HHI index below 0.15 indicates an unconcentrated index, a
HHI index between 0.15 to 0.25 indicates moderate concentration, while a HHI index above
0.25 indicates high concentration.) respectively. 'B' stands for billions while 'M' for millions.
Table 3.4.b: Greece - Time Series Analysis of characteristic banking indicators
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Table 3.5.a: UK - Liquidity Creation of Historical M&As
 Acquirer in 't-1' (M) Target in 't-1' (M) Consolidated Instutition in 't+1' (M)
_1 Cheltenham & Gloucester BS Essex Equitable BS Cheltenham & Gloucester BS
4249.1 386.28 5411.8
_2 Heart of England BS Rowley Regis BS Heart of England BS
265.57 53.11 416.29
_3 Heart of England BS Kidderminster Equitable BS Heart of England BS
265.57 66.39 416.29
_4 West of England BS North Wilts Ridgeway BS West of England BS
294.22 163.46 367.89
_5 Woolwich Equitable BS Gateway BS Woolwich Equitable BS (3)
10182.2 3394.07 13750
_6 Chelsea BS City of London BS Chelsea BS
1526.9 79.53 1606.5
_7 Cheshunt BS Aid to Thrift BS Cheshunt BS
349.34 148.12 658.74
_8 Cheltenham & Gloucester BS Bolton BS Cheltenham & Gloucester BS
4249.1 249.95 5411.8
_9 Cheltenham & Gloucester BS Bury St Edmunds BS Cheltenham & Gloucester BS
5411.8 386.56 8656.8
_10 West of England BS Regency Regency & West of England BS
367.89 487.55 957.42
_11 Wessex BS Portman BS Portman Wessex BS
395.07 908.65 1723.35
_12 Cheltenham & Gloucester BS Bedford BS Cheltenham & Gloucester BS
8656.8 577.12 11158.35
_13 Cheltenham & Gloucester BS Guardian BS Cheltenham & Gloucester BS
8656.8 618.34 11158.35
_14 Bradford & Bingley BS Sheffield BS Bradford & Bingley BS
6725.2 499.64 8993.55
_15 Cheltenham & Gloucester BS Peckham BS Cheltenham & Gloucester BS
8656.8 541.05 11158.35
_16 Stroud & Swindon BS Frome Selwood Permanent BS Stroud & Swindon BS
474.75 32.52 522.3
_17 Cheltenham & Gloucester BS Walthamstow BS Cheltenham & Gloucester BS
8656.8 509.22 11158.35
_18 Regency & West of England BS Portman Wessex BS Portman BS
957.42 1723.35 1946.95
_19 Sussex Eastbourne Mutual BS Southdown BS
486.45 413.12 1000.64
_20 Bradford & Bingley BS Louth Mablethorpe & Sutton BS Bradford & Bingley BS
6725.2 439.56 8993.55
_21 Bradford & Bingley BS Hendon BS Bradford & Bingley BS
8993.55 576.51 9912.75
_22 Bradford & Bingley BS Hampshire BS Bradford & Bingley BS
8993.55 548.39 9912.75
_23 Cheltenham & Gloucester BS Portsmouth BS Cheltenham & Gloucester BS
11158.35 557.92 12717.5
_24 Bradford and Bingley Leamington Spa Bradford and Bingley
8993.55 505.26 9912.75
_25 Cheltenham & Gloucester BS Bedford Crown BS Cheltenham & Gloucester BS
11158.35 743.89 12717.5
_26 Britannia BS Mornington BS Britannia BS
6120.2 425.01 6592.3
_27 Bristol and West BS Cheshunt BS Bristol and West BS
5171.05 397.77 5700.3
  (Continued)
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Table 3.5.a: UK - Liquidity Creation of Historical M&As (Continued)
 Acquirer in 't-1' (M) Target in 't-1' (M) Consolidated Instutition in 't+1' (M)
_28 Leeds Permanent BS Southdown BS Leeds Permanent BS
913.44 375.9 1564.29
_29 Woolwich BS Town and Country BS Woolwich BS
17980.25 628.68 18700.75
_30 Northern Rock BS Lancastrian BS Northern Rock BS
4654.7 427.04 5577.45
_31 Cheltenham & Gloucester BS Mid-Sussex BS Cheltenham & Gloucester BS
12717.5 508.7 13273.4
_32 Yorkshire Haywards Health BS Yorkshire
3768.6 348.94 4138.2
_33 Northern Rock BS Surrey BS Northern Rock BS
5577.45 625.73 7577.6
_34 Cheltenham & Gloucester BS Heart of England BS Cheltenham & Gloucester BS
13273.4 829.59 14480.85
_35 Bradford & Bingley BS Bexhill-on-Sea BS Bradford & Bingley BS
10135.35 542 11215
_36 Portman BS St Pancreas BS Portman BS
2121.3 235.7 2454.4
_37 Northern Rock BS North of England BS Northern Rock BS
7577.6 911.76 8701.1
_38 Universal BS Tynemouth BS Universal BS
774.69 227.85 1152.36
_39 Halifax BS Leeds Permanent BS Halifax BS
52611.55 2086.42 71594.6
_40 Lloyds Cheltenham and Gloucester Lloyds
61974.5 24417.1 105024.65
_41 Lloyds TSB Lloyds TSB
61974.5 13810 105024.65
_42 Stroud and Swindon BS City and Metropolitan BS Stroud and Swindon BS
708.6 48.2 836.4
_43 Abbey Nat. National and Provincial BS Abbey Nat.
37461.5 2148.76 49600
_44 Bank of Ireland Bristol and West BS Bristol and West BS (4)
561.3 6987.85 10052.3
_45 Cumberland BS West Cumbria BS Cumberland BS
504.15 38.78 583.15
_46 Portman BS Greenwich BS Portman BS
2885.75 129.15 3289.15
_47 Abbey Nat. Cater Allen Abbey Nat.
96485 -14.25 108402
_48 Halifax Birmingham Midshires Halifax
61491.5 6259.3 80996.5
_49 Mercantile BS Standard BS Mercantile BS
116.9 7.95 138.85
_50 Newcastle BS Nottingham Imperial BS Newcastle BS
1760.35 1161.85 3236.15
_51 Royal Bank of Scotland Natwest Royal Bank of Scotland
68556 88615.5 217631.5
_52 Yorkshire BS Gainsborough BS Yorkshire BS
8364.2 22.3 8761.65
_53 Barclays Woolwich Woolwich (5)
186665.5 30529.2 227553.2
_54 Halifax Bank of Scotland HBOS
114381 60172.5 187484
  (Continued)
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Table 3.5.a: UK - Liquidity Creation of Historical M&As (Continued)
 Acquirer in 't-1' (M) Target in 't-1' (M) Consolidated Instutition in 't+1' (M)
_55 Derbyshire BS Ilkeston Permanent BS Derbyshire BS
2338.5 11.2 2459.7
_56 Derbyshire BS Clay Cross BS Derbyshire BS
2459.7 14.14 2648.35
_57 Northern Rock Legal and General Bank Northern Rock
2899.65 972.8 3130.5
_58 Portman BS Staffordshire BS Portman BS
7529 1220.85 9854.6
_59 Britannia BS Bristol and West Britannia BS
8119.25 16308.25 28684.25
_60 Leeds BS Mercantile BS Leeds BS
4874.95 159.85 5908.85
_61 Portman BS Lambeth BS Portman BS
7063 730.9 13663.4
_62 Newcastle BS Universal BS Newcastle BS
2378.55 426.35 2953.4
_63 Nationwide BS Portman BS Nationwide BS
89696.1 13663.4 111716.55
_64 Abbey Nat. Alliance & Leicester Santander
93406.5 27361 195841
_65 Abbey Nat. Bradford & Bingley Santander
93406.5 21544.15 195841
_66 Lloyds TSB HBOS Lloyds TSB
136577.5 147494.5 334286.5
_67 Yorkshire BS Barnsley BS Yorkshire BS
3771.3 251.15 1295
_68 Nationwide BS Cheshire BS Nationwide BS
111716.55 3032.35 93965.5
_69 Chelsea BS Catholic BS Chelsea BS
7885.1 29.5 8317.85
_70 Nationwide BS Derbyshire BS Nationwide BS
111716.55 4918.1 93965.5
_71 Nationwide BS Dunfermline BS Nationwide BS
93965.5 2395.75 116404.5
_72 Skipton BS Scarborough BS Skipton BS
7777.65 2047.85 5775.65
_73 Yorkshire BS Chelsea BS Yorkshire BS
9767.65 8574.7 13450.55
_74 Skipton BS Chesham BS Skipton BS
7688.6 183.2 8266.55
_75 Coventry BS Stroud & Swindon BS Coventry BS
12062 1494.3 14089.64
Notes: This table presents the level of liquidity creation of those UK financial institutions that involved in a domestic
retail bank M&A activity during the period 1988-2011. The level of liquidity creation is calculated as described in
Table 3.2.
1. We refer to the year of consolidation as 't', consequently we measure the liquidity creation of both the acquirer
and target (i.e., Proforma bank) in time 't-1' and in time 't+1'  regarding the consolidated institution.
2. 'M' stands for millions.
3. We do not include the last four consolidation activities that took place at 2011 and onwards due to unavailability
of data.
4. In 1990, Woolwich Equitable BS renamed to Woolwich BS.
5. Bristol & West demutualised and was sold to Bank of Ireland becoming a division of the bank but maintaining its
operations and branch network under the Bristol & West brand.
6. The Woolwich brand-name was retained after the acquisition
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Table 3.5.b: Greece - Liquidity Creation of Historical M&As
 Acquirer in 't-1' (M) Target in 't-1' (M) Consolidated Instutition in 't+1' (M)
_1 EFG Eurobank Interbank EFG Eurobank
304.95 335.445 729.4
_2  National Mortgage Bank of Greece  National Housing Bank of Greece  National Mortgage Bank of Greece
1296.55 75.38081395 1498.6
_3 Piraeus Bank Chase Manhattan (1) Piraeus Bank
460.2 115.05 2265.55
_4 Piraeus Bank Credit Lyonnais Greece Piraeus Bank
2265.55 63.442 3386.75
_5  National Bank of Greece  National Mortgage Bank of Greece  National Bank of Greece
6327.3 1498.6 10662.25
_6 EFG Eurobank Bank of Athens EFG Eurobank
951.35 151 4365.65
_7 EFG Eurobank Creta Bank EFG Eurobank
951.35 635.75 4365.65
_8 Egnatia bank Bank of Central Greece Egnatia bank
827.2 240.6 1232.9
_9 Alpha Bank Ionian and Popular Bank of Greece Alpha Bank
7136 1101 14842.95
_10 Piraeus Bank  Macedonia Thrace Bank Piraeus Bank
3386.75 747.1 5548.3
_11 Piraeus Bank Xios Bank Piraeus Bank
3386.75 482.85 5548.3
_12 Piraeus Bank Nat.Westminster Bank Piraeus Bank
3386.75 103.51 5548.3
_13 EFG Eurobank Ergobank EFG Eurobank-Ergasias
4365.65 1762.35 6792.6
_14 Telesis Investment Bank Dwriki Bank Telesis Investment Bank
56.1 46.75 160.55
_15 EFG Eurobank-Ergasias Telesis Investment Bank EFG Eurobank-Ergasias
6792.6 160.55 9293.9
_16 Piraeus Bank Hellenic Industrial Development Bank Piraeus Bank
7963.65 315.45 10315
_17  National Bank of Greece Nation. Invest. Bank for Industrial Development  National Bank of Greece
24244.25 290.4 30616.8
_18 Aspis Bank ABN-AMRO Aspis Bank
996.85 46.27 1112.95
_19 Emporiki Bank of Greece SA Bank of Investments Emporiki Bank of Greece SA
12599.1 242.67 18661.25
_20 Marfin Bank Egnatia bank Marfin Egnatia
362.3 1724.9 4918.45
_21 Marfin Bank Laiki Bank Marfin Egnatia
362.3 2044.55 4918.45
_22 Proton Bank Omega Bank Proton Bank
772.6 693 1772.3
_23 Aspis Bank FBB First Business Bank Aspis Bank
1760.8 1032.35 3096.35
_24 TT Hellenic Postbank Aspis Bank T Bank (Aspis)
7026.75 1729.4 9114.5
Notes: This table presents the level of liquidity creation of those Greek financial institutions that involved in a domestic retail bank
 M&A activity during the period 1988-2011. The level of liquidity creation is calculated as described in Table 3.2.
1. We refer to the year of consolidation as 't', consequently we measure the liquidity creation of both the acquirer and target (i.e.,
Proforma bank) in time 't-1' and in time 't+1'  regarding the consolidated institution.
2. 'M' stands for millions.
3. We do not include the last eleven consolidation activities that took place at 2011 and onwards due to unavailability of data.
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Table 3.6.a: UK - Differences among Liquidity measures
dif_catfat dif_liquid1_acquirer dif_liquid2_aquirer dif_liquid1_target dif_liquid2_target
dif_catfat 0 15 out 75 (20%) 9 out of 75 (12%) 16 out of 75 (21.33%) 12 out of 75  (16%)
dif_liquid1_acquirer 15 out 75 (20%) 0 7 out of 75 (9.33%) 13 out of 75 (17.33%) 12 out of 75  (16%)
dif_liquid2_acquirer 9 out of 75 (12%) 7 out of 75 (9.33%) 0 14 out of 75 (18.66%) 11 out of75 (14.6%)
dif_liquid1_target 16 out of 75 (21.33%) 13 out of 75 (17.33%) 14 out of 75 (18.66%) 0 4 out of 75 (5.3%)
dif_liquid2_target 12 out of 75  (16%) 12 out of 75  (16%) 11 out of75 (14.6%) 4 out of 75 (5.3%) 0
Notes: This table reports in how many of the historical M&A cases that took place in the UK banking sector we found differences in the liquidity creation
level produced among each one of the three different liquidity measures, between time 't+1' and time 't-1'.  Specifically, 'catfat' refers to the level of liquidity
creation 'based on Berger and Bouwman (2009) measure as described in Table 3.2. 'Liquid1' and 'Liquid2' refer to the level of liquidity 'creation based on the
following two equations:
                            a. Liquid1=Liquid Assets/Total Assets     and     b. Liquid2=Liquid Assets/Customer&Short Term Funding
dif_catfat' represents the difference in the level of liquidity creation between the consolidated institution in time 't+1' and the acquirer and target together
(i.e., Proforma bank) in time 't-1'. On the contrary, 'dif_liquid1_acquirer' and 'dif_liquid1_target' represent the difference in the level of liquidity creation
between the consolidated institution in time 't+1' and the acquirer (without the target institution) in time 't-1' or the target (without the  acquirer institution) in
time 't-1' as far as the 'absolute' measure of liquidity (i.e. 'Liquid1') is concerned. The same holds for the 'relative' measure of liquidity (i.e. 'Liquid2') .
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Table 3.6.b: Greece - Differences among Liquidity measures
dif_catfat dif_liquid1_aquirer dif_liquid2_aquirer dif_liquid1_target dif_liquid2_target
dif_catfat 0 3 out of 24 (12.5%) 3 out of 24 (12.5%) 5 out of 24 (20.83%) 5 out of 24 (20.83%)
dif_liquid1_aquirer 3 out of 24 (12.5%) 0 0 out of 24 4 out of 24 (16.66%) 4 out of 24 (16.66%)
dif_liquid2_aquirer 3 out of 24 (12.5%) 0 out of 24 0 4 out of 24 (16.66%) 4 out of 24 (16.66%)
dif_liquid1_target 5 out of 24 (20.83%) 4 out of 24 (16.66%) 4 out of 24 (16.66%) 0 0 out of 24
dif_liquid2_target 5 out of 24 (20.83%) 4 out of 24 (16.66%) 4 out of 24 (16.66%) 0 out of 24 0
Notes: This table reports in how many of the historical M&A cases that took place in the Greek banking sector we found differences in the liquidity creation
level produced among each one of the three different liquidity measures, between time 't+1' and time 't-1'.  Specifically, 'catfat' refers to the level of liquidity
creation 'based on Berger and Bouwman (2009) measure as described in Table 3.2. 'Liquid1' and 'Liquid2' refer to the level of liquidity 'creation based on the
following two equations:
                            a. Liquid1=Liquid Assets/Total Assets     and     b. Liquid2=Liquid Assets/Customer&Short Term Funding
dif_catfat' represents the difference in the level of liquidity creation between the consolidated institution in time 't+1' and the acquirer and target together
(i.e., Proforma bank) in time 't-1'. On the contrary, 'dif_liquid1_acquirer' and 'dif_liquid1_target' represent the difference in the level of liquidity creation
between the consolidated institution in time 't+1' and the acquirer (without the target institution) in time 't-1' or the target (without the  acquirer institution) in
time 't-1' as far as the 'absolute' measure of liquidity (i.e. 'Liquid1') is concerned. The same holds for the 'relative' measure of liquidity (i.e. 'Liquid2') .
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Table 3.7.a: UK - Differences among Liquidity measures for each M&A activity
M&A activity dif_catfat (M) dif_liquid1_aquirer dif_liquid2_aquirer dif_liquid1_target dif_liquid2_target
_1 776.42 0.01 1.41 0.09 10.85
_2 97.61 0.09 0.26 0.09 0.78
_3 84.33 0.04 0.26 0.09 0.74
_4 -89.79 0.04 0.76 0.13 0.98
_5 173.73 0.04 4.48 -0.68 14.99
_6 0.07 0.01 0.66 0.02 11.98
_7 161.28 0.04 1.62 0.09 2.09
_8 912.75 0.01 1.41 0.1 11.18
_9 2858.44 0.02 1.2 0.11 12.15
_10 101.98 0.55 4.37 0.47 3.02
_11 419.63 -0.09 16.67 0.03 3.27
_12 1924.43 -0.01 0.85 0.08 13.08
_13 1883.21 -0.01 0.85 0.09 13.01
_14 1768.71 0.01 0.84 0.13 14.28
_15 1960.5 -0.01 0.85 0.09 13.03
_16 15.03 0.02 2.31 0.08 9.15
_17 1992.33 -0.01 0.85 0.09 13.08
_18 -733.82 -0.53 11.58 -0.01 -0.85
_19 101.07 0.25 2.2 0.31 2.51
_20 1828.79 0.01 0.84 0.13 14.45
_21 342.69 -0.02 -1.78 0.1 12.55
_22 370.81 -0.02 -1.78 0.11 12.61
_23 1001.23 0.04 1.64 0.13 14.79
_24 413.94 -0.02 -1.78 0.11 12.69
_25 815.26 0.04 1.64 0.12 14.56
_26 47.09 0.04 4.04 0.11 12.52
_27 131.48 0.05 5.08 -0.19 7.77
_28 274.95 0.44 3.81 0.78 7.42
_29 91.82 0.02 2.1 0.07 12.48
_30 495.71 0.09 1.61 0.08 7.49
_31 47.2 0.03 1.3 0.16 16.16
_32 20.66 0.15 0.73 0.42 9.7
_33 1374.42 0.83 0.89 0.94 9.7
_34 377.86 0.32 2.06 0.44 17.89
_35 537.65 0.01 0.53 0.08 14.49
_36 97.4 0.11 3.8 0.21 21.85
_37 211.74 0.46 2.68 1.11 10
_38 149.82 0.51 1.34 1.18 1.84
_39 16896.63 0.21 1.56 -1 -3.61
_40 18633.05 0.04 3.24 -0.26 12.78
_41 29240.15 0.04 3.24 -0.12 -8.56
_42 79.6 0.02 1.97 0.04 4.64
_43 9989.74 0.03 3.58 0.06 15.9
_44 2503.15 -0.34 -32.68 0.58 61.87
_45 40.22 0.01 1.06 0.04 11.76
_46 274.25 0.02 1.72 0 0.44
_47 11931.25 0 2.22 -1.1 -112.14
_48 13245.7 0 -5.46 0.08 5.31
_49 14 0.02 1.39 0.23 27.25
_50 313.95 0.04 4.36 0.09 9.51
             (Continued)
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Table 3.7.a: UK - Differences among Liquidity measures for each M&A activity  (Continued)
M&A activity dif_catfat (M) dif_liquid1_aquirer dif_liquid2_aquirer dif_liquid1_target dif_liquid2_target
_51 60460 0.32 33.87 0.15 21.3
_52 375.15 0.03 1.95 -0.18 -22.11
_53 10358.5 0.06 6.47 0.23 27.24
_54 12930.5 -0.11 -8.31 -0.03 -5.51
_55 110 0 -0.11 0 -0.81
_56 174.51 0.01 1.58 -0.2 -21.31
_57 -741.95 -0.08 -2.5 0.1 12.58
_58 1104.75 0.11 10.62 0.04 4.57
_59 4256.75 0.07 5.5 0.11 15.07
_60 874.05 0.02 2.69 -0.03 -3.88
_61 5869.5 0.04 17.71 0.16 9.76
_62 148.5 -0.01 -1.65 -0.06 -8.31
_63 8357.05 0.05 3.09 -0.21 -18.16
_64 75073.5 0.26 21.34 0.45 48.88
_65 80890.35 0.26 21.34 0.48 50.6
_66 50214.5 0.35 50.92 0.58 71.1
_67 -2727.45 0.05 5.63 0.32 -11.08
_68 -20783.4 0.17 6.55 0.19 7.23
_69 403.25 0.18 8.7 -0.01 -13.02
_70 -22669.15 0.17 6.55 0.2 6.34
_71 20043.25 -0.12 -6.84 0.1 1.3
_72 -4049.85 0.18 -0.53 0.25 3.8
_73 -4891.8 -0.03 -0.71 0.22 -14.4
_74 394.75 -0.05 1.36 -0.07 -10.48
_75 0.3 8.26 4.53 0.08 -2.99
Notes: This table reports for each one of the historical UK bank M&As, the estimated differences with respect
to the liquidity creation level produced among each one of the three different liquidity measures, described in
Table 3.6.a, between time 't+1' and time 't-1'. As far as the two conventional in the literature measures of liquidity
creation (i.e. Liquid1’ and ‘Liquid2’) are concerned we report differences in the level of liquidity creation for
both the acquirer and target as well. For brevity purposes numbers in the first column entitled 'M&A activity'
correspond to the exact consolidation activity presented in Table 3.5.a. 'M' stands for millions.
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Table 3.7.b: Greece - Differences among Liquidity measures for each M&A activity
M&A activity dif_catfat (M) dif_liquid1_aquirer dif_liquid2_aquirer dif_liquid1_target dif_liquid2_target
_1 89.01 0.14 15.96 0.08 7.09
_2 126.67 0.03 4.89 0.37 44.52
_3 1690.3 0.07 6.16 0.22 24.75
_4 1057.76 0.01 4.47 0.23 31.92
_5 2836.35 0.04 10.44 -0.08 -7.12
_6 3263.3 0.1 11.14 0.11 13.59
_7 2778.55 0.1 11.14 0.15 18.3
_8 165.1 0.13 9.75 0.09 7.98
_9 6605.95 0.13 13.31 0.02 3.33
_10 1414.45 0.04 8.01 -0.04 -3.66
_11 1678.7 0.04 8.01 -0.21 -14.79
_12 2058.04 0.04 8.01 -0.12 -9.22
_13 664.6 0.05 6.27 0.02 2.02
_14 57.7 -0.05 -24.45 0.03 8.9
_15 2340.75 0.03 1.86 -0.01 -15.47
_16 2035.9 0.04 6 0.09 7.6
_17 6082.15 0.02 1.48 0.13 12.16
_18 69.83 0.03 3.76 0.16 23.16
_19 5819.48 0.02 2.99 0.09 18.23
_20 2831.25 -0.05 -3.94 0.03 2.13
_21 2511.6 -0.05 -3.94 0.05 5.63
_22 306.7 0.07 7.2 0.12 13.81
_23 303.2 0.08 8.97 0.07 9.71
_24 358.35 0.04 2.41 0.04 2.97
Notes: This table reports for each one of the historical Greek bank M&As, the estimated differences with respect
to the liquidity creation level produced among each one of the three different liquidity measures, described in
Table 3.6.b, between time 't+1' and time 't-1'. As far as the two conventional in the literature measures of liquidity
creation (i.e. Liquid1’ and ‘Liquid2’) are concerned we report differences in the level of liquidity creation for
both the acquirer and target as well. For brevity purposes numbers in the first column entitled 'M&A activity'
correspond to the exact consolidation activity presented in Table 3.5.b. 'M' stands for millions.
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Table 3.8.a: UK - Financial Fragility Hypothesis vs. Risk Absorption Hypothesis and Deposit Insurance Hypothesis
All-Acquirers Large-Acquirers Small-Acquirers
dif_catfat Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er.
HHIrev 7 5.1 8.61 5.36 -3.55 -2.71
HHIrev^2 -4.65 -5.03 -5.78 -5.19 2.28 1.96
Uninsured deposits -5.52 -1.11 -6.99 -0.98 -3.43 -0.56 -4.65 -1.15 -2.17 -2.34 -2.41 -2.35
Bank capital -3.19 -1.03 -0.37 -0.27 -5.82 -1.38 -0.12 -0.07 -2.95 -2.73 -2.52 -2
Gdp -0.007 -0.91 -0.003 -1.71 -0.005 -1.02 -0.001 -1.2 -0.004 -0.98 -0.009 -2.74
Public status 0.47 2.49 0.05 0.54 2.34 1.53 0.04 0.48 2.99 1.13 0.61 0.73
Relative size 0.24 5.36 0.32 4.24 0.25 6.05 0.31 5.84 0.19 3.22 0.09 3.03
Intercept 0.8 2.73 2.81 5.58 0.87 2.65 3.34 5.8 0.04 0.16 1.58 1.85
R-squared 0.75 0.81 0.74 0.78 0.55 0.73
Adj R-squared 0.59 0.66 0.58 0.56 0.36 0.52
F value 5.47 6.94 3.72 5.09 2.37 4.46
Observations 75 75 56 56 19 19
Notes: This table presents two sets of results -with and without a risk diversification measure- for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent variable is the
difference between the level of liquidity creation of the 'consolidated' institution and of the 'proforma' institution in time 't+1' and the independent variables are related to the 'acquirer'
institution in time 't-1' for the UK banking sector during our sample period. The model is
					((catfat)/(GTA))i,t+1	-	((catfat)/(GTA))i ,t-1 	=	a0	+	a1((UninsuredDeposits)/(GTA))i,t-1	+	a2((Bankcapital)/(GTA))i,t-1	+	a3Relativesizei,t-1+	a4Publicstatusi,t-1+	a5GDPi,t-1	+	εi,t
and when risk diversification measure is included the model is extended by the following two factors:
																																																																																																																																																a6HHIrev	i,t-1	+	a7HHI^2rev	i,t-1
where ‘catfat’ represents the liquidity measures based on category including both on and off balance sheet activities for the merged banks at t+1 and for the proforma bank at t-1,
uninsured deposits' are the total uninsured deposits of the acquirer bank before the merger and ‘Bankcapital’ is the amount of equity capital of the acquirer bank before the merger.
‘Relativesize’ is the ratio of target and acquirer gross total assets (GTA). ‘Publicstatus’ is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if both acquirers and targets are private and 0 otherwise,
and ‘GDP’ is the real gross domestic product. Herfindahl-Hirschman of revenue ‘HHIrev’ is the diversification measure and we allow for a nonlinear relationship as well. We compute
the diversification measure as follows:
HHIrev =((NON)/(NETOP))²+((NET)/(NETOP))²                         and                      NETOP=NON+NET
where ‘NON’ is non interest income, ‘NET’ is net interest income, and ‘NETOP’ is net operating revenue.  Normalization by GTA is necessary to make both the dependent and
independent variables meaningful and comparable across banks and to avoid giving undue weight to the largest institutions. Reported statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.
Results are reported for all the sample and for only large and small acquirers as well.
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Table 3.8.b: Greece - Financial Fragility Hypothesis vs. Risk Absorption Hypothesis and Deposit Insurance Hypothesis
All-Acquirers Large-Acquirers Small-Acquirers
dif_catfat Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er.
HHIrev -3.56 -3.4 -9.28 -2.55 -2.14 -3.47
HHIrev^2 4.95 3.68 5.71 2.45 19.57 0.6
Uninsured deposits -7.97 -0.09 -4.2 -0.5 -6.51 -0.39 -5.25 -1.52 -3.46 -2.17 5.61 -0.21
Bank capital -2.17 -3.09 -4.55 -5.18 -3.15 -0.86 -8.03 -1.12 -2.01 -1.97 -2.28 -2.19
Gdp -0.001 -0.93 -0.008 -0.69 -0.004 -0.22 -0.003 -0.11 -0.001 -0.64 -0.002 -0.73
Public status 0.43 2.59 0.46 2.11 0.17 3.52 0.64 1.81 0.49 2.34 0.39 1.97
Relative size 0.3 3.02 0.21 2.82 0.27 0.79 0.26 0.86 0.38 1.46 0.12 0.46
Intercept 1.23 1.36 2.59 3.72 0.45 0.49 4.51 1.55 2.57 1.22 3.67 0.73
R-squared 0.76 0.89 0.6 0.78 0.85 0.93
Adj R-squared 0.69 0.84 0.3 0.48 0.7 0.73
F value 10.85 17.47 4.16 3.17 5.66 4.68
Observations 24 24 14 14 10 10
Notes: This table presents two sets of results -with and without a risk diversification measure- for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent variable is the
difference between the level of liquidity creation of the 'consolidated' institution and of the 'proforma' institution in time 't+1' and the independent variables are related to the 'acquirer'
institution in time 't-1' for the Greek banking sector during our sample period. The model is
					((catfat)/(GTA))i,t+1	-	((catfat)/(GTA))i ,t-1 	=	a0	+	a1((UninsuredDeposits)/(GTA))i,t-1	+	a2((Bankcapital)/(GTA))i,t-1	+	a3Relativesizei,t-1+	a4Publicstatusi,t-1+	a5GDPi,t-1	+	εi,t
and when risk diversification measure is included the model is extended by the following two factors:
																																																																																																																																																a6HHIrev	i,t-1	+	a7HHI^2rev	i,t-1
where ‘catfat’ represents the liquidity measures based on category including both on and off balance sheet activities for the merged banks at t+1 and for the proforma bank at t-1,
uninsured deposits' are the total uninsured deposits of the acquirer bank before the merger and ‘Bankcapital’ is the amount of equity capital of the acquirer bank before the merger.
‘Relativesize’ is the ratio of target and acquirer gross total assets (GTA). ‘Publicstatus’ is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if both acquirers and targets are private and 0 otherwise,
and ‘GDP’ is the real gross domestic product. Herfindahl-Hirschman of revenue ‘HHIrev’ is the diversification measure and we allow for a nonlinear relationship as well. We compute
the diversification measure as follows:
HHIrev =((NON)/(NETOP))²+((NET)/(NETOP))²                         and                      NETOP=NON+NET
where ‘NON’ is non interest income, ‘NET’ is net interest income, and ‘NETOP’ is net operating revenue.  Normalization by GTA is necessary to make both the dependent and
independent variables meaningful and comparable across banks and to avoid giving undue weight to the largest institutions. Reported statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.
Results are reported for all the sample and for only large and small acquirers as well.
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Table 3.9.a UK - Financial Fragility Hypothesis vs. Risk Absorption Hypothesis and Deposit Insurance Hypothesis
(Independent variables : 'proforma' institution)
All-Acquirers Large-Acquirers Small-Acquirers
dif_catfat Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er.
HHIrev 1.26 3.86 1.54 4.22 -0.55 -2.14
HHIrev^2 -0.51 -2.17 -0.65 -2.45 0.43 2.22
Uninsured deposits -0.31 -0.08 -1.68 -0.39 -1.09 -0.23 -1.12 -0.23 -7.81 -1.41 -6.99 -0.97
Bank capital -0.46 -0.34 -3.02 -1.45 -0.72 -0.43 -3.71 -1.3 -1.54 -2.69 -0.84 -2.41
Gdp -0.003 -0.56 -0.001 -0.39 -0.007 -0.61 -0.005 -0.78 -0.002 -0.44 -0.001 -0.05
Public status 0.46 0.51 0.88 0.27 0.44 0.16 0.86 0.99 0.71 0.34 0.82 0.35
Relative size 0.24 4.74 0.22 6.94 0.24 5.11 0.22 5.36 0 3.01 0.12 3.28
Intercept 0.59 2.15 1.44 3.77 0.59 1.95 1.54 3.8 0.05 0.21 0.21 0.42
R-squared 0.78 0.83 0.75 0.87 0.57 0.68
Adj R-squared 0.6 0.74 0.67 0.75 0.44 0.45
F value 3.56 4.89 7.43 3.39 3.33 2.34
Observations 75 75 56 56 19 19
Notes: This table presents two sets of results -with and without a risk diversification measure- for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent variable is the
difference between the level of liquidity creation of the 'consolidated' institution and of the 'proforma' institution in time 't+1' and the independent variables are related to the 'proforma'
institution in time 't-1' for the UK banking sector during our sample period. The model is
					((catfat)/(GTA))i,t+1	-	((catfat)/(GTA))i ,t-1 	=	a0	+	a1((UninsuredDeposits)/(GTA))i,t-1	+	a2((Bankcapital)/(GTA))i,t-1	+	a3Relativesizei,t-1+	a4Publicstatusi,t-1+	a5GDPi,t-1	+	εi,t
and when risk diversification measure is included the model is extended by the following two factors:
																																																																																																																																																a6HHIrev	i,t-1	+	a7HHI^2rev	i,t-1
where ‘catfat’ represents the liquidity measures based on category including both on and off balance sheet activities for the merged banks at t+1 and for the proforma bank at t-1,
uninsured deposits' are the total uninsured deposits of the acquirer bank before the merger and ‘Bankcapital’ is the amount of equity capital of the acquirer bank before the merger.
‘Relativesize’ is the ratio of target and acquirer gross total assets (GTA). ‘Publicstatus’ is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if both acquirers and targets are private and 0 otherwise,
and ‘GDP’ is the real gross domestic product. Herfindahl-Hirschman of revenue ‘HHIrev’ is the diversification measure and we allow for a nonlinear relationship as well. We compute
the diversification measure as follows:
HHIrev =((NON)/(NETOP))²+((NET)/(NETOP))²                         and                      NETOP=NON+NET
where ‘NON’ is non interest income, ‘NET’ is net interest income, and ‘NETOP’ is net operating revenue.  Normalization by GTA is necessary to make both the dependent and
independent variables meaningful and comparable across banks and to avoid giving undue weight to the largest institutions. Reported statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.
Results are reported for all the sample and for only large and small acquirers as well.
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Table 3.9.b Greece - Financial Fragility Hypothesis vs. Risk Absorption Hypothesis and Deposit Insurance Hypothesis
(Independent variables : 'proforma' institution)
All-Acquirers Large-Acquirers Small-Acquirers
dif_catfat Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er.
HHIrev -2.26 -3.75 -0.86 -1.97 -2.52 -1.59
HHIrev^2 2.54 3.64 0.62 3.29 0.94 0.84
Uninsured deposits -1.9 -0.14 -8.64 -0.68 -3.64 -1.56 -3.63 -1.36 -0.48 -3.02 -4.59 -3.63
Bank capital -1.34 -3.35 -2.73 -2.5 -1.39 -1.52 -0.62 -0.67 -1.4 -3.65 -6.5 -4.66
Gdp -0.002 -0.06 -0.007 -0.39 -0.001 -1.61 -0.006 -1.21 -0.003 -0.18 -0.004 -1.33
Public status 0.28 2.87 0.46 2.38 0.01 2.37 0.04 2.21 0.38 2.74 0.88 2.47
Relative size 0.43 4.15 0.46 2.74 0.98 1.61 0.84 1.57 0.39 3.26 0.49 5.08
Intercept 0.35 0.31 0.74 0.01 2.56 1.64 1.52 0.99 1.24 0.48 3.62 4.91
R-squared 0.65 0.74 0.68 0.62 0.69 0.79
Adj R-squared 0.55 0.63 0.43 0.42 0.45 0.57
F value 6.59 6.48 3.79 3.42 2.83 4.55
Observations 24 24 14 14 10 10
Notes: This table presents two sets of results -with and without a risk diversification measure- for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent variable is the
difference between the level of liquidity creation of the 'consolidated' institution and of the 'proforma' institution in time 't+1' and the independent variables are related to the 'proforma'
institution in time 't-1' for the Greek banking sector during our sample period. The model is
					((catfat)/(GTA))i,t+1	-	((catfat)/(GTA))i ,t-1 	=	a0	+	a1((UninsuredDeposits)/(GTA))i,t-1	+	a2((Bankcapital)/(GTA))i,t-1	+	a3Relativesizei,t-1+	a4Publicstatusi,t-1+	a5GDPi,t-1	+	εi,t
and when risk diversification measure is included the model is extended by the following two factors:
																																																																																																																																																a6HHIrev	i,t-1	+	a7HHI^2rev	i,t-1
where ‘catfat’ represents the liquidity measures based on category including both on and off balance sheet activities for the merged banks at t+1 and for the proforma bank at t-1,
uninsured deposits' are the total uninsured deposits of the acquirer bank before the merger and ‘Bankcapital’ is the amount of equity capital of the acquirer bank before the merger.
‘Relativesize’ is the ratio of target and acquirer gross total assets (GTA). ‘Publicstatus’ is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if both acquirers and targets are private and 0 otherwise,
and ‘GDP’ is the real gross domestic product. Herfindahl-Hirschman of revenue ‘HHIrev’ is the diversification measure and we allow for a nonlinear relationship as well. We compute
the diversification measure as follows:
HHIrev =((NON)/(NETOP))²+((NET)/(NETOP))²                         and                      NETOP=NON+NET
where ‘NON’ is non interest income, ‘NET’ is net interest income, and ‘NETOP’ is net operating revenue.  Normalization by GTA is necessary to make both the dependent and
independent variables meaningful and comparable across banks and to avoid giving undue weight to the largest institutions. Reported statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.
Results are reported for all the sample and for only large and small acquirers as well.
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Table 3.10.a UK - Financial Fragility Hypothesis vs. Risk Absorption Hypothesis and Deposit Insurance Hypothesis
(Dependent variable: without equity capital)
All-Acquirers Large-Acquirers Small-Acquirers
dif_catfat Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er.
HHIrev 7.19 5.11 8.8 5.34 -4.25 -2.06
HHIrev^2 -4.77 -5.03 -5.91 -5.17 2.69 2.09
Uninsured deposits -5.8 -1.12 -5.27 -1.02 -3.47 -0.55 -6.81 -1.13 -2.83 -2.42 -2.41 -2.29
Bank capital -3.31 -1.03 -0.36 -0.25 -6.1 -1.4 -0.16 -0.09 -2.75 -3.54 -2.53 -2.13
Gdp -0.002 -0.97 -0.004 -1.05 -0.009 -1.09 -0.001 -1.38 -0.005 -0.8 -0.007 -2.45
Public status 0.49 1.51 0.05 0.58 0.41 1.44 0.05 0.5 0.71 1.24 0.1 0.64
Relative size 0.24 5.2 0.32 4.34 0.25 6.93 0.32 5.93 0.32 3.35 0.13 3.39
Intercept 0.85 2.79 2.9 5.62 0.93 2.72 3.44 5.82 0.03 0.12 1.85 2.07
R-squared 0.79 0.86 0.72 0.77 0.53 0.72
Adj R-squared 0.62 0.76 0.57 0.57 0.36 0.49
F value 4.42 4.84 3.84 3.51 3.13 3.99
Observations 75 75 56 56 19 19
Notes: This table presents two sets of results -with and without a risk diversification measure- for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent variable is the
difference between the level of liquidity creation of the 'consolidated' institution and of the 'proforma' institution in time 't+1' and the independent variables are related to the 'acquirer'
institution in time 't-1' for the UK banking sector during our sample period. Note, that equity capital has been excluded from the calculation of the dependent variable. The model is
					((catfat)/(GTA))i,t+1	-	((catfat)/(GTA))i ,t-1 	=	a0	+	a1((UninsuredDeposits)/(GTA))i,t-1	+	a2((Bankcapital)/(GTA))i,t-1	+	a3Relativesizei,t-1+	a4Publicstatusi,t-1+	a5GDPi,t-1	+	εi,t
and when risk diversification measure is included the model is extended by the following two factors:
																																																																																																																																																a6HHIrev	i,t-1	+	a7HHI^2rev	i,t-1
where ‘catfat’ represents the liquidity measures based on category including both on and off balance sheet activities for the merged banks at t+1 and for the proforma bank at t-1,
uninsured deposits' are the total uninsured deposits of the acquirer bank before the merger and ‘Bankcapital’ is the amount of equity capital of the acquirer bank before the merger.
‘Relativesize’ is the ratio of target and acquirer gross total assets (GTA). ‘Publicstatus’ is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if both acquirers and targets are private and 0 otherwise,
and ‘GDP’ is the real gross domestic product. Herfindahl-Hirschman of revenue ‘HHIrev’ is the diversification measure and we allow for a nonlinear relationship as well. We compute
the diversification measure as follows:
HHIrev =((NON)/(NETOP))²+((NET)/(NETOP))²                         and                      NETOP=NON+NET
where ‘NON’ is non interest income, ‘NET’ is net interest income, and ‘NETOP’ is net operating revenue.  Normalization by GTA is necessary to make both the dependent and
independent variables meaningful and comparable across banks and to avoid giving undue weight to the largest institutions. Reported statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.
Results are reported for all the sample and for only large and small acquirers as well.
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Table 3.10.b Greece - Financial Fragility Hypothesis vs. Risk Absorption Hypothesis and Deposit Insurance Hypothesis
(Dependent variable: without equity capital)
All-Acquirers Large-Acquirers Small-Acquirers
dif_catfat Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er.
HHIrev -4.17 -2.63 -3.45 -4.98 -5.61 -0.53
HHIrev^2 4.91 1.86 3.04 5.05 3.74 0.5
Uninsured deposits -5.44 -0.7 -5.3 -0.67 -3.54 -0.43 -4.73 -0.95 -7.33 -2.14 -9.9 -2.65
Bank capital -1.28 -2.45 -3.99 -4.21 -14.3 -0.31 -1.22 -1.05 -0.7 -3.15 -0.38 -2.8
Gdp -0.004 -1.43 -0.009 -1.37 -0.001 -1.12 -0.003 -2.87 -0.007 -0.95 -0.004 -0.03
Public status 4.47 2.87 4.95 2.81 3.69 2.74 7.96 3.26 4.89 3.21 3.74 2.94
Relative size 0.96 1.94 1.21 2 0.72 0.16 3.19 1.55 0 0.11 0 0.03
Intercept 1.29 0.25 1.28 0.67 2.21 0.61 2.29 4.94 0.51 1.46 2.05 0.68
R-squared 0.46 0.71 0.43 0.92 0.78 0.82
Adj R-squared 0.3 0.29 0.22 0.52 0.57 0.38
F value 2.9 2.26 2.36 9.35 3.63 7.52
Observations 24 24 14 14 10 10
Notes: This table presents two sets of results -with and without a risk diversification measure- for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent variable is the
difference between the level of liquidity creation of the 'consolidated' institution and of the 'proforma' institution in time 't+1' and the independent variables are related to the 'acquirer'
institution in time 't-1' for the Greek banking sector during our sample period. Note, that equity capital has been excluded from the calculation of the dependent variable. The model is
					((catfat)/(GTA))i,t+1	-	((catfat)/(GTA))i ,t-1 	=	a0	+	a1((UninsuredDeposits)/(GTA))i,t-1	+	a2((Bankcapital)/(GTA))i,t-1	+	a3Relativesizei,t-1+	a4Publicstatusi,t-1+	a5GDPi,t-1	+	εi,t
and when risk diversification measure is included the model is extended by the following two factors:
																																																																																																																																																a6HHIrev	i,t-1	+	a7HHI^2rev	i,t-1
where ‘catfat’ represents the liquidity measures based on category including both on and off balance sheet activities for the merged banks at t+1 and for the proforma bank at t-1,
uninsured deposits' are the total uninsured deposits of the acquirer bank before the merger and ‘Bankcapital’ is the amount of equity capital of the acquirer bank before the merger.
‘Relativesize’ is the ratio of target and acquirer gross total assets (GTA). ‘Publicstatus’ is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if both acquirers and targets are private and 0 otherwise,
and ‘GDP’ is the real gross domestic product. Herfindahl-Hirschman of revenue ‘HHIrev’ is the diversification measure and we allow for a nonlinear relationship as well. We compute
the diversification measure as follows:
HHIrev =((NON)/(NETOP))²+((NET)/(NETOP))²                         and                      NETOP=NON+NET
where ‘NON’ is non interest income, ‘NET’ is net interest income, and ‘NETOP’ is net operating revenue.  Normalization by GTA is necessary to make both the dependent and
independent variables meaningful and comparable across banks and to avoid giving undue weight to the largest institutions. Reported statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.
Results are reported for all the sample and for only large and small acquirers as well.
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Table 3.11.a: UK - Financial Fragility Hypothesis vs. Risk Absorption Hypothesis and Deposit Insurance Hypothesis (Dependent variable: without
equity capital & Independent variables:  'proforma' institution)
All-Acquirers Large-Acquirers Small-Acquirers
dif_catfat Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er.
HHIrev 1.32 3.89 1.6 4.24 -0.46 -2.39
HHIrev^2 -0.54 -2.2 -0.68 -2.47 0.37 2.98
Uninsured deposits -0.39 -0.09 -1.83 -0.41 1.15 -0.23 -1.19 -0.23 -8.06 -1.64 -7.59 -1.01
Bank capital -0.45 -0.31 -3.11 -1.04 -0.73 -0.42 -3.84 -1.09 -1.75 -2.16 -0.25 -3.12
Gdp -0.005 -0.61 -0.009 -0.44 -0.001 -0.66 -0.002 -0.84 -0.007 -0.82 -0.004 -0.49
Public status 0.48 0.54 0.93 1.35 0.46 0.39 0.92 1.06 0.33 0.77 0.57 0.93
Relative size 0.24 5.85 0.22 6.78 0.24 6.96 0.22 5.22 0.21 3.14 0.09 3.9
Intercept 0.64 2.22 1.53 3.86 0.63 2.02 1.63 3.88 0.01 0.05 0.14 0.26
R-squared 0.78 0.85 0.73 0.87 0.56 0.66
Adj R-squared 0.66 0.73 0.61 0.75 0.43 0.45
F value 4.51 4.17 3.57 4.67 2.91 2.1
Observations 75 75 56 56 19 19
Notes: This table presents two sets of results -with and without a risk diversification measure- for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent variable is the
difference between the level of liquidity creation of the 'consolidated' institution and of the 'proforma' institution in time 't+1' and the independent variables are related to the 'proforma'
institution in time 't-1' for the UK banking sector during our sample period. Note, that equity capital has been excluded from the calculation of the dependent variable. The model is
					((catfat)/(GTA))i,t+1	-	((catfat)/(GTA))i ,t-1 	=	a0	+	a1((UninsuredDeposits)/(GTA))i,t-1	+	a2((Bankcapital)/(GTA))i,t-1	+	a3Relativesizei,t-1+	a4Publicstatusi,t-1+	a5GDPi,t-1	+	εi,t
and when risk diversification measure is included the model is extended by the following two factors:
																																																																																																																																																a6HHIrev	i,t-1	+	a7HHI^2rev	i,t-1
where ‘catfat’ represents the liquidity measures based on category including both on and off balance sheet activities for the merged banks at t+1 and for the proforma bank at t-1,
uninsured deposits' are the total uninsured deposits of the acquirer bank before the merger and ‘Bankcapital’ is the amount of equity capital of the acquirer bank before the merger.
‘Relativesize’ is the ratio of target and acquirer gross total assets (GTA). ‘Publicstatus’ is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if both acquirers and targets are private and 0 otherwise,
and ‘GDP’ is the real gross domestic product. Herfindahl-Hirschman of revenue ‘HHIrev’ is the diversification measure and we allow for a nonlinear relationship as well. We compute
the diversification measure as follows:
HHIrev =((NON)/(NETOP))²+((NET)/(NETOP))²                         and                      NETOP=NON+NET
where ‘NON’ is non interest income, ‘NET’ is net interest income, and ‘NETOP’ is net operating revenue.  Normalization by GTA is necessary to make both the dependent and
independent variables meaningful and comparable across banks and to avoid giving undue weight to the largest institutions. Reported statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.
Results are reported for all the sample and for only large and small acquirers as well.
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Table 3.11.b: Greece - Financial Fragility Hypothesis vs. Risk Absorption Hypothesis and Deposit Insurance Hypothesis (Dependent variable: without
equity capital & Independent variables:  'proforma' institution)
All-Acquirers Large-Acquirers Small-Acquirers
dif_catfat Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er. Coefficient b/St.Er.
HHIrev -3.1 -5.08 -8.3 -2.06 1.93 1.24
HHIrev^2 3.09 2.44 14 3.52 1.56 1.13
Uninsured deposits -1.96 -0.21 -3.02 -0.12 -1.05 -0.04 -2.09 -0.83 -2.48 -3.64 -1.62 -2.64
Bank capital -1.51 -2.99 -3.53 -3.81 -3.69 -0.76 -7.4 -0.97 -1.4 -3.86 -1.67 -2.98
Gdp -0.003 -1.17 -0.006 -0.67 -0.004 -0.49 -0.001 -0.15 -0.008 -0.1 -0.006 -0.7
Public status 4.92 3.61 2.79 2.08 4.91 1.88 0.67 2.39 2.5 2.61 1.43 2.17
Relative size 0.96 2.16 0.96 2.53 0.31 0.4 3.49 0.84 0.36 2.27 0.17 3.45
Intercept 0.47 0.1 0.91 0.02 7 0.33 4.1 0.32 0.25 0.22 0.02 0.02
R-squared 0.55 0.72 0.52 0.89 0.57 0.8
Adj R-squared 0.33 0.6 0.22 0.77 0.35 0.41
F value 4.42 5.85 1.75 7.18 1.46 2.05
Observations 24 24 14 14 10 10
Notes: This table presents two sets of results -with and without a risk diversification measure- for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent variable is the
difference between the level of liquidity creation of the 'consolidated' institution and of the 'proforma' institution in time 't+1' and the independent variables are related to the 'proforma'
institution in time 't-1' for the Greek banking sector during our sample period. Note, that equity capital has been excluded from the calculation of the dependent variable. The model is
					((catfat)/(GTA))i,t+1	-	((catfat)/(GTA))i ,t-1 	=	a0	+	a1((UninsuredDeposits)/(GTA))i,t-1	+	a2((Bankcapital)/(GTA))i,t-1	+	a3Relativesizei,t-1+	a4Publicstatusi,t-1+	a5GDPi,t-1	+	εi,t
and when risk diversification measure is included the model is extended by the following two factors:
																																																																																																																																																a6HHIrev	i,t-1	+	a7HHI^2rev	i,t-1
where ‘catfat’ represents the liquidity measures based on category including both on and off balance sheet activities for the merged banks at t+1 and for the proforma bank at t-1,
uninsured deposits' are the total uninsured deposits of the acquirer bank before the merger and ‘Bankcapital’ is the amount of equity capital of the acquirer bank before the merger.
‘Relativesize’ is the ratio of target and acquirer gross total assets (GTA). ‘Publicstatus’ is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if both acquirers and targets are private and 0 otherwise,
and ‘GDP’ is the real gross domestic product. Herfindahl-Hirschman of revenue ‘HHIrev’ is the diversification measure and we allow for a nonlinear relationship as well. We compute
the diversification measure as follows:
HHIrev =((NON)/(NETOP))²+((NET)/(NETOP))²                         and                      NETOP=NON+NET
where ‘NON’ is non interest income, ‘NET’ is net interest income, and ‘NETOP’ is net operating revenue.  Normalization by GTA is necessary to make both the dependent and
independent variables meaningful and comparable across banks and to avoid giving undue weight to the largest institutions. Reported statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.
Results are reported for all the sample and for only large and small acquirers as well.
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Tables 3.12.a: UK - Prospective M&As scenarios
Financial Institution 1 Financial Institution 2 Financial Institution 3 Difference of Cost Efficiency/Liquidity Creation (M)
 Up to 2006 Up to 2011
_1 Barclays Bank Plc Co-operative Bank Plc (The) 4489.43 -2897.36
_2 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc 9767.44 3858.81
_3 Barclays Bank Plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc 8640.53 4510.99
_4 Barclays Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 6032.48 2810.99
_5 Barclays Bank Plc Sainsbury's Bank plc 1413.19 306.462
_6 Barclays Bank Plc Santander UK Plc 2399.94 1086.42
_7 Barclays Bank Plc Standard Chartered Bank 3875.88 1288.35
_8 Barclays Bank Plc UBS 788.688 246.899
_9 Barclays Bank Plc AIB 1987.56 680.552
_10 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) HSBC Bank plc 3354.17 -1204.2
_11 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Lloyds TSB Bank Plc 2688.32 -972.787
_12 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 2974.84 -2228.15
_13 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Sainsbury's Bank plc 210.916 -703.142
_14 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Santander UK Plc 798.14 -1665.48
_15 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Standard Chartered Bank 1002.48 -1736.16
_16 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) UBS -388.955 -151.231
_17 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) AIB 534.937 -380.029
_18 HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc 7622.83 8947.36
_19 HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 4519.4 5305.89
_20 HSBC Bank plc Sainsbury's Bank plc 928.56 1538.46
_21 HSBC Bank plc Santander UK Plc 1648.25 2688.35
_22 HSBC Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 2040.59 2525.1
_23 HSBC Bank plc UBS 670.194 890.585
_24 HSBC Bank plc AIB 1251.24 2194.57
_25 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 3448.98 5904.31
_26 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Sainsbury's Bank plc 679.143 1979.13
_27 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Santander UK Plc 1488.67 4151.29
_28 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Standard Chartered Bank 2373.58 3581.86
_29 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc UBS 304.711 1128.65
_30 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc AIB 1049.53 2676.09
_31 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Sainsbury's Bank plc 575.89 962.167
_32 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Santander UK Plc 932.95 1682.41
_33 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Standard Chartered Bank 1392.81 1876.89
_34 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) UBS 335.595 811.697
_35 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) AIB 607.799 1504.32
_36 Sainsbury's Bank plc Santander UK Plc 1210.39 812.974
_37 Sainsbury's Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 1353.42 729.122
_38 Sainsbury's Bank plc UBS 66.1156 -1697.53
_39 Sainsbury's Bank plc AIB 489.587 -491.981
_40 Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 1906.92 2352.21
_41 Santander UK Plc UBS 398.14 747.14
_42 Santander UK Plc AIB 874.72 1065.39
_43 Standard Chartered Bank UBS 449.905 658.43
_44 Standard Chartered Bank AIB 943.76 972.761
_45 UBS AIB 223.02 -525.764
_46 Barclays Bank Plc Co-operative Bank Plc (The) HSBC Bank plc 10755.7 1735.81
_47 Barclays Bank Plc Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Lloyds TSB Bank Plc 9128.09 1363.27
_48 Barclays Bank Plc Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 8694.68 2061.47
_49 Barclays Bank Plc Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Sainsbury's Bank plc 1458.5 -1881.29
_50 Barclays Bank Plc Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Santander UK Plc 6589.49 313.061
_51 Barclays Bank Plc Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Standard Chartered Bank 7926.39 -138.809
_52 Barclays Bank Plc Co-operative Bank Plc (The) UBS 1241.62 -1365.9
_53 Barclays Bank Plc Co-operative Bank Plc (The) AIB 3312.04 133.245
_54 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc 14487 6066.36
                 (Continued)
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Tables 3.12.a: UK - Prospective M&As scenarios (Continued)
Financial Institution 1 Financial Institution 2 Financial Institution 3 Difference of Cost Efficiency/Liquidity Creation (M)
 Up to 2006 Up to 2011
_55 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 13889.6 5399.84
_56 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc Sainsbury's Bank plc 5395.02 3168.77
_57 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc Santander UK Plc 7640.29 3458.49
_58 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 7771.57 2462.4
_59 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc UBS 4463.95 1892.12
_60 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc AIB 6442.57 3168.77
_61 Barclays Bank Plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 12022.5 5643.92
_62 Barclays Bank Plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Sainsbury's Bank plc 3688.08 3533.77
_63 Barclays Bank Plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Santander UK Plc 5514.17 4179.5
_64 Barclays Bank Plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Standard Chartered Bank 6640.01 3859.79
_65 Barclays Bank Plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc UBS 3294.08 1825.4
_66 Barclays Bank Plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc AIB 4924.96 3308.26
_67 Barclays Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Sainsbury's Bank plc 3905.06 2756.49
_68 Barclays Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Santander UK Plc 5915.75 3696.34
_69 Barclays Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Standard Chartered Bank 7199.44 3074.8
_70 Barclays Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) UBS 3845.07 1194.52
_71 Barclays Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) AIB 5298.52 2488.63
_72 Barclays Bank Plc Sainsbury's Bank plc Santander UK Plc 3760.38 2393.21
_73 Barclays Bank Plc Sainsbury's Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 5176.18 1726.22
_74 Barclays Bank Plc Sainsbury's Bank plc UBS 535.716 -187.887
_75 Barclays Bank Plc Sainsbury's Bank plc AIB 1383.2 271.778
_76 Barclays Bank Plc Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 4739.11 2819.03
_77 Barclays Bank Plc Santander UK Plc UBS 1737.91 784.841
_78 Barclays Bank Plc Santander UK Plc AIB 3139.92 1927.01
_79 Barclays Bank Plc Standard Chartered Bank UBS 1911.36 316.574
_80 Barclays Bank Plc Standard Chartered Bank AIB 3772.46 1541.59
_81 Barclays Bank Plc UBS AIB 894.004 -76.4034
_82 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc 4218.97 2298.03
_83 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 3403.62 2215.82
_84 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) HSBC Bank plc Sainsbury's Bank plc 1556.14 960.839
_85 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) HSBC Bank plc Santander UK Plc 2636.53 1371.35
_86 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) HSBC Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 3109.29 1011.65
_87 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) HSBC Bank plc UBS 1148.47 782.498
_88 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) HSBC Bank plc AIB 1770.83 716.654
_89 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 3023.1 1918.9
_90 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Sainsbury's Bank plc 1188.84 1022.23
_91 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Santander UK Plc 2294.87 1798.92
_92 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Standard Chartered Bank 2553.02 1476.07
_93 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Lloyds TSB Bank Plc UBS 911.601 838.31
_94 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Lloyds TSB Bank Plc AIB 1322.41 798.473
_95 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Sainsbury's Bank plc 1425.94 944.873
_96 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Santander UK Plc 2557.93 1341.39
_97 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Standard Chartered Bank 2744.84 1181.48
_98 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) UBS 1170.84 728.67
_99 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) AIB 2160.23 528.185
_100 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Sainsbury's Bank plc Santander UK Plc 1289.88 761.46
_101 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Sainsbury's Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 1424.26 900.771
_102 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Sainsbury's Bank plc UBS 69.071 -414.719
_103 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Sainsbury's Bank plc AIB 309.21 -557.194
_104 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 2359.65 1793.04
_105 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Santander UK Plc UBS 1195.48 786.89
_106 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Santander UK Plc AIB 1436.98 364.97
_107 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Standard Chartered Bank UBS 1482.21 604.963
_108 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Standard Chartered Bank AIB 1742.75 303.095
                 (Continued)
250
Tables 3.12.a: UK - Prospective M&As scenarios (Continued)
Financial Institution 1 Financial Institution 2 Financial Institution 3 Difference of Cost Efficiency/Liquidity Creation (M)
 Up to 2006 Up to 2011
_109 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) UBS AIB 625.16 -278.14
_110 HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 10049 7226.36
_111 HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Sainsbury's Bank plc 2699.46 3910.95
_112 HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Santander UK Plc 5058.07 4724.22
_113 HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Standard Chartered Bank 5718.21 4218.66
_114 HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc UBS 2335.89 2189.53
_115 HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc AIB 4348.78 3897.12
_116 HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Sainsbury's Bank plc 3654.9 3128.26
_117 HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Santander UK Plc 5007.49 4311.93
_118 HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Standard Chartered Bank 6697.58 3859.04
_119 HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) UBS 3513.4 2773.76
_120 HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) AIB 4087.2 2964.71
_121 HSBC Bank plc Sainsbury's Bank plc Santander UK Plc 3155.89 2608.03
_122 HSBC Bank plc Sainsbury's Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 4537.68 2110.25
_123 HSBC Bank plc Sainsbury's Bank plc UBS 415.052 107.967
_124 HSBC Bank plc Sainsbury's Bank plc AIB 1016.56 575.634
_125 HSBC Bank plc Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 4144.9 3546.13
_126 HSBC Bank plc Santander UK Plc UBS 1394.55 962.884
_127 HSBC Bank plc Santander UK Plc AIB 2748.84 2111.07
_128 HSBC Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank UBS 1446.43 822.731
_129 HSBC Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank AIB 3177 2214.5
_130 HSBC Bank plc UBS AIB 559.517 356.134
_131 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Sainsbury's Bank plc 3407.75 3222.34
_132 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Santander UK Plc 4788.58 4536.75
_133 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Standard Chartered Bank 5768.96 4752.82
_134 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) UBS 3195.71 2939.58
_135 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) AIB 3739.37 3400.01
_136 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Sainsbury's Bank plc Santander UK Plc 2947.96 2715.75
_137 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Sainsbury's Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 3662.47 3236.15
_138 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Sainsbury's Bank plc UBS 275.4 189.244
_139 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Sainsbury's Bank plc AIB 894.713 724.48
_140 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 3477.41 4204.75
_141 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Santander UK Plc UBS 1197.87 1094.78
_142 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Santander UK Plc AIB 2397.17 2224.87
_143 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Standard Chartered Bank UBS 1215.01 976.8
_144 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Standard Chartered Bank AIB 3059.93 2802.64
_145 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc UBS AIB 415.46 389.825
_146 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Sainsbury's Bank plc Santander UK Plc 2935.68 2549.27
_147 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Sainsbury's Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 3928.58 2709.86
_148 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Sainsbury's Bank plc UBS 369.371 88.5841
_149 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Sainsbury's Bank plc AIB 925.047 669.768
_150 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 3904.5 3928.81
_151 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Santander UK Plc UBS 1116.99 824.157
_152 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Santander UK Plc AIB 2422.71 2073.36
_153 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Standard Chartered Bank UBS 1337.91 791.517
_154 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Standard Chartered Bank AIB 3203.31 2579.35
_155 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) UBS AIB 914.273 236.796
_156 Sainsbury's Bank plc Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 1298.22 1010.26
_157 Sainsbury's Bank plc Santander UK Plc UBS 664.17 500.88
_158 Sainsbury's Bank plc Santander UK Plc AIB 998.74 688.12
_159 Sainsbury's Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank UBS 748.78 414.789
_160 Sainsbury's Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank AIB 1245.98 550.14
_161 Sainsbury's Bank plc UBS AIB 538.313 -190.811
                 (Continued)
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Tables 3.12.a: UK - Prospective M&As scenarios (Continued)
Financial Institution 1 Financial Institution 2 Financial Institution 3 Difference of Cost Efficiency/Liquidity Creation (M)
 Up to 2006 Up to 2011
_162 Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank UBS 1232.15 972.024
_163 Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank AIB 2824.41 2070.4
_164 Santander UK Plc UBS AIB 603.48 300.787
_165 Standard Chartered Bank UBS AIB 701.66 198.49
Notes: This tables presents for each prospective M&A scenario in the UK banking sector, the difference in the estimated level of cost efficiency associated with the level of liquidity
creation 'between the potentially ''consolidated' institution and of the 'proforma' institution both in 2006 (i.e. pre crisis scenario) and in 2011 (i.e. post crisis scenario). 'M' stands for
millions. The level of of liquidity creation is computed by the model described in table 3.8.a, whereas the level of cost efficiency is estimated by the following model:
                                                                                                                                                              lnTC,it=lnC(y{it},w{it},T,E{it} ;β)+u{it}+v{it}
where subscripts i=1,....N  stand for each financial institution (i.e. each M&A activity), T=.year1,year2...,final-year, and indicates a time trend and is included in each specification to
allow for technological change, using both linear and quadratic (i.e. T and T²) respectively. TC_{it} is individual bank total cost; y_{it} and w_{it} indicate vectors of output and input
prices; we specify equity (E) as a quasi-fixed input to control for differences in risk preferences, which may arise due to regulation, financial distress, or informational asymmetries; β is
a vector of parameters to be estimated. The two-sided random error term v_{it} is assumed to be independent of the non-negative cost efficiency variable u_{it} and is assumed to follow
a symmetric normal distribution around the frontier and ui, accounts for the firm's inefficiency and is assumed to follow a half-normal distribution.
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Tables 3.12.b: Greece - Recent & Prospective M&As scenarios
Financial Institutions Difference of Cost Efficiency/Liquidity Creation (M)
Exist  Up to 2006 Up to 2011
_1 ALPHA-EMPORIKI 4536.91 1395.63
_2 ETHNIKI-FBB 3048.13 2610.53
_3 ETHNIKI-PROBANK 3564.84 3290.63
_4 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK 7648.84 4070.01
_5 PIRAEUS-ATE 4329.05 -1786.36
_6 PIRAEUS-GENIKI 3581.85 -1371.03
_7 PIRAEUS-MARFIN_EGNATIA 3143.06 1506.42
_8 PIRAEUS-MILLENIUM 2246.28 746.06
_9 PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI 3267.81 -1789.74
_10 PIRAEUS-ATE-MARFIN_EGANTIA 2877.77 -814.13
_11 PIRAEUS-ATE-MILLENIUM 2029.82 1280.5
_12 PIRAEUS-GENIKI-MARFIN_EGNATIA 2663.83 -587.52
_13 PIRAEUS-GENIKI-MILLENIUM 1480.23 418.15
_14 PIRAEUS-MARFIN_EGANTIA-MILLENIUM 1082.37 1155.13
_15 PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI-MARFIN_EGANTIA 1820.57 -441.66
_16 PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI-MILLENIUM 1363.2 -1549.08
_17 PIRAEUS-GENIKI-MARFIN_EGANATIA-MILLENIUM 851.44 -199.96
_18 PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM 445.36 -617.14
_19 EUROBANK_PROTON 1609.42 -1014.34
_20 EUROBANK_TT_HELLENIC 2283.55 1873.8
_21 EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC 4086.79 -473.38
Could Exist
_22 ALPHA-ATTICA 3734.16 1878.05
_23 ALPHA-AEGEAN 1528.02 1665.81
_24 ALPHA-PANELLINIA 1525.16 1084.44
_25 ALPHA-PANCREATAN 2221.55 1792.08
_26 ETHNIKI-ATTICA 7991.02 2907.92
_27 ETHNIKI-AEGEAN 4133.74 4394.21
_28 ETHNIKI-PANELLINIA 3950.47 2950.33
_29 ETHNIKI-PANCREATAN 4796.59 4097.23
_30 PIRAEUS-ATTICA 3420.91 1448.64
_31 PIRAEUS-AEGEAN 2252.81 2276.18
_32 PIRAEUS-PANELLINIA 1636.99 1563.83
_33 PIREAUS-PANCREATAN 2813.28 2463.36
_34 EUROBANK-ATTICA 3215.15 1575.06
_35 EUROBANK-AEGEAN 1658.64 1720.31
_36 EUROBANK-PANELLINIA 1369.44 1019.9
_37 EUROBANK-PANCRETAN 1904.32 1525.53
Potential
_38 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-ATTICA 4314.91 -1427.84
_39 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN 2601.49 2425.53
_40 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-PANELLINIA 2121.12 1662.8
_41 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-PANCRETAN 2961.47 2372.92
_42 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-ATTICA-AEGEAN 3360.72 -2110.76
_43 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-ATTICA-PANELLINIA 2795.48 -1580.62
_44 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-ATTICA-PANCRETAN 3847.96 -2175.7
_45 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA 2355.8 1894.45
_46 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 2820.8 2706.03
_47 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 2210.56 -790.98
_48 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA 1912.35 -1856.47
_49 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 2749.02 -1659.72
_50 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-ATTICA-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 1753.17 -2337.69
                     (Continued)
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Tables 3.12.b: Greece - Recent & Prospective M&As scenarios (Continued)
Financial Institutions Difference of Cost Efficiency/Liquidity Creation (M)
Potential  Up to 2006 Up to 2011
_51 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 2281.07 -1185.95
_52 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 1310.17 -2740.43
_53 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-ATTICA 10080.73 -3249.13
_54 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN 6667.93 2793.67
_55 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-PANELLINIA 6079.13 -2594.83
_56 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-PANCRETAN 8238.43 2361.83
_57 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-ATTICA-AEGEAN 7776.37 -2199.33
_58 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-ATTICA-PANELLINIA 5576.37 -3399.33
_59 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-ATTICA-PANCRETAN 7424.69 -2273.31
_60 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA 5849.55 1299.73
_61 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 5760.45 1943.1
_62 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 4314.75 1119.21
_63 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA 2846.91 -2442.49
_64 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 3389.78 -1592.54
_65 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-ATTICA-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 2432.52 -2792.54
_66 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 2016.02 -691.78
_67 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 1876.07 -1494.82
_68 PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-ATTICA 290.11 -1121.52
_69 PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-AEGEAN 75.41 -210.52
_70 PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-PANELLINIA -150.75 -864.81
_71 PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-PANCRETAN 388.77 -469.67
_72 PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-ATTICA-AEGEAN 247.85 -590.82
_73 PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-ATTICA-PANELLINIA 73.36 -1719.65
_74 PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-ATTICA-PANCRETAN 123.97 -972.19
_75 PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA 9.86 78.21
_76 PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 27.2 471.41
_77 PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 54.5 -7154.69
_78 PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA 26.78 -976.48
_79 PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 82.6 -798.21
_80 PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-ATTICA-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 86.17 -1194.72
_81 PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 6.42 -583.74
_82 PIRAEUS-ATE-GENIKI-MARFIN_EGNATIA-MILLENIUM-ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN -22.1 -1476.89
_83 EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC-ATTICA 5828.47 -1298.01
_84 EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC-AEGEAN 4373.08 848.77
_85 EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC-PANELLINIA 4152.24 -781.05
_86 EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC-PANCRETAN 4794.49 630.17
_87 EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC-ATTICA-AEGEAN 4495.53 -729.73
_88 EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC-ATTICA-PANELLINIA 4364.78 -1402.83
_89 EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC-ATTICA-PANCRETAN 4536.67 -926.76
_90 EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA 3853.25 -339.92
_91 EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 3547.73 559.66
_92 EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 2635.21 -525.14
_93 EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC-ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA 1701.94 -1076.74
_94 EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC-ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 2335.16 -673.44
_95 EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC-ATTICA-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 1576.19 -1480.27
_96 EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 1050.33 -422.02
_97 EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC-ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 284.18 -786.07
                     (Continued)
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Tables 3.12.b: Greece - Recent & Prospective M&As scenarios (Continued)
Financial Institutions Difference of Cost Efficiency/Liquidity Creation (M)
Potential  Up to 2006 Up to 2011
_98 ATTIKA-AEGEAN 886.97 -72.51
_99 ATTICA-PANELLINIA 653.38 -467.4
_100 ATTICA-PANCRETAN 1006.92 -186.53
_101 AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 349.94 242.28
_102 PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 281.74 -234.74
_103 ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA 1168.66 -373.44
_104 ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 1397.84 -166.16
_105 AEGEAN-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 692.39 21.68
_106 ATTICA-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 1051.49 -207.63
Notes: This tables presents for each recent and prospective M&A scenario in the Greek banking sector, the difference in the estimated level of cost efficiency associated with the level of
liquidity 'creation 'between the potentially ''consolidated' institution and of the 'proforma' institution both in 2006 (i.e. pre crisis scenario) and in 2011 (i.e. post crisis scenario). 'M' stands
for millions. The level of of liquidity creation is computed by the model described in table 3.8.b, whereas the level of cost efficiency is estimated by the following model:
                                                                                                                                                              lnTC,it=lnC(y{it},w{it},T,E{it} ;β)+u{it}+v{it}
where subscripts i=1,....N  stand for each financial institution (i.e. each M&A activity), T=.year1,year2...,final-year, and indicates a time trend and is included in each specification to
allow for technological change, using both linear and quadratic (i.e. T and T²) respectively. TC_{it} is individual bank total cost; y_{it} and w_{it} indicate vectors of output and input
prices; we specify equity (E) as a quasi-fixed input to control for differences in risk preferences, which may arise due to regulation, financial distress, or informational asymmetries; β is
a vector of parameters to be estimated. The two-sided random error term v_{it} is assumed to be independent of the non-negative cost efficiency variable u_{it} and is assumed to follow
a symmetric normal distribution around the frontier and ui, accounts for the firm's inefficiency and is assumed to follow a half-normal distribution.
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Table 3.13.a: Table: UK - Unit root analysis of the variables used in the stress test scenario
d Catfat Ceff d TPL
Method Statistic P-value Statistic P-value Statistic P-value
ADF - Fisher Chisquare 59.2898 0,000 13.3426 0,000 9.1028 0,000
PP - Fisher Chisquare 86.4639 0,000 22.6894 0,000 14.8929 0,000
d GDP d Real EER d 3M Tbill
Method Statistic P-value Statistic P-value Statistic P-value
ADF - Fisher Chisquare 124.9676 0,000 36.1855 0,000 37.0507 0,000
PP - Fisher Chisquare 211.5184 0,000 61.4127 0,000 64.7155 0,000
as the UK banking sector is concerned. Specifically,  'd Catfat', 'd TPL',  'd GDP', 'd Real EER' and 'd 3M Tbill' refer to the first differences of Liquidity Creation,
Total Problem Loans, Gdp Growth Rate, Real Effective Exchange Rate and Three month treasury bill rate respectively, while 'Ceff' refers to the cost efficiency score.
Constant and Trend included in the model
Notes: This table reports the empirical estimates of the unit root analysis on the variables that were considered in the panel vector autoregressive system (PVAR) as far
d Catfat Ceff d TPL
Method Statistic P-value Statistic P-value Statistic P-value
ADF - Fisher Chisquare 59.2898 0,000 13.3426 0,000 9.1028 0,000
PP - Fisher Chisquare 86.4639 0,000 22.6894 0,000 14.8929 0,000
d GDP d Real EER d 3M Tbill
Method Statistic P-value Statistic P-value Statistic P-value
ADF - Fisher Chisquare 124.9676 0,000 36.1855 0,000 37.0507 0,000
PP - Fisher Chisquare 211.5184 0,000 61.4127 0,000 64.7155 0,000
as the Greek banking sector is concerned. Specifically,  'd Catfat', 'd TPL',  'd GDP', 'd Real EER' and 'd 3M Tbill' refer to the first differences of Liquidity Creation,
Total Problem Loans, Gdp Growth Rate, Real Effective Exchange Rate and Three month treasury bill rate respectively, while 'Ceff' refers to the cost efficiency score.
Table 3.13.b: Table: Greece - Unit root analysis of the variables used in the stress test scenario
Constant and Trend included in the model
Notes: This table reports the empirical estimates of the unit root analysis on the variables that were considered in the panel vector autoregressive system (PVAR) as far
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Table 3.14: Liquidity Creation - Variance Decompositions
UK
d_catfat2 ceff d_TPL2 dGdP d_Real_EER d_3M_Tbill
10 0.78493406 0.04171584 0.11601967 0.01612504 0.00167409 0.03953131
20 0.78493398 0.04171584 0.11601967 0.01612504 0.00167412 0.03953135
30 0.78493398 0.04171584 0.11601967 0.01612504 0.00167412 0.03953135
Greece BEFORE the recent consolidation activity
d_catfat2 ceff d_TPL2 dGdP d_Real_EER d_3M_Tbill
10 0.80889784 0.0134512 0.13678105 0.00436625 0.00224342 0.03426025
20 0.80887736 0.01346604 0.13678158 0.00436657 0.00224787 0.03426058
30 0.80887619 0.01346662 0.13678185 0.00436659 0.00224809 0.03426066
Greece AFTER the recent consolidation activity
d_catfat2 ceff d_TPL2 dGdP d_Real_EER d_3M_Tbill
10 0.76155485 0.00393531 0.19510167 0.00033914 0.00004538 0.03902365
20 0.761545 0.00395142 0.19509328 0.00033949 0.00004988 0.03902093
30 0.7615442 0.00395189 0.19509325 0.0003395 0.00005011 0.03902105
This table reports the variance decompositions of Liquidity Creation with respect to a Bank, a
Macroeconomic and a Financial shock, deriving from the panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) system
for both the UK and Greek baseline scenario where there is no bank consolidation activity in the sector
 and the additional baseline scenario that indicates the current conditions of the Greek banking system
after the recent wave of Greek banks' M&As. Specifically, 'd Catfat2', 'd TPL',  'd GDP', 'd Real EER' and
d 3M Tbill' refer to the first differences of Liquidity Creation, Total Problem Loans ( i.e. Bank shock), Gdp
Growth Rate (i.e. Macroeconomic shock), Real Effective Exchange Rate (i.e. Financial shock) and Three
month treasury bill rate (i.e. Financial shock) respectively, while 'Ceff' refers to the cost efficiency score
( i.e. Bank shock). The total effect accumulated is reported over 10, 20 and 30 years.
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Table 3.15: Cost Efficiency - Variance Decompositions
UK
d_catfat2 ceff d_TPL2 dGdP d_Real_EER d_3M_Tbill
ceff 10 0.21495877 0.31843069 0.31431747 0.01811352 0.05647597 0.07770357
ceff 20 0.21332242 0.31343812 0.31877367 0.01763171 0.05847431 0.07835977
ceff 30 0.21324806 0.31321167 0.318976 0.01760985 0.05856497 0.07838946
Greece BEFORE the recent consolidation activity
d_catfat2 ceff d_TPL2 dGdP d_Real_EER d_3M_Tbill
ceff 10 0.13958527 0.42648238 0.24301 0.02160677 0.0769042 0.09241137
ceff 20 0.13438309 0.42511087 0.24650601 0.0213031 0.0804462 0.09225072
ceff 30 0.13412232 0.42503868 0.24668334 0.02128799 0.08062535 0.09224233
Greece AFTER the recent consolidation activity
d_catfat2 ceff d_TPL2 dGdP d_Real_EER d_3M_Tbill
ceff 10 0.16024421 0.31277699 0.28216 0.01264193 0.11817795 0.11399892
ceff 20 0.15620581 0.31057 0.28393777 0.01248 0.12229427 0.11451215
ceff 30 0.15605264 0.31014 0.28434267 0.01247369 0.12246123 0.11452977
This table reports the variance decompositions of Cost Efficiency with respect to a Bank, a
Macroeconomic and a Financial shock, deriving from the panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) system
for both the UK and Greek baseline scenario where there is no bank consolidation activity in the sector
 and the additional baseline scenario that indicates the current conditions of the Greek banking system
after the recent wave of Greek banks' M&As. Specifically, 'd Catfat2', 'd TPL',  'd GDP', 'd Real EER' and
d 3M Tbill' refer to the first differences of Liquidity Creation, Total Problem Loans ( i.e. Bank shock), Gdp
Growth Rate (i.e. Macroeconomic shock), Real Effective Exchange Rate (i.e. Financial shock) and Three
month treasury bill rate (i.e. Financial shock) respectively, while 'Ceff' refers to the cost efficiency score
( i.e. Bank shock). The total effect accumulated is reported over 10, 20 and 30 years.
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Table 3.16.a: UK: Half - Life & Total Effect after a Macroeconomic shock
Half Life (years)
Total Effect (abs. values
%)
Banking System without any M&A 1.651 8.531
Banking System with Potential M&A
Financial Institution 1 Financial Institution 2 Financial Institution 3
_1 HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc 1.411 5.262
_2 HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 1.415 5.574
_3 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc 1.274 4.348
_4 HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 1.327 4.912
_5 HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Santander UK Plc 1.345 4.846
_6 HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Santander UK Plc 1.317 4.774
_7 HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Standard Chartered Bank 1.347 4.628
_8 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 1.482 7.156
_9 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc 1.289 4.782
_10 Barclays Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Santander UK Plc 1.386 6.141
_11 HSBC Bank plc Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 1.267 4.431
_12 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc Santander UK Plc 1.243 4.317
_13 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc AIB 1.389 4.943
_14 HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) AIB 1.416 5.372
_15 Barclays Bank Plc Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 1.273 4.371
_16 HSBC Bank plc Santander UK Plc 1.297 4.782
_17 HSBC Bank plc Sainsbury's Bank plc Santander UK Plc 1.304 5.246
_18 HSBC Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 1.301 5.379
_19 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 1.251 4.387
_20 Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 1.342 5.038
_21 HSBC Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank AIB 1.318 5.176
_22 HSBC Bank plc AIB 1.408 6.046
_23 Barclays Bank Plc Santander UK Plc AIB 1.423 6.161
_24 Barclays Bank Plc Co-operative Bank Plc (The) HSBC Bank plc 1.501 6.895
_25 Barclays Bank Plc Standard Chartered Bank AIB 1.487 6.016
_26 HSBC Bank plc Sainsbury's Bank plc 1.546 6.947
_27 Barclays Bank Plc Standard Chartered Bank 1.304 4.864
_28 Barclays Bank Plc Santander UK Plc 1.287 4.643
_29 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) HSBC Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 1.517 6.432
_30 Sainsbury's Bank plc Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 1.476 6.214
_31 Standard Chartered Bank AIB 1.502 6.249
_32 HSBC Bank plc UBS AIB 1.604 7.943
This table demonstrate those UK prospective combinations of banks' M&A which form a banking sector whose half-life and total effect after a Macroeconomic shock, with respect to its
 'liquidity creation',  is less than the respective ones which derive from a banking system without the presence of those specific potential banks' consolidation activities.
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Table 3.16.b: Greece: Half - Life & Total Effect after a Macroeconomic shock
Half Life (years) Total Effect (abs. values %)
Banking system Before  recent consolidation activity without any M&A 1.914 17.165
Banking system Before  recent consolidation activity with Potential M&A
_1 ETHNIKI-AEGEAN 1.598 11.745
_2 ETHNIKI-PANCREATAN 1.645 12.186
_3 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK 1.481 10.946
_4 ETHNIKI-PROBANK 1.694 12.357
_5 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN 1.254 9.864
_6 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 1.416 10.618
_7 ETHNIKI-FBB 1.671 12.684
_8 PIREAUS-PANCREATAN 1.716 14.391
_9 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN 1.487 11.493
_10 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-PANCRETAN 1.569 11.717
_11 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-PANCRETAN 1.347 10.468
_12 PIRAEUS-AEGEAN 1.764 14.849
_13 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 1.378 11.064
_14 ALPHA-PANCREATAN 1.617 12.397
_15 EUROBANK-AEGEAN 1.744 14.622
_16 ALPHA-AEGEAN 1.571 12.078
_17 ALPHA-EMPORIKI 1.643 12.755
Banking system After  recent consolidation activity without any M&A 2.682 21.597
Banking system After  recent consolidation activity with Potential M&A
_1 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK 2.316 14.699
_2 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN 2.186 13.937
_3 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 2.484 17.418
_4 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN 2.379 15.522
_5 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-PANCRETAN 2.461 16.691
_6 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-PANCRETAN 2.287 14.462
_7 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 2.428 15.923
_8 ALPHA-EMPORIKI 2.583 18.461
This table demonstrate those Greek prospective combinations of banks' M&A which form a banking sector whose half-life and total effect after a
Macroeconomic shock, with respect to its 'liquidity creation',  is less than the respective ones which derive from a banking system without the
presence of those specific potential banks' consolidation activities. Results are reported for both states of the Greek banking sector, i.e. with and
without accounting for the recent wave of M&As.
260
Table 3.17.a: UK: Half - Life & Total Effect after a Financial shock
Half Life (years) Total Effect (abs.values %)
Banking System without any M&A 0.963 4.234
Banking System with Potential M&A
Financial Institution 1 Financial Institution 2 Financial Institution 3
_1 HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 0.687 2.247
_2 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc 0.574 2.695
_3 Barclays Bank Plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 0.863 3.473
_4 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 0.714 2.597
_5 HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 0.698 2.781
_6 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Standard Chartered Bank 0.781 3.429
_7 HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Santander UK Plc 0.576 2.754
_8 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.639 3.048
_9 Barclays Bank Plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Santander UK Plc 0.746 3.105
_10 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.679 3.014
_11 HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Sainsbury's Bank plc 0.708 3.343
_12 HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc AIB 0.682 3.152
_13 HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Standard Chartered Bank 0.614 2.874
_14 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc 0.579 2.524
_15 HSBC Bank plc Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.537 2.246
_16 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc Santander UK Plc 0.528 2.197
_17 Barclays Bank Plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc AIB 0.768 3.476
_18 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Sainsbury's Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.867 3.943
_19 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc Sainsbury's Bank plc 0.604 2.884
_20 HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Sainsbury's Bank plc 0.691 3.217
_21 Barclays Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Standard Chartered Bank 0.637 3.078
_22 Barclays Bank Plc Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.581 2.576
_23 HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) UBS 0.701 3.314
_24 HSBC Bank plc Santander UK Plc 0.591 2.768
_25 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Sainsbury's Bank plc Santander UK Plc 0.849 3.716
_26 HSBC Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.608 2.943
_27 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.536 2.297
_28 Barclays Bank Plc Sainsbury's Bank plc Santander UK Plc 0.673 3.946
_29 Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.624 3.072
_30 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Santander UK Plc AIB 0.819 3.881
_31 HSBC Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank AIB 0.638 3.112
_32 HSBC Bank plc Santander UK Plc AIB 0.603 2.671
_33 HSBC Bank plc Sainsbury's Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.657 3.487
_34 Barclays Bank Plc Santander UK Plc AIB 0.679 3.187
_35 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc UBS 0.619 2.873
_36 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Standard Chartered Bank 0.703 3.472
_37 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.826 4.137
_38 Barclays Bank Plc Co-operative Bank Plc (The) HSBC Bank plc 0.736 3.768
_39 Barclays Bank Plc Sainsbury's Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.649 3.348
_40 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Santander UK Plc 0.751 3.794
_41 Barclays Bank Plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.614 3.173
_42 Barclays Bank Plc Santander UK Plc 0.597 3.067
_43 Santander UK Plc AIB 0.649 3.581
_44 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) HSBC Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.734 3.974
_45 Standard Chartered Bank AIB 0.711 3.618
_46 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) HSBC Bank plc Sainsbury's Bank plc 0.753 3.816
(Continued)
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Table 3.17.a: UK: Half - Life & Total Effect after a Financial shock (Continued)
Half Life (years) Total Effect (abs.values %)
Banking System without any M&A 0.963 4.234
Banking System with Potential M&A
Financial Institution 1 Financial Institution 2 Financial Institution 3
_47 HSBC Bank plc UBS 0.662 3.418
_48 HSBC Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank UBS 0.609 3.214
_49 Barclays Bank Plc Santander UK Plc UBS 0.638 3.495
_50 Sainsbury's Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.814 3.799
_51 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) HSBC Bank plc AIB 0.874 3.946
_52 Barclays Bank Plc AIB 0.617 3.186
_53 HSBC Bank plc Sainsbury's Bank plc AIB 0.649 3.427
_54 Sainsbury's Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank AIB 0.826 3.849
_55 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Santander UK Plc AIB 0.904 4.167
_56 HSBC Bank plc UBS AIB 0.719 3.674
_57 Barclays Bank Plc Standard Chartered Bank UBS 0.671 3.442
_58 Barclays Bank Plc Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Santander UK Plc 0.769 3.578
_59 Barclays Bank Plc Sainsbury's Bank plc 0.691 3.642
_60 Santander UK Plc UBS AIB 0.784 3.714
_61 Barclays Bank Plc Sainsbury's Bank plc AIB 0.726 3.941
_62 Standard Chartered Bank UBS AIB 0.834 3.891
This table demonstrate those UK prospective combinations of banks' M&A which form a banking sector whose half-life and total effect after a Financial shock, with
respect to its 'liquidity creation',  is less than the respective ones which derive from a banking system without the presence of those specific potential  banks'
consolidation activities.
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Table 3.17.b: Greece: Half - Life & Total Effect after a Financial shock
Half Life (years) Total Effect (abs. values %)
Banking system Before  recent consolidation activity without any M&A 1.557 15.048
Banking system Before  recent consolidation activity with Potential M&A
_1 ETHNIKI-AEGEAN 0.738 10.314
_2 ETHNIKI-PANCREATAN 0.791 11.183
_3 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK 0.677 9.912
_4 ETHNIKI-PROBANK 0.804 11.008
_5 ETHNIKI-PANELLINIA 1.041 12.261
_6 ETHNIKI-ATTICA 1.199 13.184
_7 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN 0.548 9.194
_8 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 0.816 12.443
_9 ETHNIKI-FBB 1.048 11.544
_10 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN 0.867 10.992
_11 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-PANCRETAN 0.924 11.472
_12 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-PANCRETAN 0.716 9.918
_13 PIRAEUS-AEGEAN 1.118 13.675
_14 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 0.847 11.911
_15 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA 1.082 13.316
_16 ALPHA-ATTICA 1.244 12.554
_17 EUROBANK_TT_HELLENIC 1.033 13.461
_18 ALPHA-PANCREATAN 1.041 11.986
_19 EUROBANK-AEGEAN 1.004 12.781
_20 ALPHA-AEGEAN 0.976 11.502
_21 PIRAEUS-MARFIN_EGNATIA 1.191 14.372
_22 ALPHA-EMPORIKI 1.073 13.411
_23 PIRAEUS-MARFIN_EGANTIA-MILLENIUM 1.124 14.554
_24 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 1.079 12.542
_25 EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC-AEGEAN 1.335 14.848
_26 EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC-PANCRETAN 1.408 14.894
Banking system After  recent consolidation activity without any M&A 1.166 12.573
Banking system After  recent consolidation activity with Potential M&A
_1 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK 0.177 7.412
_2 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN 0.048 6.694
_3 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 0.316 9.943
_4 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN 0.367 8.492
_5 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-PANCRETAN 0.424 8.972
_6 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-PANCRETAN 0.216 7.418
_7 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 0.347 9.411
_8 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA 0.582 10.816
_9 ALPHA-EMPORIKI 0.573 10.911
_10 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 0.579 10.042
_11 EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC-AEGEAN 0.835 12.348
_12 EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC-PANCRETAN 0.908 12.394
This table demonstrate those Greek prospective combinations of banks' M&A which form a banking sector whose half-life and total effect after a
Financial shock, with respect to its 'liquidity creation',  is less than the respective ones which derive from a banking system without the
presence of those specific potential banks' consolidation activities. Results are reported for both states of the Greek banking sector, i.e. with and
without accounting for the recent wave of M&As.
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Table 3.18.a: UK: Half - Life & Total Effect after a Bank shock
Half Life (years) Total Effect (abs. values %)
Banking System without any M&A 0.767 3.149
Banking System with Potential M&A
Financial Institution 1 Financial Institution 2 Financial Institution 3
_1 HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc 0.624 2.478
_2 HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 0.579 2.317
_3 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc 0.472 1.884
_4 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 0.503 2.076
_5 HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 0.514 2.142
_6 HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Santander UK Plc 0.516 1.847
_7 Barclays Bank Plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc 0.614 3.047
_8 HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Santander UK Plc 0.497 1.945
_9 HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.476 1.716
_10 Barclays Bank Plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Santander UK Plc 0.594 2.814
_11 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Santander UK Plc 0.622 3.016
_12 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.546 2.689
_13 HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc AIB 0.615 2.717
_14 Barclays Bank Plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.561 3.047
_15 HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Standard Chartered Bank 0.494 3.086
_16 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc 0.513 2.063
_17 HSBC Bank plc Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.415 1.289
_18 Barclays Bank Plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Sainsbury's Bank plc 0.698 3.084
_19 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc Santander UK Plc 0.423 1.374
_20 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc AIB 0.493 1.746
_21 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc Sainsbury's Bank plc 0.594 2.073
_22 Barclays Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Standard Chartered Bank 0.647 2.431
_23 HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) AIB 0.604 2.634
_24 Barclays Bank Plc Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.464 1.714
_25 Barclays Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 0.671 2.613
_26 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Standard Chartered Bank AIB 0.713 3.104
_27 Barclays Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Sainsbury's Bank plc 0.667 3.006
_28 HSBC Bank plc Santander UK Plc 0.472 1.63
_29 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc AIB 0.704 3.067
_30 HSBC Bank plc Sainsbury's Bank plc Santander UK Plc 0.614 2.014
_31 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Standard Chartered Bank AIB 0.711 2.913
_32 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Sainsbury's Bank plc Santander UK Plc 0.728 2.987
_33 HSBC Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.487 1.671
_34 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.427 1.344
_35 Barclays Bank Plc Sainsbury's Bank plc Santander UK Plc 0.594 2.437
_36 Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.514 1.749
_37 HSBC Bank plc Santander UK Plc AIB 0.473 1.943
_38 HSBC Bank plc Sainsbury's Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.514 2.476
_39 Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank AIB 0.576 2.871
_40 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc UBS 0.514 2.656
_41 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.668 2.839
_42 Barclays Bank Plc Sainsbury's Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.694 3.084
_43 Barclays Bank Plc Standard Chartered Bank AIB 0.589 2.461
_44 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) HSBC Bank plc Santander UK Plc 0.544 2.694
_45 Barclays Bank Plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.519 1.949
_46 Barclays Bank Plc Santander UK Plc 0.504 1.884
_47 Santander UK Plc AIB 0.579 2.341
_48 Sainsbury's Bank plc Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.536 2.093
_49 Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank UBS 0.579 2.465
_50 HSBC Bank plc Santander UK Plc UBS 0.514 1.784
(Continued)
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Table 3.18.a: UK: Half - Life & Total Effect after a Bank shock (Continued)
Half Life (years) Total Effect (abs. values %)
Banking System without any M&A 0.767 3.149
Banking System with Potential M&A
Financial Institution 1 Financial Institution 2 Financial Institution 3
_51 HSBC Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank UBS 0.526 1.804
_52 Sainsbury's Bank plc Santander UK Plc 0.657 2.942
_53 Barclays Bank Plc Santander UK Plc UBS 0.534 1.974
_54 Santander UK Plc UBS 0.624 2.614
_55 Sainsbury's Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 0.688 2.946
_56 Sainsbury's Bank plc Santander UK Plc AIB 0.617 2.514
_57 Standard Chartered Bank UBS 0.634 2.725
_58 Sainsbury's Bank plc Santander UK Plc UBS 0.727 3.041
_59 Sainsbury's Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank UBS 0.748 3.106
_60 Barclays Bank Plc Standard Chartered Bank UBS 0.499 1.874
_61 HSBC Bank plc Sainsbury's Bank plc UBS 0.608 2.493
This table demonstrate those UK prospective combinations of banks' M&A which form a banking sector whose half-life and total effect after a Bank shock, with respect to
its 'liquidity creation',  is less than the respective ones which derive from a banking system without the presence of those specific potential  banks' consolidation
activities.
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Table 3.18.b: Greece: Half - Life & Total Effect after a Bank shock
Half Life (years) Total Effect (abs. values %)
Banking system Before  recent consolidation activity without any M&A 0.902 13.165
Banking system Before  recent consolidation activity with Potential M&A
_1 ETHNIKI-AEGEAN 0.574 8.687
_2 ETHNIKI-PANCREATAN 0.607 8.988
_3 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK 0.512 7.841
_4 ETHNIKI-PROBANK 0.613 9.265
_5 ETHNIKI-PANELLINIA 0.817 10.173
_6 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN 0.468 8.191
_7 ETHNIKI-FBB 0.797 9.384
_8 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN 0.662 9.461
_9 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-PANCRETAN 0.704 9.965
_10 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-PANCRETAN 0.517 8.716
_11 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 0.684 9.684
_12 ALPHA-PANCREATAN 0.791 10.411
_13 ALPHA-AEGEAN 0.804 10.485
_14 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-PANELLINIA 0.871 10.766
_15 EUROBANK-PANCRETAN 0.716 10.081
_16 PIRAEUS-MARFIN_EGNATIA 0.791 10.541
_17 ALPHA-EMPORIKI 0.701 9.842
_18 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA 0.775 10.214
_19 PIRAEUS-MARFIN_EGANTIA-MILLENIUM 0.658 9.477
_20 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 0.808 10.763
_21 PIRAEUS-MILLENIUM 0.824 10.944
_22 EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 0.897 11.084
_23 AEGEAN-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 0.836 10.773
Banking system After  recent consolidation activity without any M&A 1.921 18.208
Banking system After  recent consolidation activity with Potential M&A
_1 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK 1.613 16.265
_2 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN 1.775 17.214
_3 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN 1.662 16.461
_4 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-PANCRETAN 1.704 16.965
_5 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-PANCRETAN 1.517 15.716
_6 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 1.684 16.684
_7 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-PANELLINIA 1.871 17.766
_8 ALPHA-EMPORIKI 1.701 16.842
_9 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN-PANELLINIA 1.808 17.763
_10 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 1.808 17.763
_11 EUROBANK-PROTON_TT-HELLENIC-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 1.897 18.084
_12 AEGEAN-PANELLINIA-PANCRETAN 1.836 17.773
This table demonstrate those Greek prospective combinations of banks' M&A which form a banking sector whose half-life and total effect after a Bank
shock, with respect to its 'liquidity creation',  is less than the respective ones which derive from a banking system without the presence of those
specific potential banks' consolidation activities. Results are reported for both states of the Greek banking sector, i.e. with and without accounting for
the recent wave of M&As.
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Table 3.19.a: UK: Half - Life & Total Effect after all three shocks
Macroeconomic Shock Financial Shock Bank Shock
Half Life
(years)
Total Effect
(abs. values
%)
Half Life
(years)
Total Effect
(abs. values
%)
Half Life
(years)
Total Effect
(abs. values
%)
Banking System without any M&A 1.651 8.531 0.963 4.234 0.767 3.149
Banking System with Potential M&A
Financial Institution 1 Financial Institution 2 Financial Institution 3
_1 HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 1.415 5.574 0.687 2.247 0.579 2.317
_2 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc Lloyds TSB Bank Plc 1.274 4.348 0.574 2.695 0.472 1.884
_3 HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) 1.327 4.912 0.698 2.781 0.514 2.142
_4 HSBC Bank plc Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Santander UK Plc 1.317 4.774 0.576 2.754 0.497 1.945
_5 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (The) Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 1.482 7.156 0.679 3.014 0.546 2.689
_6 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc 1.289 4.782 0.579 2.524 0.513 2.063
_7 HSBC Bank plc Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 1.267 4.431 0.537 2.246 0.415 1.289
_8 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc Santander UK Plc 1.243 4.317 0.528 2.197 0.423 1.374
_9 Barclays Bank Plc Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 1.273 4.371 0.581 2.576 0.464 1.714
_10 HSBC Bank plc Santander UK Plc 1.297 4.782 0.591 2.768 0.472 1.63
_11 HSBC Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 1.301 5.379 0.608 2.943 0.487 1.671
_12 Barclays Bank Plc HSBC Bank plc Standard Chartered Bank 1.251 4.387 0.536 2.297 0.427 1.344
_13 Santander UK Plc Standard Chartered Bank 1.342 5.038 0.624 3.072 0.514 1.749
_14 Barclays Bank Plc Standard Chartered Bank 1.304 4.864 0.614 3.173 0.519 1.949
_15 Barclays Bank Plc Santander UK Plc 1.287 4.643 0.597 3.067 0.504 1.884
This table demonstrate those UK prospective combinations of banks' M&A which form a banking sector whose half-life and total effect after all three different types of shocks (i.e Macroeconomic,
Financial, Bank) with respect to  its 'liquidity creation',  is less than the respective ones which derive from a banking system without the presence of those specific potential  banks'
consolidation activities.
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Table 3.19.b: Greece: Half - Life & Total Effect after all three shocks
Macroeconomic Shock Financial Shock Bank Shock
Half Life
(years)
Total Effect
(abs. values %)
Half Life
(years)
Total Effect
(abs. values %)
Half Life
(years)
Total Effect
(abs. values %)
Banking system Before  recent consolidation activity without any M&A 1.914 16.165 1.557 15.048 0.902 13.165
Banking system Before  recent consolidation activity with Potential M&A
_1 ETHNIKI-AEGEAN 1.598 11.745 0.738 10.314 0.574 8.687
_2 ETHNIKI-PANCREATAN 1.645 12.186 0.791 11.183 0.607 8.988
_3 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK 1.481 10.946 0.677 9.912 0.512 7.841
_4 ETHNIKI-PROBANK 1.694 12.357 0.804 11.008 0.613 9.265
_5 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN 1.254 9.864 0.548 9.194 0.468 8.191
_6 ETHNIKI-FBB 1.671 12.684 1.048 11.544 0.797 9.384
_7 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN 1.487 11.493 0.867 10.992 0.662 9.461
_8 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-PANCRETAN 1.569 11.717 0.924 11.472 0.704 9.965
_9 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-PANCRETAN 1.347 10.468 0.716 9.918 0.517 8.716
_10 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 1.378 11.064 0.847 11.911 0.684 9.684
_11 ALPHA-PANCREATAN 1.617 12.397 1.041 11.986 0.791 10.411
_12 ALPHA-AEGEAN 1.571 12.078 0.976 11.502 0.804 10.485
_13 ALPHA-EMPORIKI 1.643 12.755 1.073 13.411 0.701 9.842
Banking system After  recent consolidation activity without any M&A 2.682 21.597 1.166 12.573 1.921 18.208
Banking system After  recent consolidation activity with Potential M&A
_1 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK 2.316 14.699 0.177 7.412 1.613 16.265
_2 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN 2.186 13.937 0.048 6.694 1.775 17.214
_3 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN 2.379 15.522 0.367 8.492 1.662 16.461
_4 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-PANCRETAN 2.461 16.691 0.424 8.972 1.704 16.965
_5 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-PANCRETAN 2.287 14.462 0.216 7.418 1.517 15.716
_6 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 2.428 15.923 0.347 9.411 1.684 16.684
_7 ALPHA-EMPORIKI 2.583 18.461 0.573 10.911 1.701 16.842
This table demonstrate those Greek prospective combinations of banks' M&A which form a banking sector whose half-life and total effect after all three different types of shocks
(i.e Macroeconomic, Financial, Bank) with respect to its 'liquidity creation',  is less than the respective ones which derive from a banking system without the presence of those
specific potential banks' consolidation activities. Results are reported for both states of the Greek banking sector, i.e. with and without accounting for the recent wave of M&As.
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Table 3.20.a: UK: Half - Life & Total Effect after all three shocks - Simultaneous Hypothetical M&As scenarios
Macroeconomic Shock Financial Shock Bank Shock
Half Life
(years)
Total Effect
(abs. values
%)
Half
Life
(years)
Total Effect
(abs. values
%)
Half
Life
(years)
Total Effect
(abs. values
%)
Banking System without any M&A 1.651 8.531 0.963 4.234 0.767 3.149
Banking System with Potential M&A
Financial Institution 1 Financial Institution 2 Financial Institution 3 Financial Institution 1 Financial Institution 2Financial Institution 3
_1 HSBC Lloyds RBS & Barclays Santander Standard Chart. 1.317 4.934 0.617 2.376 0.507 1.976
_2 HSBC Lloyds RBS & Santander Standard Chart. 1.352 5.211 0.636 2.513 0.522 1.981
_3 HSBC Lloyds RBS & Barclays Standard Chart. 1.338 5.184 0.6437 2.571 0.528 2.094
_4 HSBC Lloyds RBS & Barclays Santander 1.347 5.074 0.642 2.593 0.516 2.071
_5 Barclays HSBC Lloyds & RBS Santander Standard Chart. 1.364 5.618 0.6174 2.714 0.481 2.194
_6 Barclays HSBC Lloyds & Santander Standard Chart. 1.291 4.524 0.583 2.694 0.473 1.714
_7 HSBC RBS & Barclays Santander Standard Chart. 1.288 4.537 0.628 2.543 0.464 1.768
_8 HSBC RBS & Santander Standard Chart. 1.319 4.861 0.649 2.843 0.489 1.827
_9 HSBC RBS & Barclays Standard Chart. 1.309 4.721 0.643 2.846 0.506 1.716
_10 HSBC RBS & Barclays Santander 1.296 4.691 0.632 2.813 0.482 1.964
_11 HSBC RBS Santander & Barclays Standard Chart. 1.301 4.709 0.576 2.794 0.467 1.834
_12 RBS Santander Standard Chart. & Barclays HSBC 1.364 5.814 0.611 2.614 0.506 2.183
_13 Barclays HSBC & Santander Standard Chart. 1.306 4.763 0.584 2.583 0.488 1.766
_14 HSBC Santander & Barclays Standard Chart. 1.284 4.687 0.591 2.847 0.461 1.534
_15 HSBC Standard Chart. & Barclays Santander 1.267 4.904 0.526 2.846 0.478 1.627
This table demonstrate those UK prospective combinations of banks' M&A that can occur simultaneously and form a banking sector whose half-life and total effect after all three different types
of shocks (i.e Macroeconomic, Financial, Bank) with respect to  its 'liquidity creation',  is less than the respective ones which derive from a banking system without the presence of those
specific potential  banks' consolidation activities.
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Table 3.20.b: Greece: Half - Life & Total Effect after all three shocks - Simultaneous Hypothetical M&As scenarios
Macroeconomic ShockFinancial Shock Bank ShockHalf Life
(years)
Total
Effect
Half Life
(years)
Total
Effect
Half Life
(years)
Total
Effect
Banking system Before  recent consolidation activity without any M&A 1.914 16.165 1.557 15.048 0.902 13.165
Banking system Before  recent consolidation activity with Potential M&A
Financial Institution 1 Financial Institution 1
_1 ETHNIKI-AEGEAN & ALPHA-EMPORIKI-PANCRETAN 1.481 11.406 0.661 10.703 0.469 9.136
_2 ETHNIKI-AEGEAN & ALPHA-PANCREATAN 1.586 11.715 0.719 10.9623 0.512 9.359
_3 ETHNIKI-AEGEAN & ALPHA-EMPORIKI 1.606 12.008 0.735 11.672 0.467 9.074
_4 ETHNIKI-PANCREATAN & ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN 1.513 11.571 0.659 10.897 0.464 9.034
_5 ETHNIKI-PANCREATAN & ALPHA-AEGEAN 1.583 11.892 0.713 11.152 0.535 9.546
_6 ETHNIKI-PANCREATAN & ALPHA-EMPORIKI 1.584 12.173 0.762 12.107 0.484 9.225
_7 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK & ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN 1.388 10.943 0.602 10.262 0.417 8.461
_8 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK & ALPHA-EMPORIKI-PANCRETAN 1.525 11.046 0.631 10.502 0.438 8.713
_9 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK & ALPHA-PANCREATAN 1.516 11.284 0.689 10.759 0.481 8.936
_10 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK & ALPHA-AEGEAN 1.495 11.287 0.656 10.517 0.488 8.973
_11 ETHNIKI-PROBANK & ALPHA-EMPORIKI 1.625 12.148 0.768 12.019 0.487 9.363
_12 ETHNIKI-PROBANK & ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN 1.51 11.473 0.665 10.812 0.467 9.173
_13 ETHNIKI-PROBANK & ALPHA-EMPORIKI-PANCRETAN 1.591 11.849 0.694 11.053 0.488 9.425
_14 ETHNIKI-PROBANK & ALPHA-PANCREATAN 1.616 12.217 0.752 11.307 0.532 9.648
_15 ETHNIKI-PROBANK & ALPHA-AEGEAN 1.583 12.084 0.722 11.065 0.538 9.685
_16 ETHNIKI-PROBANK & ALPHA-EMPORIKI 1.604 12.451 0.768 12.019 0.487 9.363
_17 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN & ALPHA-EMPORIKI-PANCRETAN 1.391 10.482 0.566 10.143 0.416 8.888
_18 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN & ALPHA-PANCREATAN 1.404 11.007 0.624 10.403 0.459 9.111
_19 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN & ALPHA-EMPORIKI 1.417 11.158 0.643 11.112 0.414 8.826
_20 ETHNIKI-FBB & ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN 1.553 11.904 0.787 11.078 0.559 9.232
_21 ETHNIKI-FBB & ALPHA-EMPORIKI-PANCRETAN 1.591 12.186 0.816 11.318 0.581 9.484
_22 ETHNIKI-FBB & ALPHA-PANCREATAN 1.611 12.511 0.874 11.575 0.624 9.707
_23 ETHNIKI-FBB & ALPHA-AEGEAN 1.608 12.246 0.842 11.333 0.632 9.744
_24 ETHNIKI-FBB & ALPHA-EMPORIKI 1.629 12.614 0.893 12.287 0.579 9.423
_25 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN & ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-PANCRETAN 1.389 10.671 0.621 10.265 0.419 8.898
_26 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-PANCRETAN & ALPHA-AEGEAN 1.421 11.182 0.676 10.521 0.493 9.412
_27 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-PANCRETAN & ALPHA-EMPORIKI 1.461 11.591 0.724 11.474 0.439 9.089
Banking system After  recent consolidation activity without any M&A 2.682 21.597 1.166 12.573 1.921 18.208
Banking system After  recent consolidation activity with Potential M&A
_1 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK & ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN 2.331 15.076 0.102 7.762 1.467 16.173
_2 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK & ALPHA-EMPORIKI-PANCRETAN 2.361 15.493 0.131 8.002 1.488 16.425
_3 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK & ALPHA-EMPORIKI 2.428 15.611 0.205 8.971 1.487 16.363
_4 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN & ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN 2.262 14.683 0.037 7.403 1.548 16.647
_5 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN & ALPHA-EMPORIKI-PANCRETAN 2.307 15.148 0.066 7.643 1.569 16.899
_6 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN & ALPHA-EMPORIKI 2.369 15.871 0.141 8.612 1.568 16.838
_7 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN & ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-PANCRETAN 2.314 14.764 0.123 7.765 1.419 15.898
_8 ALPHA-EMPORIKI-AEGEAN & ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN 2.374 15.617 0.187 8.761 1.503 16.382
_9 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-PANCRETAN & ALPHA-EMPORIKI 2.367 16.308 0.224 8.974 1.439 16.089
_10 ETHNIKI-FFB-PROBANK-AEGEAN-PANCRETAN & ALPHA-EMPORIKI 2.467 16.948 0.292 9.971 1.522 16.573
This table demonstrate those Greek prospective combinations of banks' M&A that can occur simultaneously and  which form a banking sector whose half-life and total effect after all three
different types of shocks (i.e Macroeconomic, Financial, Bank) with respect to its 'liquidity creation',  is less than the respective ones which derive from a banking system without the presence
of those specific potential banks' consolidation activities. Results are reported for both states of the Greek banking sector, i.e. with and without accounting for the recent wave of M&As.
Chapter 4
Assessing Bank E¢ ciency and
Stability
4.1 Introduction
There is a vast literature aiming at testing e¢ ciency of banks that
goes under the title non-structural and structural approaches. The
non-structural approach compares productivity and performance ratios
among banks and considers how these ratios are related to investment
strategies and bankscharacteristics, such as the quality of banksgov-
ernance, its product mix, etc. The structural approach usually relies
on the economics of cost minimization or prot maximization, where
the performance equation denotes a cost function or a prot function.
In the most recent literature, the optimization problem is managerial
utility maximization, where the manager trades o¤ risk and expected
return.
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As far as the structural performance equation is concerned, this
can be tted into the data as an average relationship, which assumes
that all banks are equally e¢ cient at minimizing cost or maximizing
prot, subject to random error "i, which is assumed to be normally
distributed. Alternatively, the structural performance equation can be
estimated as a stochastic frontier to capture best-practice and to gauge
ine¢ ciency; i.e., the di¤erence between the best-practice performance
and achieved performance.
In the stochastic frontier, the error term, "i, consists of two com-
ponents; a two-sided random error that represents noise (vi) and a
one-sided (i.e. nonnegative) error representing ine¢ ciency (ui). Banks
ine¢ ciency is usually estimated by the mean of the conditional distrib-
ution of ui given "i i.e., E(uij"i). The di¤erence between best-practice
and achieved performance gauges managerial ine¢ ciency in terms of
either excessive cost cost ine¢ ciency or lost prot prot ine¢ -
ciency.
The standard prot function studied in the literature (Berger and
Mester, 1997), in log form, is:
ln(i + ) = f(pi; wi) + ln vi   lnui; (4.1.1)
where i denotes prots of rm i;  is a constant added to the prots
of each bank in order to attain positive values, enabling them to be
treated logarithmically; pi is the vector of prices of variable inputs; wi
is the vector of prices of the variable outputs.
Prot e¢ ciency is the ratio of the predicted actual prots to the
predicted maximum prots that could be earned if the bank was as
e¢ cient as the best-practice bank in the sample, net of random error,
or the proportion of maximum prots that are actually earned and is
represented by the following equation:
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Std EFFi =
i
max
=
fexp [f(pi; wi)]  exp [ui]g   
fexp [f(pmax; wmax)]  exp [umax]g    ;
(4.1.2)
where umax represents the maximum value of ui in the sample.
Standard prot e¢ ciency measures determine how close a bank is
to producing the maximum possible prot given a particular level of
input prices and output prices (and other variables). In contrast to the
cost function, the standard prot function species variable prots in
place of variable costs and takes variable output prices as given, rather
than holding all output quantities statistically xed at their observed,
possibly ine¢ cient, levels. That is, the prot dependent variable allows
for consideration of revenues that can be earned by varying outputs as
well as inputs. Output prices are taken as exogenous, allowing for inef-
ciencies in the choice of outputs when responding to these prices or to
any other arguments of the prot function. In our opinion, the prot ef-
ciency concept is superior to the cost e¢ ciency concept for evaluating
the overall performance of the rm. Prot e¢ ciency accounts for errors
on the output side as well as those on the input side, and some prior
evidence suggests that ine¢ ciencies on the output side may be as large
or larger than those on the input side (e.g., Berger et al. 1993). Prot
e¢ ciency is based on the more accepted economic goal of prot maxi-
mization, which requires that the same amount of managerial attention
be paid to raising a marginal dollar of revenue as well as to reducing
a marginal dollar of costs. That is, a rm that spends one additional
dollar to raise revenues by $2, all else being equal, would appropriately
be measured as being more prot e¢ cient but might inappropriately
be measured as being less cost e¢ cient. Prot e¢ ciency is based on a
comparison with the best-practice point of prot maximization within
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the data set, whereas cost e¢ ciency evaluates performance holding out-
put constant at its current level, which generally will not correspond
to an optimum. A rm that is relatively cost e¢ cient at its current
output may or may not be cost e¢ cient at its optimal output, which
typically involves a di¤erent scale and mix of outputs. Thus, standard
prot e¢ ciency may take better account of cost ine¢ ciency than the
cost e¢ ciency measure itself, since standard prot e¢ ciency embodies
the cost ine¢ ciency deviations from the optimal point.
The standard prot function assumes that markets for outputs and
inputs are perfectly competitive. The exogenous nature of prices in this
concept of prot e¢ ciency assumes that there is no market power on
the banksside. If, instead of taking prices as given, it is assumed the
possibility of imperfect competition, it would be taken as given only
the output vector, and not that of prices. Thus, Berger and Mester
(1997) dene the alternative prot function where banks take as given
the quantity of output (y) and the price of inputs (p) and maximise
prots by adjusting the price of the output (w) and the quantity of
inputs:
ln(i + ) = f(pi; qi) + ln vi   lnui (4.1.3)
As with standard prot e¢ ciency, alternative prot e¢ ciency is the
ratio of predicted actual prots to the predicted maximum prots for
a best-practice bank:
AltEFFi =
ai
amax
=
fexp [f(pi; qi)]  exp [ui]g   
fexp [f(pmax; qmax)]  exp [umax]g    ; (4.1.4)
The alternative prot function provides a way of controlling for un-
measured di¤erences in output quality since it considers the additional
revenue that higher quality output can generate.
Typically in the literature up to the late 90s, the cost and prot
functions or frontiers are measured without considering the bankscap-
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ital structure or bankschoice of risk. As it noted by Hughes et al.
(1996, 1999, 2000) this is a serious omission since banksproduction
technologies embody their ability to diversify and o¤set a variety of
risks, and the production decisions that managers take may mirror their
incentives to take on risks as well as to diversify them. Later in the lit-
erature (Hughes et al. (1996); Mester and Moon (2001)) are developed
tests of ine¢ ciency that include measures of risk which is reected by
equity capital (k). These authors estimate a best-practice risk-return
frontier and measure ine¢ ciency relative to it. Precisely, they suggest
an estimation of a stochastic frontier similar to (4:1:1) that gives the
highest expected return at any particular risk exposure:
E(i=ki) = a0 + aii + a2
2
i + vi   ui; (4.1.5)
where, they indicate that a banks return ine¢ ciency is the di¤erence
between its potential return and its noise-adjusted expected return,
gauged among its peers with the same level of return risk. However,
they dont consider whether banksmanagers are taking too much or
too little risk relative to the value-maximizing amount.
Among other things, this implies that current models and tests of
banking e¢ ciency are not able to take into account the trade-o¤ that
might exist between bankse¢ ciency and stability. The intution behind
this is that equation (4:1:5) represents an ex ante indicator of risk. In
other words a bank is equally e¢ cient regardless of its position along
the expected prot-risk e¢ cient curve. We believe that for stability it
is not irrelevant where the banks stands along this e¢ ciency curve.
Indeed, modern banking theory emphasizes managerscontrasting
incentives for risk-taking. On the one hand, increased risk taking may
exploit valuable investment opportunities, while, on the other hand,
reduced risk-taking protects a bank from costly episodes of nancial
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distress involving liquidity crises, regulatory intervention, and even for-
feiture of the banks valuable charter. However, failure to take into
account this important trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and stability may
reduce the predictive power of any e¢ ciency model of banking and may
bring about misleading conclusions on the welfare implications of bank-
ing structure and behaviour. As an example of this, a bank with too
little expected prot for the amount of risk it is taking on is deemed
ine¢ cient. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the trade-o¤ that
banksmanagers very often face between loosing prot opportunities
today to increase their opportunities tomorrow. This trade-o¤ comes
from the fact that banks which take on too much risk relatively to their
resources face a higher probability to be insolvent when adverse e¤ects
occur in the future.In other words, our assumption is that the level of a
banks risk depends not only on the degree of risk aversion of the man-
ager (i.e. which point of the risk-return curve the managers chooses)
but also on the objective circumstances which a¤ect risk, as well as how
much the bank is vulnerable to changes in the market conditions.
This study contributes in the literature of banking e¢ ciency in two
ways: Firstly, by presenting a new indicator of prot e¢ ciency which
takes into account both the propensity to risk (ex ante measure of risk)
reected by the vulnerability of the bank to changes to the nancial
markets conditions and the realized risk (ex post measure of risk) due
to mismanagement of the bank. Secondly, by testing how e¢ cient both
current tests of banking e¢ ciency as well as the one proposed in this
paper are, with respect to the e¤ect of the crisis on the probability
to fail. The on-going nancial and economic crisis provides a natural
experiment to pursue this analysis. We would expect that more e¢ cient
banks at the onset of the crisis, other things being equal, to be able to
withstand in a better the impact of the crisis. So, if this is true, the
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relative position of the banks from an e¢ ciency point of view should be
similar after and at the onset of the crisis. On the contrary, if the most
e¢ cient banks change their relative position during the crisis, it implies
that current tests of e¢ ciency have little predictive power, because they
do not take into account other factors which may a¤ect banksrisk and
returns.
The rst empirical strategy of the paper is to compare the devia-
tion of banking e¢ ciency estimates of the conventional index and our
proposed risk - adjusted index at the onset and in the period during
and after the recent nancial crisis. With this in mind, we estimate
e¢ ciency of US commercial banks in three couples of sub-periods 2003-
2004 and 2005-2006; 2005 -2006 and 2008 - 2009; and 2004-2006 and
2010-2012 in order to compare the relative position of the banks and
draw conclusions on the capability of these tests to take account of
changes in risk of nancial institutions with respect to future bank
prots. With this in mind we construct three di¤erent in range; i.e.,
deciles, quartiles, half-tiles, Markov transitions matrices accompanied
by their respective probabilities and standard error matrices. The sec-
ond empirical strategy of this study is to compare the explanatory and
predictive power of each one of the two prot e¢ ciency measures with
respect to the growth of banksprots. Thus, we investigate which
index could signal in a more accurate way the severe erosion of prots
that was about to occur during and after the global nancial turmoil.
The last empirical strategy of the paper is to compare in the same
spirit as before the explanatory and predictive power of each test with
respect to the prots on one hand of the nancial institutions that re-
mained solvent in the aftermath of the crisis and on the other hand of
those that did not manage to withstand the severe adverse economic
conditions both during and after the crisis.
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We provide strong empirical evidence that our suggested prot ef-
ciency index produces less deviation of its estimates compared to the
standard in the literature index among all three di¤erent time peri-
ods (i.e., pre - crisis, during - crisis, post - crisis) and in all three
di¤erent Markov transition matrices. This nding is being strength-
ened when we investigate the most extremes scenarios of changes of the
relative position of banks;i.e, from the top 50% to the lowest (and vice-
versa) 10%, 25% and 50% as far as deciles, quartiles and half-tiles are
concerned respectively, as far each measures prot e¢ ciency estimates
are concerned. In addition, our empirical results highlight the supe-
riority of the risk - adjusted prot e¢ ciency index regarding both its
explanatory and predictive power throughout all groups of sub - sam-
ples chosen for comparison. The inadequateness of the standard prot
e¢ ciency measure is revealed once again when we di¤erentiate our sam-
ple between savedand failedbanks, since a dynamic risk - adjusted
index, such as the one we suggest, is found to capture with a higher
degree of precision current and future bank - prots. Last but not least,
we present indicative empirical evidence which highlights the statistical
signicance of our index in contrast to the characteristic insignicance
of the standard prot e¢ ciency index when they are jointly taken into
account. In addition, we show that in various cases where both indexes
coexist in the same model, the variable of banks estimates deriving
from the conventional prot e¢ ciency measure contradicts with funda-
mental assumptions that underlie the theory of prot e¢ ciency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 explains
the theoretical framework between bank e¢ ciency and stability and
species the model. Section 4.3 discusses our empirical methodology
while section 4.4 describes the data. Section 4.5 presents the empirical
evidence and robustness tests as well, while the nal section concludes.
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4.2 Theoretical Framework: Bank e¢ ciency
and stability
4.2.1 How e¢ cient are bank e¢ ciency tests?
On a theoretical ground, we would expect that e¢ cient banks would
fulll two conditions; to produce the amount of output which maximizes
prots or minimizes costs (economic e¢ ciency) and to mix output and
inputs to obtain the maximum prot or minimum cost at the lowest
possible risk. In other words, to combine the portfolio in such a way
that they can reach a point on the e¢ cient frontier.
However, we pointed out above that e¢ ciency and stability may
not be complementary but substitutes. Higher productivity today may
be achieved by undertaking excessive risks, and this may weaken the
stability of the bank. With this in mind, we argue that current measures
of e¢ ciency do not take into account this trade-o¤.
Traditionally, a bank has been dened in terms of its twin functions,
i.e. providing credit and o¤ering demand deposits, or more generally,
payment services. In addition to macroeconomic risks, bank loans to
a large corporate client have a number of embedded risks such as the
risk that interest rates will rise reducing the present value of future
repayments or the risk that the client rm will default. However, loans
provide more predictable expected revenues than non-interest income,
such as fees, commissions and trading income. Thus, the latter are more
closely related to the conditions in the capital and nancial markets,
and therefore are subject to more rapid changes than interest income.
Similarly, retail or core deposits tend to di¤er from other forms of
bank funding because they are primarily held for their liquidity services
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and, in addition, are covered by deposit insurance. So, deposit fund-
ing tends to carry lower risks than non-deposit funding in causing a
potential liquidity crisis. In addition, deposit and non-deposit funding
are di¤erent in terms of the speed and size of changes in funding costs.
Specically, the volume and price of wholesale funding, can adjust more
quickly to reect banks riskiness, and in some cases to reect only the
investorssentiments.
Nevertheless, in the last decade there has been an unprecedented
expansion of non-lending and non-deposit activities on banksbalance
sheets fuelled very often by leverage.
Indeed, DemirgucKunt and Huizinga (2010) document that, as a
result of the changing nature of the banks, in the period 1999-2007 the
fee income share increased from 33% to 38% of total operating income.
The overall trend in the non-deposit funding share has been downward
over the same period, but this result is due to the decreasing trend of
the commercial banks not of the other banks: reliance on non-deposit
funding by investment banks and other banks has increased signicantly
until 2007.
This is due to the fact that, banks rationally pursue prots in
booms, and accept book losses in busts, as money making opportunities
in booms are so attractive. In busts, banks hold on to securities because
of expected capital gains, rather than liquidate them and make fresh
loans to new projects. But if banks borrow short term to underwrite
securities that nance long term projects, they might not be able to
maintain those investments on their books should economic conditons
do not improve. Banks wish to hold on to these undervalued securities,
but they are forced to liquidate by creditors. Leverage promotes a fur-
ther expansion of balance sheets in boom times, and generally increases
the cyclicality of investment and prots. In addition, leverage leads to
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liquidations of bank portfolios at prices below fundamental values in
bad times.
Another source of the boom lending and risk in the last decade is
due to securitization. Relative to direct lending, securitization raises
the level of investment, but also cyclicality of prots and the balance
sheet. In addition, it transmits uctuations in investor sentiment into
commercial banking and the real economy (Shleifer and Vishny, 2009).
Moreover, Rajan (2005) pointed out another channel of increasing
risk in banking activity due to securitization. Risk transfer from the
banks to the markets by securitization increases also the average risk
of the loans, due to the fact that banks expand lending by nancing
lower quality projects.
So, there are countervailing e¤ects of an increasing share of non-
deposit funding and non-lending activities in the balance sheet. On
one hand, banks can grow faster; on the other hand, it makes banking
strategies that rely predominantly on generating noninterest income or
attracting nondeposit funding very risky. As a matter of fact, the empir-
ical evidence supports the view that banks that rely on fee-generating
activities to a greater extent are subject to greater risk (Demirguc
Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). Moreover, in a recent paper Beltratti and
Stulz (2012) show that more leveraged banks at the outset of the crisis
performed worst during the crisis, which strengthens our belief that
bank e¢ ciency tests should account for leverage.
With this in mind, we suggest a new prot e¢ ciency index which ac-
counts for both an ex post and ex ante indicator of risk. Specically, we
introduce two di¤erent types of risks: the rst (1) is credit risk which
is captured by the ratio of each banks Non-Performing Loans(NPLs)
to its total loans(TLs) and represents and ex post risk indicator; the
second (2) is the risk deriving from excessive leverage and reects an
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ex ante risk indicator as it captures to what extend the bank is vul-
nerable to adverse economic conditions. It is measured by the ratio of
each banks total assets to its overall level of equity capital (i.e. the
sum of common equity, non-controlling interest, securities revaluation
reserves and other accumulated comprehensive income). The proposed
prot e¢ cient indicator is expressed in the following way:
ln(i=i) = f(pi; qi) + ln 1i + ln2i + ln vi   lnui (4.2.1)
4.2.2 Model Specication
A critical discussion of the two mostly used approaches for measur-
ing and dening inputs and outputs has been done by Berger and
Humphrey (1997). They conclude that despite the fact that none of
them is ideal, the production approach is preferable when we want to
evaluate the e¢ ciency of branches of nancial institutions, whereas the
intermediation approach is preferable when we want to analyse the ef-
ciency of the whole nancial institution. Therefore, in line with the
vast and established literature regarding the determinants of cost e¢ -
ciency in banking (Berger 2007), we specify the cost kernel components
that represent the intermediation approach of banks used by Sealey
and Lindley (1977) to dene inputs and output1. In the present study
we specify the two mainstream types of outputs as total loans (q1) and
total earning assets (q2). Additionally, we specify as our three types
of inputs: (1) the total intermediated funds (F ), which consists of sav-
ings accounts, current accounts, time deposits, repurchase agreements
and alternative funding sources, (2) the labor (L), which refers to the
1 The key di¤erence between the two approaches, is that production approach
treats deposits as outputs, whereas intermediation approach treats them as inputs.
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manpower involved in the operations of the all the credit institutions
in the sample and (3) the physical capital depreciation and amortiza-
tion (K), which consists of xed assets, including tangible xed assets
(land, buildings, o¢ ce equipment, etc., less depreciation) and intan-
gible assets (software, underwriting expenses, research expenses, etc.).
We measure the price of input (p1) by using the ratio of interest ex-
penses to total deposits and short term funding. Also we measure the
price of input (p2) by using the ratio of sta¤ expenses to total assets.
Lastly we measure the price of input (p3) by using the ratio of fee and
commission expenses added to administration expenses to xed assets.
As dependent variable we use total prots before tax (PBT ).
At this point it is of crucial importance to discuss the problem of
the possible negative values of the dependent variable. Theoretically
our model assumes that PBT 2 R, nevertheless, lnPBT is not dened
if PBT 2 R , where PBT [ 1; 0]. In order to tackle the issue of
negative prots (losses) we follow the approach proposed by Bos and
Koetter (2011) that allows to use all of the available information in
the sample. Specically, we left-censor PBT , but assign a value of
one to those banks with PBTit 2 R . In order to include all informa-
tion available on the censored part of PBT and to this end specify an
additional independent variable NPI (for Negative Prot Indicator).
Consequently, we dene NPI to be equal to one for observations where
PBT 2 R+ and equal to the absolute value of PBT for a loss incurring
bank.
The nal specication of our prot stochastic frontier model takes
the following log-linear form which represents a logarithmic transfor-
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mation of a Cobb-Douglas production function:
ln(PBTit=(it)) = a0 +
2X
l=1
aql ln qit;l +
2X
s=1
aps ln pit;s + aNPI lnNPIit
+a1 ln(1it + 1) + a2 ln(2it) + uit   vit (4.2.2)
2. We note that linear homogeneity in input prices, has to be im-
posed a priori for the estimation of the prot frontier to develop appro-
prietely. This requires:
3X
s=1
aps = 1 (4.2.3)
In turn, linear homogeneity restrictions are imposed on all input prices
and the dependent variable with respect to one of the input prices.
Here we use the price of physical capital depreciation and amortization
(p3) as a numeraire.
4.3 Empirical Methodology
4.3.1 Transition of Banks
First, we compare the standard prot e¢ ciency index with our sug-
gested risk - adjusted index in terms of the robustness of the bank-
specic prot e¢ ciency scores they produce within di¤erent time peri-
ods. To pursue this analysis for each of the two prot e¢ ciency indexes,
we create three di¤erent in terms of range Markov transition matrices3,
2 1 is a constant added to the ratio of each banks Non-Performing Loans(NPLs)
to total loans(TLs) in order to enable it to be treated logarithmically.
3 A Markov transition matrix derives from a Markov chain which is a math-
ematical system that undergoes transitions from one state to another on a state
space.
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i.e., deciles, quartiles and half-tiles4 and allocate each bank within
each category according to its prot e¢ ciency score. Thus, the least
prot e¢ cient banks are classied in the lowest half-tiles, quartiles, and
deciles whereas the most e¢ cient banks in the sample are allocated in
the top of each respective range. With this in mind, we investigate the
scale of deviation of the aforementioned ordering of banks with respect
to each index among di¤erent time horizons. Consequently, we account
for three di¤erent states of the economy; pre - crisis, during - crisis,
post - crisis. As far as the rst one is concerned, we examine the
deviation of bankse¢ ciency scores between 2003-2004 and 2005-2006,
in order to test the robustness of each prot index in tranquil peri-
ods. The reasoning behind this, is to test the whether the performance
of the two prot e¢ ciency indicators is di¤erent when the impact of
the nancial turmoil is not taken into account. In the same spirit, we
are interested in capturing potential changes that may have occurred
during the recent nancial turmoil and to investigate which index is
able to account for these changes more accurately. Hence, we compare
each indexs prot e¢ ciency estimates between 2005 -2006 and 2008 -
2009. Similarly, in the last couple of time periods that we select, we
compare the prot e¢ ciency scores of each index with respect to both
normal times (i.e, 2004-2006) and the aftermath of the nancial crisis
(i.e., 2010-2012).
4 For the sake of euphony half-tile refers to a two by two Markov transition
matrix.
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4.3.2 Explanatory & Predictive power
In the second step of our empirical strategy we address two issues:
Firstly, we examine which one of the two prot e¢ ciency indexes ex-
plains better the prots (PBT ) of banks in three di¤erent pre - crisis
time periods; i.e., 2003-2004, 2005-2006 and 2004-2006. Thus, the fol-
lowing regression equations are estimated:
lnPBTit = a0+a1 ln p1;it+a2 ln p2;it+a3 ln q1;it+a4 ln q2;it+a5 lnNPIit+a6PEit+"it
(4.3.1)
lnPBTit = a0 + a1 ln p1;it + a2 ln p2;it + a3 ln q1;it + a4 ln q2;it + a5 lnNPIit
+a61;it + a72;it + a8RiskadjPEit + "it; (4.3.2)
where PE and RiskadjPE reect the estimated level of prot ef-
ciency with respect to the conventional and the risk adjusted prot
e¢ ciency index and 1 and 2 refer to the ex post (i.e. credit risk) and
to the ex ante (i.e excessive leverage) indicator of risk.
Secondly, we compare the two indexes in terms of their forecasting
power. To be more precise by using the three aforementioned time
periods we investigate which prot e¢ ciency index can capture better
the growth of bank prots in a pre - crisis, during - crisisand post
- crisisstate of the economy respectively. In a similar manner as in
the rst step we employ the same the regression equations but with the
rudimentary di¤erence that the dependent variables value is calculated
at future point in time:
lnPBTi;t+n = a0+a1 ln p1;it+a2 ln p2;it+a3 ln q1;it+a4 ln q2;it+a5 lnNPIit+a6PEit+"it
(4.3.3)
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lnPBTi;t+n = a0 + a1 ln p1;it + a2 ln p2;it + a3 ln q1;it + a4 ln q2;it + a5 lnNPIit
+a61;it + a72;it + a8RiskadjPEit + "it (4.3.4)
In this way, we investigate which index could be more adequately
in line with the forthcoming distortion of the worlds nancial stability
and the tremendous impact it had on the e¢ ciency of various banking
systems in both developed and emerging markets. In both the issues
that we address (i.e. explanatory and predictive power of each index) we
allow for a simultaneous examination of the two prot e¢ ciency indexes
in order to capture any unobserved dynamics among them which is
represented by the following regression equation:
lnPBTit & i;t+n = a0 + a1 ln p1;it + a2 ln p2;it + a3 ln q1;it + a4 ln q2;it + a5 lnNPIit
+a61;it + a72;it + a8PEit + a9RiskadjPEit + "it (4.3.5)
4.3.3 Conditional Specication
In the nal step of our empirical methodology, we perform the same
analysis we did in the previous step, but with a neuralgic di¤erence: we
di¤erentiate our sample between banks that went bankrupt in the pe-
riod 2008-2009 and in those that managed to survive the rst impact of
the nancial turmoil. Additionally, to be able to capture any remaining
adverse contagion e¤ects, we account for the banks that became insol-
vent in the post crisis years (i.e., 2010-2011) and those who sustained
their viability in the aftermath of the crisis. In this way, we examine
which prot e¢ ciency measure can explain better the development of
banksprots in both categories (i.e., savedand failedbanks) not
just for the comparison of the pre - crisiswith respect to the during -
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crisisperiod (i.e.,2005-2006 vs. 2008-2009), but for the comparison of
the during - crisiswith respect to the post - crisisperiod as well (i.e.,
2008-2009 vs. 2010-2011). As before, we allow for the co-existence of
the two prot e¢ ciency benchmarks in every state of the economy.
4.4 Data
For the estimation of the model we use data that consists of an un-
balanced panel5 of all the commercial banks during the period 2003 -
2012 in the United States. Following the majority of empirical studies
in banking, we obtain the largest part of our bank-level data from the
Bankscope database of Bureau Van Dijks company. Any missing infor-
mation on the variables of interest is lled in from the o¢ cial websites
of the US banks and by the annual reports of the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System. Overall, our sample accounts for
a signicant market share in terms of assets, loans and deposits. More
precisely, the sample consists of 75,219 observations for 8,886 nancial
institutions.
At this point we highlight a number of crucial points that we take
into account in our data selection strategy. This strategy is of major
importance in terms of accuracy of the results and of the inferences
based on them. Regrettably it has been mistakenly disdained by the
bulk of the empirical studies that have used Bankscope database (see
Claessens and van Horen, 2012 and Clerides et. al 2013). To be more
precise, rst, we check both samples for double-counting observations.
5 We note that as far as the rst two empirical strategies; i.e., Transition of
Banksand Forecastingare concerned we use a strongly balanced panel in order to
make accurate comparisons of the two prot e¢ ciency indexes in all three di¤erent
states of the economy.
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Bankscope provides company account statements for banks and nan-
cial institutions across the world by collecting nancial statements with
both consolidation and unconsolidation status. We select the uncon-
solidated data6 and exclude the equivalent consolidated data to avoid
double counting the same nancial institution.
As a second step, we take into consideration mergers and acquisi-
tions (M&A). For this purpose we thoroughly went through all M&A
activities that took place in the past in both banking sectors so that
only the merged entity or the acquiring bank remains in the sample
after a take-over. As an intuitive example: assume that bank A and
bank B merged in 2006 to create a new entity, bank C, then the two
individual banks A and B are each included in the dataset until 2006.
From 2006 onwards, these two banksoperations are considered to be
terminated and the new bank (bank C) is included in the database. In
the same spirit, assume that bank A was acquired by bank B in 2006;
both banks are included in the database until 2006, with bank A then
becoming inactive after 2006 and bank B remaining active after 2006.
We obtain detailed information on mergers and acquisitions from the
Zephyr database of Bureau Van Dijks company.
All data are deated using the GDP deator (with 2005 as the
base year) obtained from the World Bank database and represented
in US Dollars. In addition to the two considerations in our data l-
tering process, we exclude observations of missing, negative or zero
values for inputs/outputs and control variables. Our nal unbalanced
sample accounts for 7,585 nancial institutions and 57,783 observations
(whereas the balanced sample accounts for 3,076 nancial institutions
and 30,760 observations) for the US commercial banking sector. Table
6 In cases where unconsolidated data were not available, we chose consolidated
data instead.
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4.1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables that we use in the
estimation of the prot frontier kernel for the US commercial banking
sector. Even though we use natural logarithms of variables in the prot
kernel components (these represent the intermediation technology) in
order to compute the e¢ ciency scores, we show the mean and standard
deviations in levels to be more informative.
4.5 Empirical Results
4.5.1 Transition of Banks
Tables 4.2.a, 4.3.a, 4.4.a regarding the standard prot e¢ ciency index
and 4.2.b, 4.3.b, 4.4.b regarding the risk adjusted prot index display
the exact number of banks that changed position with respect to the
pre - crisisstate of the economy and among the three Markov tran-
sition matrices ; half-tiles, quartiles, and deciles respectively. In the
same spirit tables 4.5.a,b; 4.6.a,b; 4.7.a,b and 4.8.a,b; 4.9.a,b; 4.10.a.b
display the exact same information with respect to during - crisisand
post - crisisstate of the economy. Additionally, we report the proba-
bility and the standard error for each possible location in these di¤er-
ent matrices7. The empirical evidence demonstrates that in all three
considered economic periods (i.e, 2003-2004 vs. 2005-2006; 2005-2006
vs. 2008-2009; 2004-2006 vs. 2010-2012 ) there is less deviation in
7 We use the subscripts i and ii with respect to the tables of the probability and
the standard errors of each specic movement scenario that can occur and corre-
sponds to the table that displays the numbers of banks for each potential event.
Thus tables 4.2.a.i and 4.2.a.ii represent the probability of a multinomial distrib-
ution and the standard error (computed in a multinomial distribution framework)
respectively of the number of banks that move in the half-tile matrix between the
2003-2004 and 2005-2006 periods whose prot e¢ ciency has been measured by the
standard in the literature prot e¢ ciency index.
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the ordering of banks with respect to their e¢ cient scores that derive
from our suggested risk-adjusted prot e¢ ciency index compared to
the baseline index. This result is unequivocally supported in all three
di¤erent Markov - matrices as well. The superiority of the risk-adjusted
prot index becomes more apparent when we examine two considerably
extreme scenarios of banks prot e¢ ciency transition. To be more pre-
cise, we focus on how many banks move from the top 50% in the rst
time framework to the lowest position in terms of e¢ ciency scores in
the preceding time period for each respective matrix; i.e., from deciles
10, 9, 8, 7, 6; from quartiles 4,3 and from half-tile 2 in time t, to
the rst (i.e., 1) decile/quartile/half-tile in time t+ 1. The results indi-
cate that fewer banks followed this extreme transition when their prot
e¢ ciency is estimated by our proposed index. This holds when we ac-
count for the reverse movement scenario as well; i.e., from the lowest
50 % to the top 10%, 25% and 50% for deciles, quartiles and half-tiles
respectively. Its noteworthy that when we examine the di¤erence in
the number of banks that move in the two opposite in direction ex-
treme (i.e., from the most e¢ cient position to the lowest one and vice-
versa) scenarios with respect to each index, each Markov matrix (i.e.,
decile/quartile/half-tile) gives a di¤erent results depending on the eco-
nomic conditions. Precisely, the di¤erence among the two prot indexes
based on the half-tile Matrix is larger when we compare them in normal
times as far as the movement from the top 50% to the lowest e¢ cient
scores is concerned, while the reverse direction (i.e., from the lowest
to the highest 50% with respect to e¢ ciency scores) exhibits its bigger
di¤erence among the two indexes in the preand during the crisis
comparison. The empirical evidence from the decile Markov transition
matrix displays a similar picture regarding the former direction (i.e.,
from the lowest to the highest) while as far the reverse direction is con-
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cerned, the results highlight the superiority of the risk-adjusted index
between the preand postcrisis comparison. As far as the quartile
Markov transition matrix is concerned, the empirical evidence favours
our proposed prot index among the preand postcrisis and during
normal times comparison for top - bottomand bottom-topdirection
respectively.
4.5.2 Forecasting
Tables 4.11.a, 4.12.a, 4.13.a as far as the conventional measure of prot
e¢ ciency is concerned and 4.11.b, 4.12.b, 4.13.b as far as the proposed
risk-adjusted prot e¢ ciency index is concerned present the explana-
tory power of each index in three distinct pre - crisis time periods
; i.e., 2003-2004, 2005-2006 and 2004-2006. Regarding the rst time
frame, by looking at tables 4.11.a and 4.11.b, we note that albeit both
indexes are statistically signicant in explaining banksprots, we note
that the model that includes the risk-adjusted prot e¢ ciency index
has smaller values in both information criterion (AIC and BIC) and
slightly higher value in both R2 and adjR2. This holds in the two ad-
ditional time periods 2005-2006 and 2004-2006 (see tables 4.12.a vs.
4.12.b and 4.13.a vs. 4.13.b). Tables 4.11.c 4.12.c and 4.13.c display
information of the explanatory power of a model with respect to the
pre - crisisbanksprots that includes both prot e¢ ciency indexes.
The empirical evidence unequivocally in all three time frame highlights
the fact that in the joint presence of both indexes in the model, the
risk-adjusted is the only statistically signicant one while the ordinary
prot index becomes insignicant.
Turning to the predictive power of each index, tables 4.14.a, 4.15.a,
4.16.a regarding the standard prot e¢ ciency measure and 4.14.b, 4.15.b,
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4.16.b regarding our proposed prot e¢ ciency measure display empiri-
cal evidence for all three di¤erent states of the economy; pre - crisis,
during - crisis, post - crisisrespectively. As far as the rst time pe-
riod is concerned, where we use the estimated scores from both indexes
in 2003-2004 to examine how well they explain the futurebanksprof-
its in 2005-2006, the results are in favour of our index, as it has smaller
values in both information criteria and it produces less mean square
and absolute forecasting error (i.e., MSE and MAE) and higher R2
and adjR2 as well. As before, we present the exact same picture with
respect to the superior predictive power of our index in explaining fu-
ture banks prots in both during - crisis (2008-2009) and post -
crisis(2010-2012) period by using estimated prot e¢ ciency values in
2005-2006 and 2004-2006 respectively. In tables 4.14.c, 4.15.c and 4.16.c
we present the regression results for the same empirical analysis as we
did before but this time we include the estimated prot e¢ ciency scores
from both indexes simultaneously. As far the remaining two states of
the economy (i.e. post - crisis and during - crisis) are concerned,
despite the fact that both indexes are found to be statistically signif-
icant in both time frameworks we note that the conventional index is
insignicant at the 1% level. An intrinsic nding is that specically
in the during - crisis(2008-2009) period we highlight a negative rela-
tionship between the standard prot index and the banksprots. This
result is of major importance as it violates the fundamental theoretical
concepts of prot e¢ ciency which states that the most prot e¢ cient
bank is the one that manages to adopt a prot maximizing combination
of inputs and outputs (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Thus, in an oxy-
moron way the empirical evidence with respect to the estimated prot
e¢ ciency by the standard index indicates that an increase in banks
prot e¢ ciency provokes a reductionin banksprots. This clearly
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signals the superiority of the risk - adjusted prot e¢ ciency index.
4.5.3 Conditional Specication
Tables 4.17.a.i, 4.18.a.i, 4.19.a.i with respect to the conventional prot
e¢ ciency index and 4.17.b.i, 4.18.b.i, 4.19.b.i with respect to the risk
- adjusted index shed light on the explanatory power of these indexes
with regards to: the banksprots in 2005-2006 of the nancial insti-
tutions that remain solvent in 2008-2009 period, the banksprots in
2005-2006 of the nancial institutions that remain solvent in 2010-2011
period and the banksprots in 2008-2009 of the nancial institutions
that remain solvent in 2010-2011 period respectively. Unequivocally,
in all three cases of the solventnancial institutions and in all three
states of the economy as well, both indexes are found to be statistical
signicant, nonetheless in all cases the model that includes the risk - ad-
justed index has smaller values in both information criterion and higher
values of both R2 and adjR2. Then we analyse the results displayed
in tables 4.17.c.i, 4.18.c.i and 4.19.c.i where we include both indexes in
the same model. It is noteworthy that in all cases the proposed prot
e¢ ciency index is statistically signicant, whereas the conventional one
only in the last category, where once again we report, an oxymoron in
terms of theoretical concepts, negative relationship between the esti-
mated prot e¢ ciency based on the ceremonious index and the banks
prots (see Table 4.19.c.i). This nding amplies our beliefs in the ap-
propriateness of our suggested index. Tables 4.17.a.ii, 4.18.a.ii, 4.19.a.ii
and 4.17.b.ii, 4.18.b.ii, 4.19.b.ii are di¤erecianted in the same manner
with the only di¤erence being that they report information regarding
the banksprots of the nancial institutions that they went bankrupt
in the same time periods, as before in the case of the savedcounter-
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parties. In line with the aforementioned set of results (i.e. the nancial
institutions that remained solvent throughout the di¤erent phases of
the crisis) both prot e¢ ciency indicators and in all di¤erent examined
scenarios are found to contribute signicantly in explaining the banks
rents of those nancial intermediaries that went bankrupt in either dur-
ing the crisis or in the aftermath of it. Additionally, all models that
include the estimated prot e¢ ciency levels by the risk - adjusted prot
index are characterized by higher values of R2 and adjR2 and lower val-
ues of AIC and BIC. This supports in greater extent the superiority
of our index in terms of its explanatory power. When we investigate
the dynamics of the joint presence of both indexes regarding the in-
solvent, in the period of during - crisisand post - crisis, nancial
institutions we report, in tables 4.17.c.ii, 4.18.c.ii, 4.19.c.ii, once again
a negative relationship between banks prots with the prot e¢ ciency
scores estimated using the conventional approach. Moreover, we note
that only the estimated risk - adjusted prot e¢ ciency score is found
to be statistically signicant in all the considered cases.
Tables 4.20.a.i, 4.21.a.i, 4.22.a.i in regards to the baseline prot
e¢ ciency index and 4.20.b.i, 4.21.b.i, 4.22.b.i in regards to the new
proposed index present the empirical evidence with respect to the pre-
dictive power of both indexes in the pre - crisis, during - crisis, post
- crisisrespectively, as far as the banks that managed to confront the
tremendous deteriorating e¤ects of the recent nancial turmoil are con-
cerned. To be more precise, we explore the forecasting power of both
indexes by using the estimated prot e¢ ciency levels in 2005-2006 to
explain the level of banksprots in 2008-2009 and in 2010-2011 and
the estimated prot e¢ ciency scores in 2008-2009 in regards to the
level of banksrents in 2010-2011 for the banks that are found to be
solvent in the aftermath of the crisis. In all these three forecasting
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scenarios, the results indicate that both indexes are signicant from a
statistical perspective point of view, nevertheless, the model that in-
cludes the estimated prot e¢ ciency scores variable that derives from
the risk adjusted index, reports in all cases smaller forecasting error,
smaller values in both information criterion and higher values of R2
and adjR2. In tables 4.20.c.i, 4.21.c.i, 4.22.c.i, we report the empirical
evidence when we account for both indexes in the same model. We
report a statistical signicant prot e¢ ciency variable stemming from
both the conventional and the risk-adjusted prot e¢ ciency indicator
in all forecasting scenarios. What is even more most interesting out-
come, is the fact that in all three scenarios it is found a violation of the
prot e¢ ciency theoretical foundations with respect to the accustomed
in the literature index since we report a negative relationship between
the conventionally estimated prot e¢ ciency scores and the prots of
banks. Tables 4.20.a.ii, 4.21.a.ii, 4.22.a.ii as far as the commonly used
prot e¢ ciency index is concerned and 4.20.b.ii, 4.21.b.ii, 4.22.b.ii as
far as the suggested index, convey the empirical evidence of the pre-
dictability power of both prot e¢ ciency measures in all three di¤erent
state of economy, regarding the banks that became insolvent either at
during-crisis(2008-2009) or post-crisis(2010-2012) period. Speci-
cally, we examine the forecasting power of both indexes by using the
estimated prot e¢ ciency levels rst in 2005-2006 to explain the level
of banksrents of the institutions that went bankrupt just after 2009
and second in 2010-2011 in regards to the nancial institutions that
went bankrupt just after 2011. Additionally, we explore the predictive
power of the two indexes by using the estimated prot e¢ ciency scores
in 2008-2009 with respect to the level of banksrents in 2010-2011 for
the banks that failed after 2011. As in the case of the savedbanks
we found that in all three scenarios both indexes are found to be sta-
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tistical signicant, nevertheless, the model that has as an explanatory
variable, the level of the estimated prot e¢ ciency scores that derives
from the risk - adjusted prot index, produces a smaller forecasting er-
ror, a smaller information criterion and a better t of data, compared
to the model that incorporates the estimates of the standard prot e¢ -
ciency index as one of its explanatory variable with respect to the rents
of the banks whose nancial stability was fatally a¤ected by the recent
nancial turmoil. Last but not least, we explore the empirical evidence
of having both indexes as explanatory variables within the same model
for the same three aforementioned scenarios. The results presented in
tables 4.20.c.ii, 4.21.c.ii, 4.22.c.ii, highlight the superiority of our index
in two ways: On one hand, the coexistence of both indexes produces the
following inference: an increase in the bankslevel of prot e¢ ciency
measured by the conventional index, reduces the bankrents, while our
suggested prot e¢ ciency measure keeps its positive fundamental re-
lationship with the banks prots. On the other hand, estimates of
prot e¢ ciency scores based on our index are found to be statistically
signicant in all three forecasting scenarios, whereas this is rejected as
far the estimated prot e¢ ciency scores in 2005-2006 stemming from
the standard index (simultaneously with the respective ones of the new
index) are used to explain bankslevel or rents in 2008-2009 of those
nancial institutions that became insolvent just after 2009 (see table
4.20.c.ii).
4.5.4 Robustness checks
In order to test the precision of our empirical ndings we conduct var-
ious robustness tests. First of all following Berger and Mester (1997)
who highlight the importance of controlling for equity as its absence
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could yield a scale bias, and the e¢ ciency of banks could be mis-
measured even if they behave optimally given their risk preferences,
we include equity as a quasi-xed input to control for di¤erences in
risk preferences. The results remained unchanged in all three steps of
empirical strategy. It is acknowledged that equity capital is used in
the construction of our suggested risk - adjusted prot e¢ ciency in-
dex, consequently, in order to account for any endogeneity concerns we
include equity capital as an input only in the standard prot index.
Once again our inferences did not change signicantly with respect to
our three-step procedure of empirical analysis. Second we included in
both the estimation of both indexes a time trend (t) in each specica-
tion to allow for technological change, using both linear and quadratic
terms (t2). The results remained una¤ected. Third, we used an al-
ternative method (Berger and Mester 1997) to account for the banks
year observations that exhibit negative prots (i.e. losses) to the one
of Bos and Koetter (2011) and we estimate each single point in the
aforementioned empirical strategy. Precisely, the dependent variable in
the prot model is transformed to
ln(PBT+ j (PBT )min j +1)
where j (PBT )min j is the minimum absolute value of PBT over all
banks in the sample. The empirical evidence conrms consistency with
respect to the ordering of the banksestimated prot e¢ ciency scores
among both methods. Last but not least, we repeat each part of our
empirical strategy and in addition each one of the aforementioned ro-
bustness points, by estimating both prot e¢ ciency scores of both in-
dexes by using a multi-product translog specication instead of the less
exible Cobb - Douglas function. Most of the core results remain un-
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changed8. Thus we are condent that the aforementioned empirical
inferences which highlight the higher explanatory and predictability
power as well of our suggested risk - adjusted prot e¢ ciency measure,
are extracted with a high degree of condence.
4.6 Conclusion
The recent nancial turmoil has distorted the stability of various bank-
ing systems and triggered numerous bank failures even of nancial insti-
tutions that were considered highly e¢ cient. In this paper we attempt
to shed light on the trade - o¤between nancial stability and e¢ ciency.
We highlight that current tests of banking e¢ ciency do not take into
account whether bank managers are taking too much or too little risk
relative to the value maximising amount. With this in mind, a new
risk-adjusted prot e¢ ciency measure is proposed which accounts for
the level of each banks credit risk and leverage. We apply a three step
comparison between the conventional prot e¢ ciency measure and our
risk - adjusted prot e¢ ciency index in a sample of US commercial
banks. First we examine the robustness of the bank-specic prot ef-
ciency scores these indexes produce within three di¤erent states of
the economy; pre - crisis, during - crisis, post - crisis. Second, we
explore which index explains more accurately banksprots in three
di¤erent pre - crisistime periods; i.e., 2003-2004, 2005-2006 and 2004-
2006. Additionally, we compare their forecasting power by examining
which of the measure captures better the growth of future banksrents.
8 In a few cases as far as the failed institutions in the post crisis scenario are con-
cerned, convergence was failed due to a limited sample, since fewer banks became in-
solvent after 2011 and the post crisis scenario consists only of two year-observations
(i.e 2010, 2011).
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Last but not least, we compare the explanatory and forecasting power
of both prot e¢ ciency measures with respect to two di¤erent banks
categories: nancial institutions that failed either during the crisis or
during the aftermath of the crisis and nancial institutions that remain
solvent uo to present.
The empirical evidence illustrated by the Markov transition matri-
ces indicates that in all three considered economic periods (i.e., 2003-
2004 vs. 2005-2006; 2005-2006 vs. 2008-2009; 2004-2006 vs. 2010-2012)
the new risk - adjusted prot e¢ ciency index produces considerably
more robust bank-specic estimates than the standard index especially
in extreme scenarios. In other words, for all three stages around the
crisis, the variance of prot e¢ ciency estimates derived by our pro-
posed risk-adjusted indicator is considerably smaller than the one that
is produced by the conventional indicator or prot e¢ ciency. Moreover,
the results indicate that a model which has as an explanatory variable
prot e¢ ciency estimates deriving from our proposed index has both
superior explanatory and predictive power in all periods around the
crisis. The newrisk-adjusted prot e¢ ciency measure has the edge
with respect to the explanatory and forecasting power of both solvent
and insolvent nancial institutionsprots as well. Our extracted em-
pirical inferences remain unchanged after various robustness tests. The
main policy implication of our suggested index is that it suggests that
moving from an intermediary bank type balance sheet to an investment
bank type not only changes the risk-return combination of the balance
sheet but also increases the banks degree of instability, that is the
probability of insolvency when adverse e¤ects occur. Therefore, regu-
latory authorities may need to exert caution in assessing the e¢ ciency
of banks, a prerequisite for the nancial stability.
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4.7 Appendix
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of the variables of interest.
 Kernel  Variable Mean St. Dev Percentiles
5th 95th
Profit before tax PBT 392.932 38.422 317.365 468.499
Price of borrowed funds p1 0.0199 0.0003 0.0192 0.0205
Price of labor p2 0.0586 0.0001 0.0584 0.0588
Price of physical capital p3 1.2709 0.0333 1.2058 1.3361
Total loans q1 996.3432 63.2001 872.4707 1120.216
Total earning assets q2 523.6729 53.5262 418.7613 628.5846
Credit Risk σ1 0.0189 63.2001 0.01863 0.0192
Leverage σ2 10.4105 0.0286 10.3543 10.4666
Notes: This table refers to 57,597 observations and 7,585 US commercial banks between 2003-2012.
The table reports descriptive statistics of the kernel variables used in the estimation of the stochastic
profit frontier model. All variables are deflated using 2005 as a base year. Kernel variables consist
of  the dependent variable, i.e. profits before tax (PBT), inputs prices (p), output quantities (q) and
the two risk indicators (σ).
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Table 4.2.a - Number of Banks (Half-tiles)
2003-2004
1 1211 327
2 327 1211
2005-2006 1 2
Note: This table presents information about the number of banks
that changed their relative position with respect to their profit
efficiency ranking deriving from the standard index from the
sub-period 2003-2004 to 2005-2006. The model is
																							ln(PBT{it})=f(p{it},q{it})+v{it}-u{it}
where the dependent variable PBT represents profit before tax
(PBT) and the independent variables p and q reflect inputs prices
(i.e. borrowed funds, labor and physical capital) and output
quantities (i.e. loans and earning assets) respectively. Half-tile '1'
and '2' consists of banks with the lowest and highest profit
efficiency levels respectively.
Table 4.2.a.i - Probability of each event (%)
2003-2004
1 39.37 10.63
2 10.63 39.37
2005-2006 1 2
Note: This table reports the banks' probability of transition to each
specific half-tile as explained in table 4.2.a.
Table 4.2.a.ii - Standard error of each prob.
2003-2004
1 0.49 0.31
2 0.31 0.49
2005-2006 1 2
Note: This table reports the standard error of the banks' probability
of transition to each specific half-tile as explained in tables 4.2.a
and 4.2.a.i.
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Table 4.2.b - Number of Banks (Half-tiles)
2003-2004
1 1195 343
2 343 1195
2005-2006 1 2
Note: This table presents information about the number of banks
that changed their relative position with respect to their profit
efficiency ranking deriving from the risk-adjusted index from the
sub-period 2003-2004 to 2005-2006. The model is
				ln(PBT{it}/σ)=f(p{it},q{it})+NPLs{it}/TLs{it}+L+v{it}-u{it}
where the dependent variable PBT represents profit before tax
(PBT) and the independent variables p and q reflect inputs prices
(i.e. borrowed funds, labor and physical capital) and output
quantities (i.e. loans and earning assets) respectively. 'NPLs'
(i.e. Non-Performing Loans) and 'L' (i.e. Leverage) account for an
ex post' and 'ex-ante' indicator of risk respectively.  Half-tile '1' and
2' consists of banks with the lowest and highest profit efficiency levels
respectively.
Table 4.2.b.i - Probability of each event (%)
2003-2004
1 38.85 11.15
2 11.15 38.85
2005-2006 1 2
Note: This table reports the banks' probability of transition to each
specific half-tile as explained in table 4.2.b.
Table 4.2.b.ii - Standard error of each prob.
2003-2004
1 0.49 0.31
2 0.31 0.49
2005-2006 1 2
Note: This table reports the standard error of the banks' probability
of transition to each specific half-tile as explained in tables 4.2.b
and 4.2.b.i.
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Table 4.3.a - Number of Banks (Quartiles)
2003-2004
1 519 181 55 14
2 171 340 199 59
3 57 195 336 181
4 22 53 179 515
2005-2006 1 2 3 4
Note: This table presents information about the number of banks
that changed their relative position with respect to their profit
efficiency ranking deriving from the standard index from the
sub-period 2003-2004 to 2005-2006. The model is
																							ln(PBT{it})=f(p{it},q{it})+v{it}-u{it}
where the dependent variable PBT represents profit before tax
(PBT) and the independent variables p and q reflect inputs prices
(i.e. borrowed funds, labor and physical capital) and output
quantities (i.e. loans and earning assets) respectively. Quartile '1'
and '4' consists of banks with the lowest and highest profit
efficiency levels respectively.
Table 4.3.a.i - Probability of each event (%)
2003-2004
1 16.87 5.88 1.79 0.46
2 5.56 11.05 6.47 1.92
3 1.85 6.34 10.92 5.88
4 0.72 1.72 5.82 16.74
2005-2006 1 2 3 4
Note: This table reports the banks' probability of transition to each
specific quartile as explained in table 4.3.a.
Table 4.3.a.ii - Standard error of each prob.
2003-2004
1 0.37 0.24 0.13 0.07
2 0.23 0.31 0.25 0.14
3 0.13 0.24 0.31 0.24
4 0.08 0.13 0.23 0.37
2005-2006 1 2 3 4
Note: This table reports the standard error of the banks' probability
of transition to each specific quartile as explained in tables 4.3.a
and 4.3.a.i.
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Table 4.3.b - Number of Banks (Quartiles)
2003-2004
1 517 174 66 12
2 169 335 191 74
3 60 200 330 179
4 23 60 182 504
2005-2006 1 2 3 4
Note: This table presents information about the number of banks
that changed their relative position with respect to their profit
efficiency ranking deriving from the risk-adjusted index from the
sub-period 2003-2004 to 2005-2006. The model is
						ln(PBT{it}/σ)=f(p{it},q{it})+NPLs{it}/TLs{it}+L+v{it}-u{it}
where the dependent variable PBT represents profit before tax
(PBT) and the independent variables p and q reflect inputs prices
(i.e. borrowed funds, labor and physical capital) and output
quantities (i.e. loans and earning assets) respectively. 'NPLs'
(i.e. Non-Performing Loans) and 'L' (i.e. Leverage) account for an
ex post' and 'ex-ante' indicator of risk respectively.  Quartile '1' and
4' consists of banks with the lowest and highest profit efficiency levels
respectively.
Table 4.3.b.i - Probability of each event (%)
2003-2004
1 16.81 5.66 2.15 0.39
2 5.49 10.89 6.21 2.41
3 1.95 6.5 10.73 5.82
4 0.75 1.95 5.92 16.38
2005-2006 1 2 3 4
Note: This table reports the banks' probability of transition to each
specific half-tile as explained in table 4.3.b.
Table 4.3.b.ii - Standard error of each prob.
2003-2004
1 0.37 0.23 0.14 0.06
2 0.23 0.31 0.24 0.15
3 0.14 0.25 0.31 0.23
4 0.09 0.14 0.24 0.37
2005-2006 1 2 3 4
Note: This table reports the standard error of the banks' probability
of transition to each specific half-tile as explained in tables 4.3.b
and 4.3.b.i.
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Table 4.4.a - Number of Banks (Deciles)
2003-2004
1 161 60 27 26 13 4 8 2 4 2
2 69 96 62 36 21 13 7 1 2 0
3 30 64 71 48 33 29 10 16 5 1
4 12 31 48 52 67 31 31 22 10 5
5 12 25 40 58 50 54 23 25 16 6
6 9 16 20 32 50 65 41 38 31 7
7 3 4 18 29 31 50 77 52 28 16
8 9 6 12 18 29 34 50 62 61 26
9 0 1 7 7 9 19 44 60 92 68
10 3 4 2 2 6 10 17 29 58 176
2005-2006 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Note: This table presents information about the number of banks that changed their relative position with
respect to their profit efficiency ranking deriving from the standard index from the sub-period 2003-2004 to
2005-2006. The model is
																																																																									ln(PBT{it})=f(p{it},q{it})+v{it}-u{it}
where the dependent variable PBT represents profit before tax (PBT) and the independent variables p and q
reflect inputs prices (i.e. borrowed funds, labor and physical capital) and output quantities (i.e. loans and
earning assets) respectively. Decile '1' and '10' consists of banks with the lowest and highest profit efficiency
levels respectively.
Table 4.4.a.i - Probability of each event (%)
2003-2004
1 5.23 1.95 0.88 0.85 0.42 0.13 0.26 0.07 0.13 0.07
2 2.24 3.12 2.02 1.17 0.68 0.42 0.23 0.03 0.07 0
3 0.98 2.08 2.31 1.56 1.07 0.94 0.33 0.52 0.16 0.03
4 0.39 1.01 1.56 1.69 2.18 1.01 1.01 0.72 0.33 0.16
5 0.39 0.81 1.3 1.89 1.63 1.76 0.75 0.81 0.52 0.2
6 0.29 0.52 0.65 1.04 1.63 2.11 1.33 1.24 1.01 0.23
7 0.1 0.13 0.59 0.94 1.01 1.63 2.5 1.69 0.91 0.52
8 0.29 0.2 0.39 0.59 0.94 1.11 1.63 2.02 1.98 0.85
9 0 0.03 0.23 0.23 0.29 0.62 1.43 1.95 2.99 2.21
10 0.1 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.2 0.33 0.55 0.94 1.89 5.72
2005-2006 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Note: This table reports the banks' probability of transition to each specific decile as explained in table 4.4.a.
Table 4.4.a.ii - Standard error of each prob.
2003-2004
1 0.22 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03
2 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.03 0
3 0.1 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.1 0.1 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.02
4 0.06 0.1 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.1 0.1 0.08 0.06 0.04
5 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.04
6 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.1 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.1 0.05
7 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.1 0.1 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.09 0.07
8 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.1 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.09
9 0 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.15
10 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.1 0.14 0.23
2005-2006 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Note: This table reports the standard error of the banks' probability of transition to each specific decile as
explained in tables 4.4.a and 4.4.a.i.
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Table 4.4.b - Number of Banks (Deciles)
2003-2004
1 157 66 28 21 12 8 7 4 0 4
2 75 90 62 29 22 18 7 2 2 0
3 27 67 70 47 32 20 24 11 8 1
4 19 30 47 64 52 39 29 17 5 6
5 10 18 30 54 66 45 27 30 19 10
6 4 21 31 31 46 60 54 25 28 9
7 6 1 19 34 37 41 54 55 43 18
8 6 7 9 16 24 47 55 66 52 25
9 0 4 6 10 14 21 35 66 88 63
10 3 3 5 2 4 10 16 31 62 171
2005-2006 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Note: This table presents information about the number of banks that changed their relative position with
respect to their profit efficiency ranking deriving from the standard index from the sub-period 2003-2004 to
2005-2006. The model is
																																																ln(PBT{it}/σ)=f(p{it},q{it})+NPLs{it}/TLs{it}+L+v{it}-u{it}
where the dependent variable PBT represents profit before tax (PBT) and the independent variables p and q
reflect inputs prices (i.e. borrowed funds, labor and physical capital) and output quantities (i.e. loans and
earning assets) respectively. Decile '1' and '10' consists of banks with the lowest and highest profit efficiency
levels respectively.
Table 4.4.b.i - Probability of each event (%)
2003-2004
1 5.1 2.15 0.91 0.68 0.39 0.26 0.23 0.13 0 0.13
2 2.44 2.93 2.02 0.94 0.72 0.59 0.23 0.07 0.07 0
3 0.88 2.18 2.28 1.53 1.04 0.65 0.78 0.36 0.26 0.03
4 0.62 0.98 1.53 2.08 1.69 1.27 0.94 0.55 0.16 0.2
5 0.33 0.59 0.98 1.76 2.15 1.46 0.88 0.98 0.62 0.33
6 0.13 0.68 1.01 1.01 1.5 1.95 1.76 0.81 0.91 0.29
7 0.2 0.03 0.62 1.11 1.2 1.33 1.76 1.79 1.4 0.59
8 0.2 0.23 0.29 0.52 0.78 1.53 1.79 2.15 1.69 0.81
9 0 0.13 0.2 0.33 0.46 0.68 1.14 2.15 2.86 2.05
10 0.1 0.1 0.16 0.07 0.13 0.33 0.52 1.01 2.02 5.56
2005-2006 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Note: This table reports the banks' probability of transition to each specific decile as explained in table 4.4.b.
Table 4.4.b.ii - Standard error of each prob.
2003-2004
1 0.22 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0 0.04
2 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.1 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.03 0
3 0.09 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.1 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.02
4 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.1 0.07 0.04 0.04
5 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.1 0.08 0.06
6 0.04 0.08 0.1 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.05
7 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.1 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.08
8 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.09
9 0 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.14
10 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.1 0.14 0.23
2005-2006 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Note: This table reports the standard error of the banks' probability of transition to each specific decile as
explained in tables 4.4.b and 4.4.b.i.
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Table 4.5.a - Number of Banks (Half-tiles)
2005-2006
1 1053 485
2 485 1053
2008-2009 1 2
Note: This table presents information about the number of banks
that changed their relative position with respect to their profit
efficiency ranking deriving from the standard index from the
sub-period 2005-2006 to 2008-2009. The model is
																							ln(PBT{it})=f(p{it},q{it})+v{it}-u{it}
where the dependent variable PBT represents profit before tax
(PBT) and the independent variables p and q reflect inputs prices
(i.e. borrowed funds, labor and physical capital) and output
quantities (i.e. loans and earning assets) respectively. Half-tile '1'
and '2' consists of banks with the lowest and highest profit
efficiency levels respectively.
Table 4.5.a.i - Probability of each event (%)
2005-2006
1 34.23 15.77
2 15.77 34.23
2008-2009 1 2
Note: This table reports the banks' probability of transition to each
specific half-tile as explained in table 4.5.a.
Table 4.5.a.ii - Standard error of each prob.
2005-2006
1 0.47 0.36
2 0.36 0.47
2008-2009 1 2
Note: This table reports the standard error of the banks' probability
of transition to each specific half-tile as explained in tables 4.5.a
and 4.5.a.i.
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Table 4.5.b - Number of Banks (Half-tiles)
2005-2006
1 1056 456
2 482 1059
2008-2009
Note: This table presents information about the number of banks
that changed their relative position with respect to their profit
efficiency ranking deriving from the risk-adjusted index from the
sub-period 2005-2006 to 2008-2009. The model is
				ln(PBT{it}/σ)=f(p{it},q{it})+NPLs{it}/TLs{it}+L+v{it}-u{it}
where the dependent variable PBT represents profit before tax
(PBT) and the independent variables p and q reflect inputs prices
(i.e. borrowed funds, labor and physical capital) and output
quantities (i.e. loans and earning assets) respectively. 'NPLs'
(i.e. Non-Performing Loans) and 'L' (i.e. Leverage) account for an
ex post' and 'ex-ante' indicator of risk respectively.  Half-tile '1' and
2' consists of banks with the lowest and highest profit efficiency levels
respectively.
Table 4.5.b.i - Probability of each event (%)
2005-2006
1 34.33 14.82
2 15.67 34.43
2008-2009 1 2
Note: This table reports the banks' probability of transition to each
specific half-tile as explained in table 4.5.b.
Table 4.5.b.ii - Standard error of each prob.
2005-2006
1 0.47 0.36
2 0.36 0.48
2008-2009 1 2
Note: This table reports the standard error of the banks' probability
of transition to each specific half-tile as explained in tables 4.5.b
and 4.5.b.i.
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Table 4.6.a - Number of Banks (Quartiles)
2005-2006
1 379 252 100 38
2 187 235 235 112
3 126 169 259 215
4 77 113 175 404
2008-2009 1 2 3 4
Note: This table presents information about the number of banks
that changed their relative position with respect to their profit
efficiency ranking deriving from the standard index from the
sub-period 2005-2006 to 2008-2009. The model is
																															ln(PBT{it})=f(p{it},q{it})+v{it}-u{it}
where the dependent variable PBT represents profit before tax
(PBT) and the independent variables p and q reflect inputs prices
(i.e. borrowed funds, labor and physical capital) and output
quantities (i.e. loans and earning assets) respectively. Quartile '1'
and '4' consists of banks with the lowest and highest profit
efficiency levels respectively.
Table 4.6.a.i - Probability of each event (%)
2005-2006
1 12.32 8.19 3.25 1.24
2 6.08 7.64 7.64 3.64
3 4.1 5.49 8.42 6.99
4 2.5 3.67 5.69 13.13
2008-2009 1 2 3 4
Note: This table reports the banks' probability of transition to each
specific quartile as explained in table 4.6.a.
Table 4.6.a.ii - Standard error of each prob.
2005-2006
1 0.33 0.27 0.18 0.11
2 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.19
3 0.2 0.23 0.28 0.25
4 0.16 0.19 0.23 0.34
2008-2009 1 2 3 4
Note: This table reports the standard error of the banks' probability
of transition to each specific quartile as explained in tables 4.6.a
and 4.6.a.i.
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Table 4.6.b - Number of Banks (Quartiles)
2003-2004
1 391 241 97 40
2 179 245 231 114
3 124 169 267 209
4 75 114 174 406
2005-2006 1 2 3 4
Note: This table presents information about the number of banks
that changed their relative position with respect to their profit
efficiency ranking deriving from the risk-adjusted index from the
sub-period 2005-2006 to 2008-2009. The model is
						ln(PBT{it}/σ)=f(p{it},q{it})+NPLs{it}/TLs{it}+L+v{it}-u{it}
where the dependent variable PBT represents profit before tax
(PBT) and the independent variables p and q reflect inputs prices
(i.e. borrowed funds, labor and physical capital) and output
quantities (i.e. loans and earning assets) respectively. 'NPLs'
(i.e. Non-Performing Loans) and 'L' (i.e. Leverage) account for an
ex post' and 'ex-ante' indicator of risk respectively.  Quartile '1' and
4' consists of banks with the lowest and highest profit efficiency levels
respectively.
Table 4.6.b.i - Probability of each event (%)
2003-2004
1 12.71 7.83 3.15 1.3
2 5.82 7.96 7.51 3.71
3 4.03 5.49 8.68 6.79
4 2.44 3.71 5.66 13.2
2005-2006 1 2 3 4
Note: This table reports the banks' probability of transition to each
specific half-tile as explained in table 4.6.b.
Table 4.6.b.ii - Standard error of each prob.
2003-2004
1 0.33 0.27 0.17 0.11
2 0.23 0.27 0.26 0.19
3 0.2 0.23 0.28 0.25
4 0.15 0.19 0.23 0.34
2005-2006 1 2 3 4
Note: This table reports the standard error of the banks' probability
of transition to each specific half-tile as explained in tables 4.6.b
and 4.6.b.i.
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Table 4.7.a - Number of Banks (Deciles)
2005-2006
1 106 72 41 36 22 8 6 12 2 2
2 47 56 54 47 36 31 16 13 5 2
3 31 37 40 51 49 32 27 26 13 1
4 29 25 41 42 37 38 35 24 28 9
5 28 25 33 33 35 39 40 41 26 9
6 16 28 32 27 35 43 45 42 30 11
7 18 18 18 25 28 37 51 44 46 23
8 14 18 17 20 28 33 31 44 62 40
9 8 13 20 13 27 24 29 36 54 83
10 10 15 11 14 12 24 28 25 41 127
2008-2009 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Note: This table presents information about the number of banks that changed their relative position with
respect to their profit efficiency ranking deriving from the standard index from the sub-period 2005-2006 to
2008-2009. The model is
																																																																									ln(PBT{it})=f(p{it},q{it})+v{it}-u{it}
where the dependent variable PBT represents profit before tax (PBT) and the independent variables p and q
reflect inputs prices (i.e. borrowed funds, labor and physical capital) and output quantities (i.e. loans and
earning assets) respectively. Decile '1' and '10' consists of banks with the lowest and highest profit efficiency
levels respectively.
Table 4.7.a.i - Probability of each event (%)
2005-2006
1 3.45 2.34 1.33 1.17 0.72 0.26 0.2 0.39 0.07 0.07
2 1.53 1.82 1.76 1.53 1.17 1.01 0.52 0.42 0.16 0.07
3 1.01 1.2 1.3 1.66 1.59 1.04 0.88 0.85 0.42 0.03
4 0.94 0.81 1.33 1.37 1.2 1.24 1.14 0.78 0.91 0.29
5 0.91 0.81 1.07 1.07 1.14 1.27 1.3 1.33 0.85 0.29
6 0.52 0.91 1.04 0.88 1.14 1.4 1.46 1.37 0.98 0.36
7 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.81 0.91 1.2 1.66 1.43 1.5 0.75
8 0.46 0.59 0.55 0.65 0.91 1.07 1.01 1.43 2.02 1.3
9 0.26 0.42 0.65 0.42 0.88 0.78 0.94 1.17 1.76 2.7
10 0.33 0.49 0.36 0.46 0.39 0.78 0.91 0.81 1.33 4.13
2008-2009 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Note: This table reports the banks' probability of transition to each specific decile as explained in table 4.7.a.
Table 4.7.a.ii - Standard error of each prob.
2005-2006
1 0.18 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.03
2 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.03
3 0.1 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.1 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.02
4 0.1 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.05
5 0.09 0.09 0.1 0.1 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.05
6 0.07 0.09 0.1 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.1 0.06
7 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.09
8 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.11
9 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.13 0.16
10 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.11 0
2008-2009 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Note: This table reports the standard error of the banks' probability of transition to each specific decile as
explained in tables 4.7.a and 4.7.a.i.
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Table 4.7.b - Number of Banks (Deciles)
2005-2006
1 100 84 40 34 19 11 4 4 9 2
2 53 54 50 45 39 29 12 16 5 4
3 28 37 52 54 46 25 33 20 11 1
4 31 24 37 44 41 40 37 25 20 9
5 24 23 33 28 36 43 44 35 32 11
6 19 28 26 23 38 42 50 42 35 6
7 21 20 23 24 25 39 42 44 39 31
8 16 15 16 21 23 31 36 61 52 36
9 8 14 21 13 23 27 26 37 58 80
10 7 8 9 22 19 22 24 23 46 127
2008-2009 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Note: This table presents information about the number of banks that changed their relative position with
respect to their profit efficiency ranking deriving from the standard index from the sub-period 2005-2006 to
2008-2009. The model is
																																																ln(PBT{it}/σ)=f(p{it},q{it})+NPLs{it}/TLs{it}+L+v{it}-u{it}
where the dependent variable PBT represents profit before tax (PBT) and the independent variables p and q
reflect inputs prices (i.e. borrowed funds, labor and physical capital) and output quantities (i.e. loans and
earning assets) respectively. Decile '1' and '10' consists of banks with the lowest and highest profit efficiency
levels respectively.
Table 4.7.b.i - Probability of each event (%)
2005-2006
1 3.25 2.73 1.3 1.11 0.62 0.36 0.13 0.13 0.29 0.07
2 1.72 1.76 1.63 1.46 1.27 0.94 0.39 0.52 0.16 0.13
3 0.91 1.2 1.69 1.76 1.5 0.81 1.07 0.65 0.36 0.03
4 1.01 0.78 1.2 1.43 1.33 1.3 1.2 0.81 0.65 0.29
5 0.78 0.75 1.07 0.91 1.17 1.4 1.43 1.14 1.04 0.36
6 0.62 0.91 0.85 0.75 1.24 1.37 1.63 1.37 1.14 0.2
7 0.68 0.65 0.75 0.78 0.81 1.27 1.37 1.43 1.27 1.01
8 0.52 0.49 0.52 0.68 0.75 1.01 1.17 1.98 1.69 1.17
9 0.26 0.46 0.68 0.42 0.75 0.88 0.85 1.2 1.89 2.6
10 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.72 0.62 0.72 0.78 0.75 1.5 4.13
2008-2009 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Note: This table reports the banks' probability of transition to each specific decile as explained in table 4.7.b.
Table 4.7.b.ii - Standard error of each prob.
2005-2006
1 0.18 0.16 0.11 0.1 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03
2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.04
3 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.1 0.08 0.06 0.02
4 0.1 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.05
5 0.09 0.09 0.1 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.06
6 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.04
7 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.1
8 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.11
9 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.16
10 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.2
2008-2009 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Note: This table reports the standard error of the banks' probability of transition to each specific decile as
explained in tables 4.7.b and 4.7.b.i.
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Table 4.8.a - Number of Banks (Half-tiles)
2004-2006
1 993 545
2 545 993
2010-2012 1 2
Note: This table presents information about the number of banks
that changed their relative position with respect to their profit
efficiency ranking deriving from the standard index from the
sub-period 2004-2006 to 2010-2012. The model is
																							ln(PBT{it})=f(p{it},q{it})+v{it}-u{it}
where the dependent variable PBT represents profit before tax
(PBT) and the independent variables p and q reflect inputs prices
(i.e. borrowed funds, labor and physical capital) and output
quantities (i.e. loans and earning assets) respectively. Half-tile '1'
and '2' consists of banks with the lowest and highest profit
efficiency levels respectively.
Table 4.8.a.i - Probability of each event (%)
2004-2006
1 32.28 17.72
2 17.72 32.28
2010-2012 1 2
Note: This table reports the banks' probability of transition to each
specific half-tile as explained in table 4.8.a.
Table 4.8.a.ii - Standard error of each prob.
2004-2006
1 0.47 0.38
2 0.38 0.47
2010-2012 1 2
Note: This table reports the standard error of the banks' probability
of transition to each specific half-tile as explained in tables 4.8.a
and 4.8.a.i.
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Table 4.8.b - Number of Banks (Half-tiles)
2004-2006
1 1019 519
2 519 1019
2010-2012 1 2
Note: This table presents information about the number of banks
that changed their relative position with respect to their profit
efficiency ranking deriving from the risk-adjusted index from the
sub-period 2004-2006 to 2010-2012. The model is
				ln(PBT{it}/σ)=f(p{it},q{it})+NPLs{it}/TLs{it}+L+v{it}-u{it}
where the dependent variable PBT represents profit before tax
(PBT) and the independent variables p and q reflect inputs prices
(i.e. borrowed funds, labor and physical capital) and output
quantities (i.e. loans and earning assets) respectively. 'NPLs'
(i.e. Non-Performing Loans) and 'L' (i.e. Leverage) account for an
ex post' and 'ex-ante' indicator of risk respectively.  Half-tile '1' and
2' consists of banks with the lowest and highest profit efficiency levels
respectively.
Table 4.8.b.i - Probability of each event (%)
2004-2006
1 33.13 16.87
2 16.87 33.13
2010-2012 1 2
Note: This table reports the banks' probability of transition to each
specific half-tile as explained in table 4.8.b.
Table 4.8.b.ii - Standard error of each prob.
2004-2006
1 0.47 0.37
2 0.37 0.47
2010-2012 1 2
Note: This table reports the standard error of the banks' probability
of transition to each specific half-tile as explained in tables 4.8.b
and 4.8.b.i.
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Table 4.9.a - Number of Banks (Quartiles)
2004-2006
1 342 250 134 43
2 179 222 233 135
3 131 168 249 221
4 117 129 153 370
2010-2012 1 2 3 4
Note: This table presents information about the number of banks
that changed their relative position with respect to their profit
efficiency ranking deriving from the standard index from the
sub-period 2004-2006 to 2010-2012. The model is
																															ln(PBT{it})=f(p{it},q{it})+v{it}-u{it}
where the dependent variable PBT represents profit before tax
(PBT) and the independent variables p and q reflect inputs prices
(i.e. borrowed funds, labor and physical capital) and output
quantities (i.e. loans and earning assets) respectively. Quartile '1'
and '4' consists of banks with the lowest and highest profit
efficiency levels respectively.
Table 4.9.a.i - Probability of each event (%)
2004-2006
1 11.12 8.13 4.36 1.4
2 5.82 7.22 7.57 4.39
3 4.26 5.46 8.09 7.18
4 3.8 4.19 4.97 12.03
2010-2012 1 2 3 4
Note: This table reports the banks' probability of transition to each
specific quartile as explained in table 4.9.a.
Table 4.9.a.ii - Standard error of each prob.
2004-2006
1 0.31 0.27 0.2 0.12
2 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.2
3 0.2 0.23 0.27 0.26
4 0.19 0.2 0.22 0.33
2010-2012 1 2 3 4
Note: This table reports the standard error of the banks' probability
of transition to each specific quartile as explained in tables 4.9.a
and 4.9.a.i.
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Table 4.9.b - Number of Banks (Quartiles)
2004-2006
1 375 235 108 51
2 160 249 225 135
3 122 158 262 227
4 112 127 174 356
2010-2012 1 2 3 4
Note: This table presents information about the number of banks
that changed their relative position with respect to their profit
efficiency ranking deriving from the risk-adjusted index from the
sub-period 2004-2006 to 2010-2012. The model is
						ln(PBT{it}/σ)=f(p{it},q{it})+NPLs{it}/TLs{it}+L+v{it}-u{it}
where the dependent variable PBT represents profit before tax
(PBT) and the independent variables p and q reflect inputs prices
(i.e. borrowed funds, labor and physical capital) and output
quantities (i.e. loans and earning assets) respectively. 'NPLs'
(i.e. Non-Performing Loans) and 'L' (i.e. Leverage) account for an
ex post' and 'ex-ante' indicator of risk respectively.  Quartile '1' and
4' consists of banks with the lowest and highest profit efficiency levels
respectively.
Table 4.9.b.i - Probability of each event (%)
2004-2006
1 12.19 7.64 3.51 1.66
2 5.2 8.09 7.31 4.39
3 3.97 5.14 8.52 7.38
4 3.64 4.13 5.66 11.57
2010-2012 1 2 3 4
Note: This table reports the banks' probability of transition to each
specific half-tile as explained in table 4.9.b.
Table 4.9.b.ii - Standard error of each prob.
2004-2006
1 0.33 0.27 0.18 0.13
2 0.22 0.27 0.26 0.2
3 0.2 0.22 0.28 0.26
4 0.19 0.2 0.23 0.32
2010-2012 1 2 3 4
Note: This table reports the standard error of the banks' probability
of transition to each specific half-tile as explained in tables 4.9.b
and 4.9.b.i.
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Table 4.10.a - Number of Banks (Deciles)
2004-2006
1 83 69 50 43 25 17 6 2 7 5
2 49 36 52 57 34 30 25 12 8 4
3 28 36 38 37 45 53 22 22 16 10
4 25 36 25 28 48 40 36 31 25 14
5 24 31 32 22 40 39 46 29 27 19
6 17 31 24 30 32 41 38 43 37 16
7 24 19 24 20 28 32 42 40 42 37
8 21 16 21 23 25 24 35 45 53 44
9 14 15 20 26 15 21 36 53 48 59
10 22 18 21 22 17 12 22 30 44 99
2010-2012 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Note: This table presents information about the number of banks that changed their relative position with
respect to their profit efficiency ranking deriving from the standard index from the sub-period 2004-2006 to
2010-2012. The model is
																																																																									ln(PBT{it})=f(p{it},q{it})+v{it}-u{it}
where the dependent variable PBT represents profit before tax (PBT) and the independent variables p and q
reflect inputs prices (i.e. borrowed funds, labor and physical capital) and output quantities (i.e. loans and
earning assets) respectively. Decile '1' and '10' consists of banks with the lowest and highest profit efficiency
levels respectively.
Table 4.10.a.i - Probability of each event (%)
2004-2006
1 2.7 2.24 1.63 1.4 0.81 0.55 0.2 0.07 0.23 0.16
2 1.59 1.17 1.69 1.85 1.11 0.98 0.81 0.39 0.26 0.13
3 0.91 1.17 1.24 1.2 1.46 1.72 0.72 0.72 0.52 0.33
4 0.81 1.17 0.81 0.91 1.56 1.3 1.17 1.01 0.81 0.46
5 0.78 1.01 1.04 0.72 1.3 1.27 1.5 0.94 0.88 0.62
6 0.55 1.01 0.78 0.98 1.04 1.33 1.24 1.4 1.2 0.52
7 0.78 0.62 0.78 0.65 0.91 1.04 1.37 1.3 1.37 1.2
8 0.68 0.52 0.68 0.75 0.81 0.78 1.14 1.46 1.72 1.43
9 0.46 0.49 0.65 0.85 0.49 0.68 1.17 1.72 1.56 1.92
10 0.72 0.59 0.68 0.72 0.55 0.39 0.72 0.98 1.43 3.22
2010-2012 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Note: This table reports the banks' probability of transition to each specific decile as explained in table 4.10.a.
Table 4.10.a.ii - Standard error of each prob.
2004-2006
1 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04
2 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.1 0.1 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.04
3 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06
4 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.07
5 0.09 0.1 0.1 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.1 0.09 0.08
6 0.07 0.1 0.09 0.1 0.1 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.07
7 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11
8 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.12
9 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.14
10 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.18
2010-2012 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Note: This table reports the standard error of the banks' probability of transition to each specific decile as
explained in tables 4.10.a and 4.10.a.i.
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Table 4.10.b - Number of Banks (Deciles)
2004-2006
1 89 77 44 36 24 16 4 5 5 7
2 58 46 54 42 37 24 16 15 9 6
3 30 38 38 40 51 34 30 17 13 16
4 23 35 23 45 41 47 38 26 25 5
5 14 25 30 41 38 33 40 39 31 18
6 24 24 24 17 35 46 47 37 31 24
7 18 20 23 29 27 35 41 37 50 28
8 13 10 25 22 18 38 39 46 54 42
9 20 19 19 20 17 26 36 46 47 57
10 18 13 27 16 21 10 17 39 42 104
2010-2012 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Note: This table presents information about the number of banks that changed their relative position with
respect to their profit efficiency ranking deriving from the standard index from the sub-period 2004-2006 to
2010-2012. The model is
																																																ln(PBT{it}/σ)=f(p{it},q{it})+NPLs{it}/TLs{it}+L+v{it}-u{it}
where the dependent variable PBT represents profit before tax (PBT) and the independent variables p and q
reflect inputs prices (i.e. borrowed funds, labor and physical capital) and output quantities (i.e. loans and
earning assets) respectively. Decile '1' and '10' consists of banks with the lowest and highest profit efficiency
levels respectively.
Table 4.10.b.i - Probability of each event (%)
2004-2006
1 2.89 2.5 1.43 1.17 0.78 0.52 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.23
2 1.89 1.5 1.76 1.37 1.2 0.78 0.52 0.49 0.29 0.2
3 0.98 1.24 1.24 1.3 1.66 1.11 0.98 0.55 0.42 0.52
4 0.75 1.14 0.75 1.46 1.33 1.53 1.24 0.85 0.81 0.16
5 0.46 0.81 0.98 1.33 1.24 1.07 1.3 1.27 1.01 0.59
6 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.55 1.14 1.5 1.53 1.2 1.01 0.78
7 0.59 0.65 0.75 0.94 0.88 1.14 1.33 1.2 1.63 0.91
8 0.42 0.33 0.81 0.72 0.59 1.24 1.27 1.5 1.76 1.37
9 0.65 0.62 0.62 0.65 0.55 0.85 1.17 1.5 1.53 1.85
10 0.59 0.42 0.88 0.52 0.68 0.33 0.55 1.27 1.37 3.38
2010-2012 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Note: This table reports the banks' probability of transition to each specific decile as explained in table 4.10.b.
Table 4.10.b.ii - Standard error of each prob.
2004-2006
1 0.17 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
2 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.04
3 0.1 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.1 0.1 0.07 0.06 0.07
4 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.04
5 0.07 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.11 0.1 0.11 0.11 0.1 0.08
6 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.09
7 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.09
8 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.12
9 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13
10 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.18
2010-2012 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Note: This table reports the standard error of the banks' probability of transition to each specific decile as
explained in tables 4.10.b and 4.10.b.i.
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Table 4.11.a -  Explanatory Power (Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 6.355 -9.24
lnp2 5.311 -3.39
lnq1 0.629 145.61
lnq2 0.249 52.79
lnNPI -0.782 -0.56
lnPE 2.32 77.49
Intercept -4.356 -189.2
R-squared 0.9679
Adj R-squared 0.9679
F value 30920.17
AIC -3168.858
BIC -3121.786
Observations 6152
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent
variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the profit efficiency level
estimated by the conventional profit efficiency index (PE) during the period 2003 - 2004. The model is
																															lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6PE+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.11.b -  Explanatory Power (With Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 6.832 35.02
lnp2 5.217 62.13
lnq1 0.643 185.47
lnq2 0.245 78.95
lnNPI -0.719 -32.01
lnσ1 -4.19 -15.42
lnσ2 -0.282 -28.17
lnRiskadj PE 2.286 174.5
Intercept -3.762 -140.85
R-squared 0.9688
Adj R-squared 0.9687
F value 23769.94
AIC -3339.53
BIC -3279.02
Observations 6152
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent
variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the profit efficiency level
estimated by the risk-adjusted profit efficiency index (RiskadjPE) during the period  2003 - 2004. The model is
										lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.11.c -  Explanatory Power (With & Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 6.74242 34.22
lnp2 5.229748 62.25
lnq1 0.6396195 177.74
lnq2 0.2460867 78.96
lnNPI -0.7285963 -32.17
lnσ1 -3.550622 -10.47
lnσ2 -0.2228062 -10.52
lnPE 0.4924921 1.15
lnRiskadj PE 1.801845 11.69
Intercept -3.884564 -82.16
R-squared 0.9688
Adj R-squared 0.9688
F value 21160.66
AIC -3347.453
BIC -3280.224
Observations 6152
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent
variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the profit efficiency level
estimated by both the conventional (PE) and the risk-adjusted index (RiskadjPE) during the period 2003 - 2004.
The model is
lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8PEit+a9RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.12.a -  Explanatory Power (Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 3.412835 20.53
lnp2 4.97556 53.77
lnq1 0.6897809 182.86
lnq2 0.1997642 56.09
lnNPI -0.9781478 -29.1
lnPE 2.380831 173.75
Intercept -4.508334 -275.71
R-squared 0.9646
Adj R-squared 0.9646
F value 30920.17
AIC -1825.649
BIC -1778.578
Observations 6152
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent
variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the profit efficiency level
estimated by the conventional profit efficiency index (PE) during the period 2005 - 2006. The model is
																															lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6PE+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.12.b -  Explanatory Power (With Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 3.786887 22.99
lnp2 4.815141 52.57
lnq1 0.6928146 184.35
lnq2 0.201067 56.85
lnNPI -0.9753453 -29.41
lnσ1 -7.111705 -20.36
lnσ2 -0.3243116 -30.44
lnRiskadj PE 2.350867 173.17
Intercept -3.760162 -130.05
R-squared 0.9655
Adj R-squared 0.9655
F value 21461.74
AIC -2010.555
BIC -1950.052
Observations 6152
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent
variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the profit efficiency level
estimated by the risk-adjusted profit efficiency index (RiskadjPE) during the period  2005 - 2006. The model is
										lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.12.c -  Explanatory Power (With & Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 3.714126 22.43
lnp2 4.842894 52.77
lnq1 0.69205 184.11
lnq2 0.2008189 56.84
lnNPI -0.9746925 -29.43
lnσ1 -5.797857 -11.91
lnσ2 -0.2548981 -12.23
lnPE 0.5368337 0.87
lnRiskadj PE 1.822932 13.31
Intercept -3.919492 -77.97
R-squared 0.9656
Adj R-squared 0.9656
F value 19122.32
AIC -2023.558
BIC -1956.332
Observations 6152
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent
variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the profit efficiency level
estimated by both the conventional (PE) and the risk-adjusted index (RiskadjPE) during the period 2005 - 2006.
The model is
lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8PEit+a9RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.13.a -  Explanatory Power (Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 2.773101 17.57
lnp2 5.33497 62.74
lnq1 0.659424 185.71
lnq2 0.2104386 63.57
lnNPI -0.9407045 -32.7
lnPE 2.314552 171.42
Intercept -4.235353 -281.2
R-squared 0.951
Adj R-squared 0.9509
F value 29813.09
AIC -323.048
BIC -259.716
Observations 9228
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent
variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the profit efficiency level
estimated by the conventional profit efficiency index (PE) during the period 2004 - 2006. The model is
																															lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6PE+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.13.b -  Explanatory Power (With Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 2.992359 19.15
lnp2 5.237133 62.17
lnq1 0.663727 186.79
lnq2 0.214565 65.06
lnNPI -0.93569 -32.9
lnσ1 -6.10242 -18.69
lnσ2 -0.28927 -28.37
lnRiskadj PE 2.266391 171.27
Intercept -3.59452 -131.17
R-squared 0.9523
Adj R-squared 0.9522
F value 22945.77
AIC -327.102
BIC -262.947
Observations 9228
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent
variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the profit efficiency level
estimated by the risk-adjusted profit efficiency index (RiskadjPE) during the period  2004 - 2006. The model is
										lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.13.c -  Explanatory Power (With & Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 2.978969 19.03
lnp2 5.241282 62.19
lnq1 0.66329 186.09
lnq2 0.214194 64.78
lnNPI -0.93492 -32.87
lnσ1 -5.71923 -13.95
lnσ2 -0.26481 -14.06
lnPE 0.209187 1.55
lnRiskadj PE 2.062555 15.56
Intercept -3.6478 -82.83
R-squared 0.9688
Adj R-squared 0.9688
F value 20399.59
AIC -327.492
BIC -256.209
Observations 9228
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent
variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the profit efficiency level
estimated by both the conventional (PE) and the risk-adjusted index (RiskadjPE) during the period 2004 - 2006.
The model is
lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8PEit+a9RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.14.a -  Predictive Power (Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 0.537054 20.53
lnp2 0.93687 53.77
lnq1 1.097112 182.86
lnq2 0.802212 56.09
lnNPI 1.250745 29.1
lnPE 1.026267 173.75
Intercept -4.50833 -275.71
R-squared 0.9646
Adj R-squared 0.9646
F value 27896.39
AIC -1825.65
BIC -1778.58
MSE 0.043417
MAE 0.133035
Observations 6152
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent
variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2005-2006 and the reggressors are estimated values during
the period 2003 - 2004. The profit efficiency level is estimated by the conventional profit efficiency index (PE).
The model is
																															lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6PE+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator. MSE and MAE stand for Mean Square Error and Mean Absolutely
 Error respectively.
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Table 4.14.b - Predictive Power (With Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 0.554275 22.99
lnp2 0.92295 52.57
lnq1 1.077968 184.35
lnq2 0.82007 56.85
lnNPI 1.355611 29.41
lnσ1 1.697113 20.36
lnσ2 1.151466 30.44
lnRiskadj PE 1.028568 173.17
Intercept -3.76016 -130.05
R-squared 0.9655
Adj R-squared 0.9655
F value 21461.74
AIC -2010.56
BIC -1950.05
MSE 0.042077
MAE 0.130262
Observations 6152
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent
variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2005-2006 and the reggressors are estimated values during
the period 2003 - 2004. The profit efficiency level estimated by the risk-adjusted profit efficiency index
(RiskadjPE). The model is
										lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator. MSE and MAE stand for Mean Square Error and Mean Absolutely
 Error respectively.
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Table 4.14.c -  Predictive Power (With & Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 0.543625 22.43
lnp2 0.92827 52.77
lnq1 1.076778 184.11
lnq2 0.819058 56.84
lnNPI 1.354704 29.43
lnσ1 1.383581 11.91
lnσ2 0.905014 12.23
lnPE 0.231405 0.87
lnRiskadj PE 0.797582 13.31
Intercept -3.91949 -77.97
R-squared 0.9656
Adj R-squared 0.9656
F value 19122.32
AIC -2023.56
BIC -1956.33
Observations 6152
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent
variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2005-2006 and the reggressors are estimated values during
the period 2003 - 2004. The profit efficiency level is estimated by both the conventional (PE) and the risk-
adjusted profit efficiency index (RiskadjPE). The model is
lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8PEit+a9RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.15.a -  Predictive Power (Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 0.501226 5.43
lnp2 1.082966 33.93
lnq1 0.783005 81.53
lnq2 1.046238 35.21
lnNPI 0.710211 118.46
lnPE 1.393904 129.83
Intercept -4.69172 -149.54
R-squared 0.8913
Adj R-squared 0.8912
F value 6286.08
AIC 5504.216
BIC 5564.722
MSE 0.143038
MAE 0.256737
Observations 6152
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent
variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2008-2009 and the reggressors are estimated values during
the period 2005 - 2006. The profit efficiency level is estimated by the conventional profit efficiency index (PE).
The model is
																															lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6PE+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.15.b - Predictive Power (With Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 0.493095 5.84
lnp2 1.10292 33.1
lnq1 0.811878 83.02
lnq2 0.998054 32.98
lnNPI 0.680999 102.46
lnσ1 0.459795 15.73
lnσ2 0.438879 7.03
lnRiskadj PE 1.4107 125.13
Intercept -4.47963 -79.39
R-squared 0.8932
Adj R-squared 0.8931
F value 8568.89
AIC 5409.356
BIC 5456.428
MSE 0.140736
MAE 0.254154
Observations 6152
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent
variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2008-2009 and the reggressors are estimated values during
the period 2005-2006. The profit efficiency level is estimated by the risk-adjusted profit efficiency index
(RiskadjPE). The model is
										lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator. MSE and MAE stand for Mean Square Error and Mean Absolutely
 Error respectively.
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Table 4.15.c -  Predictive Power (With & Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 0.494818 5.31
lnp2 1.080946 33.77
lnq1 0.788649 78.22
lnq2 1.036066 34.13
lnNPI 0.701778 101.22
lnσ1 0.11996 2.73
lnσ2 0.013733 0.18
lnPE -0.238572 -2.08
lnRiskadj PE 1.158203 10.28
Intercept -4.69242 -78.66
R-squared 0.893
Adj R-squared 0.893
F value 5694.77
AIC 5401.231
BIC 5468.461
Observations 6152
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent
variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2008-2009 and the reggressors are estimated values during
the period 2005-2006. The profit efficiency level is estimated by both the conventional (PE) and the risk-
adjusted profit efficiency index (RiskadjPE). The model is
lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8PEit+a9RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.16.a -  Predictive Power (Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 -0.13273 -1.69
lnp2 10.13347 66.23
lnq1 2.828794 123.22
lnq2 0.004358 52.42
lnNPI 0.639062 97.12
lnPE 1.193108 153.71
Intercept -4.5078 -207.82
R-squared 0.9202
Adj R-squared 0.9201
F value 17717.55
AIC 6566.479
BIC 6616.388
MSE 0.119098
MAE 0.233977
Observations 9228
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent
variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2010-2012 and the reggressors are estimated values during
the period 2004 - 2006. The profit efficiency level is estimated by the conventional profit efficiency index (PE).
The model is
																															lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6PE+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.16.b - Predictive Power (With Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 0.269428 1.96
lnp2 1.21732 64.12
lnq1 0.924924 128.8
lnq2 1.009884 49.92
lnNPI 0.59831 85.28
lnσ1 0.598909 32.56
lnσ2 0.993284 20.41
lnRiskadj PE 1.176718 146.27
Intercept -3.84217 -99.41
R-squared 0.9232
Adj R-squared 0.9231
F value 13844.45
AIC 6212.79
BIC 6276.955
MSE 0.114611
MAE 0.227207
Observations 9228
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent
variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2010-2012 and the reggressors are estimated values during
the period 2004-2006. The profit efficiency level is estimated by the risk-adjusted profit efficiency index
(RiskadjPE). The model is
										lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator. MSE and MAE stand for Mean Square Error and Mean Absolutely
 Error respectively.
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Table 4.16.c -  Predictive Power (With & Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 0.11555 1.48
lnp2 9.719735 64.03
lnq1 2.907151 126.89
lnq2 0.004153 49.99
lnNPI 0.59898 84.31
lnσ1 0.528423 17.22
lnσ2 0.872332 13.55
lnPE 0.160277 2.17
lnRiskadj PE 1.019586 18.41
Intercept -3.92247 -82.21
R-squared 0.9233
Adj R-squared 0.9232
F value 12316.75
AIC 6206.558
BIC 6277.852
Observations 9228
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent
variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2010-2012 and the reggressors are estimated values during
the period 2004-2006. The profit efficiency level is estimated by both the conventional (PE) and the risk-
adjusted profit efficiency index (RiskadjPE). The model is
lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8PEit+a9RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.17.a.i -  Explanatory Power (Saved - Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 2.355353 18.16
lnp2 4.141994 59.1
lnq1 0.606738 211.1
lnq2 0.224642 80.38
lnNPI -0.53211 -42.85
lnPE 2.62758 221.94
Intercept -4.225 -342.66
R-squared 0.9575
Adj R-squared 0.9575
F value 41775.62
AIC -1.72329
BIC 49.50165
Observations 11135
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'solvent' banks after
2009, where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the
profit efficiency level estimated by the conventional profit efficiency index (PE) during the period 2005 - 2006.
The model is
																															lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6PE+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.17.b.i -  Explanatory Power (Saved - With Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 2.970881 23.17
lnp2 3.958462 57.4
lnq1 0.629261 219.2
lnq2 0.216429 78.1
lnNPI -0.5796 -47.16
lnσ1 -4.39324 -17.75
lnσ2 -0.31353 -42.15
lnRiskadj PE 2.588879 225.25
Intercept -3.55881 -184.52
R-squared 0.9596
Adj R-squared 0.9596
F value 32928.26
AIC -591.064
BIC -525.241
Observations 11135
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'solvent' banks after
2009, where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the
profit efficiency level estimated by the risk-adjusted profit efficiency index (RiskadjPE) during the period 2005 -
2006. The model is
										lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.17.c.i -  Explanatory Power (Saved - With & Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 2.962167 22.75
lnp2 3.960305 57.29
lnq1 0.628913 209.1
lnq2 0.216545 77.69
lnNPI -0.57893 -46.65
lnσ1 -4.32582 -14.31
lnσ2 -0.30844 -20.49
lnPE 0.052312 0.39
lnRiskadj PE 2.537377 19.08
Intercept -3.56962 -105.51
R-squared 0.9596
Adj R-squared 0.9596
F value 29267.34
AIC -589.215
BIC -516.079
Observations 11135
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'solvent' banks after
2009, where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the
profit efficiency level estimated by both the conventional (PE) and the risk-adjusted profit efficiency index
(RiskadjPE) during the period 2005 - 2006. The model is
lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8PEit+a9RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.17.a.ii -  Explanatory Power (Failed - Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 3.493156 5.54
lnp2 3.767304 10.62
lnq1 0.627934 50.61
lnq2 0.207265 18.77
lnNPI -0.49406 -7.84
lnPE 2.729469 52.51
Intercept -4.32778 -70.28
R-squared 0.9616
Adj R-squared 0.9609
F value 1421.8
AIC 77.26981
BIC 114.5094
Observations 467
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'insolvent' banks after
2009, where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the
profit efficiency level estimated by the conventional profit efficiency index (PE) during the period 2005 - 2006.
The model is
																															lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6PE+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.17.b.ii -  Explanatory Power (Failed - With Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 4.01251 6.1
lnp2 3.602417 9.79
lnq1 0.637722 49.61
lnq2 0.207278 17.68
lnNPI -0.5122 -7.69
lnσ1 -4.91842 -3.4
lnσ2 -0.24862 -5.81
lnRiskadj PE 2.723743 50.35
Intercept -3.78931 -34.26
R-squared 0.9631
Adj R-squared 0.9626
F value 2001.78
AIC 53.21085
BIC 82.23516
Observations 467
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'insolvent' banks after
2009, where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the
profit efficiency level estimated by the risk-adjusted profit efficiency index (RiskadjPE) during the period 2005 -
2006. The model is
										lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.17.c.ii -  Explanatory Power (Failed - With & Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 3.485842 5.3
lnp2 3.748749 10.33
lnq1 0.627654 48.86
lnq2 0.206173 17.9
lnNPI -0.48882 -7.45
lnσ1 -0.53965 -0.31
lnσ2 0.033009 0.42
lnPE -0.29242 -0.41
lnRiskadj PE 3.021451 4.22
Intercept -4.39226 -24.48
R-squared 0.9631
Adj R-squared 0.9623
F value 1312.66
AIC 61.3918
BIC 102.7691
Observations 467
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'insolvent' banks after
2009, where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the
profit efficiency level estimated by both the conventional (PE) and the risk-adjusted profit efficiency index
(RiskadjPE) during the period 2005 - 2006. The model is
lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8PEit+a9RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.18.a.i -  Explanatory Power (Saved - Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 2.428648 18.95
lnp2 4.142195 59.62
lnq1 0.609498 215.55
lnq2 0.22241 80.72
lnNPI -0.53249 -41.98
lnPE 2.630305 225.66
Intercept -4.23389 -348.57
R-squared 0.9584
Adj R-squared 0.9584
F value 43291.78
AIC -54.2518
BIC -2.9313
Observations 11288
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'solvent' banks after
2011, where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the
profit efficiency level estimated by the conventional profit efficiency index (PE) during the period 2005 - 2006.
The model is
																															lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6PE+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.18.b.i -  Explanatory Power (Saved - With Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 3.04117 23.92
lnp2 3.966035 57.82
lnq1 0.630279 223.87
lnq2 0.215821 79.2
lnNPI -0.58083 -46.06
lnσ1 -4.34075 -17.57
lnσ2 -0.31031 -41.93
lnRiskadj PE 2.595149 228.66
Intercept -3.57529 -187.13
R-squared 0.9602
Adj R-squared 0.9602
F value 33871.85
AIC -572.894
BIC -506.948
Observations 11288
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'solvent' banks after
2011, where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the
profit efficiency level estimated by the risk-adjusted profit efficiency index (RiskadjPE) during the period 2005 -
2006. The model is
										lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.18.c.i -  Explanatory Power (Saved - With & Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 3.004382 23.26
lnp2 3.973541 57.8
lnq1 0.62886 213.34
lnq2 0.216272 78.96
lnNPI -0.57797 -45.4
lnσ1 -4.06101 -13.48
lnσ2 -0.28908 -19.24
lnPE 0.218172 1.62
lnRiskadj PE 2.380164 17.91
Intercept -3.62029 -107.53
R-squared 0.9602
Adj R-squared 0.9602
F value 30112.98
AIC -573.531
BIC -500.258
Observations 11288
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'solvent' banks after
2011, where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the
profit efficiency level estimated by both the conventional (PE) and the risk-adjusted profit efficiency index
(RiskadjPE) during the period 2005 - 2006. The model is
lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8PEit+a9RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.18.a.ii -  Explanatory Power (Failed - Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 1.754262 2.05
lnp2 3.805233 8.66
lnq1 0.584914 33.45
lnq2 0.243313 16.72
lnNPI -0.48614 -9.67
lnPE 2.739301 34.93
Intercept -4.1999 -47.36
R-squared 0.9398
Adj R-squared 0.9387
F value 799.36
AIC 96.24241
BIC 122.4882
Observations 314
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'insolvent' banks after
2011, where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the
profit efficiency level estimated by the conventional profit efficiency index (PE) during the period 2005 - 2006.
The model is
																															lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6PE+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.18.b.ii -  Explanatory Power (Failed - With Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 2.216009 2.65
lnp2 3.582742 8.4
lnq1 0.614904 32.95
lnq2 0.229773 14.69
lnNPI -0.50496 -10.41
lnσ1 -7.0352 -4.31
lnσ2 -0.31389 -6.44
lnRiskadj PE 2.699339 35.84
Intercept -3.52974 -26.75
R-squared 0.9462
Adj R-squared 0.9448
F value 662.35
AIC 66.81525
BIC 100.4444
Observations 314
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'insolvent' banks after
2011, where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the
profit efficiency level estimated by the risk-adjusted profit efficiency index (RiskadjPE) during the period 2005 -
2006. The model is
										lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.18.c.ii -  Explanatory Power (Failed - With & Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 2.258244 2.7
lnp2 3.563839 8.36
lnq1 0.619995 32.57
lnq2 0.229359 14.68
lnNPI -0.50797 -10.47
lnσ1 -8.93023 -4.11
lnσ2 -0.3982 -4.94
lnPE -1.04879 -1.31
lnRiskadj PE 3.734585 4.72
Intercept -3.34907 -17.59
R-squared 0.9466
Adj R-squared 0.945
F value 590.37
AIC 67.03551
BIC 104.4012
Observations 314
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'insolvent' banks after
2011, where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the
profit efficiency level estimated by both the conventional (PE) and the risk-adjusted profit efficiency index
(RiskadjPE) during the period 2005 - 2006. The model is
lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8PEit+a9RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
349
Table 4.19.a.i -  Explanatory Power (Saved - Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 0.514523 1.92
lnp2 3.669998 29.62
lnq1 0.387219 63.77
lnq2 0.143459 25.81
lnNPI -0.60864 -110.33
lnPE 7.619215 102.23
Intercept -2.75874 -114.86
R-squared 0.7769
Adj R-squared 0.7767
F value 4661.35
AIC 16072.83
BIC 16138.35
Observations 10741
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'solvent' banks after
2011, where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the
profit efficiency level estimated by the conventional profit efficiency index (PE) during the period 2008 - 2009.
The model is
																															lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6PE+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.19.b.i -  Explanatory Power (Saved - With Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 -0.03805 -0.14
lnp2 3.658819 28.61
lnq1 0.385105 61.7
lnq2 0.140309 24.63
lnNPI -0.58387 -92.76
lnσ1 -2.35406 -13.92
lnσ2 0.058647 3.59
lnRiskadj PE 9.54274 98.96
Intercept -2.78818 -65.94
R-squared 0.7817
Adj R-squared 0.7816
F value 6405.97
AIC 15879.07
BIC 15930.04
Observations 10741
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'solvent' banks after
2011, where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the
profit efficiency level estimated by the risk-adjusted profit efficiency index (RiskadjPE) during the period 2008 -
2009. The model is
										lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.19.c.i -  Explanatory Power (Saved - With & Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 0.331691 1.22
lnp2 3.788914 30.07
lnq1 0.384612 62.62
lnq2 0.143231 25.54
lnNPI -0.60459 -96.11
lnσ1 -0.4391 -2.25
lnσ2 0.124245 7.55
lnPE -4.84634 -6.28
lnRiskadj PE 11.41914 18.8
Intercept -3.02446 -69.59
R-squared 0.784
Adj R-squared 0.7838
F value 4319.03
AIC 15726.78
BIC 15799.58
Observations 10741
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'solvent' banks after
2011, where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the
profit efficiency level estimated by both the conventional (PE) and the risk-adjusted profit efficiency index
(RiskadjPE) during the period 2008 - 2009. The model is
lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8PEit+a9RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.19.a.ii -  Explanatory Power (Failed - Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 -0.37169 -0.28
lnp2 3.869407 6.28
lnq1 0.377611 11.26
lnq2 0.10601 3.7
lnNPI -0.52731 -22.02
lnPE 8.811628 22.19
Intercept -2.81774 -22.14
R-squared 0.7407
Adj R-squared 0.7369
F value 198.5
AIC 598.0064
BIC 626.3545
Observations 424
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'insolvent' banks after
2011, where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the
profit efficiency level estimated by the conventional profit efficiency index (PE) during the period 2008 - 2009.
The model is
																															lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6PE+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.19.b.ii -  Explanatory Power (Failed - With Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 -0.89605 -0.65
lnp2 3.701819 5.75
lnq1 0.372469 10.77
lnq2 0.108527 3.71
lnNPI -0.49376 -18.42
lnσ1 -2.77828 -4.23
lnσ2 -0.06039 -0.91
lnRiskadj PE 10.7474 21.1
Intercept -2.52823 -13.38
R-squared 0.7407
Adj R-squared 0.7369
F value 198.5
AIC 598.0064
BIC 626.3545
Observations 424
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'insolvent' banks after
2011, where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the
profit efficiency level estimated by the risk-adjusted profit efficiency index (RiskadjPE) during the period 2008 -
2009. The model is
										lnPBTit=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.19.c.ii -  Explanatory Power (Failed - With & Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 -0.13917 -0.1
lnp2 3.678193 5.81
lnq1 0.389827 11.35
lnq2 0.094801 3.27
lnNPI -0.49881 -18.89
lnσ1 -1.45722 -1.99
lnσ2 -0.01711 -0.26
lnPE -1.29947 -0.41
lnRiskadj PE 9.786533 3.83
Intercept -2.74501 -14.13
R-squared 0.7451
Adj R-squared 0.7396
F value 134.49
AIC 596.639
BIC 637.1363
Observations 424
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'insolvent' banks after
2011, where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) and one of the reggressors is the
profit efficiency level estimated by both the conventional (PE) and the risk-adjusted profit efficiency index
(RiskadjPE) during the period 2008 - 2009. The model is
1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8PEit+a9RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.20.a.i - Predictive Power (Saved - Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 -2.03967 -12.81
lnp2 -0.09171 -2.07
lnq1 0.951351 79.03
lnq2 0.901386 29.36
lnNPI (omitted)
lnPE 1.999715 60.14
Intercept -3.46586 -115.35
R-squared 0.8125
Adj R-squared 0.8124
F value 5749.8
AIC 9194.141
BIC 9234.946
MSE 0.233395
MAE 0.339636
Observations 10562
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'solvent' banks after
2009 where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2008-2009 and the reggressors
are estimated values during the period 2005 - 2006. The profit efficiency level is estimated by the conventional
profit efficiency index (PE). The model is
																															lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6PE+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator. MSE and MAE stand for Mean Square Error and Mean Absolutely
Error respectively.
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Table 4.20.b.i -  Predictive Power (Saved - With Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 -1.57304 -12.63
lnp2 -0.13147 -2.9
lnq1 0.960801 81.94
lnq2 0.877277 27.92
lnNPI (omitted)
lnσ1 1.12939 15.24
lnσ2 0.915889 11.85
lnRiskadj PE 2.482158 57.66
Intercept -2.77484 -45.94
R-squared 0.8193
Adj R-squared 0.8191
F value 4289.91
AIC 8910.75
BIC 8965.149
MSE 0.223825
MAE 0.332758
Observations 10562
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'solvent' banks after
2009 where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2008-2009 and the reggressors
are estimated values during the period 2005 - 2006. The profit efficiency level is estimated by the risk-adjusted
profit efficiency index (RiskadjPE). The model is
										lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator. MSE and MAE stand for Mean Square Error and Mean Absolutely
Error respectively.
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Table 4.20.c.i - Predictive Power (Saved - With & Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 -107.37 -2.12
lnp2 74.52968 4.24
lnq1 40.89226 7.47
lnq2 51.91907 3.58
lnNPI 136.3475 22.18
lnσ1 -132.819 -5.1
lnσ2 35.22742 1.16
lnPE -382.663 -2.96
lnRiskadj PE 731.8866 4.39
Intercept -217.454 -8.73
R-squared 0.0761
Adj R-squared 0.0753
F value 96.44
AIC 148538.6
BIC 148611.2
Observations 10562
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'solvent' banks after
2009 where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2008-2009 and the reggressors
are estimated values during the period 2005 - 2006. The profit efficiency level is estimated by both the
conventional (PE) and the risk-adjusted profit efficiency index (RiskadjPE) during the period 2005 - 2006.
The model is
lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8PEit+a9RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.20.a.ii - Predictive Power (Failed - Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 -2.69584 -2.96
lnp2 0.354065 0.93
lnq1 0.834847 12.88
lnq2 0.850989 4.6
lnNPI (omitted)
lnPE 1.794449 9.03
Intercept -3.05387 -13.83
R-squared 0.7391
Adj R-squared 0.7318
F value 101.42
AIC 332.3878
BIC 351.7099
MSE 0.330863
MAE 0.440599
Observations 683
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'insolvent' banks after
2009 where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2008-2009 and the reggressors
are estimated values during the period 2005 - 2006. The profit efficiency level is estimated by the conventional
profit efficiency index (PE). The model is
																															lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6PE+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator. MSE and MAE stand for Mean Square Error and Mean Absolutely
Error respectively.
359
Table 4.20.b.ii -  Predictive Power (Failed - With Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 -2.51582 -3.4
lnp2 0.37515 1
lnq1 0.913571 14.82
lnq2 0.737862 4.2
lnNPI (omitted)
lnσ1 2.864358 5.38
lnσ2 0.955498 1.61
lnRiskadj PE 2.203014 8.93
Intercept -2.40805 -6.64
R-squared 0.7761
Adj R-squared 0.7673
F value 87.66
AIC 308.0854
BIC 333.8482
MSE 0.283927
MAE 0.392973
Observations 683
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'insolvent' banks after
2009 where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2008-2009 and the reggressors
are estimated values during the period 2005 - 2006. The profit efficiency level is estimated by the risk-adjusted
profit efficiency index (RiskadjPE). The model is
										lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator. MSE and MAE stand for Mean Square Error and Mean Absolutely
Error respectively.
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Table 4.20.c.ii - Predictive Power (Failed - With & Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 -2.48359 -3.34
lnp2 0.311336 0.8
lnq1 0.921264 14.56
lnq2 0.729611 4.13
lnNPI (omitted)
lnσ1 3.000012 5.13
lnσ2 1.147044 1.67
lnPE -1.47133 -0.57
lnRiskadj PE 4.098706 3.22
Intercept -2.30069 -5.61
R-squared 0.7765
Adj R-squared 0.7664
F value 76.44
AIC 309.7496
BIC 338.7328
Observations 683
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'insolvent' banks after
2009 where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2008-2009 and the reggressors
are estimated values during the period 2005 - 2006. The profit efficiency level is estimated by both the
conventional (PE) and the risk-adjusted profit efficiency index (RiskadjPE) during the period 2005 - 2006.
The model is
lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8PEit+a9RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.21.a.i -  Predictive Power (Saved - Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 -3.73535 -14.36
lnp2 -0.06357 -1.7
lnq1 1.079356 91.12
lnq2 0.842444 27.98
lnNPI -4.08416 -5.84
lnPE 1.881796 56.44
Intercept -3.63095 -124.28
R-squared 0.838
Adj R-squared 0.8379
F value 6082.76
AIC 10147.42
BIC 10195.46
MSE 0.245819
MAE 0.353785
Observations 9910
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'solvent' banks after
2011 where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2010-2011 and the reggressors
are estimated values during the period 2005 - 2006. The profit efficiency level is estimated by the conventional
profit efficiency index (PE). The model is
																															lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6PE+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator. MSE and MAE stand for Mean Square Error and Mean Absolutely
Error respectively.
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Table 4.21.b.i - Predictive Power (Saved - With Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 -2.5275 -15.7
lnp2 -0.23463 -7.78
lnq1 1.133825 126.36
lnq2 0.980442 41.21
lnNPI -3.34648 -6.78
lnσ1 0.795138 18.96
lnσ2 1.365982 20.99
lnRiskadj PE 0.926437 88.83
Intercept -3.45331 -66.64
R-squared 0.9039
Adj R-squared 0.9037
F value 8284.43
AIC 6434.63
BIC 6496.389
MSE 0.145311
MAE 0.264845
Observations 9910
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'solvent' banks after
2011 where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2010-2011 and the reggressors
are estimated values during the period 2005 - 2006. The profit efficiency level is estimated by the risk-adjusted
profit efficiency index (RiskadjPE). The model is
										lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator. MSE and MAE stand for Mean Square Error and Mean Absolutely
Error respectively.
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Table 4.21.c.i -  Predictive Power (Saved - With & Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 -2.4614 -15.32
lnp2 -0.24089 -8.01
lnq1 1.138786 127
lnq2 1.008827 41.98
lnNPI -3.30469 -6.72
lnσ1 0.798796 19.12
lnσ2 1.443693 21.96
lnPE -0.29645 -7.22
lnRiskadj PE 1.014881 63.16
Intercept -3.44273 -66.65
R-squared 0.9046
Adj R-squared 0.9044
F value 7423.08
AIC 6384.672
BIC 6453.292
Observations 9910
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'solvent' banks after
2011 where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2010-2011 and the reggressors
are estimated values during the period 2005 - 2006. The profit efficiency level is estimated by both the
conventional (PE) and the risk-adjusted profit efficiency index (RiskadjPE) during the period 2005 - 2006.
The model is
lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8PEit+a9RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.21.a.ii - Predictive Power (Failed - Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 -5.03888 -2.62
lnp2 -0.05954 -0.27
lnq1 1.044135 16.13
lnq2 0.788009 6.33
lnNPI (omitted)
lnPE 1.770526 9.86
Intercept -3.3836 -21.07
R-squared 0.8452
Adj R-squared 0.8414
F value 221.68
AIC 263.8854
BIC 283.9394
MSE 0.195404
MAE 0.34776
Observations 432
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'insolvent' banks after
2011 where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2010-2011 and the reggressors
are estimated values during the period 2005 - 2006. The profit efficiency level is estimated by the conventional
profit efficiency index (PE). The model is
																															lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6PE+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator. MSE and MAE stand for Mean Square Error and Mean Absolutely
Error respectively.
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Table 4.21.b.ii - Predictive Power (Failed - With Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 -2.41591 -1.92
lnp2 -0.30346 -1.55
lnq1 1.028379 19.94
lnq2 1.107121 9.9
lnNPI (omitted)
lnσ1 0.394217 3.8
lnσ2 1.065526 3.09
lnRiskadj PE 0.732894 12.5
Intercept -3.19686 -10.98
R-squared 0.8966
Adj R-squared 0.893
F value 248.89
AIC 183.6271
BIC 210.3658
MSE 0.130572
MAE 0.275928
Observations 432
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'insolvent' banks after
2011 where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2010-2011 and the reggressors
are estimated values during the period 2005 - 2006. The profit efficiency level is estimated by the risk-adjusted
profit efficiency index (RiskadjPE). The model is
										lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator. MSE and MAE stand for Mean Square Error and Mean Absolutely
Error respectively.
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Table 4.21.c.ii - Predictive Power (Failed - With & Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 -2.38651 -1.89
lnp2 -0.30273 -1.55
lnq1 1.027393 19.86
lnq2 1.12018 9.71
lnNPI (omitted)
lnσ1 0.393271 3.79
lnσ2 1.119171 3.08
lnPE -0.12053 -2.97
lnRiskadj PE 0.768219 8.09
Intercept -3.17106 -10.68
R-squared 0.8967
Adj R-squared 0.8925
F value 216.96
AIC
BIC
Observations 432
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'insolvent' banks after
2011 where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2010-2011 and the reggressors
are estimated values during the period 2005 - 2006. The profit efficiency level is estimated by both the
conventional (PE) and the risk-adjusted profit efficiency index (RiskadjPE) during the period 2005 - 2006.
The model is
lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8PEit+a9RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.22.a.i - Predictive Power (Saved - Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 -17.6316 -14.36
lnp2 -0.07175 -1.7
lnq1 1.698951 91.12
lnq2 1.306069 27.98
lnNPI -3.57316 -5.84
lnPE 0.649634 56.44
Intercept -3.63095 -124.28
R-squared 0.838
Adj R-squared 0.8379
F value 6082.76
AIC 10147.42
BIC 10195.46
MSE 0.245819
MAE 0.353785
Observations 9910
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'solvent' banks after
2011 where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2010-2011 and the reggressors
are estimated values during the period 2008 - 2009. The profit efficiency level is estimated by the conventional
profit efficiency index (PE). The model is
																															lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6PE+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator. MSE and MAE stand for Mean Square Error and Mean Absolutely
Error respectively.
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Table 4.22.b.i - Predictive Power (Saved - With Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 202.0122 15.7
lnp2 -0.25433 -7.78
lnq1 1.855665 126.36
lnq2 1.508099 41.21
lnNPI -3.32905 -6.78
lnσ1 1.466188 18.96
lnσ2 -7.22762 -20.99
lnRiskadj PE 0.251945 88.83
Intercept -3.45331 -66.64
R-squared 0.9039
Adj R-squared 0.9037
F value 8284.43
AIC 6434.63
BIC 6496.389
MSE 0.145311
MAE 0.264845
Observations 9910
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'solvent' banks after
2011 where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2010-2011 and the reggressors
are estimated values during the period 2008 - 2009. The profit efficiency level is estimated by the risk-adjusted
profit efficiency index (RiskadjPE). The model is
										lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator. MSE and MAE stand for Mean Square Error and Mean Absolutely
Error respectively.
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Table 4.22.c.i - Predictive Power (Saved - With & Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 196.7285 15.32
lnp2 -0.26111 -8.01
lnq1 1.863785 127
lnq2 1.551762 41.98
lnNPI -3.28749 -6.72
lnσ1 1.472933 19.12
lnσ2 -7.6388 -21.96
lnPE -0.10234 -7.22
lnRiskadj PE 0.275997 63.16
Intercept -3.44273 -66.65
R-squared 0.9046
Adj R-squared 0.9044
F value 7423.08
AIC 6384.672
BIC 6453.293
Observations 9910
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'solvent' banks after
2011 where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2010-2011 and the reggressors
are estimated values during the period 2008 - 2009. The profit efficiency level is estimated by both the
conventional (PE) and the risk-adjusted profit efficiency index (RiskadjPE) during the period 2008 - 2009.
The model is
lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8PEit+a9RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
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Table 4.22.a.ii - Predictive Power (Failed - Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 23.78186 2.62
lnp2 -0.05856 -0.27
lnq1 1.617352 16.13
lnq2 1.80863 6.33
lnNPI (omitted)
lnPE 0.55041 9.86
Intercept -3.3836 -21.07
R-squared 0.8452
Adj R-squared 0.8414
F value 221.68
AIC 263.8854
BIC 283.9394
MSE 0.195404
MAE 0.34776
Observations 432
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'insolvent' banks after
2011 where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2010-2011 and the reggressors
are estimated values during the period 2008 - 2009. The profit efficiency level is estimated by the conventional
profit efficiency index (PE). The model is
																															lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6PE+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator. MSE and MAE stand for Mean Square Error and Mean Absolutely
Error respectively.
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Table 4.22.b.ii - Predictive Power (Failed - With Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 5.974745 1.92
lnp2 -0.2937 -1.55
lnq1 1.697737 19.94
lnq2 2.343993 9.9
lnNPI (omitted)
lnσ1 0.998242 3.8
lnσ2 5.538302 3.09
lnRiskadj PE 0.184075 12.5
Intercept -3.19686 -10.98
R-squared 0.8966
Adj R-squared 0.893
F value 248.89
AIC 183.6271
BIC 210.3658
MSE 0.130572
MAE 0.275928
Observations 432
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'insolvent' banks after
2011 where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2010-2011 and the reggressors
are estimated values during the period 2008 - 2009. The profit efficiency level is estimated by the risk-adjusted
profit efficiency index (RiskadjPE). The model is
										lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator. MSE and MAE stand for Mean Square Error and Mean Absolutely
Error respectively.
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Table 4.22.c.ii -  Predictive Power (Failed - With & Without Risk)
lnPBT Coefficient b/St.Er.
lnp1 5.902035 1.89
lnp2 -0.29299 -1.55
lnq1 1.696109 19.86
lnq2 2.371642 9.71
lnNPI (omitted)
lnσ1 0.995847 3.79
lnσ2 5.817135 3.08
lnPE -0.03747 -3.17
lnRiskadj PE 0.192947 8.09
Intercept -3.17106 -10.68
R-squared 0.8967
Adj R-squared 0.8925
F value 216.96
AIC 185.3926
BIC 215.4736
Observations 432
Note: This table presents results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the 'insolvent' banks after
2011 where the dependent variable is the banks' profits before tax (PBT) in 2010-2011 and the reggressors
are estimated values during the period 2005 - 2006. The profit efficiency level is estimated by both the
conventional (PE) and the risk-adjusted profit efficiency index (RiskadjPE) during the period 2008 - 2009.
The model is
lnPBTit+n=a0+a1lnp1,it+a2lnp2,it+a3lnq1,it+a4lnq2,it+a5lnNPIit+a6σ1,it+a7σ2,it+a8PEit+a9RiskadjPEit+εit
where 'NPI' is the negative profit indicator.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis covers four di¤erent elds in the nancial economics and
banking literature using the concept of e¢ ciency as a linking bridge
between these topics. As a research output we contribute both from
a theoretical and an empirical perspective. We provide a methodology
in the spectrum of M&As among banks within a latent class context.
Additionally, we propose a theoretical framework that combines eco-
nomic e¢ ciency with liquidity creation. We also present an econometric
framework to compare and evaluate potential M&A activity. Last but
not least we suggest a new index that accounts both for prot e¢ ciency
and stability.
More precisely, Chapter 2 deals with the fact that surveys of bank
e¢ ciency intrinsically draw conclusions based on the assumption that
all banks in a sample use the same production technology. Neverthe-
less, neglecting the existence of unobserved di¤erences in technological
regimes might distort the e¢ ciency estimates by assigning incorrectly
these deviations as ine¢ ciency. We approach this consideration by esti-
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mating the unobserved heterogeneity in the UK and the Greek banking
technologies using a latent class stochastic frontier model. In order to
increase our condence regarding the extracted inferences, two distinct
empirical methodologies are followed: a pooled cross-section method
and a panel data modelling strategy. Finally we examine numerous
potential M&As scenarios among banks that belong to di¤erent tech-
nological regimes, in order to test whether there is a transition of the
new bank to a more e¢ cient technological class resulting from the M&A
activity. The empirical ndings suggest that bank-heterogeneity can be
fully captured by two di¤erent technological regimes. This holds un-
der both modelling strategies. We also provide empirical evidence of
improved economic e¢ ciency in both banking sectors after certain po-
tential consolidation activity. This raises concerns in recent specic
cases of Greek M&As that were not found to result in cost e¢ ciency
enhancement.
In Chapter 3 we address the issue that the global nancial crisis
distorted one of the primordial functions of banksraison dêtre: liq-
uidity creation. For this purpose we propose a novel hypothesis the
"Cost E¢ ciency-Liquidity Creation Hypothesis" that argues that "cost
e¢ ciency" enhancing banksM&A can create both increased liquidity
and social welfare surplus. To test empirically our suggested hypothesis
we propose a novel use of a stress test scenario under a panel vector
autoregressive (PVAR) methodology where we account for a macroeco-
nomic, a nancial and a bank shock. This permits us to shed light on
the direction of causality among cost e¢ ciency and liquidity creation.
Additionally, we investigate the level of liquidity of all historical and
potential consolidation activity in the UK and Greek banking sector
by employing recent measures of liquidity creation. Last, we suggest a
framework to evaluate and compare the robustness of bank consolida-
375
tion activity by using new half-life measures. The empirical evidence we
get via our proposed "Cost E¢ ciency-Liquidity Creation Hypothesis"
reveals that specic potential consolidation activity can facilitate the
ow of credit in the economy and at the same time create social well-
being surplus. This is established via the stress scenario and precisely
from the positive impact of cost e¢ ciency on liquidity creation. Addi-
tionally, the results highlight that the direction of causality is stronger
from liquidity creation to cost e¢ ciency. The UK banking sector with
respect to liquidity creation is found to be more robust in all three
di¤erent shocks. Lastly, as far as the Greek banking sector is con-
cerned, the half-life and total e¤ect results of adverse macroeconomic
and bank-specic conditions demonstrate that the Greek banking sys-
tem was more robust with respect to liquidity creation before its recent
systemic formation. This casts further doubts on the decisions made
by policy authorities as far as the recent wave of consolidation activity
is concerned.
Finally, Chapter 4 stresses the fact that conventional tests of bank-
ing e¢ ciency do not take into account the trade-o¤ that might exist
between bankse¢ ciency and stability. Specically, it is argued that
current measures of e¢ ciency do not take into consideration whether
banksmanagers are taking too much or too little risk relative to the
value maximising amount and consequently do not account on whether
this increases banks degree of instability. For this purpose we suggest
a new prot e¢ ciency index which accounts for two di¤erent types of
risks: credit risk and the risk deriving from excessive leverage. In this
way, on one hand we compare the deviation of banking e¢ ciency es-
timates of our proposed risk-adjusted index and the standard one in
various states of the economy. On the other hand we investigate the
explanatory and forecasting power of these two measures accounting for
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an additional di¤erentiation in our sample; solvent banks and insolvent
banks, both during and in the aftermath of the crisis. The results sug-
gest that the risk-adjusted index exhibits considerably less deviation of
its estimated prot e¢ ciency values among all di¤erent time horizons
compared to the conventional index. Furthermore, we provide strong
empirical evidence of the superiority that characterises our suggested
index in terms of both its explanatory and predictive power in contrast
to the current prot e¢ ciency measure. This holds in all periods that
both indicators are tested and in three samples: all banks, solvent and
insolvent. Additional robustness tests conrm our extracted inferences.
Noteworthy is the fact that when both measures coexist in the same
model the dynamic e¤ects have as a result the conventional index to
become ine¤ective and to create contradictory inferences with respect
to fundamental assumptions that underlie the theory of prot e¢ ciency.
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